fix(web): harden multimodal draft and storage lifecycle

This commit is contained in:
creatixchu
2026-07-31 17:15:08 +08:00
parent f415e16c83
commit 8b00482d7c
34 changed files with 303 additions and 129 deletions

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@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/client/connection/README.md
README.md: 8b4a8fddc2fdc48873a4f93c99fce62a3dd17766
README.zh.md: cac04f5735f30498a301fb1a70748f8d7426dfbf
README.md: 8e8cb23cf56745116142d786ad712d7230f4f2c5
README.zh.md: dc2416d8b4dafa06f715e60f97e6dcd6d7fc29d9

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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
English | [中文](README.zh.md)
Wire consumer layer: the client plugin's apply mounts `ctx.connection` (shared api client + single-consumer stream-loop starter); the export face carries the wire contract types, the `AbstractApiClient` seam, and the loop's sink/config types. Each successful generation validates `host.describe` before `onConnected`; a business-error response fails the generation like a transport error. The node half's `/api` route pins the privileged method set (`host.pickDirectory`, `host.openPath`, and the whole configuration plane — `settings.describe`/`update`/`replace`/`mutate` and `credentials.describe`/`set`/`unset`, reads included, since describing returns the exposed configuration and probing an arbitrary reference reports where a credential comes from) to loopback by passing the trust fence with an empty trust list — a declared `trustedHosts` authority reaches every other method, while these stay loopback-local until a real authentication layer exists. The platform subclasses (WebApiClient/FixtureApiClient), the ConnectionController loop, and the fixture data source are package-internal — apply selects and drives them; tests reach them via src. Contract: api-contracts v3 §3.
Wire consumer layer: the client plugin's apply mounts `ctx.connection` (shared api client + single-consumer stream-loop starter); the export face carries the wire contract types, the `AbstractApiClient` seam, and the loop's sink/config types. Each successful generation validates `host.describe` before `onConnected`; a business-error response fails the generation like a transport error. The node half's `/api` route pins the privileged method set (`host.pickDirectory`, `host.openPath`, and the whole configuration plane — `settings.describe`/`update`/`replace`/`mutate` and `credentials.describe`/`set`/`unset`, reads included, since describing returns the exposed configuration and probing an arbitrary reference reports where a credential comes from) to loopback by passing the trust fence with an empty trust list — a declared `trustedHosts` authority reaches every other method, while these stay loopback-local until a real authentication layer exists. Its independent `maxRequestBodyBytes` config caps every buffered API request (32 MiB default) and must be large enough for the configured aggregate image payload after base64 and envelope expansion; changing image policy does not silently redefine the carrier cap for text and other methods. The platform subclasses (WebApiClient/FixtureApiClient), the ConnectionController loop, and the fixture data source are package-internal — apply selects and drives them; tests reach them via src. Contract: api-contracts v3 §3.
## /api browser-trust fence

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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
[English](README.md) | 中文
协议消费层:客户端插件的 apply 会挂载 `ctx.connection`(共享 API 客户端 + 单消费方流循环启动器);导出表层携带协议契约类型、`AbstractApiClient` seam以及循环的 sink配置类型。每个成功连接代都会在 `onConnected` 前校验 `host.describe`业务错误响应会像传输错误一样使该连接代失败。node 半侧的 `/api` 路由让特权方法集(`host.pickDirectory``host.openPath`,以及整个配置面——`settings.describe`/`update`/`replace`/`mutate``credentials.describe`/`set`/`unset`,读取也在内,因为 describe 会返回已暴露的配置,而探测任意引用会报出某条凭据来自何处)以空信任表过信任 fence从而钉在回环——已声明的 `trustedHosts` 授权可达其余全部方法而这些方法在真正的认证层出现之前仍只限回环本机。平台子类WebApiClient/FixtureApiClient、ConnectionController 循环和 fixture 数据源都属于包内部apply 负责选择并驱动它们,测试则通过 src 访问。契约api-contracts v3 §3。
协议消费层:客户端插件的 apply 会挂载 `ctx.connection`(共享 API 客户端 + 单消费方流循环启动器);导出表层携带协议契约类型、`AbstractApiClient` seam以及循环的 sink配置类型。每个成功连接代都会在 `onConnected` 前校验 `host.describe`业务错误响应会像传输错误一样使该连接代失败。node 半侧的 `/api` 路由让特权方法集(`host.pickDirectory``host.openPath`,以及整个配置面——`settings.describe`/`update`/`replace`/`mutate``credentials.describe`/`set`/`unset`,读取也在内,因为 describe 会返回已暴露的配置,而探测任意引用会报出某条凭据来自何处)以空信任表过信任 fence从而钉在回环——已声明的 `trustedHosts` 授权可达其余全部方法,而这些方法在真正的认证层出现之前仍只限回环本机。其独立的 `maxRequestBodyBytes` 配置会限制每个缓冲 API 请求(默认 32 MiB并且必须足以容纳配置的图片总载荷经 base64 和请求封装膨胀后的大小;修改图片策略不会静默地为文本和其他方法重定义载体上限。平台子类WebApiClient/FixtureApiClient、ConnectionController 循环和 fixture 数据源都属于包内部apply 负责选择并驱动它们,测试则通过 src 访问。契约api-contracts v3 §3。
## /api 浏览器信任栅栏

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@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ export const name = 'client-connection'
/** Headroom for RPC JSON fields around the aggregate base64 image payload. */
const REQUEST_ENVELOPE_HEADROOM_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
/** Independent default carrier cap; deployments may raise it for larger valid non-image RPCs. */
const DEFAULT_MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES = 32 * 1024 * 1024
/** Services required before mounting the route. */
export const inject = ['httpServer', 'apiProxy', 'attachments']
@@ -31,10 +33,17 @@ export interface ConnectionConfig {
* that is not a bare, canonical authority fails the plugin load.
*/
trustedHosts?: string[]
/**
* Maximum buffered JSON body for every `/api` request. This carrier policy
* is independent of image limits but must be large enough for the configured
* aggregate image bytes after base64 and envelope expansion.
*/
maxRequestBodyBytes?: number
}
export const Config: z<ConnectionConfig> = z.object({
trustedHosts: z.array(String).default([]),
maxRequestBodyBytes: z.natural().min(1).default(DEFAULT_MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES),
})
/**
@@ -80,9 +89,16 @@ export function apply(ctx: Context, config?: ConnectionConfig): void {
// silently authorizing its hostname prefix at request time.
for (const entry of trustedHosts) assertTrustedAuthority(entry)
const apiHandler = toFetchHandler(ctx.apiProxy)
const maxRequestBodyBytes = Math.ceil(
const requiredImageBodyBytes = Math.ceil(
ctx.attachments.imageLimits.maxMessageImageBytes * 4 / 3,
) + REQUEST_ENVELOPE_HEADROOM_BYTES
const maxRequestBodyBytes = config?.maxRequestBodyBytes ?? DEFAULT_MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES
if (maxRequestBodyBytes < requiredImageBodyBytes) {
throw new Error(
`client-connection maxRequestBodyBytes (${String(maxRequestBodyBytes)}) must be at least `
+ `${String(requiredImageBodyBytes)} for the configured aggregate image limit`,
)
}
const route: WebRoute = {
kind: 'prefix',
path: API_PATH,

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@@ -51,7 +51,10 @@ function fakeResponse(): { response: ServerResponse; state: { status?: number; b
return { response, state }
}
async function mounted(config?: { trustedHosts?: string[] }): Promise<{ routes: WebRoute[]; dispose: () => Promise<void> }> {
async function mounted(config?: {
trustedHosts?: string[]
maxRequestBodyBytes?: number
}): Promise<{ routes: WebRoute[]; dispose: () => Promise<void> }> {
const ctx = new Context()
const routes: WebRoute[] = []
ctx.provide('httpServer', fakeHttpServer(routes) as HttpServerService)
@@ -96,6 +99,17 @@ describe('connection node half', () => {
expect(routes).toHaveLength(0)
})
it('fails loud when the independent carrier cap cannot hold the configured image batch', () => {
const ctx = new Context()
const routes: WebRoute[] = []
ctx.provide('httpServer', fakeHttpServer(routes) as HttpServerService)
ctx.provide('apiProxy', {} as unknown as ApiProxy)
ctx.provide('attachments', fakeAttachments())
expect(() => { apply(ctx, { maxRequestBodyBytes: 1024 }) })
.toThrow(/must be at least .* aggregate image limit/)
expect(routes).toHaveLength(0)
})
it('refuses an untrusted Host on any /api path before the bridge runs', async () => {
const { routes, dispose } = await mounted()
const { response, state } = fakeResponse()