feat(permission): user-facing permission presets — one Permissions select over the two knobs
A preset names a bundle of the two mechanism knobs — request = workspace-write + ask, yolo = danger-full-access + never — so the editor shows ONE 'Permissions' select where the sandbox-mode and approval-policy tiers stay orthogonal capabilities (the Codex /approvals shape: presets over two dials). ctx.permission (dsh-permission) owns the config-defined table, validates the default preset's bundle against the composed knob defaults at load (fails loud), and writes a switch THROUGH: one log-only permission/preset event (the audit fact reverse-mapping cannot recover — the planned 'agent' preset shares request's knob values and differs only in composed policy) plus each knob event via its own setter, deduped — a net-zero switch appends nothing. Every knob consumer keeps reading its own fold, untouched. The current preset DERIVES from the effective knob values — the fold breaks bundle ties, a knob state outside the table is the reserved 'custom' value (a state, not an error: shown while it holds, switchable FROM, never a target), and defaultPreset disappears (zero-event state reverse-maps from the composition defaults). The ACP bridge drops the two per-knob selects for the one preset select (advertised only when ctx.permission is composed); pending/anchor/no-op semantics carry over unchanged, with the no-op echo acknowledged before vocabulary validation so a client re-pushing a derived 'custom' current never errors. The sandbox variant example composes the service with a workspace-write default; the permission-switching, escalation-approved and escalation-rejected scenarios are re-recorded under it (escalations now target an outside-workspace /tmp path under danger-full-access, self-cleaning) and config-options is re-authored on the single-select wire.
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@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Integrations that expose the agent to an external editor or client. These are **
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| `acp/` | Agent Client Protocol bridge: serves the agent to an ACP editor (Zed) over JSON-RPC stdio | (drives `ctx.agents`/`ctx.sessions`) |
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| `user-approval/` | One-shot user-approval mechanism, closed outcome vocabulary, audit events, and per-session approval policy | `ctx.approval` |
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| `permission/` | User-facing permission presets (request/yolo): one product-level select bundling the sandbox-mode and approval-policy knobs, written through to their session events | `ctx.permission` |
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| `user-interaction/` | Abstract human question/answer seam used by UI-backed confirmation tools | `ctx.userInteraction` |
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| `tool-ask-user/` | Model-facing `ask_user_question` tool over `ctx.userInteraction` | (registers on `ctx.tools`) |
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| `stdio-agent/` | Terminal stdio chat APP: the agent-core spine + console logger + readline UI + a pre-created `main` agent, with a `bin` | (composition + `bin`) |
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