refactor(runtime): compose consumers over fs and subprocess

This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
2026-07-28 23:00:00 +08:00
parent 987d477cfc
commit 8917ff8ef4
116 changed files with 2828 additions and 1122 deletions

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@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/fs/fs-local/README.md
README.md: 6d344fa3fef7f6bda6c0daa50184661156a925a7
README.zh.md: 4c94de64561d805684f91f02d5b0dfc375f0d04f
README.md: f5cf2441adcd62e55c6169ceb766f88382e314f5
README.zh.md: 40f5a83626780bae8f335c80662721bae6cc0b0b

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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
English | [中文](README.zh.md)
The **local-filesystem implementation** of the `ctx.fs` provider seam ([`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs`](../fs)). Backs the eight `FileSystem` primitives with the host filesystem; loading it as a plugin populates `ctx.fs`.
The **local-filesystem implementation** of the `ctx.fs` provider seam ([`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs`](../fs)). Backs the twelve `FileSystem` primitives with the host filesystem; loading it as a plugin populates `ctx.fs`.
```ts ignore-check
import { LocalFileSystem } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-local'
@@ -15,8 +15,9 @@ await ctx.plugin(LocalFileSystem, { cwd: process.cwd() })
## Behavior
- **`resolve(path, opts?)`** — a relative `path` resolves against `opts.cwd` when the caller supplies one (the model-facing tools pass the calling agent's session cwd — see [the per-session cwd Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-02-fs-per-session-cwd.md)), else `config.cwd` (default `process.cwd()`); an absolute `path` ignores both. `opts.signal` is checked before and after local resolution, while a remote sibling backend may use it to abort its round-trip. The `targetKey` is the file's `realpath`, so two input paths reaching the same file through symlinks share one identity, and writes/edits land on the link target (preserving the link). A not-yet-existing path uses the realpathed parent directory plus basename when the parent exists; only an unresolvable parent falls back to the absolute path. `displayPath` is the absolute (un-resolved) path.
- **Execution-world coordinates** — `processPath` exposes the target's canonical host path, `fileUrl` encodes that path through Node's platform-aware URL conversion, and `contains` uses platform path semantics to test identity or descendant containment without consumers parsing `targetKey`.
- **`stat` / `lstat`** — return target metadata or `undefined` when absent. `stat` reports `FsInfo` for an already resolved target (`version` = an opaque token derived from bigint `dev:ino:size:mtimeNs:ctimeNs`, `type` of `file`/`directory`/`other`, byte `size`); path-shaped `lstat` reports `FsPathInfo` without following the final symlink and can therefore return `symlink`. Both check cancellation before and after their asynchronous metadata probe, so an abort that lands in flight reports `FS_ABORTED` rather than stale absence.
- **`readText` / `streamText`** — UTF-8 only. `readText` reads the whole file; `streamText` streams it in chunks (cross-chunk decoding) so a huge file never has to be held whole in memory. Both reject invalid UTF-8 and NUL-byte binary samples (`FS_NOT_TEXT`) and non-regular targets. The `read` tool (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-fs`) decides which to call by size and owns the line windowing.
- **`readText` / `readTextBounded` / `streamText`** — UTF-8 only. `readText` reads the whole file; `readTextBounded` opens one no-follow, nonblocking handle, verifies it is regular, and retains at most `maxBytes + 1` bytes so growth cannot bypass the cap; `streamText` decodes chunks so a huge file need not be held whole in memory. All reject invalid UTF-8 and NUL-byte binary samples (`FS_NOT_TEXT`) and non-regular targets. The `read` tool (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-fs`) owns line windowing; protocol consumers such as the LSP host use the stable bounded operation.
- **`listDir`** — lists one directory level in stable `name.localeCompare()` order. Each entry carries the child basename, type, resolved child target (`displayPath` under the listed directory, `targetKey` as the realpath identity), and cheap stat metadata (`version`, plus `size` for regular files). It never opens or decodes file contents. Missing targets report `FS_NOT_FOUND`, file/special-file targets report `FS_NOT_DIRECTORY`, aborted calls report `FS_ABORTED`, permission failures report `FS_PERMISSION_DENIED`, and other listing or child metadata I/O failures report `FS_IO_ERROR`. Broken/disappeared children are returned as `other` without metadata, but permission/IO failures while resolving a child fail the whole listing with a structured `FsError`.
- **`writeText`** — atomic: writes to a temp file opened exclusively (`wx`, `0o600`) inside a randomly-named private staging dir (`0o700`) next to the target, fsyncs, then renames over the target. An existing file's mode is preserved, while new files default to `0o600`; on Windows a new file inherits the destination directory's DACL, while replacement copies the target DACL onto the empty temp before writing and publishes through `ReplaceFileW` so the original access policy survives ([Windows DACL preservation Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md)). The `expected` guard is OPTIONAL: omitting it unconditionally creates-or-overwrites; `createIfAbsent` creates a missing target and rejects an existing one (`FS_NOT_OBSERVED`); `replaceIfVersion` replaces only at the observed version (a missing target or mismatch is `FS_STALE_VERSION`).
- **`editText`** — atomic literal read-modify-write over the same primitive, serialized per target by a mutation lock. The `expected` guard is OPTIONAL: when supplied it verifies the version BEFORE literal matching (a stale edit reports `FS_STALE_VERSION`, never `FS_EDIT_NOT_FOUND`/`FS_AMBIGUOUS_EDIT` against newer content); omitting it edits the current content unconditionally. A missing target reports `FS_STALE_VERSION` either way. LF-normalizes for matching, restores the file's dominant CRLF/LF style, and rejects empty `oldString` / zero matches (`FS_EDIT_NOT_FOUND`) or ambiguous multi-matches without `replace_all` (`FS_AMBIGUOUS_EDIT`).
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ No direct invalidation; the named consumer owns any request-prefix changes.
- **`config.cwd` is not a sandbox** — it is a resolution default, not containment: absolute paths and `..` escape it. Enforce containment with a stricter `ctx.fs` backend or a permission plugin on the `tools/execute` waterfall ([capability-seam Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-06-17-filesystem-capability-seam.md#consequences)).
- **An overwrite reads the whole prior file into memory** — solely as the UI diff basis; bounding that pre-read above a size threshold is deferred (`TODO(overwrite-diff-bound)`).
- **Version tokens are `mtimeMs:size`** — an external change that preserves both within the filesystem's timestamp granularity defeats the stale guard.
- **Version tokens depend on filesystem metadata** — they combine device, inode, size, nanosecond mtime, and nanosecond ctime; a storage layer that cannot update any of those facts for a rewrite can still defeat the stale guard.
- **`editText` holds the whole file (plus the edited copy) in memory** — streaming exists only on the read path.
- **Binary detection is asymmetric** — reads NUL-sample only the first 8192 bytes while edits scan the whole buffer, so a file with a late NUL reads fine but rejects edits.
- **The per-target mutation lock is in-process only** — a writer in another process is caught only by the optional version guard, never serialized.

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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
[English](README.md) | 中文
`ctx.fs` 提供方 seam([`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs`](../fs))的**本地文件系统实现**。它使用宿主文件系统支持八个 `FileSystem` 原语;将其作为插件加载会填充 `ctx.fs`。
`ctx.fs` 提供方 seam([`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs`](../fs))的**本地文件系统实现**。它使用宿主文件系统支持十二个 `FileSystem` 原语;将其作为插件加载会填充 `ctx.fs`。
```ts ignore-check
import { LocalFileSystem } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-local'
@@ -15,27 +15,28 @@ await ctx.plugin(LocalFileSystem, { cwd: process.cwd() })
## 行为
- **`resolve(path, opts?)`**:相对 `path` 在调用方提供 `opts.cwd` 时以该值为基准解析(面向模型的工具会传入调用 agent(智能体)的会话 cwd;见[每会话 cwd Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-02-fs-per-session-cwd.md)),否则以 `config.cwd` 为基准(默认 `process.cwd()`);绝对 `path` 会忽略两者。`opts.signal` 会在本地解析前后检查,远程同级后端则可以用它中止往返。`targetKey` 是文件的 `realpath`,因此经符号链接到达同一文件的两个输入路径会共享一个身份,写入/编辑落在链接目标上,同时保留链接。尚不存在的路径在父目录存在时使用 realpath 后的父目录加 basename;只有父目录无法解析时才回退到绝对路径。`displayPath` 是绝对但未经解析的路径。
- **`stat` / `lstat`**:返回目标元数据;目标不存在时返回 `undefined`。`stat` 为已解析目标报告 `FsInfo`(`version` 是由 bigint `dev:ino:size:mtimeNs:ctimeNs` 派生的不透明 token,`type` 为 `file`/`directory`/`other`,`size` 以字节计);路径形态的 `lstat` 不跟随最后一个符号链接,报告 `FsPathInfo`,因此可以返回 `symlink`。两者都会在异步元数据探测前后检查取消,因此异步探测进行期间发生的中止会报告 `FS_ABORTED`,而非已失效的「不存在」结果。
- **`readText` / `streamText`**:只支持 UTF-8。`readText` 读取整个文件;`streamText` 按分片流式读取(跨分片解码),因此超大文件无需整体保存在内存中。两者都会拒绝无效 UTF-8、包含 NUL 字节的二进制样本(`FS_NOT_TEXT`)以及非普通文件目标。`read` 工具(`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-fs`)按大小决定调用哪个方法,并负责行窗口逻辑。
- **执行世界坐标**:`processPath` 公开目标的规范化宿主路径,`fileUrl` 通过 Node 的平台感知 URL 转换对该路径编码,`contains` 则使用平台路径语义检查身份相等或后代包含关系,消费方无需解析 `targetKey`。
- **`stat` / `lstat`**:返回目标元数据;目标不存在时返回 `undefined`。`stat` 为已解析目标报告 `FsInfo`(`version` 是由 bigint `dev:ino:size:mtimeNs:ctimeNs` 派生的不透明 token,`type` 为 `file`/`directory`/`other`,`size` 以字节计);路径形态的 `lstat` 不跟随最后一个符号链接,报告 `FsPathInfo`,因此可以返回 `symlink`。两者都会在异步元数据探测前后检查取消,因此飞行中的中止会报告 `FS_ABORTED`,而非陈旧的不存在结果。
- **`readText` / `readTextBounded` / `streamText`**:只支持 UTF-8。`readText` 读取整个文件;`readTextBounded` 打开一个不跟随符号链接的非阻塞句柄,确认其为普通文件,并最多保留 `maxBytes + 1` 字节,使文件增长无法绕过上限;`streamText` 按分片解码,因此超大文件无需整体保存在内存中。三者都会拒绝无效 UTF-8、包含 NUL 字节的二进制样本(`FS_NOT_TEXT`)以及非普通文件目标。`read` 工具(`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-fs`)拥有行窗口逻辑;LSP 主机等协议消费方使用稳定的有界操作。
- **`listDir`**:按稳定的 `name.localeCompare()` 顺序列出一层目录。每个条目携带子项 basename、类型、解析后的子目标(`displayPath` 位于所列目录下,`targetKey` 是 realpath 身份)和低成本 stat 元数据(`version`,普通文件另有 `size`)。它绝不会打开或解码文件内容。缺失目标报告 `FS_NOT_FOUND`,文件/特殊文件目标报告 `FS_NOT_DIRECTORY`,已中止调用报告 `FS_ABORTED`,权限失败报告 `FS_PERMISSION_DENIED`,其他列出或子项元数据 I/O 失败报告 `FS_IO_ERROR`。损坏/消失的子项以无元数据的 `other` 返回,但解析子项时出现权限/I/O 失败会让整个列表以结构化 `FsError` 失败。
- **`writeText`**:原子写入。它会向排他打开的临时文件(`wx`、`0o600`)写入;该文件位于目标旁随机命名的私有暂存目录(`0o700`)内。完成写入和 fsync 后,以 rename 覆盖目标。现有文件的 mode 会保留,新文件默认为 `0o600`;Windows 上的新文件继承目标目录的 DACL,而替换会在写入前把目标 DACL 复制到空临时文件,并通过 `ReplaceFileW` 发布,使原访问策略得以保留(见 [Windows DACL 保留 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md))。`expected` 防护是可选(OPTIONAL)的:省略时无条件创建或覆盖;`createIfAbsent` 创建缺失目标并拒绝现有目标(`FS_NOT_OBSERVED`);`replaceIfVersion` 只在观察到的版本上替换(目标缺失或版本不匹配均为 `FS_STALE_VERSION`)。
- **`editText`**:在同一原语之上执行原子式的字面量读取-修改-写入,并通过变更锁按目标串行化。`expected` 防护是可选(OPTIONAL)的:提供时,会在字面量匹配之前校验版本(陈旧编辑报告 `FS_STALE_VERSION`,绝不会针对较新内容报告 `FS_EDIT_NOT_FOUND`/`FS_AMBIGUOUS_EDIT`);省略时,无条件编辑当前内容。无论哪种情况,目标缺失都报告 `FS_STALE_VERSION`。匹配时规范化为 LF,随后恢复文件主要的 CRLF/LF 风格;空 `oldString` / 零匹配报告 `FS_EDIT_NOT_FOUND`,未设置 `replace_all` 的多个匹配则报告 `FS_AMBIGUOUS_EDIT`。
- **`writeText`**:原子写入。它会向排他打开的临时文件(`wx`、`0o600`)写入;该文件位于目标旁随机命名的私有暂存目录(`0o700`)内。完成写入和 fsync 后,以 rename 覆盖目标。现有文件的 mode 会保留,新文件默认为 `0o600`;Windows 上的新文件继承目标目录的 DACL,而替换会在写入前把目标 DACL 复制到空临时文件,并通过 `ReplaceFileW` 发布,使原访问政策得以保留(见 [Windows DACL 保留 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md))。`expected` 防护是可选的:省略时无条件创建或覆盖;`createIfAbsent` 创建缺失目标并拒绝现有目标(`FS_NOT_OBSERVED`);`replaceIfVersion` 只在观察到的版本上替换(目标缺失或版本不匹配均为 `FS_STALE_VERSION`)。
- **`editText`**:在同一原语之上依次执行原子的字面量读取、修改和写入,并通过变更锁按目标串行化。`expected` 防护是可选的:提供时,会在字面量匹配之前校验版本(陈旧编辑报告 `FS_STALE_VERSION`,绝不会针对较新内容报告 `FS_EDIT_NOT_FOUND`/`FS_AMBIGUOUS_EDIT`);省略时,无条件编辑当前内容。无论哪种情况,目标缺失都报告 `FS_STALE_VERSION`。匹配时规范化为 LF,随后恢复文件主要的 CRLF/LF 风格;空 `oldString` / 零匹配报告 `FS_EDIT_NOT_FOUND`,未设置 `replace_all` 的多个匹配则报告 `FS_AMBIGUOUS_EDIT`。
包根目录的 SDK 接口包含默认/具名 `LocalFileSystem` 类和 `Config`。原始 I/O 位于 `src/fsio.ts`(不依赖 Cordis,单独进行单元测试);`src/index.ts` 是轻量服务接线。
包根 SDK 接口包含默认/具名 `LocalFileSystem` 类和 `Config`。原始 I/O 位于 `src/fsio.ts`(不依赖 Cordis,单独进行单元测试);`src/index.ts` 是轻量服务接线。
## 模型体验
通过 [`dsh-tool-fs`](../tool-fs/README.md) 间接产生影响;该消费方在有上限的保留结果中渲染本提供方带行窗口的 UTF-8 内容、变更确认和精确提供方消息,而版本、原子写入机制和目录元数据仍属内部实现。
通过 [`dsh-tool-fs`](../tool-fs/README.md) 间接产生影响;该消费方把本提供方带行窗口的 UTF-8 内容、变更确认和精确提供方消息渲染为有上限且保留的结果,而版本、原子写入机制和目录元数据保持内部可见。
#### KV Cache 影响
不会直接使缓存失效;具名消费方负责请求前缀的任何变化。
## 已知限制与暂缓事项
## 已知限制与延期工作
- **`config.cwd` 不是沙箱**:它是解析默认值,而非约束;绝对路径和 `..` 可以逃逸。请使用更严格的 `ctx.fs` 后端或 `tools/execute` waterfall(瀑布式事件)上的权限插件实施约束(见[能力 seam Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-06-17-filesystem-capability-seam.md#consequences))。
- **覆盖会把整个旧文件读入内存**:只用于 UI diff;在大小阈值之上限制这次预读取的工作延期处理(`TODO(overwrite-diff-bound)`)。
- **版本 token 是 `mtimeMs:size`**:如果外部变更在文件系统时间戳粒度内保持两者不变,就能绕过陈旧防护。
- **版本 token 依赖文件系统元数据**:它们组合设备、inode、大小、纳秒级 mtime 和纳秒级 ctime;如果存储层在重写时无法更新其中任何一项事实,仍可能绕过陈旧防护。
- **`editText` 会把整个文件及编辑后的副本保存在内存中**:只有读取路径支持流式处理。
- **二进制检测不对称**:读取只对前 8192 字节执行 NUL 采样,编辑则扫描整个 buffer,因此 NUL 出现在后部的文件可以读取,但编辑会被拒绝。
- **每目标变更锁仅限进程内**:其他进程中的写入方只会被可选版本防护发现,绝不会被串行化。

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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
*/
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
import { createReadStream } from 'node:fs'
import { constants, createReadStream } from 'node:fs'
import { chmod, lstat, mkdir, open, readFile, realpath, readdir, rename, rm, stat } from 'node:fs/promises'
import type { BigIntStats, Dirent, Stats } from 'node:fs'
import { basename, dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path'
@@ -369,6 +369,77 @@ export async function readWholeText(target: LocalTarget, signal?: AbortSignal):
return decodeUtf8(raw, 'read', target.displayPath)
}
/**
* Read one regular UTF-8 file through a single no-follow handle, retaining at
* most `maxBytes + 1` bytes so a concurrent grow cannot bypass the bound.
* @param target - the resolved file to read.
* @param maxBytes - positive safe-integer byte ceiling.
* @param signal - aborts between handle operations.
* @returns the complete decoded text when it fits.
*/
export async function readWholeTextBounded(
target: LocalTarget,
maxBytes: number,
signal?: AbortSignal,
): Promise<string> {
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(maxBytes) || maxBytes <= 0) {
throw new Error('bounded read maxBytes must be a positive safe integer')
}
throwIfAborted(signal, 'read')
let handle: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof open>>
try {
handle = await open(
target.targetKey,
constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK,
)
} catch (error: unknown) {
if (isENOENT(error)) throw new FsError(`cannot read "${target.displayPath}": not found`, 'FS_NOT_FOUND', { cause: error })
if (isPermissionError(error)) throw new FsError(`cannot read "${target.displayPath}": permission denied`, 'FS_PERMISSION_DENIED', { cause: error })
throw new FsError(`cannot read "${target.displayPath}" safely: ${errorMessage(error)}`, 'FS_IO_ERROR', { cause: error })
}
try {
throwIfAborted(signal, 'read')
const info = await handle.stat()
if (!info.isFile()) {
throw new FsError(`cannot read "${target.displayPath}": not a regular file`, 'FS_NOT_REGULAR_FILE')
}
if (info.size > maxBytes) {
throw new FsError(
`cannot read "${target.displayPath}": ${info.size} bytes exceeds the ${maxBytes}-byte limit`,
'FS_IO_ERROR',
)
}
const chunks: Buffer[] = []
let total = 0
for (;;) {
throwIfAborted(signal, 'read')
// Allocate in fixed internal chunks so a permissive deployment cap does
// not reserve that entire cap for a small file. Once exactly at the
// bound, one final byte detects concurrent growth without retaining it.
const remaining = total === maxBytes ? 1 : Math.min(64 * 1024, maxBytes - total)
const chunk = Buffer.allocUnsafe(remaining)
const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(chunk, 0, chunk.length, total)
if (bytesRead === 0) break
total += bytesRead
if (total > maxBytes) {
throw new FsError(
`cannot read "${target.displayPath}": file grew past the ${maxBytes}-byte limit while reading`,
'FS_IO_ERROR',
)
}
chunks.push(chunk.subarray(0, bytesRead))
}
throwIfAborted(signal, 'read')
const bytes = chunks.length === 1 ? chunks[0] as Buffer : Buffer.concat(chunks, total)
if (bytes.subarray(0, BINARY_SAMPLE_BYTES).includes(0)) {
throw new FsError(`cannot read "${target.displayPath}": binary file`, 'FS_NOT_TEXT')
}
return decodeUtf8(bytes, 'read', target.displayPath)
} finally {
await handle.close()
}
}
/**
* Stream a whole regular UTF-8 text file as decoded text chunks. Same text
* semantics as {@link readWholeText} (regular-file check, binary/NUL rejection,

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@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@
*/
import { Context } from 'cordis'
import { resolve } from 'node:path'
import { isAbsolute, relative, resolve, sep } from 'node:path'
import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'
import z from 'schemastery'
import { FileSystem, FsError, FsVersion } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs'
import type {
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ import {
readForEdit,
readTextForDiff,
readWholeText,
readWholeTextBounded,
resolveLocalTarget,
restoreLineEndings,
streamWholeText,
@@ -90,6 +92,19 @@ export class LocalFileSystem extends FileSystem {
return { targetKey: local.targetKey, displayPath: local.displayPath }
}
override processPath(target: FsTarget): string {
return String(target.targetKey)
}
override fileUrl(target: FsTarget): string {
return pathToFileURL(this.processPath(target)).href
}
override contains(parent: FsTarget, child: FsTarget): boolean {
const path = relative(this.processPath(parent), this.processPath(child))
return path === '' || (path !== '..' && !path.startsWith(`..${sep}`) && !isAbsolute(path))
}
override async stat(target: FsTarget, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<FsInfo | undefined> {
if (signal?.aborted) throw new FsError('stat aborted', 'FS_ABORTED')
const info = await probe(target.targetKey)
@@ -111,6 +126,10 @@ export class LocalFileSystem extends FileSystem {
return readWholeText({ displayPath: target.displayPath, targetKey: target.targetKey }, signal)
}
override async readTextBounded(target: FsTarget, maxBytes: number, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<string> {
return readWholeTextBounded({ displayPath: target.displayPath, targetKey: target.targetKey }, maxBytes, signal)
}
override streamText(target: FsTarget, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<AsyncIterable<string>> {
return Promise.resolve(streamWholeText({ displayPath: target.displayPath, targetKey: target.targetKey }, signal))
}

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import { mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, realpath, rm, stat, symlink, unlink, utimes, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'
import { Context } from 'cordis'
import { LocalFileSystem } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-local'
import { FsVersion } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs'
@@ -85,6 +86,20 @@ describe('resolve', () => {
await expect(pending).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'FS_ABORTED' })
})
it('projects process paths, file URLs, and canonical containment', async () => {
await mkdir(join(dir, 'nested'))
await writeFile(join(dir, 'nested', 'file.txt'), 'text')
const root = await fs.resolve('.')
const child = await fs.resolve('nested/file.txt')
const outside = await fs.resolve('..')
expect(fs.processPath(child)).toBe(await realpath(join(dir, 'nested', 'file.txt')))
expect(fs.fileUrl(child)).toBe(pathToFileURL(await realpath(join(dir, 'nested', 'file.txt'))).href)
expect(fs.contains(root, root)).toBe(true)
expect(fs.contains(root, child)).toBe(true)
expect(fs.contains(root, outside)).toBe(false)
})
})
describe('stat', () => {
@@ -203,6 +218,15 @@ describe('readText / streamText', () => {
expect(await fs.readText(await fs.resolve('a.txt'))).toBe('one\ntwo\nthree')
})
it('reads complete text through the stable byte bound', async () => {
await writeFile(join(dir, 'bounded.txt'), '€abc')
const target = await fs.resolve('bounded.txt')
expect(await fs.readTextBounded(target, 6)).toBe('€abc')
await expect(fs.readTextBounded(target, 5)).rejects.toThrow('exceeds the 5-byte limit')
await expect(fs.readTextBounded(target, 0)).rejects.toThrow('positive safe integer')
await expect(fs.readTextBounded(target, 6, AbortSignal.abort())).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'FS_ABORTED' })
})
it('streams the same text', async () => {
await writeFile(join(dir, 'a.txt'), 'one\ntwo\nthree')
const target = await fs.resolve('a.txt')

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
* policy and lives in `dsh-fs-policy`, so it is not tested here.
*/
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import { chmod, mkdtemp, readFile, rename, rm, stat, symlink, unlink, writeFile, mkdir, readdir, realpath } from 'node:fs/promises'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { join } from 'node:path'
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import {
probeNoFollow,
readForEdit,
readWholeText,
readWholeTextBounded,
resolveLocalTarget,
restoreLineEndings,
streamWholeText,
@@ -316,6 +317,66 @@ describe('readWholeText', () => {
})
})
describe('readWholeTextBounded', () => {
it('rejects non-files, binary text, and initial oversize without a full read', async () => {
await expect(readWholeTextBounded(localTarget(dir), 10)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'FS_NOT_REGULAR_FILE' })
await writeFile(join(dir, 'large'), '12345')
await expect(readWholeTextBounded(localTarget(join(dir, 'large')), 4)).rejects.toThrow('exceeds the 4-byte limit')
await writeFile(join(dir, 'binary'), Buffer.from([0x61, 0x00, 0x62]))
await expect(readWholeTextBounded(localTarget(join(dir, 'binary')), 3)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'FS_NOT_TEXT' })
})
it('detects growth past the bound on the same open handle', async () => {
const close = vi.fn(async () => {})
const read = vi.fn(async (buffer: Buffer, offset: number, length: number, position: number) => {
const bytes = position === 0 ? Buffer.from('abc') : Buffer.from('d')
bytes.copy(buffer, offset, 0, Math.min(length, bytes.length))
return { bytesRead: Math.min(length, bytes.length), buffer }
})
vi.resetModules()
vi.doMock('node:fs/promises', async (importOriginal) => {
const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import('node:fs/promises')>()
return {
...actual,
open: async () => ({
stat: async () => ({ isFile: () => true, size: 3 }),
read,
close,
}),
}
})
try {
const isolated = await import('../src/fsio.ts')
await expect(isolated.readWholeTextBounded(localTarget('/virtual/growing'), 3))
.rejects.toThrow('grew past the 3-byte limit')
expect(close).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
} finally {
vi.doUnmock('node:fs/promises')
vi.resetModules()
}
})
it('translates permission and generic open failures', async () => {
const failure: { current: Error & { code?: string } } = { current: Object.assign(new Error('denied'), { code: 'EACCES' }) }
vi.resetModules()
vi.doMock('node:fs/promises', async (importOriginal) => {
const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import('node:fs/promises')>()
return { ...actual, open: async () => { throw failure.current } }
})
try {
const isolated = await import('../src/fsio.ts')
await expect(isolated.readWholeTextBounded(localTarget('/virtual/denied'), 3))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'FS_PERMISSION_DENIED' })
failure.current = new Error('open broke')
await expect(isolated.readWholeTextBounded(localTarget('/virtual/broken'), 3))
.rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'FS_IO_ERROR' })
} finally {
vi.doUnmock('node:fs/promises')
vi.resetModules()
}
})
})
describe('streamWholeText', () => {
it('streams the whole file as decoded text', async () => {
const file = join(dir, 'a.txt')