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Merge branch 'codex/invariant-package-registration-gate' into codex/package-invariant-checks

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# Conflicts:
#	.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-package-invariant-runtime-contracts.i18n.yaml
#	.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-package-invariant-runtime-contracts.md
#	.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-package-invariant-runtime-contracts.zh.md
#	.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-package-owned-invariant-service.i18n.yaml
#	docs/rfc/INDEX.md
#	packages/AGENTS.md
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
2026-07-20 00:54:28 +08:00
parent 941b0411d8 6520f71f94
commit 684fcf3357
683 changed files with 7058 additions and 2430 deletions
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6
packages/web/web-fetch-local/README.md
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@@ -38,8 +38,12 @@ The numeric limits are validated at plugin construction: every cap except `maxRe
Indirectly, through [`dsh-tool-web`](../tool-web/README.md), which places this provider's `maxBodyChars`-bounded decoded text or markdown-shaped HTML under its fetch-result wrapper and retains provider failures while redirects, headers, and transport mechanics remain hidden.
#### KV Cache effect
No direct invalidation; the named consumer owns any request-prefix changes.
## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- **SSRF / private-network protection is deferred** — no blocking of private, loopback, link-local, multicast, or otherwise non-public destinations, no DNS-resolve-then-validate, no per-hop re-validation (see [the web capability seam RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-24-web-capability-seam.md)). Until it lands, this provider is an SSRF primitive and **must not be enabled** in a deployment that can reach sensitive internal network targets.
- **SSRF / private-network protection is deferred** — no blocking of private, loopback, link-local, multicast, or otherwise non-public destinations, no DNS-resolve-then-validate, no per-hop re-validation (see [the web capability seam Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-06-24-web-capability-seam.md)). Until it lands, this provider is an SSRF primitive and **must not be enabled** in a deployment that can reach sensitive internal network targets.
- **Only textual content decodes** — html/xhtml and `text/*`-plus-JSON/XML families; a missing `Content-Type` or any binary type throws `WEB_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE`, and text-extractable PDF decoding is named deferred work.
- **Charset comes only from the `Content-Type` header** (UTF-8 default) — an HTML `<meta charset>` declaration is ignored, and a declared-but-unrecognized charset label throws rather than falling back.

2
packages/web/web-fetch-local/src/policy.ts
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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ export type FetchableKind = 'html' | 'text'
* Validate a request URL against the basic transport hygiene the provider
* enforces before any network access: http(s) only, no embedded credentials,
* bounded length. Returns the parsed `URL`. Throws {@link WebError} otherwise.
* (SSRF / private-network blocking is deferred — see the package RFC.)
* (SSRF / private-network blocking is deferred — see the package Agent Note.)
*
* @param input - the raw URL string from the fetch request.
* @param maxUrlLength - inclusive upper bound on `input`'s length.