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fix(bundle): drop the approval service from the Windows layer entirely

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The Windows layer previously kept the approval service with policy 'never',
which made the approval plugin inject 'Approval prompts are disabled in
this session: actions that require approval are rejected automatically'
into the model context. On Windows nothing asks for approval — the
escalation surfaces (sandbox_permissions) do not exist — so the sentence
described a rejection surface that is not there. The layer now disables
the approval row too: the service is absent, the model is never told
approval exists, and the danger-full-access degradation is complete.

base.spec.ts pins approval among the Windows disables; the Agent Note and
bundle README record the absent service.
This commit is contained in:
Huanqi Cao
2026-08-07 01:41:32 +08:00
parent acac2149a5
commit 73c6f35171
9 changed files with 31 additions and 26 deletions
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4
packages/bundle/base/README.md
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ English | [中文](README.zh.md)
The shared dsh core as a profile bundle: [`cordis.patch.yml`](cordis.patch.yml) inserts every base plugin row — model adapters, tools, persistence, policy, settings/credentials, repository Plugins, telemetry — over the empty profile root, as the first layer of every profile's `dsh.profile.bundles` list. Later bundle layers (e.g. [`dsh-web-app`](../web-app/README.md)) and the user's profile `cordis.patch.yml` override these rows by id; a patch replaces a row's whole `config`, so mode-specific values live in mode bundles, not here. The package has no runtime API; the profile composer resolves the universal patch through the `dsh.bundle.patch` manifest field, and the launcher reads the Windows platform layer below from code on win32 hosts.
Windows hosts booting a shipped profile additionally receive [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](windows.cordis.patch.yml): it disables the POSIX-only sandboxed stacks — the bash executor/tool, the permission switcher (dsh-permission requires a confining executor), and the sandbox/fs-policy stack — and inserts the PowerShell executor and tool (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`, `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`) plus the unconfined `dsh-fs-local`, with the approval policy set to `never`. Windows has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the shipped posture is honest danger-full-access rather than a boundary only the fs tools pretend to enforce. The launcher applies the layer between the bundle layers and the user layers on win32 hosts; a Windows host that prefers the bash stack overrides these rows through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml`. POSIX hosts never receive it.
Windows hosts booting a shipped profile additionally receive [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](windows.cordis.patch.yml): it disables the POSIX-only sandboxed stacks — the bash executor/tool, the permission switcher (dsh-permission requires a confining executor), the sandbox/fs-policy stack, and the approval service — and inserts the PowerShell executor and tool (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`, `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`) plus the unconfined `dsh-fs-local`. Windows has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the shipped posture is honest danger-full-access rather than a boundary only the fs tools pretend to enforce; nothing in the roster asks for approval, so the approval service is absent. The launcher applies the layer between the bundle layers and the user layers on win32 hosts; a Windows host that prefers the bash stack overrides these rows through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml`. POSIX hosts never receive it.
The row set and its rationale are documented inline in the patch file; the [generated composition graph](../../../apps/cli/composition.md) renders it.
@@ -19,4 +19,4 @@ None directly; each inserted row's package owns its effect.
## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- **A patch replaces whole row configs** — profile overrides must restate every field a row keeps; there is no deep-merge layer.
- **Windows has no sandbox** — no OS runner exists on win32 (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the Windows platform layer removes the whole sandbox stack: `sandbox`/`sandbox-policy`/`fs-sandbox` are disabled, `dsh-fs-local` provides `ctx.fs`, the permission switcher leaves the roster, and the approval policy is `never`. Everything degrades to danger-full-access: the shell is unconfined and the fs tools make no confinement claims.
- **Windows has no sandbox and no approval** — no OS runner exists on win32 (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the Windows platform layer removes the whole sandbox stack (`sandbox`/`sandbox-policy`/`fs-sandbox` disabled, `dsh-fs-local` provides `ctx.fs`), the permission switcher leaves the roster, and the approval service is disabled — nothing on Windows asks for approval, so the model is never told approval exists. Everything degrades to danger-full-access: the shell is unconfined and the fs tools make no confinement claims.