docs: replace vague provenance prose with recorded facts
This commit is contained in:
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/settings/settings/README.md
|
||||
README.md: 0841624e553364fa03f7a1f1209aa72ab13d97e4
|
||||
README.zh.md: 3dbe14a7ce6fc002569eb612f355fa0ff7372ae3
|
||||
README.md: 49ae5b405c003b6116e459cf377fc7a099538f2e
|
||||
README.zh.md: c55db331ece9421fb7f0367697ce158b8e9b06f1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +38,6 @@ No direct invalidation; a consumer that folds a settings value into the request
|
||||
|
||||
## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
|
||||
|
||||
- **Single user layer** — resolution knows schema defaults, one composition `base`, and one user document; there is no project/managed layering or per-value provenance yet.
|
||||
- **Single user layer** — resolution knows schema defaults, one composition `base`, and one user document; it does not yet record which layer supplied each resolved value.
|
||||
- **`redactSecrets` is not a proven wire boundary** — the walker follows `object`/`dict`/`array`, so a `role('secret')` reached only through a union, intersection, or transform is returned VERBATIM with an empty `secrets` list, and `schema.toJSON()` carries a secret field's `.default(...)` to every client. Neither case is rejected; a schema whose secrets are not reachable through the walked containers must not be registered on a wire-exposed namespace. A fail-closed `describeForWire()` — one that refuses a schema it cannot prove safe, and sanitizes the serialized envelope and error text — is the real answer and is deferred.
|
||||
- **Cross-process concurrency is provider-defined** — the seam serializes writes per namespace in-process only; concurrent processes converge by provider behavior (the local file provider read-modify-writes under a writer lock, so namespaces survive concurrent writers and same-namespace conflicts resolve last-write-wins).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +38,6 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## 已知限制与暂缓事项
|
||||
|
||||
- **单一用户层** — 解析只认识 schema 默认值、一个组合 `base` 与一个用户文档;尚无 project/managed 分层或按值溯源。
|
||||
- **单一用户层** — 解析只认识 schema 默认值、一个组合 `base` 与一个用户文档;它尚未记录每个解析值由哪一层提供。
|
||||
- **`redactSecrets` 并非一条可被证明的协议边界**:walker 只跟随 `object`/`dict`/`array`,因此只能经由 union、intersection 或 transform 抵达的 `role('secret')` 会被**原样**返回,且 `secrets` 列表为空;而 `schema.toJSON()` 会把 secret 字段的 `.default(...)` 一并带给每个客户端。这两种情况都不会被拒绝;机密无法经由被遍历的容器抵达的 schema,绝不可注册到暴露于协议的 namespace 上。真正的答案是一个 fail-closed 的 `describeForWire()`——它拒绝自己无法证明安全的 schema,并对序列化信封与错误文本做净化——此项暂缓。
|
||||
- **跨进程并发由 provider 定义** — seam 仅在进程内按 namespace 串行化写入;跨进程并发按 provider 行为收敛(本地文件 provider 在写锁下读-改-写,因此 namespace 在并发写入者下不会丢失,同 namespace 冲突按后写胜出解决)。
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user