Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into worktree/provider-routed-llm-adapters

# Conflicts:
#	docs/config-catalog.md
#	docs/cordis-catalog/events.md
#	docs/cordis-catalog/services.md
#	docs/core-data-structures/core.md
#	docs/event-producer-consumer.md
#	docs/persistence-catalog.md
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/session.1.jsonl
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/session.2.jsonl
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/session.jsonl
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/session.jsonl
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/hook-cc-pretool-ask/session.jsonl
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/skill-load/session.jsonl
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/text-turn/session.jsonl
#	examples/sandbox-acp-agent/cordis.yml
#	examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/session.jsonl
#	examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-rejected/session.jsonl
#	examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/snapshots/mode-switching/session.jsonl
#	packages/compact/compact-basic/README.md
#	packages/compact/compact-basic/src/index.ts
#	packages/compact/compact-basic/tests/compact-basic.spec.ts
#	packages/core/agent-loop/README.md
#	packages/core/agent-loop/src/loop.ts
#	packages/core/agent-loop/tests/properties.spec.ts
#	packages/core/session/README.md
#	packages/core/session/src/types.ts
#	packages/core/session/tests/derived-cache.spec.ts
#	packages/llm/llm-deepseek/src/index.ts
#	packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/README.md
#	packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/src/adapter.ts
#	packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/src/convert.ts
#	packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/tests/adapter.spec.ts
#	packages/llm/llm/README.md
#	packages/llm/llm/src/call-config.ts
#	packages/llm/llm/src/index.ts
#	packages/ui/acp-agent/src/index.ts
#	packages/ui/acp/tests/harness.ts
#	packages/ui/jsonrpc/README.md
#	packages/ui/jsonrpc/src/server.ts
#	packages/ui/stdio-agent/README.md
#	packages/ui/stdio-agent/src/index.ts
#	python/sdk/README.i18n.yaml
This commit is contained in:
Yichen Jiang
2026-07-14 22:17:50 +08:00
672 changed files with 10295 additions and 14200 deletions

View File

@@ -48,12 +48,7 @@ describe('cordis_mount', () => {
})
it('normalizes a self-made tool\'s result into the host realm, so the session log accepts it', async () => {
// The model's execute builds its content blocks INSIDE the vm, where
// Object.prototype is a different object — dsh-session's isJsonValue (the
// gate every `tool/result` append runs through) compares prototype
// IDENTITY, so a raw foreign-realm result would error the whole turn the
// first time the self-made tool runs. harness.defineTool round-trips the
// return into host-realm JSON before it reaches the registry.
// VM-realm objects fail the session prototype-identity check; normalize them into host JSON.
const ctx = await setup()
await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', { code: REVERSE_TOOL_CODE })
const reversed = await call(ctx, 'reverse_text', { text: 'harness' })
@@ -94,11 +89,8 @@ describe('cordis_mount', () => {
['object-form blocks missing the type tag', 'return { content: [{ text: \'hi\' }] }', '{"content":[{"text":"hi"}]}'],
['undefined — a forgotten return', 'return undefined', 'undefined'],
])('rejects an execute return of %s as that one call\'s teaching error', async (_label, returnStatement, preview) => {
// The failure this prevents: the registry trusts the return shape
// (postExecute spreads result.content), so an unvalidated { content: 'ok' }
// would enter the session log as ['o','k'] and silently corrupt the next
// model request. The shape check turns it into THIS call's error instead —
// one well-formed text block the log and the model can digest.
// The registry spreads result.content, so { content: 'ok' } would become ['o','k']; reject
// it as this call's error before it corrupts the next request.
const ctx = await setup()
await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: `
@@ -150,10 +142,8 @@ describe('cordis_mount', () => {
})
it('accepts a JSON-Schema-style parameters wrapper and normalizes it to the DSL', async () => {
// The dialect models write by strong prior: the { type:'object',
// properties, required: […] } wrapper, `type: 'integer'`, and
// `required: false`. All of it has exactly one meaning — normalize instead
// of burning a model turn on a lecture.
// These common JSON-Schema spellings each have one DSL meaning, so normalize rather than
// consume another model turn with a rejection.
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: `
@@ -535,10 +525,9 @@ describe('cordis_mount', () => {
})
it('makes instanceof inside the sandbox see BOTH realms (patched vm constructors, host untouched)', async () => {
// The args a tool's execute receives are HOST-realm objects; without the
// dual-realm Symbol.hasInstance prelude, `args.items instanceof Array` in
// sandbox code is silently false. The patch lives on the vm realm's own
// constructors only — the host realm's must stay pristine.
// The args a tool's execute receives are HOST-realm objects; without the dual-realm
// Symbol.hasInstance prelude, `args.items instanceof Array` in sandbox code is silently
// false.
const ctx = await setup()
await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: `

View File

@@ -2,13 +2,10 @@ import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import { call, setup, text } from './helpers.ts'
/**
* The sandbox context façade is a whitelist, not a pass-through proxy: mount
* code reaches only the registration/eventing verbs, the timer helpers, a
* guarded `tools`, and its injected services. Every framework-plumbing member
* that could hand back an UNGUARDED context — through which a plugin could
* `ctx.<escape>.tools.register({…})` to bypass the marker check and host-realm
* normalization — is denied. These are the regression guards for that escape
* class (the review finding on the original pass-through proxy).
* The sandbox context façade is a whitelist, not a pass-through proxy. Mounted code reaches only
* registration/eventing verbs, timer helpers, guarded tools, and injected services. Framework
* members that expose an unguarded context are denied because they could bypass marker checks and
* host-realm normalization; these tests pin that escape class.
*/
/** Mount a plugin whose `apply` touches one framework member, and report the error text. */
@@ -77,10 +74,8 @@ describe('sandbox context façade — escape surface is closed', () => {
it('denies a service whose method returns a Context (the .ctx escape), registering nothing', async () => {
// A cordis Service instance carries `.ctx` (a real Context), so
// `ctx.systemPrompt.ctx.root.tools.register(…)` would be a fresh unguarded
// handle. The service wrapper's return-value guard rejects any Context on
// the way back to sandbox code, so the escape never lands. (`systemPrompt`
// is in the setup harness, so the plugin activates and its apply runs.)
// `ctx.systemPrompt.ctx.root.tools.register(…)` would escape the façade; service-return
// guards reject that Context before the registration lands.
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: `
@@ -104,10 +99,8 @@ describe('sandbox context façade — escape surface is closed', () => {
})
it('guards an async injected-service method: a host-realm Promise resolves through the guard', async () => {
// The return guard's Promise arm only fires for a HOST-realm Promise
// (a vm-realm one is not `instanceof` the host `Promise`). Provide a
// host-realm service from the test, then inject + await it from a mount:
// the resolved value is non-Context data and passes through.
// The return guard's Promise arm only fires for a HOST-realm Promise (a vm-realm one is not
// `instanceof` the host `Promise`).
const ctx = await setup()
ctx.plugin({
name: 'host-async-svc',
@@ -194,11 +187,8 @@ describe('sandbox context façade — inject gate on services', () => {
})
it('a cross-mount consumer must declare the provider — the undeclared path is refused, not left as a zombie tool', async () => {
// The finding's scenario: a consumer registers a tool built on a provider's
// service WITHOUT declaring inject. cordis would then never park the
// consumer when the provider unmounts, leaving a tool that fails only at
// execution. The gate refuses the undeclared access up front, so the
// dependency is always visible to cordis.
// Without declared inject, Cordis cannot park the consumer when its provider unmounts. The
// façade refuses access up front instead of leaving a zombie tool.
const ctx = await setup()
await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: 'return { name: \'greeter-provider\', apply(ctx) { ctx.provide(\'greeter\', { greet: (n) => \'hi \' + n }) } }',
@@ -231,11 +221,9 @@ describe('sandbox context façade — inject gate on services', () => {
describe('sandbox tools façade — get is a read-only schema view', () => {
it('ctx.tools.get returns a schema, not the live ToolDefinition with execute', async () => {
// The finding: returning the raw ToolDefinition hands mount code the
// tool's execute function, letting it bypass ToolRegistry.execute (and its
// pre/post hooks). get now returns the same name/description/parameters
// view as schemas(), with no execute. Asserted via a self-made tool that
// reports the shape it saw — world-checked, not self-reported.
// The finding: returning the raw ToolDefinition hands mount code the tool's execute
// function, letting it bypass ToolRegistry.execute (and its pre/post hooks). get now
// returns the same name/description/parameters view as schemas(), with no execute.
const ctx = await setup()
await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: `