docs(workflow): admit the node:vm escape concretely — absent globals are surface, not containment
The review's critical finding: the engine README and the tool description read as if the missing filesystem/network/Node globals were enforced, but a script can reach the host Function constructor via globalThis.constructor.constructor and from it process and every Node builtin. Per the trust premise this is ACCEPTED (model-written scripts, bash-equivalent trust; genuine sandboxing is the deferred engine swap already listed) — but the docs must say so instead of implying a wall. The trust-premise sections (engine README, module doc, RFC) now name the escape and its acceptance; the model-facing tool description says the APIs are not PROVIDED rather than implying they are prevented.
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@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Script-body hooks:
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Misused hooks (bad arguments, unknown options, unsupported schemas, tripped caps) throw errors that ALWAYS kill the script — they never dissolve into a per-item \`null\`.
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Constraints: concurrency and total-agent caps apply; \`Date.now()\`, \`Math.random()\`, and argless \`new Date()\` throw (pass timestamps via \`args\`); no filesystem, network, timers, or Node.js APIs — the agents do the work, the script only coordinates them. The run executes in the foreground: this call returns when the whole script finishes.`
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Constraints: concurrency and total-agent caps apply; \`Date.now()\`, \`Math.random()\`, and argless \`new Date()\` throw (pass timestamps via \`args\`); no filesystem, network, timers, or Node.js APIs are provided — the agents do the work, the script only coordinates them. The run executes in the foreground: this call returns when the whole script finishes.`
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type WorkflowCallArgs = { script: string; args?: Record<string, unknown> }
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