Merge branch 'codex/invariant-package-registration-gate' into codex/package-invariant-checks
# Conflicts: # .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-package-invariant-runtime-contracts.i18n.yaml # .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-package-invariant-runtime-contracts.md # .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-package-invariant-runtime-contracts.zh.md # .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-19-package-owned-invariant-service.i18n.yaml # docs/rfc/INDEX.md # packages/AGENTS.md
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
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# sandbox/ — process-sandbox capability family
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The confinement half of the [capability-seam split](../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md): an abstract provider interface and platform backends. Consumers hand `ctx.sandbox` the exact argv they are about to spawn and spawn the returned (wrapped) argv instead; policy (`SandboxPolicy`: mode + workspace root) rides each call, so different consumers confine under different policies at the same instant. All **product** packages.
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The confinement half of the [capability-seam split](../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md): an abstract provider interface and platform backends. Consumers hand `ctx.sandbox` the exact argv they are about to spawn and spawn the returned (wrapped) argv instead; policy (`SandboxPolicy`: mode + workspace root) rides each call, so different consumers confine under different policies at the same instant. All **product** packages.
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| Package | Role | ctx key |
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|---|---|---|
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| `sandbox/` | Abstract process-sandbox seam (the `SandboxProvider` contract + the mode/enforcement/policy vocabulary) | `ctx.sandbox` |
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| `sandbox-local/` | Local backends by platform chain: Linux `bwrap` else the `landlock-run` launcher (the npm-distributed [`node-addon-landlock-run`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/node-addon-landlock-run) family, built and released from its own repository), darwin `sandbox-exec`/Seatbelt — multi-candidate chains functionally probed, sole candidates selected directly, verdict cached, fail-closed | (registers `ctx.sandbox`) |
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The seam confines SAME-WORLD subprocesses only (shared filesystem and kernel). Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends here — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups; the boundary is recorded in [the sandbox RFC](../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
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The seam confines SAME-WORLD subprocesses only (shared filesystem and kernel). Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends here — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups; the boundary is recorded in [the sandbox Agent Note](../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
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Consumers today: [`bash/bash-sandbox`](../bash/bash-sandbox/) (wraps `['bash', '-c', command]`; see [the acp-agent example's default composition](../../examples/acp-agent/) for the composed leaf). In-process tools (fs/web) cannot be confined by an OS wrapper — their sandbox semantics are policy at their own seams (the sandbox RFC's cross-family phase).
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Consumers today: [`bash/bash-sandbox`](../bash/bash-sandbox/) (wraps `['bash', '-c', command]`; see [the acp-agent example's default composition](../../examples/acp-agent/) for the composed leaf). In-process tools (fs/web) cannot be confined by an OS wrapper — their sandbox semantics are policy at their own seams (the sandbox Agent Note's cross-family phase).
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The package root exports the default and named `LocalSandboxProvider` plugin, `Config`, and its public test-injection seam; platform profile builders stay internal.
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Unsupported platforms and unusable runners fail closed with `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`; execution never silently falls through unconfined. Each wrap carries runner-failure signatures so consumers can distinguish a broken sandbox from a command failure. The [sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) owns selection rationale and profile differences.
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Unsupported platforms and unusable runners fail closed with `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`; execution never silently falls through unconfined. Each wrap carries runner-failure signatures so consumers can distinguish a broken sandbox from a command failure. The [sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) owns selection rationale and profile differences.
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Policy is per call; the provider stores only the mechanism and cached runner verdict. Each wrap reports enforcement completeness plus backend-specific denial and runner-failure signatures. `runnerCommand` is an operator assertion of a bwrap-shaped runner and skips probes, but missing or unexecutable commands still fail closed at execution. Because its mechanism is unknown, it carries both Linux denial dialects. `probeTimeoutMs` bounds functional probes. The [sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) owns selection and failure semantics.
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Policy is per call; the provider stores only the mechanism and cached runner verdict. Each wrap reports enforcement completeness plus backend-specific denial and runner-failure signatures. `runnerCommand` is an operator assertion of a bwrap-shaped runner and skips probes, but missing or unexecutable commands still fail closed at execution. Because its mechanism is unknown, it carries both Linux denial dialects. `probeTimeoutMs` bounds functional probes. The [sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) owns selection and failure semantics.
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The Seatbelt profile is allow-default with `(deny file-write*)` plus write allow-lists, so exactly the mode's promised file effects are governed: `read-only` grants the `/dev/null` literal alone; `workspace-write` adds the workspace root, `/tmp`, and the per-user darwin temp dir (`os.tmpdir()` — the platform's real temp area for mkstemp-family tools), every root canonicalized because Seatbelt matches resolved paths (`/tmp` IS `/private/tmp`). Apple marks the `sandbox-exec` CLI deprecated but ships it on every macOS; the functional probe is what fails closed if that ever changes.
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@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ Consumers: [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/); see [the
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Indirectly, through [`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/README.md) and [`dsh-tool-bash`](../../bash/tool-bash/README.md), which render this provider's enforcement and denial facts while the [`dsh-sandbox`](../sandbox/README.md) seam owns the `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` text and runner selection and profiles stay outside context.
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#### KV Cache effect
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No direct invalidation; the named consumer owns any request-prefix changes.
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## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
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- **Windows has no runner** — `win32` fails closed with `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`; an AppContainer-family backend is deferred.
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# @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox
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Abstract process-sandbox seam. Owns the `ctx.sandbox` service contract ([`SandboxProvider`](src/index.ts)) and the confinement vocabulary the harness shares: `SandboxMode` (`read-only` / `workspace-write` / `danger-full-access`, file effects only), `SandboxEnforcement` (`full` / `partial`, per kernel ABI), `SandboxPolicy` (per-CALL policy — mode + workspace root), and the fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error. Interface package of the [capability-seam split](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md): depends only on cordis (+ the harness error base), never on a backend.
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Abstract process-sandbox seam. Owns the `ctx.sandbox` service contract ([`SandboxProvider`](src/index.ts)) and the confinement vocabulary the harness shares: `SandboxMode` (`read-only` / `workspace-write` / `danger-full-access`, file effects only), `SandboxEnforcement` (`full` / `partial`, per kernel ABI), `SandboxPolicy` (per-CALL policy — mode + workspace root), and the fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error. Interface package of the [capability-seam split](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md): depends only on cordis (+ the harness error base), never on a backend.
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The contract in one line: `ctx.sandbox.confine(argv, policy)` returns the argv to spawn INSTEAD of your own — wrapped so the process (and everything it spawns) runs confined — plus two facts about the selected backend: the enforcement completeness it achieves and its denial dialect (`denialSignatures`, the stderr substrings its kernel prints on a denied file effect — what stderr-inferring consumers match instead of a cross-backend union); when no backend is usable it throws rather than passing the argv through unconfined.
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Policy rides the call, not the provider: two consumers may confine under different policies at the same instant (bash under `read-only` while a confined child agent keeps its state directory writable), and an approved escalated retry is just a new call with a wider policy.
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**Same-world confinement only.** A backend shares the host's filesystem and kernel (`bwrap`, Landlock, Seatbelt); `workspaceRoot` names a real host path. Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends of this seam — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups. The boundary and its rationale: [the sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
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**Same-world confinement only.** A backend shares the host's filesystem and kernel (`bwrap`, Landlock, Seatbelt); `workspaceRoot` names a real host path. Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends of this seam — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups. The boundary and its rationale: [the sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
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Implementations: [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`](../sandbox-local/) (Linux: `bwrap`, else the per-platform Landlock launcher; macOS: `sandbox-exec`/Seatbelt). Consumers: [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/) (wraps `['bash', '-c', command]`).
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@@ -14,16 +14,24 @@ Implementations: [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`](../sandbox-local/) (Linux: `
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### Confinement error, indirectly
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**What the model sees**: Through [`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/README.md) and [`dsh-tool-bash`](../../bash/tool-bash/README.md), failure to enforce a requested mode produces code `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` and the exact error below. An execution-time runner failure adds ` Runner failure: <detail>`.
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#### What the model sees
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**Token effect**: Conditional error text is visible for that call and retained in history until compaction.
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Through [`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/README.md) and [`dsh-tool-bash`](../../bash/tool-bash/README.md), failure to enforce a requested mode produces code `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` and the exact error below. An execution-time runner failure adds ` Runner failure: <detail>`.
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#### Exact error
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##### Exact error
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```markdown
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sandbox mode "<mode>" is requested but no sandbox backend is usable on this host; refusing to run the command unconfined. Install bubblewrap or run a Landlock-enforcing kernel (Linux), ensure sandbox-exec is usable (macOS) — Windows has no confinement backend yet — or switch the consumer to danger-full-access.
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```
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#### Token effect
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Conditional error text is visible for that call and retained in history until compaction.
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#### KV Cache effect
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Append-only; newly visible content follows the reusable request prefix and does not invalidate existing KV-cache entries.
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## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
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- **File effects are the whole policy vocabulary** — the seam expresses no network, process, syscall, device, or credential restrictions.
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