Coder/deepseek-harness
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/trim-ai-prose

Browse Source 
# Conflicts:
#	docs/AGENTS.md
#	docs/config-catalog.md
#	packages/bash/bash-sandbox/src/index.ts
#	packages/bash/bash/src/session-mode.ts
#	packages/bash/tool-bash/README.md
#	packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/README.md
#	packages/compact/compact/src/index.ts
#	packages/core/agent-core/README.md
#	packages/hooks/hooks-claude/src/config.ts
#	packages/hooks/hooks-claude/src/index.ts
#	packages/hooks/hooks-codex/src/config.ts
#	packages/hooks/hooks-codex/src/index.ts
#	packages/llm/llm/README.md
#	packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-jsonl/README.md
#	packages/session-persistence/session-persistence/README.md
#	packages/skill/skill-local/README.md
#	packages/support/acp-snapshot/README.md
#	packages/support/invariants/src/index.ts
#	packages/ui/acp/README.md
#	packages/ui/jsonrpc-agent/README.md
#	packages/ui/jsonrpc/README.md
#	packages/ui/permission/README.md
#	packages/ui/user-approval/README.md
#	packages/ui/user-interaction/README.md
#	packages/web/web-search-deepseek/README.md
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
2026-07-14 14:37:16 +08:00
parent 1ab64dba62 6e5c908a1b
commit 8590ba00a4
105 changed files with 2343 additions and 339 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

36
packages/ui/user-approval/README.md
View File

@@ -8,4 +8,38 @@ Answerers are `approval/request` waterfall listeners. Return an outcome to answe
`ApprovalPolicy` is `'ask'` or `'never'`. The effective value is the last `approval/policy` event, falling back to config; `setApprovalPolicy()` is the write path. `'never'` rejects before interactive dispatch and is the only policy stated in the prompt. Switches produce at most one coalesced notice whose header marker distinguishes user changes from operator/config changes.
The tools pipeline consumes this seam for `ask` decisions and the sandboxed bash tool uses it for escalated retries. See the [approval-seam RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md) and [sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
The tools pipeline routes `ask` decisions through this seam and fails closed when it is absent; the sandboxed bash tool also uses it for escalated retries. The ACP bridge is the shipped human answerer for calls it owns. Audit events remain log-only, so the model sees only the asking consumer's result. See the [approval-seam RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md) and [sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
## Model Experience
### System prompt and policy notice
**What the model sees**: Under `ask`, every agent request carries the ask-policy prompt section below. Under `never`, it carries the never-policy prompt section below. A policy switch injects exactly `The approval policy changed from "<old>" to "<new>" (changed by the user).` or `The approval policy changed from "<old>" to "<new>" (changed by the operator/config).` before the next step.
**Token effect**: Small fixed per-request cost, larger under `never`; a change notice is conditional and retained in history.
#### Ask-policy prompt section
```markdown
<!-- dsh-user-approval-policy:ask -->
```
#### Never-policy prompt section
```markdown
Approval prompts are disabled in this session: actions that require approval are rejected automatically — do not request sandbox escalation (do not set `sandbox_permissions`).
<!-- dsh-user-approval-policy:never -->
```
### Tool outcome
**What the model sees**: `approval/asked` and `approval/decided` are log-only. The model sees only the asking consumer's eventual allowed, rejected, cancelled, or unavailable tool outcome; the human permission UI is not context.
**Token effect**: Zero duplicate audit tokens. A rejection may replace a normal tool result with a small retained error, while an allowance leaves the consumer's ordinary result.
## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- **Requests are valid only inside an open turn** — an idle or between-turn caller throws before auditing; a durable out-of-turn approval workflow is deferred.
- **Only one-shot grants exist** — the outcome vocabulary has `allowed-once` but no `allow-always`, remembered rule, revocation, or grant store; session policy is only `ask` / `never`.
- **The request carries no tool arguments** — a UI must correlate `callId` with an already rendered tool call, and a call-less request cannot be presented by the shipped ACP answerer.
- **No built-in answerer** — headless or incompletely composed deployments resolve `unavailable` and fail closed; the service itself never prompts a human.