Merge branch 'master' into session-query
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ flowchart LR
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pkg_sandbox_local["sandbox-local"]
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pkg_approval["approval"]
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svc_approval["ctx.approval<br/>Approval seam"]
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pkg_permission["permission"]
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svc_permission["ctx.permission<br/>Permission presets"]
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pkg_code_runtime["code-runtime"]
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svc_codeRuntime["ctx.codeRuntime<br/>Code-execution seam"]
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pkg_code_runtime_worker["code-runtime-worker"]
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@@ -101,6 +103,7 @@ flowchart LR
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pkg_llm_deepseek --> svc_llm
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pkg_llm_pi_ai --> svc_llm
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pkg_llm_replay --> svc_llm
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pkg_permission --> svc_permission
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pkg_sandbox --> svc_sandbox
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pkg_sandbox_local --> svc_sandbox
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pkg_session --> svc_sessions
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@@ -142,6 +145,7 @@ flowchart LR
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svc_fs --> pkg_tool_fs
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svc_llm --> pkg_agent_loop
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svc_llm --> pkg_compact_basic
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svc_permission --> pkg_acp
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svc_sandbox --> pkg_bash_sandbox
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svc_sessionPersistence --> pkg_acp
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svc_sessionPersistence --> pkg_agent_loop
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@@ -191,6 +195,7 @@ flowchart LR
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| `ctx.bash` | `seam` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash) | [`bash-local`](../packages/bash/bash-local), [`bash-sandbox`](../packages/bash/bash-sandbox) | [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash), [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex) | - | The model-facing bash tools and hook bridges consume this seam; sandboxed or remote executors replace bash-local without touching them. |
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| `ctx.sandbox` | `seam` | [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox) | [`sandbox-local`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local) | [`bash-sandbox`](../packages/bash/bash-sandbox) | - | Consumers hand over the exact argv they are about to spawn; same-world backends wrap it under a per-call policy and report enforcement. |
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| `ctx.approval` | `seam` | `approval` | [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash) | - | One-shot permission decisions dispatched over the `approval/request` waterfall; answerers are listeners (the ACP bridge for its own agents), absence fails closed to `unavailable`. |
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| `ctx.permission` | `core` | [`permission`](../packages/ui/permission) | - | [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | - | User-facing preset table (`workspace-write`/`danger-full-access`) bundling the sandbox-mode and approval-policy knobs; a switch writes one `permission/preset` event through to both knob events. |
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| `ctx.codeRuntime` | `seam` | [`code-runtime`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime) | [`code-runtime-worker`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) | - | Runs one model-written program against host-provided async bindings; backends differ by substrate and language (the tool registry consumes it for Code Mode). |
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| `ctx.fs` | `seam` | [`fs`](../packages/fs/fs) | [`fs-local`](../packages/fs/fs-local) | [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs) | [`fs-policy`](../packages/fs/fs-policy) | tool-fs executes read/write/edit through ctx.fs; fs-policy contributes observed-state checks through the fs/* event gate. |
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| `ctx.compact` | `seam` | [`compact`](../packages/compact/compact) | [`compact-basic`](../packages/compact/compact-basic) | [`compact-basic`](../packages/compact/compact-basic) | - | The basic backend currently consumes the pre-step event directly; a model-facing compact tool remains deferred. |
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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ export interface AcpConfig {
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Depends on: `Stream` (`@agentclientprotocol/sdk`)
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Source: [`packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts:250`](../packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts)
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Source: [`packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts:248`](../packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts)
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## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent`
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@@ -444,6 +444,41 @@ export interface Config {
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Source: [`packages/support/llm-replay/src/index.ts:429`](../packages/support/llm-replay/src/index.ts)
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## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-permission`
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Requires: `bash` · `approval`
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```ts config-catalog
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/** The {@link PermissionService} config: the deployment's preset table. */
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export interface Config {
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/**
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* The preset table: name → knob bundle. Defaults to `workspace-write`
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* (workspace-write + ask) and `danger-full-access` (danger-full-access +
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* never). The name `custom` is reserved for the derived not-a-preset state.
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*/
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presets?: Record<string, PresetSpec>
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}
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/**
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* One preset's knob bundle — the sandbox mode and approval policy a session
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* runs under while the preset is active — plus its presentation.
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*/
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export interface PresetSpec {
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/** The `bash/sandbox-mode` value the preset writes through. */
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sandbox: SandboxMode
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/** The `approval/policy` value the preset writes through. */
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approval: ApprovalPolicy
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/** The display label a client shows for this preset; the raw table key when omitted. */
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name?: string
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/** One user-facing sentence on what the preset means; omitted when not configured. */
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description?: string
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}
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```
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Depends on: [`ApprovalPolicy`](core-data-structures/approval.md) · [`SandboxMode`](core-data-structures/sandbox.md)
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Source: [`packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts:97`](../packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts)
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## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-repeat-tool-guard`
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```ts config-catalog
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@@ -161,6 +161,21 @@ Types: [GenerateOptions](../core-data-structures/core.md) · [StreamChunk](../co
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Source: [`packages/llm/llm/src/index.ts:88`](../../packages/llm/llm/src/index.ts)
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## `ctx.permission` — `PermissionService`
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The permission service (`ctx.permission`). Owns the deployment's preset table and THE write path for preset switches; presentation layers (the ACP bridge's single `Permissions` select) advertise names and call set. Composing it REQUIRES both mechanism knobs — a confining `ctx.bash` executor and the `ctx.approval` seam. A knob state matching no table entry is not an error but the derived CUSTOM_PRESET state: shown as the current value, never a switch target.
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```ts cordis-catalog
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current(events: readonly SessionEvent[]): string
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resolve(name: string): PresetSpec
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optionOf(name: string): PresetOption
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set(session: Session, name: string): void
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```
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Types: [SessionEvent](../core-data-structures/core.md)
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Source: [`packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts:115`](../../packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts)
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## `ctx.sandbox` — `SandboxProvider` (abstract seam)
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Abstract process-sandbox service. Subclass, implement confine, and load the subclass as a plugin — it registers as `ctx.sandbox` (one implementation per context; loading a second throws, cordis' standard duplicate-service behavior).
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@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ flowchart TD
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pkg_app_boot["app-boot"]
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pkg_jsonrpc["jsonrpc"]
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pkg_jsonrpc_agent["jsonrpc-agent"]
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pkg_permission["permission"]
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pkg_stdio_agent["stdio-agent"]
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pkg_tool_ask_user["tool-ask-user"]
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pkg_user_approval["user-approval"]
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@@ -195,6 +196,10 @@ flowchart TD
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pkg_bash_sandbox --> pkg_bash
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pkg_bash_sandbox --> pkg_bash_local
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pkg_bash_sandbox --> pkg_sandbox
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pkg_permission --> pkg_bash
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pkg_permission --> pkg_sandbox
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pkg_permission --> pkg_session
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pkg_permission --> pkg_user_approval
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pkg_agent_loop --> pkg_agent
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pkg_agent_loop --> pkg_llm
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pkg_agent_loop --> pkg_scope
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@@ -242,6 +247,7 @@ flowchart TD
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pkg_acp --> pkg_agent
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pkg_acp --> pkg_bash
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pkg_acp --> pkg_llm
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pkg_acp --> pkg_permission
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pkg_acp --> pkg_sandbox
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pkg_acp --> pkg_session
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pkg_acp --> pkg_session_persistence
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@@ -372,6 +378,7 @@ flowchart TD
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| [`workflow`](../packages/workflow/workflow) | `workflow` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
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| [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) | `core` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`code-runtime`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`scope`](../packages/core/scope), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) |
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| [`bash-sandbox`](../packages/bash/bash-sandbox) | `bash` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`bash-local`](../packages/bash/bash-local), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox) |
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| [`permission`](../packages/ui/permission) | `ui` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) |
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| [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) | `core` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`scope`](../packages/core/scope), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
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| [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash) | `bash` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) |
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| [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs) | `fs` | [`fs`](../packages/fs/fs), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
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@@ -382,7 +389,7 @@ flowchart TD
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| [`tool-todo`](../packages/todo/tool-todo) | `todo` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
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| [`tool-cordis`](../packages/cordis/tool-cordis) | `cordis` | [`scope`](../packages/core/scope), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
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| [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex) | `hooks` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`hook-protocol`](../packages/hooks/hook-protocol), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
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| [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval), [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) |
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| [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`permission`](../packages/ui/permission), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval), [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) |
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| [`tool-ask-user`](../packages/ui/tool-ask-user) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) |
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| [`repeat-tool-guard`](../packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard) | `guard` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
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| [`tool-workflow`](../packages/workflow/tool-workflow) | `workflow` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`workflow`](../packages/workflow/workflow) |
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@@ -153,6 +153,18 @@ A hook command's outcome — log-only, paired with a prior `hook/invoked` (same
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Source: [`packages/hooks/hook-protocol/src/types.ts:45`](../packages/hooks/hook-protocol/src/types.ts)
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### `permission/*`
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#### `permission/preset` — log-only
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The session's permission preset was switched — log-only (the `bash/sandbox-mode` precedent): durable and replayable, never in the model transcript. The LAST such event is the session's preset (effectivePermissionPreset); the knob events the switch wrote through follow it in the same turn, and they — not this record of the user's choice — are what execution reads.
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```ts persistence-catalog
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'permission/preset': { preset: string }
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```
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Source: [`packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts:42`](../packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts)
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|
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### `prompt/*`
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#### `prompt/blocked` — log-only
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Tool-call presentation remains tool-owned. A tool's `presentCall` and `presentRe
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Permission handling is an answerer on the [user-approval seam](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md), not an ask-every-tool policy in ACP. An `approval/request` for a bridge-owned agent with a call id becomes `session/request_permission` on that agent's editor session, with one-shot allow/reject choices. Foreign or call-less requests delegate; a missing or failed answerer remains fail-closed. The plugin that asks—such as a pre-execute policy or bash escalation—owns the decision to ask.
|
||||
|
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The bridge advertises ACP config options instead of session modes. `sandbox-mode` exists only when the mounted bash executor reports sandbox capability, and `approval-policy` exists only when `ctx.approval` is composed. Each option is an independent select whose current value is the session event fold over the composition default. `session/set_config_option` validates against the owning domain vocabulary and writes through `setSandboxMode` or `setApprovalPolicy`. An open-turn switch appends immediately; an idle switch is overlaid in the response and anchored at the next turn start. Until that anchor it is memory-only and a crash reverts to the durable fold. ACP session modes are deliberately not modeled because one mode list cannot represent these orthogonal knobs and config options are the forward protocol surface. Runtime model selection remains outside this decision; `AcpConfig.model` is connection-wide.
|
||||
The bridge advertises ACP config options instead of session modes. When `ctx.permission` is composed, it exposes one `permission` select whose options come from the deployment's preset table; the shipped presets are `workspace-write` and `danger-full-access`, and each bundles a sandbox mode with an approval policy. The current value comes from `PermissionService.current()`, including the derived switch-away-only `custom` state when the effective knobs match no preset. `session/set_config_option` validates through `PermissionService.set()` and writes the chosen preset through to both owning knob events. An open-turn switch appends immediately; an idle switch is overlaid in the response and anchored at the next turn start. Until that anchor it is memory-only and a crash reverts to the durable fold. ACP session modes are deliberately not modeled because config options are the forward protocol surface. Runtime model selection remains outside this decision; `AcpConfig.model` is connection-wide.
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge also provides the ACP-backed `UserInteractionProvider`: `ask_user_question` requests become form elicitations on the owning session. Select, multi-select, option descriptions, and custom-answer override semantics are preserved.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The precise supported and deferred protocol rows live in [`packages/ui/acp/acp-f
|
||||
|
||||
**Execute bash through ACP `terminal/*`** — rejected. That would move execution outside the harness and bypass its sandbox, credential scrub, task ownership, cwd resolution, and session log. Terminal metadata is presentation only.
|
||||
|
||||
**Represent sandbox and approval as ACP session modes** — rejected. They are independent composable settings, while a single current mode is mutually exclusive. ACP config options represent both without a cross-product and match the protocol's forward direction.
|
||||
**Represent permission presets as ACP session modes** — rejected. The deployment-defined preset is already one config-option select, while session modes are the legacy surface slated for removal in ACP v2.
|
||||
|
||||
**Hijack stdout defensively** — rejected. Process-wide monkey-patching is outside Cordis effect ownership and races the protocol transport. The app composition owns stdout purity.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ One `cordis.yml` entry mounts the seam. Not loading it is the fail-closed opt-ou
|
||||
# policy: never # deployment default for sessions without an override; 'ask' when omitted
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The entry alone provides mechanism, not a channel: with no answerer composed, every ask resolves `unavailable` and the asking tool call denies — fail-closed needs no configuration. Composing the ACP app (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent`, as in [the sandbox example](../../../../examples/sandbox-acp-agent/README.md)) completes the loop: its bridge registers an answerer that prompts the owning editor session via `session/request_permission`, so a hook's `ask` or an escalation request surfaces as a one-shot Allow/Reject prompt attached to the already-streamed tool call. `policy: never` is the unattended stance — every ask auto-rejects deterministically, stated in the system prompt, no human in the loop. `policy` is validated against the closed list at plugin load; anything else throws.
|
||||
The entry alone provides mechanism, not a channel: with no answerer composed, every ask resolves `unavailable` and the asking tool call denies — fail-closed needs no configuration. Composing the ACP app (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent`, as in [the acp-agent example's default tree](../../../../examples/acp-agent/README.md)) completes the loop: its bridge registers an answerer that prompts the owning editor session via `session/request_permission`, so a hook's `ask` or an escalation request surfaces as a one-shot Allow/Reject prompt attached to the already-streamed tool call. `policy: never` is the unattended stance — every ask auto-rejects deterministically, stated in the system prompt, no human in the loop. `policy` is validated against the closed list at plugin load; anything else throws.
|
||||
|
||||
What a composed deployment observes: `allowed-once` lets exactly that call proceed; rejection, dismissal, and channel absence deny with three distinct reasons the model can tell apart; every ask lands a durable `approval/asked`/`approval/decided` pair on the asking agent's session log; nothing about a grant persists past the call that asked.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ One seam, one per-platform chain of local backends, one consumer, and two levers
|
||||
|
||||
### How a deployment uses it
|
||||
|
||||
Three `cordis.yml` entries turn an unconfined coding agent into the sandboxed product path; [`examples/sandbox-acp-agent`](../../../../examples/sandbox-acp-agent/README.md) is this composition, live:
|
||||
Four `cordis.yml` entries turn an unconfined coding agent into the sandboxed product path; [`examples/acp-agent`](../../../../examples/acp-agent/README.md) uses this composition by default:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
- id: sandbox
|
||||
@@ -24,17 +24,21 @@ Three `cordis.yml` entries turn an unconfined coding agent into the sandboxed pr
|
||||
- id: bash
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox' # the confined executor, replacing dsh-bash-local behind ctx.bash
|
||||
config:
|
||||
mode: read-only # the deployment default every session starts from
|
||||
mode: workspace-write # the deployment default every session starts from
|
||||
workspaceRoot: !!js process.cwd() # the boundary workspace-write may write under
|
||||
- id: approval
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval' # the escalation gate's channel (the approval RFC)
|
||||
config:
|
||||
policy: ask
|
||||
- id: permission
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-permission' # one product-facing select over both mechanism knobs
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The swap is invisible to every consumer of `ctx.bash`: the bash tools, hook commands, and background tasks run exactly as before, spawned through the wrapped argv the provider returns. Deleting the `sandbox` and `bash` entries and loading `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local` instead is the opt-out — execution is unconfined again and the escalation fields vanish from the tool schema, because they are capability-gated on the mounted executor, not on configuration. Omitting only `approval` keeps confinement but fails every escalation closed with its own error text.
|
||||
The swap is invisible to every consumer of `ctx.bash`: the bash tools, hook commands, and background tasks run exactly as before, spawned through the wrapped argv the provider returns. Deleting the `sandbox` and `permission` entries and replacing `bash` with `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local` is the opt-out — execution is unconfined again and the escalation fields vanish from the tool schema, because they are capability-gated on the mounted executor, not on configuration. Omitting only `approval` keeps confinement but fails every escalation closed with its own error text; `permission` also requires the approval seam and a confining executor, so a partially composed preset layer fails loud at load.
|
||||
|
||||
Misconfiguration fails loud: `mode` outside the closed vocabulary is rejected at plugin load, and a host with no usable backend throws the structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` — at `confine()` before the command ever spawns — rather than degrading to unconfined execution. `runnerCommand` on `dsh-sandbox-local` is the operator's explicit assertion of a bwrap-compatible runner (chain and probes skipped); it doubles as the deterministic fake-runner seam for keyless tests.
|
||||
|
||||
What the model then experiences: denied file effects come back as result facts with a `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker plus standing instructions not to retry around them; under a confining executor the schema offers `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` for the one-approval escalated retry (validated strictly wider than the session's effective mode at execution); the system prompt deliberately does NOT state the sandbox mode — the model learns the boundary from the marker (which names the mode) when it hits it, instead of preemptively refusing work a standing declaration discourages. What an ACP editor experiences: a `sandbox-mode` and an `approval-policy` config-option select per session (each advertised only when its knob is composable), switchable at runtime; a sandbox switch simply changes what subsequent commands may do, while an approval-policy switch to `'never'` is stated in the prompt and narrated.
|
||||
What the model then experiences: denied file effects come back as result facts with a `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker plus standing instructions not to retry around them; under a confining executor the schema offers `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` for the one-approval escalated retry (validated strictly wider than the session's effective mode at execution); the system prompt deliberately does NOT state the sandbox mode — the model learns the boundary from the marker (which names the mode) when it hits it, instead of preemptively refusing work a standing declaration discourages. What an ACP editor experiences: one `Permissions` config-option select per session (advertised when the `dsh-permission` preset layer is composed; each preset bundles a sandbox mode and an approval policy and writes through to both knob events — a knob state outside the table derives a switch-away-only `custom` current), switchable at runtime; a sandbox switch simply changes what subsequent commands may do, while an approval-policy switch to `'never'` is stated in the prompt and narrated.
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The product path, concretely (the escalation arc is verbatim from the recorded `escalation-approved` scenario; the denial leg is pinned on the real-kernel e2e tier):
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@@ -57,7 +61,7 @@ Reject instead and nothing executes: the result is the verbatim `the user reject
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- Everything else executes inside the harness process (fs is in-process `node:fs`, web is in-process `fetch`, every `ToolDefinition.execute()` closes over `ctx`): an OS sandbox wraps `execve` and cannot wrap an in-process function call, so "sandbox any tool" is policy at each tool's seam, never a mechanical transport change.
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- `tools/pre-execute` (`allow`/`deny`/`ask`) exists, with `ask` serviced by [the approval seam](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md); the fs intent gates are version guards with no mode input yet.
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- `dsh-bash`'s request/spec split (`BashExecRequest` → `resolve()` → `BashExecSpec`) carries per-call fields the way escalation needs — `owner` is the template: request-optional, spec required-but-nullable, carried verbatim — and the result types already speak `SandboxMode`, so a per-call policy field adds no dependency edge.
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- The pinned-header snapshot design means a schema/description change churns at most one pinning fixture per suite, and the escalation fields are advertised only under a sandboxing executor — so they live in exactly one pinned header, the sandbox example suite's `mode-switching` fixture.
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- The pinned-header snapshot design means a schema/description change churns at most one pinning fixture per suite, and the escalation fields are advertised only under a sandboxing executor — so they live in exactly one pinned header, the acp example suite's `permission-switching` fixture.
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#### The seam: `ctx.sandbox`
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@@ -120,7 +124,7 @@ Each owner exports the same three-piece kit: the event declaration, a pure fold
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**Visibility is deliberately asymmetric between the knobs.** The SANDBOX mode is stated nowhere and its switches are not narrated: a standing "you are read-only" declaration teaches the model to refuse preemptively (observed live: sessions where the model would not even attempt a write it could have escalated), while the denial marker already names the mode the command ran under at exactly the moment the boundary matters — behavior, not belief, carries the state, and a switch simply changes what the next command does. The APPROVAL policy keeps both layers, because its failure mode is the opposite: an auto-rejected ask under `'never'` returns "the user rejected …" wording no behavior can disambiguate, so the prompt states `'never'` (and ONLY `'never'` — an `'ask'` promise is unknowable without asking, and absence under a logged header is how the narrator reads `'ask'` back), and an `agent/pre-step` narrator injects at most one coalesced notice per policy switch: idle flip-flops collapse to one notice at the next turn's first step, a net-zero round trip to none, and a mid-turn change is narrated no later than the next step. Its "last told" is in-memory with a log-derived fallback (the folded header's system text parsed against the closed candidate sentence; LAST occurrence wins, so a persona quoting it cannot shadow the real section), so restarts lose nothing; attribution is positional (a knob event after the log's last `request/header*` reads `changed by the user`, a drift with no such event reads `changed by the operator/config`).
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||||
|
||||
**The editor surface** is protocol-native [Session Config Options](https://agentclientprotocol.com/protocol/session-config-options) — the spec's replacement for session modes (slated for removal in ACP v2), already SDK-typed. The bridge advertises one independent `select` per composable knob — `sandbox-mode` (category `mode`) iff the mounted executor confines, `approval-policy` iff the approval seam is composed — with `currentValue` folded from each session's own log, in `session/new` and `session/load` responses. `session/set_config_option` validates against the same closed lists, routes to the domain setter, and returns the complete refreshed state (the spec contract).
|
||||
**The editor surface** is protocol-native [Session Config Options](https://agentclientprotocol.com/protocol/session-config-options) — the spec's replacement for session modes (slated for removal in ACP v2), already SDK-typed. When `ctx.permission` is composed, the bridge advertises one `permission` select (category `mode`) in `session/new` and `session/load`; its options are the deployment's preset table, and its `currentValue` is `PermissionService.current()` over the session log plus composition defaults. The shipped `workspace-write` and `danger-full-access` presets each bundle a sandbox mode with an approval policy and write through to both domain setters; a knob combination outside the table is reported as switch-away-only `custom`. `session/set_config_option` validates and switches through the permission service, then returns the complete refreshed state (the spec contract).
|
||||
|
||||
**Anchoring: turn-enclosure is the commit boundary.** The turn-enclosure contract makes a bare between-turns append invalid (the JSONL backend treats a post-`turn/end` tail as crash garbage; dev invariants throw). A switch while a turn is open appends immediately — openness read from the LOG (last boundary event is `turn/start`), not `agent.status`, which stays `running` between queued turns. An idle switch is held on the bridge's session record and anchored at the next turn's `agent/prompt-submit` — inside the turn, before anything in it assembles or executes, last write per knob, and OUTSIDE any `session/event` emit (appending from inside that feed reorders events for later-registered listeners — a bug the dev invariants caught live). Until anchored, the switch exists only in bridge memory: responses overlay it truthfully, and a crash before the next turn reverts it — `session/load` then reports the fold's truth, so the editor UI self-corrects rather than lies.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -133,9 +137,9 @@ FIXME: Revisit this tool-local boundary. The follow-up design needs to determine
|
||||
### Testing
|
||||
|
||||
- Unit tier (no real runner anywhere): profile dialects, per-platform chain selection (sole candidate unprobed, no chain fails closed, multi-candidate probe order), verdict caching, the fail-closed end, probe-report parsing, and the launcher/`sandbox-exec` CLI contracts via fake runner scripts in `dsh-sandbox-local`; wrapping, policy hand-off, fact stamping, and runner-failure-outranks-denial classification (foreground throw, background `runnerFailed` fact) against a fake provider in `dsh-bash-sandbox`; the error's structured identity in `dsh-sandbox`. The escalation matrix spans the three bash packages: verbatim carry-through in `dsh-bash-local`, stamp/branch/per-task-facts in `dsh-bash-sandbox`, and the capability gate, `justification` pairing, fail-closed texts (pinned verbatim), and grant stamping in `dsh-tool-bash`. The switching surface pins the folds, the stamping precedence, the `'never'` gate, per-session section rendering, the full narrator matrix (cold start, coalescing, net-zero, resume drift with operator wording, positional attribution, persona-shadow hardening), and the bridge's advertisement gating, validation rejections, idle-vs-mid-turn anchoring (dev invariants mounted), and `session/load` reporting over a real two-process JSONL round trip.
|
||||
- Keyless real-runner e2e, split along the seam and per rung: CI's `sandbox-e2e` matrix runs bwrap and Landlock on Linux (the Landlock leg once per architecture, each confining through the registry-installed launcher) and Seatbelt on macOS against real kernels, failing on a silent all-skip. World-proofs live in `dsh-sandbox-local` (denied writes absent on disk, workspace writes landing, temp-area grants pinned, kernel denial text matching the advertised dialect) and `dsh-bash-sandbox` (the through-`ctx.bash` consumer proofs, including denied-then-overridden-write-lands). This package's own publish path is rehearsed without publishing (`packed-install.e2e.ts`): `pnpm pack`, tarballs installed into a throwaway consumer with the launcher family resolving from the registry, plain `node` confining through the INSTALLED launcher — asserted executable apart, so a mode-stripped binary can never masquerade as a non-enforcing kernel. The switching surface has its own keyless e2e (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent`): the real `cordis.yml` tree advertises both options, honors switches end to end, and rejects out-of-vocabulary values.
|
||||
- With-key e2e (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/escalation.e2e.ts`): real model + real runner + the REAL bridge answerer, world-verified — denied under `read-only`, escalates with justification, the scripted editor grants and the retried write lands on disk, while a rejected escalation leaves no write. Self-skips without `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` or a usable runner (e2e.yml installs bubblewrap so it actually executes in CI).
|
||||
- Snapshot tier (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/acp.snapshot.ts`): the keyless config-option wire; the recorded mode-switching arc as the suite's pinned header — necessarily, since mid-session switches emit the `request/header-delta`s the uniformity guard licenses only in the pin — committing both switches, the prompt-section delta and one "changed by the user" notice per knob, and a confined write landing under the switched mode; and both recorded escalation branches over scripted `permissionAnswers` (grant runs confined under `workspace-write`; rejection executes nothing and pins the fail-closed text). Replay re-executes every fixture's bash calls under the host's real runner (ci.yml's snapshot lane installs bubblewrap). Deliberately absent: a fixture carrying a real DENIAL — denial stderr is the backend's dialect and would pin a fixture to its recording platform; the escalation prompts assert the prior denial instead, and the denial→marker path stays on the tiers above.
|
||||
- Keyless real-runner e2e, split along the seam and per rung: CI's `sandbox-e2e` matrix runs bwrap and Landlock on Linux (the Landlock leg once per architecture, each confining through the registry-installed launcher) and Seatbelt on macOS against real kernels, failing on a silent all-skip. World-proofs live in `dsh-sandbox-local` (denied writes absent on disk, workspace writes landing, temp-area grants pinned, kernel denial text matching the advertised dialect) and `dsh-bash-sandbox` (the through-`ctx.bash` consumer proofs, including denied-then-overridden-write-lands). This package's own publish path is rehearsed without publishing (`packed-install.e2e.ts`): `pnpm pack`, tarballs installed into a throwaway consumer with the launcher family resolving from the registry, plain `node` confining through the INSTALLED launcher — asserted executable apart, so a mode-stripped binary can never masquerade as a non-enforcing kernel. The switching surface has its own keyless e2e (the acp-agent example's `escalation.e2e.ts`): the real default `cordis.yml` tree advertises the one permission option, honors switches end to end, and rejects out-of-vocabulary values.
|
||||
- With-key e2e (`examples/acp-agent/tests/escalation.e2e.ts`): real model + real runner + the REAL bridge answerer, world-verified — denied under `read-only`, escalates with justification, the scripted editor grants and the retried write lands on disk, while a rejected escalation leaves no write. Self-skips without `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` or a usable runner (e2e.yml installs bubblewrap so it actually executes in CI).
|
||||
- Snapshot tier (`examples/acp-agent/tests/acp.snapshot.ts`): the keyless config-option wire; the recorded permission-switching arc as the pinned header of its class — necessarily, since mid-session switches emit the `request/header-delta`s the uniformity guard licenses only in the pin — committing one `workspace-write`→`danger-full-access` preset switch (the `permission/preset` event written through to both knobs), the approval prompt-section delta and its "changed by the user" notice; and both recorded escalation branches over scripted `permissionAnswers` (grant runs under the granted `danger-full-access`; rejection executes nothing and pins the fail-closed text). Snapshot mode starts the shared example tree at `danger-full-access` so established fixtures remain runner-independent; the switching and escalation inputs explicitly select `workspace-write` before exercising the policy path. Deliberately absent: a fixture carrying a real DENIAL — denial stderr is the backend's dialect and would pin a fixture to its recording platform; the escalation prompts assert the prior denial instead, and the denial→marker path stays on the real-runner tiers above.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deferred phases
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -169,7 +173,7 @@ Each phase gets its full design when picked up, validated against the code at th
|
||||
- **Narrate via `agent/user-message` + a bus event** — rejected: it presupposes a turn-entry seam that does not exist (the real seam is `agent/prompt-submit`), and pre-step's position serves both the coalesced turn-entry notice and the mid-turn immediacy bound with one listener.
|
||||
- **A standing prompt statement of the sandbox mode (+ a switch narrator)** — shipped first, then removed on live evidence: with `Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.` in every request, the model refused to ATTEMPT denied-then-escalatable work (five of twelve turns in the first manual session ended with zero tool calls), turning the sandbox into a soft lockout. The denial marker names the mode at the moment it matters and the escalation fields carry the recovery; the approval knob keeps its statement because an auto-rejection is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human "no".
|
||||
- **Track "last told" with its own bookkeeping events** — rejected: the `request/header*` fold already records the exact prompt the model saw; parsing the closed candidate sentences back replaces a second bookkeeping stream — events are needed only where they ARE the store.
|
||||
- **ACP session modes instead of config options** — rejected: one mode list cannot carry two orthogonal knobs; config options are the spec's designed surface and modes are slated for removal in ACP v2.
|
||||
- **ACP session modes instead of config options** — rejected: the preset is already one deployment-defined config-option select, and modes are slated for removal in ACP v2.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user