Merge origin/master into worktree/ci-under-minute
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Windows write-permission semantics — inherited DACLs, not mode bits
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
The replacement-file decision in this record is superseded by [Windows DACL preservation](../bug-fix/2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
`writeFileAtomic` in `@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-local` protects write-in-progress content with POSIX mode bits: the staging directory is created `0o700`, the temp file is opened `0o600`, and new files default to `0o600`. On POSIX this keeps temporary content owner-only regardless of the parent directory's permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows has no working equivalent behind the same API. Node's `chmod` there drives only the read-only attribute (every mode this package passes carries owner-write, so the calls are benign no-ops), and `stat().mode` reports synthetic `0o666`/`0o444` bits. The real security state is the file's DACL: a newly created file or directory inherits from its parent, while replacement needs the explicit handling owned by the superseding Agent Note.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
New Windows files use directory inheritance rather than synthetic mode bits: the staging directory is created inside the target's parent directory (`dirname(absolutePath)`), so it and the temp file inherit the destination directory's DACL. Replacement files follow the stricter [DACL preservation contract](../bug-fix/2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Tests assert mode bits on POSIX only. Native Windows coverage pins the package-owned replacement behavior; new-file inheritance remains an operating-system contract rather than a machine-specific ACL allowlist.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**Explicit owner-only DACLs for new files.** Rejected because they would break inheritance and surprise users whose project directories are deliberately shared. Replacement writes copy the target's existing DACL rather than inventing an owner-only policy.
|
||||
|
||||
**Test-side ACL verification.** A `Get-Acl` SID allowlist or `icacls` would verify Windows inheritance and the machine's `%TEMP%` ACL rather than package behavior; `icacls` also localizes well-known account names, making parsing locale-fragile.
|
||||
|
||||
**Skip `chmod` on Windows.** Platform-guarding benign no-op calls adds branches without changing behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
POSIX keeps owner-only temp content regardless of the parent directory. A new Windows target inside a broadly accessible directory inherits that accessibility by design; a replacement retains the target's narrower DACL when one exists.
|
||||
|
||||
Mode preservation across a replace degenerates to a no-op on Windows: a writable file probes as `0o666`, and replaying that through `chmod` leaves the read-only attribute clear. A read-only target cannot be replaced there because publication fails before the synthetic mode would matter.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Windows-native durable JSONL publication
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-session-persistence-jsonl` publishes a session log lazily on the first append. The POSIX protocol writes a temp file, fsyncs it, links it to the final name, fsyncs the parent directory, and then removes the temp link. The parent-directory fsync is part of the durability contract: a crash after the namespace change must not lose the committed final name while leaving callers believing the session log materialized.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows has atomic namespace operations, but Node does not expose a POSIX-equivalent parent-directory fsync contract there. Treating Windows directory sync failures as success would silently weaken a durable backend. The Windows path therefore needs a different publication primitive rather than a conditional inside the POSIX `syncDir` helper.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
The JSONL backend forks inside `materialize()` before any namespace mutation. Shared code computes the session directory, final log path, and encoded header plus initial event batch; POSIX and Windows then run separate publication protocols.
|
||||
|
||||
POSIX keeps the existing protocol: create the root and cwd bucket with parent directory fsyncs, write and fsync a temp file, publish with `link()` so an existing final log is never overwritten, fsync the bucket directory, then remove the redundant temp hard link.
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||||
|
||||
Windows creates missing directories through a durable staging publish: create a random sibling directory, then publish it to the final directory name with `MoveFileExW(..., MOVEFILE_WRITE_THROUGH)` without `MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING` or `MOVEFILE_COPY_ALLOWED`. File materialization writes and fsyncs the temp log, then publishes that temp file to the final path with the same write-through `MoveFileExW` call and no replacement. `koffi` is the minimal Win32 bridge for this API surface; its install script is allowed in `pnpm-workspace.yaml` because the package ships the native loader and prebuilt platform modules.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**Ignore Windows directory-sync failures.** Rejected because it reports a first append as durable without forcing the published namespace entry to stable storage.
|
||||
|
||||
**Use `CreateHardLinkW`.** Rejected because hard links are filesystem-dependent, do not publish directories, and expose no write-through option.
|
||||
|
||||
**Use replacement or transactional APIs.** `ReplaceFileW` has replacement semantics that conflict with same-id collision rejection, and Transactional NTFS is not recommended for new application designs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
The backend keeps one external contract across platforms: first append either publishes a complete log at the final name or fails without overwriting an existing log. The platform split is an implementation detail; `SessionPersistence` APIs and the logical JSONL record format do not change. The later [Zstandard encoding decision](2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.md) applies before either platform publishes the opaque bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
Windows tests exercise the real Win32 publish path on native Windows. Power-loss behavior remains an API-contract property rather than something unit tests can prove; the testable invariants are that directory fsync is not called on Windows materialization, final-path collisions fail, temp logs are fsync'd before publication, and the resulting log loads normally.
|
||||
|
||||
Append and repair still use ordinary file-handle fsyncs on both platforms. A failed append closes its append-only handle, reopens the log read/write, truncates it to the pre-append size, and fsyncs the rollback because Windows rejects `ftruncate` on append-only handles.
|
||||
@@ -12,13 +12,13 @@ The implementation needs enough state to preserve real ownership and settlement
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
The runtime uses one mechanism per independent fact. Scope routing has an opaque carrier; each live registry object has one entry record; each create or resume operation has one transaction; typed same-process calls borrow readonly values; real data boundaries materialize once; the cooperative prompt-assembly result is authoritative; and worker/process code retains separate terminal and quiescence state only where different owners can genuinely race.
|
||||
The runtime uses one mechanism per independent fact. Scope routing has an opaque carrier and shared layer store; each live registry object has one entry record; each create or resume operation has one transaction; typed same-process calls borrow readonly values; real data boundaries materialize once; the cooperative prompt-assembly result is authoritative; and worker/process code retains separate terminal and quiescence state only where different owners can genuinely race.
|
||||
|
||||
The design can be skimmed as seven choices:
|
||||
|
||||
| Problem | Authoritative mechanism |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Select global plus one agent's registrations | Opaque scope key and routing carrier |
|
||||
| Select global plus one agent's registrations | Opaque scope key, routing carrier, and shared layer store |
|
||||
| Own one live agent or session | One registry entry captured by its disposer |
|
||||
| Coordinate create/resume | One `AgentCreationTransaction` |
|
||||
| Protect durable, queued, model, or wire data | Materialize once at that boundary |
|
||||
@@ -68,11 +68,11 @@ A `ScopeKey` is an opaque object compared by identity. The harness uses the live
|
||||
|
||||
The receiver is a small carrier rather than a transparent proxy for the domain object. Code that needs the agent receives the explicit event argument; code that needs registration ownership receives `agent.ctx`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Registry reads overlay one exact map
|
||||
### Registry reads overlay one exact layer
|
||||
|
||||
Scope-aware registries store global contributions separately from identity-keyed local contributions. A read resolves the global layer and at most one local layer; it never traverses parentage.
|
||||
Scope-aware registries use `ScopedLayers` to own one eager global aggregate and lazily created identity-keyed aggregates. A read resolves the global layer and at most one exact local layer; it never creates state or traverses parentage. Registration visibility and Cordis effect ownership derive from the same context, and reclamation waits until the concrete layer's complete aggregate is empty ([decision](2026-07-12-scoped-layers-store.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
Each service retains its domain rule. Named prompt values and tools use local shadowing, tool restrictions filter globals before local tools are added, and events select listener audiences rather than registered data. Scope supplies identity and ownership, not a universal merge algorithm.
|
||||
Each service retains its domain rule. Named command and prompt views use the shared insertion-ordered shadow merge; tools keep a richer resolver because restrictions filter globals before local tools are added and the reserved Code Mode transport is inserted separately. Prompt variables and tool guards retain live iteration, while tool-provider membership is materialized per assembly. Scope supplies storage lifecycle and named shadowing, not a universal registry view.
|
||||
|
||||
### Fused dispatch helpers prevent subject drift
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
|
||||
2026-07-12-scoped-layers-store.md: b850b6bcbb22401b386b4458b6d5c65a160c85cd
|
||||
2026-07-12-scoped-layers-store.zh.md: 8bfc0a0e8ec1e3de624ff8d9e48b7517833fc025
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Shared scoped-layer storage
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
English | [中文](2026-07-12-scoped-layers-store.zh.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
Agent scoping ([decision](2026-07-08-agent-scope-contexts.md), [runtime design](2026-07-12-agent-scope-runtime-design.md)) gives scope-aware registries the same recurring shape: one global registration layer plus one exact agent layer. Seven registration facades use that shape: `tools.register`, `tools.restrict`, and `tools.guard` in `dsh-tools`; `SystemPrompt.section`, `SystemPrompt.tools`, and `SystemPrompt.variable` in `dsh-system-prompt`; and `CommandService.register` in `dsh-commands`.
|
||||
|
||||
Without a shared primitive, each facade repeats the lifecycle choreography around its domain state: derive visibility from the calling context, create a scoped container on demand, attach ownership to the same Cordis fiber, install undo before notifying observers, return Cordis's exact disposer, and reclaim empty scoped state. Separate maps and collection types also leave a service without one object representing a scope's complete contribution.
|
||||
|
||||
The duplicated code carries three non-obvious requirements:
|
||||
|
||||
- Visibility and ownership must come from the same context; accepting them separately permits a registration visible in one scope but disposed with another.
|
||||
- Undo must be collected before a change callback runs, so a throwing callback rolls the mutation back.
|
||||
- The public disposer must be the exact function returned by `ctx.effect()`; wrapping it breaks Cordis's identity-based ordered teardown.
|
||||
|
||||
The shared part is lifecycle and insertion-ordered storage, not registry policy. Tool restrictions, reserved transport handling, prompt evaluation timing, command normalization, exact diagnostics, and callback containment remain different domain contracts.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope` provides a key-agnostic `store.ts` implementation module. The package continues to peer on Cordis and `@deepseek-ai/dsh-invariants`, and its invariant companion remains unchanged. The package root exports four storage symbols: `ScopeLayer`, `ScopedLayers`, `NamedEntries`, and `AnonymousEntries`. `EntryValues` remains internal, and `store.ts` is not a package subpath.
|
||||
|
||||
`ScopeLayer` keeps the aggregate concept explicit while requiring only whole-layer emptiness. A service defines one concrete layer whose tables and domain helpers fit that service; `ScopedLayers` owns construction, selection, lifecycle attachment, notification, and aggregate reclamation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Public interface
|
||||
|
||||
```ts ignore-check
|
||||
export interface ScopeLayer {
|
||||
isEmpty(): boolean
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class ScopedLayers<L extends ScopeLayer> {
|
||||
constructor(
|
||||
createLayer: (scope: ScopeKey | undefined) => L,
|
||||
onChange: () => void,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
readonly global: L
|
||||
peek(scope: ScopeKey | undefined): L | undefined
|
||||
|
||||
merge<V>(
|
||||
scope: ScopeKey | undefined,
|
||||
pick: (layer: L) => NamedEntries<V>,
|
||||
): Map<string, V>
|
||||
|
||||
effect(
|
||||
ctx: Context,
|
||||
action: (layer: L) => () => void,
|
||||
options: { label: string; notify?: boolean },
|
||||
): () => void
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class NamedEntries<V> {
|
||||
constructor(duplicateError: (name: string) => Error)
|
||||
insert(name: string, value: V): () => void
|
||||
get(name: string): V | undefined
|
||||
has(name: string): boolean
|
||||
keys(): IterableIterator<string>
|
||||
entries(): IterableIterator<[string, V]>
|
||||
values(): IterableIterator<V>
|
||||
isEmpty(): boolean
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class AnonymousEntries<V> {
|
||||
append(value: V): () => void
|
||||
values(): IterableIterator<V>
|
||||
isEmpty(): boolean
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Storage contract
|
||||
|
||||
- The constructor creates `global` once with `createLayer(undefined)`. A scoped layer is created only by `effect()`; `peek()` and `merge()` never create one, and `peek(undefined)` returns `undefined` because the global layer is already explicit.
|
||||
- `merge()` is the only materialized generic read. It copies named global entries in insertion order, then applies matching scoped entries in their insertion order so same-name entries shadow without moving unrelated names.
|
||||
- `NamedEntries.insert()` checks and inserts atomically, returns an idempotent exact-entry undo, and obtains the registry's exact duplicate diagnostic from the caller-supplied factory. Lookup and iterators retain native `Map` order and stay live within one nonempty table generation; draining the table starts a new generation so an in-flight iterator cannot observe a self-replacement.
|
||||
- `AnonymousEntries.append()` assigns a unique internal key per registration, so equal callbacks or values remain independent. Its iterator is insertion-ordered and uses the same live-generation boundary.
|
||||
- `effect()` derives the key with `scopeOf(ctx)` and attaches the action to that same `ctx.effect()`. It accepts one synchronous action returning one synchronous undo; actions must either return their undo or throw before retaining a contribution. The helper does not normalize the wider Cordis `Effect` union.
|
||||
- `effect()` collects the action's undo before calling `onChange` and returns the exact `ctx.effect()` disposer. Disposal runs the action undo before notification, is idempotent through Cordis, and removes a scoped layer only after its complete `ScopeLayer.isEmpty()` becomes true.
|
||||
- `options.notify` defaults to `true`. The callback's own policy stays authoritative: tool and prompt change callbacks may throw and trigger registration rollback; `CommandService.notifyChange()` contains observer failures; tool guards pass `notify: false`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Registry migrations
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-tools` defines one `ToolLayer` containing named tools plus anonymous compiled restrictions and guard registrations. `ToolRegistry` retains its private domain resolver for visible definitions, pre-restriction known names, restrictable global names, scoped shadowing, restrictions, and reserved `run_code` insertion. Guard evaluation live-iterates global then scoped registrations: additions to a nonempty generation can run in the current dispatch, while a self-replacement after draining the guard table begins with the next dispatch.
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-system-prompt` defines one `PromptLayer` containing named sections and variables plus anonymous tool providers. Assembly merges sections before evaluating them, so a shadowed provider is never called. Tool-provider membership is materialized once per assembly. Variable providers live-iterate global then scoped tables: additions to a nonempty generation can run in the current assembly, while a self-replacement after draining the variable table begins with the next assembly.
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-commands` defines a one-table layer containing `NamedEntries<RegisteredCommand>`. Effective views use `merge()`, while `CommandService` retains definition normalization and freezing, exact duplicate diagnostics, sorted immutable descriptors, direct execution, HMR cleanup, and independently contained `commands/change` observers.
|
||||
|
||||
All seven facades keep validation and diagnostics in their owning registry and continue to return the exact Cordis disposer. The migration changes neither public registry behavior nor model-, human-, wire-, persistence-, or configuration-visible output.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**Keep the independent implementations.** This avoids a new library interface but leaves lifecycle ordering, disposer identity, and scope reclamation duplicated across seven facades.
|
||||
|
||||
**One helper per table.** This removes some local code but preserves multiple per-scope maps and cannot reclaim one scope's aggregate contribution correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
**Per-scope registry instances.** Child registries would need delegation for global-plus-scoped views, special subtraction for restrictions, and observer discovery across instances. They would move complexity rather than remove it.
|
||||
|
||||
**Explicit scope parameters on registration methods.** Separate visibility and ownership inputs make mismatched lifetimes representable, while an omitted scope silently becomes global.
|
||||
|
||||
**Accept the complete Cordis `Effect` union.** None of the seven registrations has asynchronous setup, multiple undos, or an independent settlement boundary. General normalization would duplicate Cordis lifecycle machinery without a current consumer.
|
||||
|
||||
**Expose `ScopedLayers.values()`, `ScopedLayers.keys()`, or a global-admission predicate.** Those operations encode consumer-specific live/materialized and filtering policies. Direct table iteration preserves explicit live semantics, `merge()` covers the shared named shadowing operation, and `ToolRegistry` keeps its richer private resolver.
|
||||
|
||||
**Put `values()` on `ScopeLayer` or export `EntryValues`.** A layer aggregates heterogeneous tables and has no coherent value type or iteration policy. `EntryValues` is useful only to share implementation details between the two table classes; making it public would enlarge the interface without giving callers a meaningful layer-wide read.
|
||||
|
||||
**Generate layers from a mapped-type table description.** Three-table and one-table concrete layers are short, inspectable, and free to hold domain helpers. A class generator would add a second construction model and generated runtime shape for little leverage.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
- Scope-aware registries express one aggregate layer and reuse the same construction, ownership, rollback, notification, and reclamation choreography. Domain-specific validation, diagnostics, filtering, evaluation, and observer policy remain in each registry.
|
||||
- The public read surface stays narrow: direct table iteration preserves explicitly live behavior, while `merge()` is the one shared materialized shadowing operation. A heterogeneous `ScopeLayer` has no layer-wide `values()` contract.
|
||||
- The helper is deliberately synchronous. A future registration that needs asynchronous setup or several independently owned undos must identify its ownership and settlement boundaries before widening this contract.
|
||||
- An action must throw before retaining a contribution or return an undo for everything it retained; the helper cannot repair mutation outside that contract. The provided entry operations are atomic, and migrated registries perform fallible validation before insertion.
|
||||
- A scoped layer remains allocated until every table in its aggregate is empty. Disposing one facade therefore cannot discard sibling contributions owned by the same scope.
|
||||
- The four public symbols become a reusable package contract. Keeping `EntryValues` internal and consumer policy outside the helper limits the compatibility surface.
|
||||
- The migration changes no public registry behavior and no model-, human-, wire-, persistence-, configuration-, or dependency-graph output.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
- `dsh-scope` unit tests cover global construction, lazy scoped construction, non-creating reads, named merge order and shadowing, aggregate reclamation, factory and action failure cleanup, notification ordering and rollback, `notify: false`, effect labels, exact disposer identity, idempotent teardown, caller-owned duplicate errors, independent anonymous duplicates, live iterators, and drained-generation detachment.
|
||||
- Focused tool, system-prompt, and command suites cover restrictions, reserved transport handling, known/restrictable-name agreement, guard re-entrancy and self-replacement, validation order, exact diagnostics, section shadow-before-evaluate, provider snapshot membership, variable re-entrancy and self-replacement, contained command observers, frozen and sorted views, direct execution, and lifecycle disposal.
|
||||
- The scoped core-data type-equivalence check ties `ScopeLayer` documentation to its source declaration. Repository documentation, module-graph, build, hygiene, coverage, and built-artifact gates exercise the root export and package boundary.
|
||||
- Existing ACP, headless, and TUI keyless snapshots remain the regression boundary for tool schemas, prompt assembly, and human commands. The implementation does not update any expected transcript.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: 共享作用域分层存储
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
[English](2026-07-12-scoped-layers-store.md) | 中文
|
||||
|
||||
## 问题
|
||||
|
||||
agent（智能体）作用域机制（[决策](2026-07-08-agent-scope-contexts.md)、[运行时设计](2026-07-12-agent-scope-runtime-design.md)）让支持作用域的注册表反复呈现同一种形态：一个全局注册层，加上一个与具体 agent 精确对应的层。七个注册门面都采用这一形态：`tools.register`、`tools.restrict` 和 `tools.guard`（位于 `dsh-tools`）；`SystemPrompt.section`、`SystemPrompt.tools` 和 `SystemPrompt.variable`（位于 `dsh-system-prompt`）；以及 `CommandService.register`（位于 `dsh-commands`）。
|
||||
|
||||
如果没有共享原语，每个门面都要围绕自己的领域状态重复相同的生命周期编排：从调用方上下文导出可见性，按需创建专属容器，把属主绑定到同一个 Cordis fiber，先装入 undo 再通知观察者，原样返回 Cordis 的 disposer，并回收空的专属状态。各自分离的映射与集合类型也会让服务缺少一个表示某个 scope 完整贡献的对象。
|
||||
|
||||
重复代码承载着三项不明显的要求：
|
||||
|
||||
- 可见性与属主必须来自同一个上下文；若分开接受二者，就能登记出对一个 scope 可见、却随另一个 scope 销毁的贡献。
|
||||
- change 回调运行前必须收集 undo，抛错的回调才能回滚变更。
|
||||
- 公开 disposer 必须就是 `ctx.effect()` 返回的那个函数；包装它会破坏 Cordis 基于身份的有序拆除。
|
||||
|
||||
共享的是生命周期与保持插入顺序的存储，而不是注册表策略。工具限制、保留传输处理、提示词求值时机、命令规范化、精确诊断和回调异常隔离，仍分别属于不同的领域契约。
|
||||
|
||||
## 决策
|
||||
|
||||
`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope` 提供与键类型无关的 `store.ts` 实现模块。该包（package）继续将 Cordis 和 `@deepseek-ai/dsh-invariants` 列为对等依赖（peer dependency），其不变量配套模块保持不变。包根导出四个存储符号：`ScopeLayer`、`ScopedLayers`、`NamedEntries` 和 `AnonymousEntries`。`EntryValues` 仍是内部接口，`store.ts` 不是包子路径。
|
||||
|
||||
`ScopeLayer` 保留显式的聚合概念，同时只要求判断整个层是否为空。服务定义一个具体层，使其表结构与领域 helper 适合该服务；`ScopedLayers` 负责构造、选择、生命周期挂接、通知和聚合回收。
|
||||
|
||||
## 公开接口
|
||||
|
||||
```ts ignore-check
|
||||
export interface ScopeLayer {
|
||||
isEmpty(): boolean
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class ScopedLayers<L extends ScopeLayer> {
|
||||
constructor(
|
||||
createLayer: (scope: ScopeKey | undefined) => L,
|
||||
onChange: () => void,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
readonly global: L
|
||||
peek(scope: ScopeKey | undefined): L | undefined
|
||||
|
||||
merge<V>(
|
||||
scope: ScopeKey | undefined,
|
||||
pick: (layer: L) => NamedEntries<V>,
|
||||
): Map<string, V>
|
||||
|
||||
effect(
|
||||
ctx: Context,
|
||||
action: (layer: L) => () => void,
|
||||
options: { label: string; notify?: boolean },
|
||||
): () => void
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class NamedEntries<V> {
|
||||
constructor(duplicateError: (name: string) => Error)
|
||||
insert(name: string, value: V): () => void
|
||||
get(name: string): V | undefined
|
||||
has(name: string): boolean
|
||||
keys(): IterableIterator<string>
|
||||
entries(): IterableIterator<[string, V]>
|
||||
values(): IterableIterator<V>
|
||||
isEmpty(): boolean
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class AnonymousEntries<V> {
|
||||
append(value: V): () => void
|
||||
values(): IterableIterator<V>
|
||||
isEmpty(): boolean
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## 存储契约
|
||||
|
||||
- 构造器只创建一次 `global`，调用的是 `createLayer(undefined)`。只有 `effect()` 会创建专属层；`peek()` 和 `merge()` 从不创建专属层，而 `peek(undefined)` 返回 `undefined`，因为全局层已经显式存在。
|
||||
- `merge()` 是唯一会物化结果的通用读取接口。它按插入顺序复制全局命名条目，再按专属条目的插入顺序应用这些条目；同名条目完成遮蔽，但不会移动无关名称。
|
||||
- `NamedEntries.insert()` 以原子方式检查并插入，返回幂等且只撤销该精确条目的 undo，并通过调用方提供的工厂取得所属注册表的精确重名诊断。查询与迭代器保留 `Map` 的原生顺序，并在同一个非空表 generation 内保持活遍历；清空表会开启新的 generation，因此尚未结束的迭代器无法观察到自我替换。
|
||||
- `AnonymousEntries.append()` 为每次登记分配唯一内部键，因此值相等的回调或其他值仍彼此独立。其迭代器保留插入顺序，并采用同样的 generation 活遍历边界。
|
||||
- `effect()` 通过 `scopeOf(ctx)` 导出键，并把 action 挂到同一个 `ctx.effect()` 上。它只接受一个同步 action，且该 action 只返回一个同步 undo；action 要么返回其 undo，要么必须在保留任何贡献之前抛错。helper 不会规范化更宽泛的 Cordis `Effect` union。
|
||||
- `effect()` 在调用 `onChange` 前收集 action 的 undo，并原样返回 `ctx.effect()` 的 disposer。销毁时先运行 action undo 再通知；Cordis 保证其幂等性；只有整个层的 `ScopeLayer.isEmpty()` 变为 true 后，helper 才删除专属层。
|
||||
- `options.notify` 默认为 `true`。回调自身的策略仍具最终效力：工具与提示词的 change 回调可以抛错并触发登记回滚；`CommandService.notifyChange()` 会隔离观察者失败；工具 guard 传入 `notify: false`。
|
||||
|
||||
## 注册表迁移
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-tools` 定义一个 `ToolLayer`，其中包含命名工具以及匿名的已编译 restriction 和 guard 登记。`ToolRegistry` 保留其私有领域解析器，由它处理可见定义、限制前的已知名称、可限制的全局名称、专属遮蔽、restriction，以及保留的 `run_code` 插入。guard 求值会先活遍历全局登记，再活遍历专属登记：向非空 generation 新增的登记可以在当前分发中运行，而 guard 表清空后的自我替换则从下一次分发开始运行。
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-system-prompt` 定义一个 `PromptLayer`，其中包含命名的段落与变量，以及匿名工具提供方。组装流程在求值前合并段落，因此被遮蔽的提供方不会被调用。每次组装只物化一次工具提供方成员集合。变量提供方会先活遍历全局表，再活遍历专属表：向非空 generation 新增的提供方可以在当前组装中运行，而变量表清空后的自我替换则从下一次组装开始运行。
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-commands` 定义一个单表层，其中包含 `NamedEntries<RegisteredCommand>`。生效视图使用 `merge()`；`CommandService` 则保留对定义的规范化与冻结处理、精确重名诊断、经过排序的不可变描述符、直接执行、HMR（热模块替换）清理，以及对各个 `commands/change` 观察者分别隔离失败的行为。
|
||||
|
||||
七个门面都把校验与诊断留在所属注册表中，并继续返回 Cordis 的原始 disposer。迁移既不改变公开注册表行为，也不改变模型可见或人类可见的输出，以及协议、持久化或配置层面的可见输出。
|
||||
|
||||
## 备选方案
|
||||
|
||||
**保留彼此独立的实现。** 这样不必新增库接口，但七个门面仍会重复生命周期顺序、disposer 身份和 scope 回收。
|
||||
|
||||
**每张表一个 helper。** 这能减少一部分局部代码，但会保留多张按 scope 划分的映射，而且无法正确回收某个 scope 的聚合贡献。
|
||||
|
||||
**每 scope 一个注册表实例。** 子注册表需要通过委托获得全局加专属的视图，对 restriction 进行特殊的减法处理，并跨实例发现观察者。这只会转移复杂度，而不会消除复杂度。
|
||||
|
||||
**注册方法上的显式 scope 参数。** 分开的可见性与属主输入让不匹配的生命周期成为可表达状态，而遗漏 scope 则会静默变成全局登记。
|
||||
|
||||
**接受完整的 Cordis `Effect` union。** 七个登记口都没有异步 setup、多份 undo 或独立 settlement 边界。通用规范化会在没有现有消费者需要它时重复 Cordis 的生命周期 machinery。
|
||||
|
||||
**暴露 `ScopedLayers.values()`、`ScopedLayers.keys()` 或全局放行谓词。** 这些操作会编码消费方特有的活遍历或物化策略，以及过滤策略。直接遍历条目表可保留显式的活语义，`merge()` 覆盖共享的命名遮蔽操作，而 `ToolRegistry` 继续保有功能更丰富的私有解析器。
|
||||
|
||||
**把 `values()` 放在 `ScopeLayer` 上，或导出 `EntryValues`。** 一个层会聚合异构表，因而没有一致的值类型或迭代策略。`EntryValues` 只适合在两个表类之间共享实现细节；将其公开只会扩大接口，却不能为调用方提供有意义的整层读取方式。
|
||||
|
||||
**通过 mapped-type 表描述生成层。** 三表与单表具体层都很短、易于检查，并可自由持有领域 helper。类生成器会增加第二种构造模型和生成式运行时形状，收益却很小。
|
||||
|
||||
## 后果
|
||||
|
||||
- 支持作用域的注册表各自通过一个聚合层表达状态，并复用相同的构造、属主、回滚、通知和回收编排。各注册表仍各自保有领域特有的校验、诊断、过滤、求值和观察者策略。
|
||||
- 公开读取接口保持狭窄：直接遍历条目表可保留显式的活语义，`merge()` 是唯一共享的物化遮蔽操作。异构的 `ScopeLayer` 不具备整层 `values()` 契约。
|
||||
- helper 刻意保持同步。未来的登记若需要异步 setup 或多份分别拥有属主的 undo，必须先明确属主与 settlement 边界，再拓宽这项契约。
|
||||
- action 必须在保留贡献前抛错，或者为自己保留的一切返回 undo；helper 无法修复超出这项契约的变更。提供的条目操作是原子的，迁移后的注册表会在插入前执行可能失败的校验。
|
||||
- 专属层会一直保持已分配状态，直到其聚合内的所有表都为空。因此，销毁一个门面不会丢弃同一 scope 拥有的其他贡献。
|
||||
- 四个公开符号构成一项可复用的包契约。将 `EntryValues` 保持为内部接口，并把消费方策略留在 helper 之外，可以限制兼容性范围。
|
||||
- 迁移不改变任何公开注册表行为，也不改变模型、人类、协议、持久化、配置或依赖图层面的任何输出。
|
||||
|
||||
## 验证
|
||||
|
||||
- `dsh-scope` 单元测试覆盖全局构造、专属层延迟构造、非创建式读取、命名合并顺序与遮蔽、聚合回收、工厂与 action 失败清理、通知顺序与回滚、`notify: false`、effect 标签、原始 disposer 身份、幂等拆除、调用方提供的重名错误、相同匿名值的独立登记、活迭代器，以及表清空后的 generation 脱离。
|
||||
- 工具、系统提示词和命令专项测试套件覆盖 restriction、保留传输处理、已知名称与可限制名称的一致性、guard 重入与自我替换、校验顺序、精确诊断、section 先遮蔽再求值、提供方快照成员关系、variable 重入与自我替换、隔离失败的命令观察者、冻结且有序的视图、直接执行和生命周期销毁。
|
||||
- 作用域核心数据的类型等价性检查将 `ScopeLayer` 文档与其源声明绑定。仓库级的文档、模块图、构建、hygiene、覆盖率与构建产物门禁会覆盖包根导出与包边界。
|
||||
- 现有 ACP（Agent Client Protocol）、headless 和 TUI 无密钥快照继续作为工具 schema、提示词组装和人类命令的回归边界。实现不会更新任何预期 transcript（文本记录）。
|
||||
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
|
||||
2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.md: 09d30594fe31eed138a128dabc1947b15857808d
|
||||
2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.zh.md: 131531d9dba7cb01407191bf937f8b0ee3c6860a
|
||||
2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.md: ccfc81dd47504e6a9e9b19cda7c4b9fc40accecc
|
||||
2026-07-19-zstandard-jsonl-session-logs.zh.md: de5436a6eaefcb45e52e0ff4fea8592c7efcd127
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ The compressed artifact is a standard concatenation of independent [Zstandard fr
|
||||
|
||||
Compression uses Node's built-in [`zstdCompress` and `zstdDecompress`](https://nodejs.org/download/release/v22.19.0/docs/api/zlib.html), available at the repository's Node 22.19 floor. The backend enables `ZSTD_c_checksumFlag`, otherwise accepts Node's defaults, and exposes neither a compression-level knob nor a new dependency. The API is marked experimental by Node, so the Node 22.19, 24, and 26 compatibility gate exercises the exact helper.
|
||||
|
||||
First materialization compresses the two initial frames before opening the temporary file, then keeps the existing write, file `fsync`, collision-safe hard-link publication, and directory `fsync` sequence. Later batches are compressed before opening the destination and appended at EOF. A caught write or file-sync failure truncates to the prior byte length, syncs the rollback, and rethrows so the coordinator can retry the unchanged batch.
|
||||
First materialization compresses the two initial frames before opening the temporary file, then writes and `fsync`s that file. POSIX publishes it through a collision-safe hard link and directory `fsync`; Windows publishes it without replacement through `MoveFileExW(..., MOVEFILE_WRITE_THROUGH)`. Later batches are compressed before opening the destination and appended at EOF. A caught write or file-sync failure closes the append handle, reopens the log read/write, truncates to the prior byte length, syncs the rollback, and rethrows so the coordinator can retry the unchanged batch on both platforms.
|
||||
|
||||
### Read, listing, and crash recovery
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ JSONL 持久化后端会逐字保留每个 `SessionEvent`，其中包括数量
|
||||
|
||||
压缩使用 Node 内置的 [`zstdCompress` 与 `zstdDecompress`](https://nodejs.org/download/release/v22.19.0/docs/api/zlib.html)，仓库最低支持的 Node 22.19 已提供这些 API。后端启用 `ZSTD_c_checksumFlag`，其余采用 Node 默认值，不公开压缩级别调节项，也不增加依赖。Node 将该 API 标记为实验性，因此 Node 22.19、24 与 26 兼容性门禁会执行同一个辅助实现。
|
||||
|
||||
首次物化会在打开临时文件之前压缩两个初始帧，然后保留既有的写入、文件 `fsync`、避免冲突的硬链接发布与目录 `fsync` 顺序。后续批次也会先压缩，再打开目标并在 EOF 追加。捕获到写入或文件同步失败时，后端会截断到原有字节长度，同步回滚结果，再重新抛出错误，让协调器重试未变化的批次。
|
||||
首次物化会在打开临时文件之前压缩两个初始帧，然后写入该文件并执行 `fsync`。POSIX 通过避免冲突的硬链接和目录 `fsync` 发布该文件；Windows 通过 `MoveFileExW(..., MOVEFILE_WRITE_THROUGH)` 在不替换目标文件的情况下发布。后续批次也会先压缩，再打开目标并在 EOF 追加。捕获到写入或文件同步失败时，后端会关闭追加句柄，以读写方式重新打开日志，截断到原有字节长度，同步回滚结果，再重新抛出错误，让协调器能够在两个平台上重试未变化的批次。
|
||||
|
||||
### 读取、列举与崩溃恢复
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
|
||||
2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md: 013119508da9be426c417797cf7a0ec14e276814
|
||||
2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.zh.md: 8ae82884c3b80409d07d3bbcfc8c273e8b227dc8
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Preserve Windows DACLs during atomic file replacement
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
English | [中文](2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.zh.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
On Windows, creating the staging directory and temp file under the target's parent and relying only on inherited DACLs is sufficient for a new file, but not for replacing an existing file whose explicit or protected DACL is narrower than its parent: content is written under the broader parent DACL, and rename carries that staging descriptor onto the replacement.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-fs-local` reads an existing target's DACL with `GetFileSecurityW`, applies it to the empty temp file with inheritance protected before writing content, and publishes the closed temp with `ReplaceFileW`. The protected staging descriptor prevents the temp directory's inherited entries from broadening access; `ReplaceFileW` preserves the original target access policy and other replacement metadata. Its ACL merge may reserialize auto-inheritance state or duplicate equivalent ACEs, so self-relative descriptor buffers are not a stable equality contract. New files have no prior descriptor to preserve and continue to inherit the destination directory's DACL.
|
||||
|
||||
Native Windows coverage protects a target DACL, inspects the written staging file, and compares the final replacement's ordered, de-duplicated ACE policy. Host-independent binding tests cover Win32 error translation and every native call boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**Rely on directory inheritance for replacements.** Rejected because a target may carry a narrower explicit or protected DACL than its parent, so inheritance neither protects staged content nor preserves the target access policy.
|
||||
|
||||
**Use `ReplaceFileW` without protecting the temp.** Rejected because it repairs the final descriptor only after the content has already been written under the staging file's inherited DACL.
|
||||
|
||||
**Install an owner-only DACL for every write.** Rejected because it would discard deliberate project sharing. Copying the target DACL preserves the deployment's existing access policy instead of inventing one.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
Replacing a Windows file now requires permission to read the target DACL and set the temp DACL; failure is loud before content is written. The package carries Koffi for the narrow Win32 calls, loaded only on Windows replacement paths. New-file behavior remains directory-inherited, and POSIX mode behavior is unchanged.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Windows 原子文件替换期间保留 DACL
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
[English](2026-07-19-windows-atomic-write-dacl-preservation.md) | 中文
|
||||
|
||||
## 问题
|
||||
|
||||
在 Windows 上，在目标文件的父目录下创建暂存目录和临时文件，并且只依赖继承的 DACL，足以满足新建文件的需要，但无法安全替换显式或受保护 DACL 比父目录更严格的现有文件：内容会在权限更宽松的父目录 DACL 下写入，而重命名又会把这个暂存安全描述符带到替换后的文件上。
|
||||
|
||||
## 决策
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-fs-local` 通过 `GetFileSecurityW` 读取现有目标文件的 DACL，在写入内容前将其以禁止继承的形式应用到空临时文件，并通过 `ReplaceFileW` 发布已关闭的临时文件。受保护的暂存安全描述符可防止暂存目录中的继承条目扩大访问权限；`ReplaceFileW` 会保留原目标文件的访问策略及其他替换元数据。其 ACL 合并过程可能重新序列化自动继承状态或复制等价 ACE，因此不能把自相对安全描述符缓冲区的逐字节相等作为稳定契约。新建文件没有既有描述符需要保留，因此仍继承目标目录的 DACL。
|
||||
|
||||
Windows 原生覆盖率测试会保护目标文件的 DACL、检查写入完成的暂存文件，并对比最终替换文件中保持顺序且去重后的 ACE 策略。与宿主平台无关的绑定测试覆盖 Win32 错误转换以及每个原生调用边界。
|
||||
|
||||
## 备选方案
|
||||
|
||||
**替换文件时依赖目录继承。** 不予采用，因为目标文件可能带有比父目录更严格的显式或受保护 DACL；目录继承既无法保护暂存内容，也无法保留目标文件的访问策略。
|
||||
|
||||
**使用 `ReplaceFileW`，但不保护临时文件。** 不予采用，因为这只能在内容已经按暂存文件继承的 DACL 写入之后修复最终描述符。
|
||||
|
||||
**每次写入都设置仅所有者可访问的 DACL。** 不予采用，因为这会破坏项目有意设置的共享权限。复制目标文件的 DACL 可以保留部署中已有的访问策略，无需另行创设策略。
|
||||
|
||||
## 影响
|
||||
|
||||
替换 Windows 文件现在要求调用方有权读取目标 DACL 并设置临时文件 DACL；如果权限不足，系统会在写入内容前明确失败。该包（package）引入 Koffi 以执行少量 Win32 调用，并且只在 Windows 替换路径上加载。新建文件仍按目录继承，POSIX mode 行为保持不变。
|
||||
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
|
||||
2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md: 9b6312e5994469606bd1645902fc798f70258580
|
||||
2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md: d4816e03d94bdf12b2db875d71dccb7db3a2c0d7
|
||||
2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md: 0897695cc14b7573ebb53f3ffa6a460652882b37
|
||||
2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md: 15de061a0d2b18392f839c927e9b0f5d0cacf28b
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Three coordinated pieces, all composed from the leaf `cordis.yml`, none touching
|
||||
`packages/fs/fs-sandbox/` (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`) mirrors the `bash-local`/`bash-sandbox` split: `SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem`, registered as `ctx.fs`, injecting `sandboxPolicy`. Reads (`resolve`/`stat`/`readText`/`streamText`/`listDir`) pass through untouched — every mode permits reading. The two mutations enforce by mode before delegating to the inherited atomic write:
|
||||
|
||||
- `read-only` denies `writeText`/`editText` outright.
|
||||
- `workspace-write` fences the canonicalized target against the writable-root set — `writableRoots(policy)` in `dsh-sandbox`: the workspace root plus the platform temp areas (`/tmp`, `os.tmpdir()`), each realpathed — the SAME set the Seatbelt profile grants, so the fs fence is the fourth dialect of one mode meaning alongside the bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt profiles, and "the write tool cannot write `/tmp` but bash can" asymmetries cannot arise. Containment is prefix-inclusion on real paths; the target is re-canonicalized (`resolve` realpaths the deepest existing ancestor) immediately before delegating, so an ancestor symlink swapped since the tool resolved it is caught.
|
||||
- `workspace-write` fences the canonicalized target against the writable-root set — `writableRoots(policy)` in `dsh-sandbox`: the workspace root plus the platform temp areas (`/tmp`, `os.tmpdir()`), each realpathed — the SAME set the Seatbelt profile grants, so the fs fence is the fourth dialect of one mode meaning alongside the bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt profiles, and "the write tool cannot write `/tmp` but bash can" asymmetries cannot arise. Canonical spellings take a lexical containment fast path; when Windows exposes one directory through different casing or long-name/8.3 spellings, an ancestor walk compares filesystem identity rather than weakening the boundary to textual prefix guesses. The target is re-canonicalized (`resolve` realpaths the deepest existing ancestor) immediately before delegating, so an ancestor symlink swapped since the tool resolved it is caught.
|
||||
- `danger-full-access` delegates unfenced.
|
||||
|
||||
A denial is the structured `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED` carrying the effective mode — distinct from `FS_PERMISSION_DENIED` (a host EACCES is the world refusing; this is policy refusing). No text inference: an in-process fence knows exactly what it denied. The per-call carrier is a trailing optional `sandboxMode` on `writeText`/`editText` (the filesystem twin of `BashExecRequest.sandboxMode`); the seam stays session-free (the caller stamps, exactly as `resolve` takes a cwd), and the bare local backend carries-and-ignores it. `FileSystem.sandboxMode` is the capability fact (`undefined` on the base and `fs-local`, the default on `SandboxedFileSystem`), so the tool layer advertises escalation from composition truth.
|
||||
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ The sandbox Agent Note's original cross-family sketch put fs enforcement on the
|
||||
What shipped — the tiers in § Testing hold each:
|
||||
|
||||
- Under `read-only`, `write`/`edit` return the `[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]` marker and the disk is untouched; `read`/`listDir` behave identically to `dsh-fs-local`.
|
||||
- Under `workspace-write`, mutations land under the workspace root and the temp areas and are denied outside; the containment matrix — `..` traversal, absolute paths outside, a pre-existing symlinked directory inside pointing out, and a new file created under such a symlink — denies every escape on real disks.
|
||||
- Under `workspace-write`, mutations land under the workspace root and the temp areas and are denied outside; the containment matrix — `..` traversal, absolute paths outside, a pre-existing symlinked directory inside pointing out, a new file created under such a symlink, and alias-equivalent root spellings — denies every escape while admitting the same directory identity on real disks.
|
||||
- A denied fs mutation retried once with `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` prompts through the composed approval chain; a grant runs exactly that call under the wider mode and the write lands; rejected/cancelled/unavailable each produce their verbatim fail-closed text and mutate nothing.
|
||||
- One `permission` preset switch governs both families: after a session switches modes, the next bash call and the next fs mutation both honor the new mode from the same `sandbox/mode` fold.
|
||||
- A direct `ctx.fs.writeText` with no per-call stamp is confined at the deployment default.
|
||||
@@ -90,5 +90,5 @@ Costs and accepted limits:
|
||||
|
||||
## Testing
|
||||
|
||||
- Unit: `dsh-sandbox` pins the escalation ladder, the marker builders, the argument-pairing validation, and `approveEscalation`'s ordered fail-closed sequence (non-widening, no-approval, no-agent, each outcome), plus `writableRoots`/`canonicalPath`. `dsh-sandbox-policy` pins the default accessors, the fold/setter, the load-time mode rejection, and HMR safety. `dsh-fs-sandbox` pins the per-mode fence and the containment matrix (inside, temp area, absolute-outside, `..`, symlinked-out directory, new file under one, path-equals-root, root-ending-in-separator) on a real filesystem, plus the per-call override and HMR safety. `dsh-tool-fs` pins advertisement gating, the mode stamp, the fold, denial-marker mapping, and the full escalation matrix (grant, reject, no-service, no-agent, pairing, non-confining guard). `dsh-tool-bash`, `dsh-bash-sandbox`, and `dsh-permission` migrate to the relocated policy/kit.
|
||||
- Unit: `dsh-sandbox` pins the escalation ladder, the marker builders, the argument-pairing validation, and `approveEscalation`'s ordered fail-closed sequence (non-widening, no-approval, no-agent, each outcome), plus `writableRoots`/`canonicalPath`. `dsh-sandbox-policy` pins the default accessors, the fold/setter, the load-time mode rejection, and HMR safety. `dsh-fs-sandbox` pins the per-mode fence and the containment matrix (inside, temp area, absolute-outside, `..`, symlinked-out directory, new file under one, path-equals-root, filesystem-root, and alias-equivalent spelling) on a real filesystem, plus the per-call override and HMR safety. `dsh-tool-fs` pins advertisement gating, the mode stamp, the fold, denial-marker mapping, and the full escalation matrix (grant, reject, no-service, no-agent, pairing, non-confining guard). `dsh-tool-bash`, `dsh-bash-sandbox`, and `dsh-permission` migrate to the relocated policy/kit.
|
||||
- Snapshot: the acp-agent example composes `dsh-sandbox-policy` + `dsh-fs-sandbox`; the pinned header carries the fs escalation fields and the `sandbox/mode` event name, re-recorded once.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
`packages/fs/fs-sandbox/`(`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`)镜像 `bash-local`/`bash-sandbox` 的拆分:`SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem`,注册为 `ctx.fs`,注入 `sandboxPolicy`。读取(`resolve`/`stat`/`readText`/`streamText`/`listDir`)原样透传——每种模式都允许读。两个变更操作在委托给继承来的原子写之前按模式执行:
|
||||
|
||||
- `read-only` 直接拒绝 `writeText`/`editText`。
|
||||
- `workspace-write` 把规范化后的目标围栏于可写根集合——`dsh-sandbox` 中的 `writableRoots(policy)`:工作区根加上平台临时目录(`/tmp`、`os.tmpdir()`),各自 realpath——与 Seatbelt profile 授予的是同一个集合,所以 fs 围栏是这一个模式含义在 bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt profile 之外的第四种方言,因此不会出现「write 工具不能写 `/tmp` 而 bash 能」的不对称。包含判定是对真实路径的前缀包含;目标在委托前被立即重新规范化(`resolve` 对最深的既有祖先做 realpath),因此自工具解析该目标以来被换出的祖先符号链接会被捕获。
|
||||
- `workspace-write` 把规范化后的目标围栏于可写根集合——`dsh-sandbox` 中的 `writableRoots(policy)`:工作区根加上平台临时目录(`/tmp`、`os.tmpdir()`),各自 realpath——与 Seatbelt profile 授予的是同一个集合,所以 fs 围栏是这一个模式含义在 bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt profile 之外的第四种方言,因此不会出现「write 工具不能写 `/tmp` 而 bash 能」的不对称。规范化路径写法采用词法包含的快速路径；当 Windows 以大小写不同的路径、长文件名或 8.3 短文件名表示同一目录时，系统会逐级遍历祖先目录并比较文件系统身份，而不会把边界弱化为依据文本前缀猜测包含关系。目标在委托前被立即重新规范化(`resolve` 对最深的既有祖先做 realpath),因此自工具解析该目标以来被换出的祖先符号链接会被捕获。
|
||||
- `danger-full-access` 不加围栏地委托。
|
||||
|
||||
拒绝是结构化的 `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`,携带生效模式——区别于 `FS_PERMISSION_DENIED`(宿主 EACCES 是世界在拒绝;这里是策略在拒绝)。无文本推断:进程内围栏确切知道它拒绝了什么。per-call 载体是 `writeText`/`editText` 上一个末尾可选的 `sandboxMode`(文件系统侧对应 `BashExecRequest.sandboxMode`);该 seam 保持无会话依赖(由调用方盖章,正如 `resolve` 接收一个 cwd),而裸的本地后端携带并忽略它。`FileSystem.sandboxMode` 是能力事实(在基类与 `fs-local` 上为 `undefined`,在 `SandboxedFileSystem` 上为默认值),所以工具层按组合真相来宣告升级。
|
||||
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
已交付的部分——§ Testing 的各层各自钉住:
|
||||
|
||||
- 在 `read-only` 下,`write`/`edit` 返回 `[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]` 标记,磁盘不受触动;`read`/`listDir` 与 `dsh-fs-local` 行为一致。
|
||||
- 在 `workspace-write` 下,变更落在工作区根与临时目录下,其外被拒;包含矩阵——`..` 穿越、指向外部的绝对路径、一个既有的、指向外部的工作区内符号链接目录,以及在这样一个符号链接下新建的文件——在真实磁盘上拒绝每一种逃逸。
|
||||
- 在 `workspace-write` 下,变更落在工作区根与临时目录下,其外被拒;包含矩阵——`..` 穿越、指向外部的绝对路径、一个既有的、指向外部的工作区内符号链接目录、在这样一个符号链接下新建的文件,以及根路径的等价别名形式——在真实磁盘上拒绝每一种逃逸,同时允许文件系统认定为同一目录的路径。
|
||||
- 一个被拒的 fs 变更,携带 `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` 重试一次,会经组合的审批链提示;一次授权让恰好那一次调用在更宽的模式下运行且写入落盘;rejected/cancelled/unavailable 各自产生其逐字的 fail-closed 文案且不做任何变更。
|
||||
- 一次 `permission` 预设切换同时管辖两个家族:会话切换模式后,下一次 bash 调用与下一次 fs 变更都从同一个 `sandbox/mode` 折叠遵循新模式。
|
||||
- 一次无 per-call 盖章的直连 `ctx.fs.writeText` 会被围栏于部署默认值。
|
||||
@@ -90,5 +90,5 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Testing
|
||||
|
||||
- 单元:`dsh-sandbox` 钉住升级阶梯、标记构造器、参数配对校验,以及 `approveEscalation` 的有序 fail-closed 序列(非加宽、无 approval、无 agent、各结果),外加 `writableRoots`/`canonicalPath`。`dsh-sandbox-policy` 钉住默认访问器、折叠/setter、加载期模式拒绝,以及 HMR 安全。`dsh-fs-sandbox` 在真实文件系统上钉住 per-mode 围栏与包含矩阵(内部、临时目录、绝对路径-外部、`..`、指向外部的符号链接目录、其下的新建文件、路径等于根、以分隔符结尾的根),外加 per-call 覆盖与 HMR 安全。`dsh-tool-fs` 钉住宣告门控、模式盖章、折叠、拒绝标记映射,以及完整的升级矩阵(授权、拒绝、无服务、无 agent、配对、非受限守卫)。`dsh-tool-bash`、`dsh-bash-sandbox` 与 `dsh-permission` 迁移到迁移后的策略/工具集。
|
||||
- 单元:`dsh-sandbox` 钉住升级阶梯、标记构造器、参数配对校验,以及 `approveEscalation` 的有序 fail-closed 序列(非加宽、无 approval、无 agent、各结果),外加 `writableRoots`/`canonicalPath`。`dsh-sandbox-policy` 钉住默认访问器、折叠/setter、加载期模式拒绝,以及 HMR 安全。`dsh-fs-sandbox` 在真实文件系统上钉住 per-mode 围栏与包含矩阵(内部、临时目录、绝对路径-外部、`..`、指向外部的符号链接目录、其下的新建文件、路径等于根、文件系统根、等价别名形式),外加 per-call 覆盖与 HMR 安全。`dsh-tool-fs` 钉住宣告门控、模式盖章、折叠、拒绝标记映射,以及完整的升级矩阵(授权、拒绝、无服务、无 agent、配对、非受限守卫)。`dsh-tool-bash`、`dsh-bash-sandbox` 与 `dsh-permission` 迁移到迁移后的策略/工具集。
|
||||
- 快照:acp-agent 示例组合 `dsh-sandbox-policy` + `dsh-fs-sandbox`;被钉住的 header 携带 fs 升级字段与 `sandbox/mode` 事件名,一次性重录。
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ The repo secret is named `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY_EXTERNAL`; it is mapped to the `DEEPS
|
||||
|
||||
The job runs only `test:e2e` on Node 24; keyless gates and version compatibility belong to the main CI workflow. Tests run unbuilt through the workspace paths map with a bounded configurable worker pool, per-test retries, and a job timeout. Superseded PR runs are cancelled, while push and scheduled runs complete for post-merge signal.
|
||||
|
||||
The DeepSeek native `web_search` probe is registered but skipped. The live Anthropic-compatible endpoint can return a successful response without structured source blocks, so its positive-source assertion is not a reliable merge signal; unit coverage still pins response parsing, but CI does not prove the live source-block wire shape.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security
|
||||
|
||||
The repository's first CI secret requires a recorded threat model because access differs between same-repository, fork, and Dependabot pull requests and changes when the repository becomes public.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
|
||||
2026-07-22-cross-platform-test-fixtures.md: 6217aabfdbe8f14f869004c8dafb7e19f4b7443a
|
||||
2026-07-22-cross-platform-test-fixtures.zh.md: 43942ec0468df822d04b39e318010c2b260c734f
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Keep supported-platform tests semantic
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
English | [中文](2026-07-22-cross-platform-test-fixtures.zh.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
The unit and coverage suites run on Windows, macOS, and Linux, but a platform-neutral behavior can be hidden behind a platform-specific fixture. Literal POSIX paths become drive-relative paths on Windows, a hosted `file:` URI can be a valid UNC path there, and child-pipe closure or event-loop scheduling does not settle at the same point on every host. POSIX-only filesystem states such as FIFOs, executable mode bits, and directory search bits have no direct Windows fixture.
|
||||
|
||||
Treating fixture syntax as product behavior either reports false regressions or encourages production normalization that erases native path semantics.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
Tests of platform-neutral behavior construct absolute paths and `file:` URIs with the host's `node:path` and `node:url` APIs, then assert native absolute output or stable workspace-relative output as the contract requires. Invalid-URI fixtures use encodings rejected by `fileURLToPath()` on every supported platform.
|
||||
|
||||
Transport-failure tests inject the connection's message writer and deliver the same asynchronous write callback error that a real Node stream would report. The production writer still writes framed messages to child stdin. This keeps a real child alive while the test deterministically distinguishes transport failure from process exit without reaching into platform-specific pipe handles.
|
||||
|
||||
Language-server teardown targets the whole descendant tree through a negative process-group id on POSIX and synchronous `taskkill /T /F` on Windows. Windows suppresses only taskkill's already-absent-tree status; command, permission, and other tree-kill failures remain teardown failures. A read-only provider query retries once only when its selected pooled transport fails before or during that query; errors from a still-live server are not replayed. Terminal tests wait for their observable rendered output instead of assuming one event-loop turn is sufficient.
|
||||
|
||||
Tests for a genuinely POSIX-only primitive use a narrow Windows exclusion on that case. Adjacent cross-platform cases continue to pin non-regular file rejection, unavailable command rejection, and inaccessible working-directory rejection. Supported Windows paths remain inside the per-file coverage gate rather than being excluded with their test files.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**Normalize all paths and URIs to POSIX strings.** This would make assertions uniform but would change correct Windows behavior: external paths are native absolute paths, UNC file URIs are valid, and configured homes resolve through the host path rules.
|
||||
|
||||
**Manipulate child-pipe internals until a write fails.** CRT descriptors and libuv handles have different ownership across hosts and Node versions, so this would test undocumented fixture machinery instead of the connection's write-failure contract.
|
||||
|
||||
**Skip whole files or packages on Windows.** Broad exclusions would hide supported behavior. Only the individual fixture whose state cannot exist on Windows is excluded; the surrounding contract remains covered.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
Portable fixtures are slightly more explicit because expected paths derive from shared native constants and transport failures enter through a narrow writer seam. Platform-only exclusions require a neighboring cross-platform assertion for the product behavior they support. Windows teardown depends on the host `taskkill` command after graceful protocol shutdown has failed; a successful synchronous result keeps disposal bounded and makes descendant exit observable before cleanup returns, while a failed tree kill remains visible to the disposer.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: 让受支持平台的测试聚焦语义
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
[English](2026-07-22-cross-platform-test-fixtures.md) | 中文
|
||||
|
||||
## 问题
|
||||
|
||||
单元测试与覆盖率测试套件会在 Windows、macOS 和 Linux 上运行，但平台无关行为可能被平台特有的 fixture（测试前置数据）掩盖。字面 POSIX 路径在 Windows 上会变成相对于驱动器的路径；带主机名的 `file:` URI 在 Windows 上可能是有效的 UNC 路径；子进程管道关闭或事件循环调度在不同宿主上的稳定时点也不一致。FIFO、可执行模式位和目录搜索权限位等仅存在于 POSIX 的文件系统状态，在 Windows 上没有可直接构造的 fixture。
|
||||
|
||||
把 fixture 语法当成产品行为，要么会误报回归，要么会促使生产代码引入抹去原生路径语义的归一化。
|
||||
|
||||
## 决策
|
||||
|
||||
测试平台无关行为时，使用宿主的 `node:path` 和 `node:url` API 构造绝对路径与 `file:` URI，再根据契约要求断言原生绝对输出或稳定的工作区相对输出。无效 URI fixture 使用一种在所有受支持平台上都会被 `fileURLToPath()` 拒绝的编码形式。
|
||||
|
||||
传输故障测试会注入连接的消息写入器，并传入与真实 Node 流相同的异步写入回调错误。生产写入器仍会把分帧消息写入子进程 stdin。这种方式让真实子进程保持存活，使测试无需触及平台特有的管道句柄，也能确定性地区分传输故障与进程退出。
|
||||
|
||||
语言服务器的资源清理会终止整棵后代进程树：POSIX 使用负数进程组 ID，Windows 同步执行 `taskkill /T /F`。Windows 只会忽略 taskkill 返回的「进程树已经不存在」状态；命令执行失败、权限错误及其他终止进程树的失败仍属于资源清理失败。只读的提供方查询仅在选定的池化传输于该次查询开始前或执行期间失效时重试一次；服务器仍存活时返回的错误不会重放。终端测试会等待可观察的渲染输出，不假设一次事件循环轮转已经足够。
|
||||
|
||||
对于真正仅存在于 POSIX 的原语，测试只在该用例上排除 Windows。相邻的跨平台用例仍会固定拒绝非普通文件、不可用命令和无法访问的工作目录的行为。Windows 上受支持的路径仍受逐文件覆盖率门禁约束，不会随测试文件一起排除。
|
||||
|
||||
## 曾考虑的替代方案
|
||||
|
||||
**将所有路径和 URI 归一化为 POSIX 字符串。**这会使断言保持一致，但也会改变正确的 Windows 行为：外部路径是原生绝对路径，UNC 文件 URI 有效，而且已配置的主目录会按照宿主路径规则解析。
|
||||
|
||||
**操纵子进程管道内部状态，直至写入失败。**CRT 描述符与 libuv 句柄在不同宿主和 Node 版本上的所有权不同，因此这种做法测试的是未文档化的 fixture 机制，而非连接的写入失败契约。
|
||||
|
||||
**在 Windows 上跳过整个测试文件或包。**过宽的排除会隐藏受支持的行为。只排除无法在 Windows 上构造相应状态的单项 fixture；相关契约仍保持覆盖。
|
||||
|
||||
## 后果
|
||||
|
||||
可移植 fixture 需要更显式地构造，因为预期路径要从共享的原生常量派生，传输故障则通过狭窄的写入器 seam 注入。仅适用于特定平台的排除项必须配有相邻的跨平台断言，以继续覆盖相应的产品行为。协议级优雅关停失败后，Windows 上的资源清理依赖宿主的 `taskkill` 命令；命令同步执行成功时，dispose 的完成边界明确，并确保清理返回前即可观察到后代进程退出；若进程树终止失败，dispose 的调用方仍能观察到该失败。
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user