Merge origin/master into worktree/remove-sdk-project-toolchain

# Conflicts:
#	THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md
-2026-07-06-sandbox.md: 0214a202a41983c76fa25e3a82e1cfaec70a0d55
-2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md: bd8dcdb74f723a955ea2a1cc5b224ef2ded4a8d5
+2026-07-06-sandbox.md: e1ec35cdcf3be2af03232f823d9a9cee57b4e8e8
+2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md: d3b74d441f72fc4c218979c327546031fd1b24f1

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md

@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ Costs and accepted limits:
 
 - **The one-wrapper illusion is given up knowingly.** A `tools/pre-execute` wrapper plus prompt conventions does not solve sandbox approval — the correct design costs structured denials, native runner probes, per-call policy carriage, and consistent cross-family enforcement, and this design pays it.
 - **`read-only` became a cross-family boundary through a follow-up.** This RFC shipped bash-only enforcement; the [cross-family fs sandbox RFC](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md) extends the same mode vocabulary to the filesystem tools through a sandboxed `ctx.fs` provider and relocates the mode/root config and the `sandbox/mode` override to `ctx.sandboxPolicy` (§ In-process tools).
-- **Windows has no backend.** Its chain slot is reserved empty — fail-closed, never a fallthrough; filling it is a deferred phase.
+- **Windows is a partial backend.** This RFC originally reserved an empty, fail-closed win32 chain; the later [Windows ACL sandbox decision](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md) filled it with the restricted-token runner. Its Everyone and hard-link gaps are reported as `enforcement: 'partial'`, never promoted to the full promise.
 - **The Seatbelt rung leans on Apple's deprecated-but-shipped `sandbox-exec` CLI.** As darwin's sole candidate it is selected without probing, so a future removal under a usable workdir surfaces as a runner-attributable spawn failure and an executable refusal through its fatal signature — both become `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`, and the command never runs; fail closed, never open.
 - **Landlock confinement is only as complete as the running kernel's ABI.** Reported as `enforcement: 'partial'` rather than refused — the deliberate trade that keeps the fallback available on older-kernel hosts.
 - **Runner attribution uses an in-band protocol.** Exit status plus stderr cannot cryptographically identify the writer, so a confined child can mimic a fatal runner line and status to cause an availability/diagnostic false attribution. The conjunction and exact notice exclusion reduce accidental matches; this is not a sandbox bypass because the child is already confined.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md

@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ fs/web/todo 在进程内执行，因此它们的沙箱语义是各自能力边
 
 - **单一包装的幻觉被有意放弃。**`tools/pre-execute` 包装加提示词约定无法解决沙箱批准——正确的设计需要结构化拒绝、原生 runner 探测、按调用策略承载和一致的跨工具族强制，本设计为此付出了代价。
 - **`read-only` 通过后续设计成为跨工具族边界。** 本 Agent Note 最初只交付 bash 强制；[跨工具族 fs 沙箱 Agent Note](2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md) 通过沙箱化的 `ctx.fs` 提供方把同一模式词汇扩展到文件系统工具，并将 mode/root 配置和 `sandbox/mode` 覆盖迁移到 `ctx.sandboxPolicy`（§ 进程内工具）。
-- **Windows 没有后端。** 其链槽保留为空——失败关闭，绝不穿透；填充它是延迟阶段。
+- **Windows 后端只提供部分强制执行。** 本 RFC 最初预留了一条空的、失败关闭的 win32 链；后续的 [Windows ACL 沙箱决策](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md)以受限令牌 runner 填充了它。其 Everyone 与硬链接缺口报告为 `enforcement: 'partial'`，绝不提升为完整承诺。
 - **Seatbelt 层级依赖 Apple 已弃用但仍交付的 `sandbox-exec` CLI。** 作为 darwin 的唯一候选，它无需探测即被选中，因此在 workdir 可用时，未来移除会表现为可归因于 runner 的 spawn 失败，可执行文件拒绝则通过其致命签名体现——两者都会变为 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`，且命令绝不会运行；失败关闭，绝不开放。
 - **Landlock 约束的完整度取决于运行内核的 ABI。** 报告为 `enforcement: 'partial'` 而非拒绝——这是有意的权衡，使备选在旧内核主机上仍可用。
 - **Runner 归因使用带内协议。** 退出状态与 stderr 无法以密码学方式识别写入者，因此受限子进程可以模仿 runner 的致命诊断行和状态，造成可用性或诊断误归因。多项证据的合取与精确通知排除减少了意外匹配；这不是沙箱绕过，因为子进程已经受到限制。

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md
-2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md: f0da86e52bcdd53a10b60164d7cc12261cfc5c49
-2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.zh.md: 41a6429eab8f86a8960ac4aa372aeacfda4661c4
+2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md: 4e681b32088954d870df86898e26fe2cae669f14
+2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.zh.md: a9d600f8a8e47db49c3733f33091e667e341c6a7

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.md

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ The harness's shipped execution profile is bash-first on every platform. Windows
 
 Windows hosts booting a shipped profile (`dsh web`, `dsh --profile headless`, one-shot tasks) get the PowerShell stack by default; POSIX hosts are unchanged.
 
-- **The platform layer is a data file, not a roster rewrite.** `@deepseek-ai/dsh-base` ships [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/windows.cordis.patch.yml) alongside its universal `cordis.patch.yml`: it disables `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` (the POSIX-only executor and its dialect tool) and inserts `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh`. Windows has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the layer drops the sandbox stack entirely — `sandbox`, `sandbox-policy`, and `fs-sandbox` are disabled and the unconfined `dsh-fs-local` provides `ctx.fs` — and degrades to danger-full-access: `permission`/`ui-permission` leave the roster (dsh-permission requires a confining executor — presets bundle a sandbox mode the unconfined executor cannot honor; see its constructor guard — and the client knob would advertise a boundary that does not exist), and the `approval` service is disabled — nothing in the Windows roster asks for approval, so the model is never told approval exists or that asks are auto-rejected. Keeping fs-only path rules would be theater: the unconfined shell can bypass them with one command, so the honest Windows posture is full access rather than a boundary only the fs tools pretend to enforce.
-- **The launcher injects the layer by platform.** `apps/cli/src/windows-shell.ts` resolves it from the base bundle layer's `packageDir` between the bundle layers and the user layers on `win32` hosts, in every composition path (boot, config-only HMR recomposition, config dumps). Overriding the shipped default is a composition decision: a Windows host that prefers the bash stack — or confinement — re-enables the bash rows through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml`. Custom profiles without the base bundle are skipped (they own their shell stack); a base bundle that ships no Windows shell patch fails loud.
-- **Module resolution is restored for cold starts.** The profiles-rework CLI dropped the pwsh packages from `apps/cli`'s dependency closure, so `healProfilesModuleFallback` never linked them into `$DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules` and a fresh Windows host could not resolve the inserted rows. `apps/cli` and `dsh-base` re-declare `dsh-pwsh-local`/`dsh-tool-pwsh`, and `dsh-base` also declares `dsh-fs-local`; the base bundle lists every row plugin as a dependency by house style.
+- **The platform layer is a data file, not a roster rewrite.** `@deepseek-ai/dsh-base` ships [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/windows.cordis.patch.yml) alongside its universal `cordis.patch.yml`. It disables the POSIX-only `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` rows and inserts `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh`. The later [Windows ACL sandbox decision](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md) filled the win32 runner chain and superseded this note's original unconfined roster: `sandbox`, `sandbox-policy`, `fs-sandbox`, `permission`/`ui-permission`, and `approval` now stay enabled exactly as on POSIX, while the ACL backend truthfully reports its Everyone and hard-link gaps as partial enforcement.
+- **The launcher injects the layer by platform.** `apps/cli/src/windows-shell.ts` resolves it from the base bundle layer's `packageDir` between the bundle layers and the user layers on `win32` hosts, in every composition path (boot, config-only HMR recomposition, config dumps). Overriding the shipped default is a composition decision: a Windows host that prefers the bash stack re-enables the bash rows and disables both pwsh rows through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml`. Custom profiles without the base bundle are skipped (they own their shell stack); a base bundle that ships no Windows shell patch fails loud.
+- **Module resolution is restored for cold starts.** The profiles-rework CLI dropped the pwsh packages from `apps/cli`'s dependency closure, so `healProfilesModuleFallback` never linked them into `$DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules` and a fresh Windows host could not resolve the inserted rows. `apps/cli` and `dsh-base` declare `dsh-pwsh-sandbox`/`dsh-tool-pwsh`; the executor's dependency chain supplies `dsh-pwsh-local`, and the base bundle lists every row plugin as a dependency by house style.
 
 The pwsh GUI rendering shipped earlier with the [pwsh UI presentation matches bash decision](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md); the [pwsh tool bash parity decision](2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) ships the tool's surface. Nothing in this decision changes POSIX behavior.
 
@@ -24,21 +24,21 @@ The pwsh GUI rendering shipped earlier with the [pwsh UI presentation matches ba
 
 **Ship the platform layer from `apps/cli` code instead of a bundle data file.** Rejected: the patch belongs next to the rows it replaces, in the bundle that owns them, so the shipped roster stays visible as composition data and dumps carry its provenance; the launcher contributes only the win32 gate.
 
-**Keep `permission`/`ui-permission` on Windows.** Rejected: `dsh-permission` hard-requires `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` and fails loud at load over an unconfined executor; making it tolerate an unconfined shell would advertise presets the shell cannot honor.
+**Keep `permission`/`ui-permission` on Windows without a confining runner.** Rejected by the original delivery: `dsh-permission` hard-requires `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` and fails loud at load over an unconfined executor. The later ACL runner removed that premise, so the current roster retains both rows.
 
-**Keep fs path-rule confinement on Windows (`sandbox-policy` + `fs-sandbox` without OS runners).** Rejected: the shell is the model's primary tool and unconfined on Windows, so fs-only path rules are trivially bypassable and would overstate the boundary; the honest posture is full degradation to danger-full-access.
+**Keep fs path-rule confinement on Windows without an OS runner.** Rejected by the original delivery: an unconfined shell could bypass fs-only path rules. The current ACL runner confines the shell and the fs provider under one policy, so this rejected half-boundary is no longer the shipped shape.
 
 **Ship a `DSH_WINDOWS_SHELL` environment escape hatch.** Rejected: decisive behavior changes belong in composition config, which already overrides the platform layer row by id; a second override channel would split the single source of truth for roster decisions.
 
 ## Consequences
 
 - A Windows host running a shipped `dsh` surface gets `pwsh` as its shell tool and PowerShell as the `ctx.bash` executor without configuration; `bash` is absent from the model-visible roster there (its tool row is disabled).
-- Windows has no sandbox at all: the fs tools run unconfined (`dsh-fs-local`), the approval service is absent (nothing asks for approval, and the model is never told approval exists), and the permission switcher is gone. The model-visible posture is honest full access rather than a boundary the shell can bypass.
+- Windows commands and fs operations share the sandbox policy, permission switcher, and approval service. The ACL runner confines writes but reports `enforcement: 'partial'`; explicit `danger-full-access` remains the approved bypass rather than the platform default.
 - POSIX hosts are unchanged: the platform layer never applies, and the bash stack remains the universal `cordis.patch.yml` rows.
-- Windows hosts that prefer the bash stack (e.g. with WSL/Git-Bash on PATH) override the shipped default through their profile or home `cordis.patch.yml` — disabling `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh` and re-enabling `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` (both executors register the same `bash` service, so an incomplete recipe fails loud at load) — composition config is the one override channel.
+- Windows hosts that prefer the bash stack (e.g. with WSL/Git-Bash on PATH) override the shipped default through their profile or home `cordis.patch.yml` — disabling `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh` and re-enabling `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` (both executors register the same `bash` service, so an incomplete recipe fails loud at load) — composition config is the one override channel.
 
 ## Verification
 
-- Unit: `apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts` pins the win32 default, the custom-profile skip, and the missing-patch failure with the platform injected, and composes the REAL shipped bundle layers (dsh-base + dsh-web-app resolved from the app installation) through the boot's patch algorithm to assert the win32 danger-full-access roster and the base-only-profile warning; `packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts` pins the shipped Windows patch file shape (disables, inserts, and the absent approval service).
+- Unit: `apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts` pins the win32 default, custom-profile skip, missing-patch failure, cold-start dependency closure, and real composed roster; `packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts` pins that the Windows layer disables only the bash rows, inserts the confined pwsh rows, and leaves sandbox, permission, fs, and approval ownership untouched.
 - Keyless: a win32 `dsh --profile <name> --dump-config` shows the pwsh rows with `windows.cordis.patch.yml` provenance and the bash rows disabled; the POSIX dump (CI Linux) is unchanged.
 - The real-composition smoke boots the web profile on win32 with the pwsh stack mounted (the exact roster this note describes).

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-01-windows-pwsh-default.zh.md

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ harness 交付的执行画像在每个平台都是 bash 优先。Windows 主机
 
 启动交付 profile（`dsh web`、`dsh --profile headless`、一次性任务）的 Windows 主机默认获得 PowerShell 栈；POSIX 主机不变。
 
-- **平台层是数据文件，不是清单重写。** `@deepseek-ai/dsh-base` 随通用 `cordis.patch.yml` 一起交付 [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/windows.cordis.patch.yml)：它禁用 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`（仅 POSIX 的执行器及其方言工具）并插入 `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh`。Windows 上没有 OS 级 sandbox runner（landlock/bwrap/seatbelt 均为 POSIX 专属），因此该层整体移除 sandbox 栈——`sandbox`、`sandbox-policy`、`fs-sandbox` 被禁用，由不限权的 `dsh-fs-local` 提供 `ctx.fs`——并完全退化为 danger-full-access：`permission`/`ui-permission` 离开清单（dsh-permission 要求有限权能力的执行器——preset 捆绑的是无限制执行器无法兑现的 sandbox 模式；见其构造函数守卫——客户端旋钮会宣传一个并不存在的边界），`approval` 服务也被禁用——Windows 清单里没有任何动作需要审批，模型也不会被告知"审批存在"或"请求会被自动拒绝"。保留仅限 fs 的路径规则是摆设：不限权的 shell 一条命令即可绕过，因此诚实的 Windows 姿态是全权访问，而不是一个只有 fs 工具假装执行的边界。
-- **启动器按平台注入该层。** `apps/cli/src/windows-shell.ts` 在 `win32` 主机上从 base bundle 层的 `packageDir` 解析它，置于 bundle 层与用户层之间，覆盖所有组合路径（启动、config-only HMR 重组合、配置转储）。覆盖交付默认是组合决策：偏好 bash 栈（或偏好有限权）的 Windows 主机通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 重新启用 bash 行。未挂 base bundle 的自定义 profile 被跳过（它们自己拥有 shell 栈）；base bundle 缺 `windows.cordis.patch.yml` 时 fail loud。
-- **冷启动的模块解析已恢复。** profiles 重构把 pwsh 包从 `apps/cli` 的依赖闭包中删掉了，`healProfilesModuleFallback` 因此从未把它们链接进 `$DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules`，新 Windows 主机解析不到插入的行。`apps/cli` 与 `dsh-base` 重新声明 `dsh-pwsh-local`/`dsh-tool-pwsh`，`dsh-base` 还声明 `dsh-fs-local`；按仓库惯例，base bundle 把每个行插件都列为依赖。
+- **平台层是数据文件，不是清单重写。** `@deepseek-ai/dsh-base` 随通用 `cordis.patch.yml` 一起交付 [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/windows.cordis.patch.yml)。它禁用仅限 POSIX 的 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` 行，并插入 `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh`。后续的 [Windows ACL 沙箱决策](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md)填充了 win32 runner 链，并取代了本笔记最初的不限权清单：`sandbox`、`sandbox-policy`、`fs-sandbox`、`permission`/`ui-permission` 与 `approval` 均与 POSIX 上一样保持启用，而 ACL 后端则如实把 Everyone 与硬链接缺口报告为部分强制执行。
+- **启动器按平台注入该层。** `apps/cli/src/windows-shell.ts` 在 `win32` 主机上从 base bundle 层的 `packageDir` 解析它，置于 bundle 层与用户层之间，覆盖所有组合路径（启动、config-only HMR 重组合、配置转储）。覆盖交付默认是组合决策：偏好 bash 栈的 Windows 主机通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 重新启用 bash 行，并禁用两个 pwsh 行。未挂 base bundle 的自定义 profile 被跳过（它们自己拥有 shell 栈）；base bundle 缺 `windows.cordis.patch.yml` 时 fail loud。
+- **冷启动的模块解析已恢复。** profiles 重构把 pwsh 包从 `apps/cli` 的依赖闭包中删掉了，`healProfilesModuleFallback` 因此从未把它们链接进 `$DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules`，新 Windows 主机解析不到插入的行。`apps/cli` 与 `dsh-base` 声明 `dsh-pwsh-sandbox`/`dsh-tool-pwsh`；执行器的依赖链提供 `dsh-pwsh-local`，按仓库惯例，base bundle 把每个行插件都列为依赖。
 
 pwsh GUI 渲染已随 [pwsh UI 呈现与 bash 对齐决策](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-bash-parity.md) 先行交付；[pwsh 工具与 bash 对齐决策](2026-08-02-pwsh-tool-bash-parity.md) 交付了工具表面。本决策不改变任何 POSIX 行为。
 
@@ -24,21 +24,21 @@ pwsh GUI 渲染已随 [pwsh UI 呈现与 bash 对齐决策](2026-08-05-pwsh-ui-b
 
 **从 `apps/cli` 代码而非 bundle 数据文件交付平台层。** 否决：patch 应放在它替换的行旁边、属于拥有这些行的 bundle，让交付清单作为组合数据保持可见、转储带有出处；启动器只贡献 win32 门控。
 
-**在 Windows 上保留 `permission`/`ui-permission`。** 否决：`dsh-permission` 硬性要求 `ctx.bash.sandboxMode`，在无限制执行器上加载即 fail loud；让它容忍无限制 shell 会宣传 shell 无法兑现的 preset。
+**在 Windows 没有隔离 runner 时保留 `permission`/`ui-permission`。** 最初交付时否决：`dsh-permission` 硬性要求 `ctx.bash.sandboxMode`，并在不限权执行器上加载时 fail loud。后续的 ACL runner 消除了该前提，因此当前清单保留这两行。
 
-**在 Windows 上保留 fs 路径规则限制（无 OS runner 的 `sandbox-policy` + `fs-sandbox`）。** 否决：shell 是模型的主工具且在 Windows 上不限权，仅限 fs 的路径规则一行命令即可绕过，会夸大边界；诚实的姿态是完全退化到 danger-full-access。
+**在 Windows 没有 OS runner 时保留 fs 路径规则限制。** 最初交付时否决：不限权 shell 可以绕过仅限 fs 的路径规则。当前 ACL runner 用同一策略约束 shell 与 fs 提供方，因此这项被否决的半边界已不是当前交付形态。
 
 **交付 `DSH_WINDOWS_SHELL` 环境变量逃生门。** 否决：决定性的行为变更应集中在组合配置中，而组合配置已能按行 id 覆盖平台层；第二条覆盖通道会分裂清单决策的单一事实来源。
 
 ## 后果
 
 - 运行交付版 `dsh` 表面的 Windows 主机无需配置即获得 `pwsh` 作为 shell 工具、PowerShell 作为 `ctx.bash` 执行器；那里的模型可见清单中没有 `bash`（其工具行被禁用）。
-- Windows 上没有任何沙箱：fs 工具不限权运行（`dsh-fs-local`）、`approval` 服务不存在（没有任何动作需要审批，模型也不会被告知审批存在）、权限切换器消失。模型可见的姿态是诚实的全权访问，而不是一个 shell 可以绕过的边界。
+- Windows 命令与 fs 操作共用沙箱策略、权限切换器和 approval 服务。ACL runner 限制写入，但报告 `enforcement: 'partial'`；显式的 `danger-full-access` 仍是获准的绕过方式，而非平台默认。
 - POSIX 主机不变：平台层永不生效，bash 栈仍是通用 `cordis.patch.yml` 的行。
-- 偏好 bash 栈的 Windows 主机（例如 PATH 上有 WSL/Git-Bash 时）通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 覆盖交付默认——禁用 `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh` 并重新启用 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`（两个执行器注册同一个 `bash` 服务，配方不完整会在加载时 fail loud）——组合配置是唯一的覆盖通道。
+- 偏好 bash 栈的 Windows 主机（例如 PATH 上有 WSL/Git-Bash 时）通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 覆盖交付默认——禁用 `pwsh-sandbox`/`tool-pwsh` 并重新启用 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`（两个执行器注册同一个 `bash` 服务，配方不完整会在加载时 fail loud）——组合配置是唯一的覆盖通道。
 
 ## 验证
 
-- 单元：`apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts` 以平台注入固定 win32 默认、自定义 profile 跳过与缺文件失败，并通过启动所用的 patch 算法组合真实交付的 bundle 层（从应用安装解析的 dsh-base + dsh-web-app）断言 win32 danger-full-access 清单与 base-only profile 警告；`packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts` 固定交付的 Windows patch 文件形状（禁用、插入与缺席的 approval 服务）。
+- 单元：`apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts` 固定 win32 默认、自定义 profile 跳过、缺少 patch 时失败、冷启动依赖闭包和真实组合清单；`packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts` 固定 Windows 层仅禁用 bash 行、插入受限的 pwsh 行，并且不改变沙箱、权限、fs 与审批的归属。
 - Keyless：win32 上的 `dsh --profile <name> --dump-config` 显示带 `windows.cordis.patch.yml` 出处的 pwsh 行、被禁用的 bash 行；POSIX 转储（CI Linux）不变。
 - 真实组合冒烟在 win32 上启动 web profile，pwsh 栈挂载成功（即本笔记描述的确切清单）。

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.md
-2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.md: 348f7ab0a26e9b39057dbac885304e0d52e0b1fb
-2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.zh.md: 4920ee6eb061d44934bfc9f5176e244f5aac8553
+2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.md: adb93b51c73d341c153b8fcafe2a08f0a5598478
+2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.zh.md: fa83bd4daec9d8e6e9e43295bb81af97782b1fdf

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.md

@@ -12,16 +12,16 @@ The naive reading of "move tools down to the agent plane" does not work. `ctx.to
 
 ## Decision
 
-Split the registry from its projection. The registry stays host-plane; the **presentation** becomes per-agent state inside it, alongside the per-agent restrictions and guards that already live there.
+Split the registry from its projection. The registry stays host-plane; the **presentation** becomes scope state inside it, alongside the scoped restrictions and guards that already live there.
 
-`ToolRegistry.presentAs(mode)` is scoped-only and mirrors `restrict()`: it writes one cell on the calling scope's `ToolLayer` through `ScopedLayers.effect`, so it unwinds with the agent that declared it. `modeFor(scope)` resolves that cell against the config `mode`, which becomes the default for agents declaring nothing rather than a process-wide fact. The three reads that decided presentation — the wire schemas, the `run_code` entry in the visibility view, and the generated SDK section — take the scope's mode instead of the service's.
+`ToolRegistry.presentAs(mode)` is scoped-only and mirrors `restrict()`: it writes one cell on the calling scope's `ToolLayer` through `ScopedLayers.effect`, so it unwinds with the scope that declared it. In the shipped Web surface that scope is an agent preset's standing mount — the `code` preset carries the `tool-mode` row — so one declaration covers every agent joined to that preset, and `modeFor(scope)` takes the nearest declaration on the chain. It resolves against the config `mode`, which becomes the default for scopes declaring nothing rather than a process-wide fact. The three reads that decided presentation — the wire schemas, the `run_code` entry in the visibility view, and the generated SDK section — take the scope's mode instead of the service's.
 
 Two consequences fell out and are load-bearing:
 
 - **`run_code` is appended per scope.** Previously the transport entered every view whenever the transport existed. Per-agent, a native agent must not find `run_code` in its dispatch table because some other agent in the process presents it — so the append is conditional on that scope's own mode, and the transport is built lazily on first need.
 - **The reserved name is now unconditional.** `run_code` was rejected as a registration only while a code mode was configured. Any agent may now select a code mode, so a name that was free to take under a native deployment would become a collision the moment a preset mounted.
 
-The SDK prompt section is registered globally by a code-mode deployment (unchanged) and additionally per agent by `presentAs`, where it shadows by name. Its body renders empty for a native scope, which the prompt renderer drops — that is what keeps an agent opting OUT of a code-mode deployment free of an SDK section.
+The SDK prompt section is registered globally by a code-mode deployment (unchanged) and additionally per scope by `presentAs`, where it shadows by name. Its body renders empty for a native scope, which the prompt renderer drops — that is what keeps an agent opting OUT of a code-mode deployment free of an SDK section.
 
 The preset expresses the choice through one row, `@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent-tool-mode`, whose whole body is a `presentAs` call. A code mode waits for `ctx.codeRuntime` through `ctx.inject` rather than assuming it: the runtime is host-plane, and a pending row is what `dsh-agent-presets` already reports as an unusable mount, naming the row — so a preset selecting Code Mode against a runtime-less deployment fails where an operator can act.
 

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-05-per-agent-tool-presentation.zh.md

@@ -12,16 +12,16 @@ agent preset 已经能按会话组装一个 agent 的工具，却管不了这些
 
 ## Decision
 
-把注册表和它的投影拆开。注册表留在宿主平面；**呈现方式**变成它内部按 agent 的状态，与已经住在那里的按 agent 限制和守卫并列。
+把注册表和它的投影拆开。注册表留在宿主平面；**呈现方式**变成它内部按 scope 的状态，与已经住在那里的作用域限制和守卫并列。
 
-`ToolRegistry.presentAs(mode)` 只接受 scoped 上下文，形状照抄 `restrict()`：它通过 `ScopedLayers.effect` 在调用方 scope 的 `ToolLayer` 上写一个单元，因此会随声明它的那个 agent 一起卸载。`modeFor(scope)` 将该单元与 config 的 `mode` 一并解析，后者于是成为「未作声明的 agent」的默认值，而不再是进程级事实。原先决定呈现方式的三处读取——wire schema、可见性视图里的 `run_code` 条目、以及生成的 SDK 段——改为读取该 scope 的模式，而非服务的。
+`ToolRegistry.presentAs(mode)` 只接受 scoped 上下文，形状照抄 `restrict()`：它通过 `ScopedLayers.effect` 在调用方 scope 的 `ToolLayer` 上写一个单元，因此会随声明它的那个 scope 一起卸载。在随附的 Web 界面里那个 scope 是某个 agent preset 的常驻挂载——`code` preset 携带 `tool-mode` 行——因此一份声明覆盖加入该 preset 的每个 agent，而 `modeFor(scope)` 取作用域链上最近的那份声明。它与 config 的 `mode` 一并解析，后者于是成为「未作声明的 scope」的默认值，而不再是进程级事实。原先决定呈现方式的三处读取——wire schema、可见性视图里的 `run_code` 条目、以及生成的 SDK 段——改为读取该 scope 的模式，而非服务的。
 
 有两个随之而来的结果，且都是承重的：
 
 - **`run_code` 按 scope 追加。** 此前只要传输存在，它就进入每一个视图。按 agent 之后，一个 native agent 不能因为进程里别的 agent 呈现了它、就在自己的分发表里看到 `run_code`——因此这次追加以该 scope 自身的模式为条件，传输也改为首次需要时才构建。
 - **保留名现在无条件生效。** `run_code` 此前只在配置了 code 模式时才被拒绝注册。如今任何 agent 都可能选择 code 模式，因此一个在 native 部署下可以随便占用的名字，会在某个 preset 挂载的那一刻变成冲突。
 
-SDK 提示词段由 code 模式的部署全局注册（不变），并由 `presentAs` 额外按 agent 注册一份，后者按名字遮蔽前者。它的正文对 native scope 渲染为空，而提示词渲染器会丢弃空段——正是这一点让「在 code 模式部署下选择退出」的 agent 不带 SDK 段。
+SDK 提示词段由 code 模式的部署全局注册（不变），并由 `presentAs` 额外按 scope 注册一份，后者按名字遮蔽前者。它的正文对 native scope 渲染为空，而提示词渲染器会丢弃空段——正是这一点让「在 code 模式部署下选择退出」的 agent 不带 SDK 段。
 
 preset 用一行来表达这个选择：`@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent-tool-mode`，其全部内容就是一次 `presentAs` 调用。code 类模式通过 `ctx.inject` 等待 `ctx.codeRuntime` 而非假定它存在：运行时在宿主平面，而一个 pending 的行正是 `dsh-agent-presets` 已经会报告的「不可用挂载」并会指名该行——于是在无运行时的部署上选择 Code Mode 的 preset，会在操作者能够动手的地方失败。
 

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md
-2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md: 7e8f229269233d9ac9baa65241ca02a4cf4c3f7c
-2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md: eeb346b228b3559f487448e5d4ec525b7bb89525
+2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md: 972713e02860218853f421aa700a8b60b33ada5b
+2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md: da41cb3f9aa46bab96a5fbb6c035205b22c442aa

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md

@@ -6,15 +6,15 @@ English | [中文](2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md)
 
 ## Problem
 
-The [sandbox decision](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) leaves `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` empty, so shipped Windows profiles degrade to danger-full-access because no confining executor exists. The win32 rung must confine the two file-effect modes the sandbox vocabulary promises — `read-only` (zero writes) and `workspace-write` (writes under the workspace root plus a backend-defined temp area) — while leaving reads, network, and process visibility alone, because every mode permits reading.
+The original [sandbox decision](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) left `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` empty, so shipped Windows profiles degraded to danger-full-access because no confining executor existed. The win32 rung must govern the two file-effect modes in the sandbox vocabulary — `read-only` (no explicit writable root) and `workspace-write` (writes under the workspace root plus a backend-defined temp area) — while reporting any effects its mechanism cannot govern; reads, network, and process visibility remain outside this vocabulary.
 
 ## Decision
 
-Implement the rung directly on the raw ACL mechanism: duplicate the caller's token into a `WRITE_RESTRICTED` token (`CreateRestrictedToken` with `WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`) whose restricting SIDs include a write SID (`S-1-4-x-y`); the write SID's Write ACEs on the workspace and temp roots are the entire write allowlist, because `WRITE_RESTRICTED` intersects write accesses only and reads keep the caller's full ambient access. The mechanism is the one huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (`10e4dfb`) demonstrates; this port checks every API call and fails closed (the POC fail-opened on every ignored return value). The write SID is the PER-WORKSPACE identity, derived deterministically from the canonical workspace path (`workspaceWriteSid` — sha256 → `S-1-4-x-y`) and stored NOWHERE: the workspace-root ACE therefore materializes once per workspace per machine — the standing ACE is the cross-session reuse cache, and every later provision hits the exact-ACE skip (idempotent re-grant skips the eager full-tree re-propagation — no garbage collection) — instead of once per session, which is what the earlier per-session random SID paid a full tree propagation per session for. The seam derives the session's PRIVATE temp subdirectory from the session id + workspace (sha256, 16 hex — stored nowhere, so no tamper surface exists) and creates it exclusively; it is removed on provider dispose, and a crash leaves it as `%TEMP%` litter whose next resume fails loudly at the exclusive creation until temp hygiene reclaims it. The seam materializes the workspace ACE STANDING (never revoked — the cache) and the temp ACE REVOCABLY (revoked on provider dispose, so an inheritable ACE never outlives its session's temp directory on the ambient temp root). The token's restricting list is the keep-alive group plus the write SID only under workspace-write: read-only = [logon SID, Everyone] and workspace-write = [logon SID, Everyone, write SID]. The keep-alive invariants are logon SID + Everyone (early DLL init dies with 0xC0000142 and CNG crashes pwsh with 0xE0434352 without them). Read-only carries no write SID: a standing grant ACE from an earlier workspace-write period stays INERT (the pass-2 check grants only what the list carries, so read-only remains strictly zero-grant across a `/permission` downgrade or a crash-resumed session, while the standing ACE keeps the re-upgrade free). Authenticated Users is absent from BOTH lists — the WMI namespace security check fails (0x80041003), so CIM is unavailable in every confined mode, and the C:\-root tree-creation escape (standing `AU:(AD)` + `AU:(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)` ACEs) is closed in both; INTERACTIVE/LOCAL are likewise absent from both (the Public tree writes are denied — pinned by the runner's Public-probe regression). Workspace-write children see a PRIVATE per-session temp subdirectory (`<temp>\dsh-<16 hex>` derived from the session id + workspace — created exclusively, reparse points rejected, removed on provider dispose — TMP/TEMP rewritten by the runner — bwrap `--tmpfs /tmp` semantics). The restricted token's DEFAULT DACL is extended with a full-access write-SID ACE (`SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl)`): new objects created without an explicit security descriptor (anonymous pipes — CreatePipe, sync objects) then carry a restricting-SID ACE and pass the write pass-2 check at creation; NAMED pipes are exempt — their default security descriptor is the Win32 layer's user-mode default SD template (built by KernelBase — owner/SYSTEM/Admins full, Everyone/ANONYMOUS read-only), which the token cannot influence, so piped stdio capture stays denied for confined grandchildren (the POC-documented boundary, pinned by the runner suite). It ships as [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md) (backend plus the `./runner` argv-prefix entry), the `win32` chain rung of [`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md), and [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) as the confining executor; the Windows platform layer re-enables the full permission surface (sandbox/sandbox-policy/permission/approval/fs-sandbox) over the confined pwsh stack.
+Implement the rung directly on the raw ACL mechanism: duplicate the caller's token into a `WRITE_RESTRICTED` token (`CreateRestrictedToken` with `WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`) whose restricting SIDs carry distinct workspace and private-temp capabilities. `WRITE_RESTRICTED` intersects write accesses only, so reads keep the caller's ambient access while a write must also match one of these capability ACEs. The mechanism is the one huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (`10e4dfb`) demonstrates; this port checks every API call and fails closed (the POC fail-opened on ignored failures). The per-workspace SID is derived deterministically from the canonical workspace path (`workspaceWriteSid` — sha256 → `S-1-4-x-y`); its standing workspace ACE is the cross-session reuse cache, and an exact-ACE skip prevents repeated eager tree propagation. Each live session/workspace pair instead gets a random private temp directory and a domain-separated SID derived from that path (`tempWriteSid`); its ACE is revocable, TMP/TEMP point at that directory, and the token default DACL names the temp SID so newly created temp objects do not acquire the shared workspace capability. A fork therefore cannot write its sibling's temp tree. A fresh provider chooses a new path and SID even for the same resumed session, so crash residue is inert litter rather than a collision or inherited capability; agentless calls create and remove the same shape per invocation. The ambient temp root is never an implicit grant. A workspace equal to or containing the temp root fails before any ACL mutation because its inheritable standing ACE would otherwise reach every private child; the direct API rejects overlap in either direction between a writable root and the actual private temp directory. PowerShell can complete its startup AppLocker probe through this private-temp capability, so `workspace-write` remains FullLanguage absent a host-wide policy; `read-only` cannot create the probe files and conservatively enters ConstrainedLanguage. That split is PowerShell startup behavior, not part of the ACL boundary. The token lists are read-only = [logon SID, Everyone] and workspace-write = [logon SID, Everyone, workspace SID, optional temp SID]. Logon SID + Everyone are keep-alive invariants (early DLL init dies with 0xC0000142 and CNG crashes pwsh with 0xE0434352 without them). Because Everyone remains, an external object granting Everyone write access clears both checks; because NTFS ACLs belong to file objects, a granted workspace hard link also grants an external alias. Rejecting all hard links would reject ordinary pnpm workspaces, so the provider reports `enforcement: 'partial'` and the native suite pins both gaps. Read-only carries no capability SID, so standing workspace ACEs remain inert across a mode downgrade. Authenticated Users is absent from both lists — CIM is unavailable, closing the C:\-root tree-creation escape — and INTERACTIVE/LOCAL are absent, denying Public-tree writes. New anonymous pipes and sync objects inherit the temp SID (or workspace SID when temp is disabled, Everyone under read-only) through `SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl)`; named pipes keep the Win32 layer's owner/SYSTEM/Admins-full, Everyone/ANONYMOUS-read-only template, so piped grandchild stdio remains denied. It ships as [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md), the `win32` rung of [`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md), and [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) as the confining executor.
 
 ## How the restriction works (why no new identity)
 
-The identity routes restrict by *who* runs the child; this rung restricts by *token derivation*. An identity route (landstrip's restricted-user, AppContainer) runs the child under a fresh account or container SID that starts with zero ACEs on the host's files — everything, reads included, defaults to denied, and every path the child may touch must then be opened back up by writing ACEs for that identity: the wholesale DACL mutation that disqualified both alternatives. The restricted token keeps the caller's own SID and logon session: [`CreateRestrictedToken`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-createrestrictedtoken) derives a token that adds the restricting SIDs and the `WRITE_RESTRICTED` flag, so Windows performs the access check twice — once against the normal SIDs, once against the restricting SIDs — and grants write-class access only where both checks pass. Reads pass on the normal check alone (the caller's SIDs already carry read access everywhere the caller can read), which is why this rung needs no read grants and no new account; writes must additionally clear the orphan-SID check, which only the workspace and temp ACEs satisfy. `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN` synthesize the limited-user effect of a fresh account token-side, so even an elevated caller derives a filtered token. The same primitive could restrict reads (`SidsToDisable` turning SIDs deny-only), but a read-restricted token would need per-path read grants — reintroducing exactly the cost the identity routes pay — and the sandbox vocabulary never requires read confinement.
+The identity routes restrict by *who* runs the child; this rung restricts by *token derivation*. An identity route (landstrip's restricted-user, AppContainer) runs the child under a fresh account or container SID that starts with zero ACEs on the host's files — everything, reads included, defaults to denied, and every path the child may touch must then be opened back up by writing ACEs for that identity: the wholesale DACL mutation that disqualified both alternatives. The restricted token keeps the caller's own SID and logon session: [`CreateRestrictedToken`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-createrestrictedtoken) derives a token that adds the restricting SIDs and the `WRITE_RESTRICTED` flag, so Windows performs the access check twice — once against the normal SIDs, once against the restricting SIDs — and grants write-class access only where both checks pass. Reads pass on the normal check alone (the caller's SIDs already carry read access everywhere the caller can read), which is why this rung needs no read grants and no new account; writes must additionally clear the capability-SID check, which only the workspace and temp ACEs satisfy. `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN` synthesize the limited-user effect of a fresh account token-side, so even an elevated caller derives a filtered token. The same primitive could restrict reads (`SidsToDisable` turning SIDs deny-only), but a read-restricted token would need per-path read grants — reintroducing exactly the cost the identity routes pay — and the sandbox vocabulary never requires read confinement.
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ The [landstrip evaluation](../../rejected/feature/2026-07-26-evaluate-landstrip-
 
 ## Consequences
 
-Bought: write-only confinement with no new OS floor (`CreateRestrictedToken` predates the mxc releases by two decades), reads/network/process visibility untouched exactly as the mode vocabulary requires, and fail-closed errors carrying the API name and the exact Win32 code. Cost: no read-side or network isolation; console isolation unavailable (hidden-console children die with `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED`; children share the host console); standing ACE mutations on the granted roots (caller-owned directories; workspace ACEs stand forever by design — the reuse cache, invisible residue when a workspace is renamed — temp ACEs revoked by provider dispose together with the derived private temp directory — a crash leaves both behind and the next resume fails loudly at the exclusive creation until temp hygiene reclaims the directory); grant materialization is an EAGER full-tree propagation (`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` walks every descendant immediately — tens of seconds on large workspaces), paid once per workspace per machine by the per-workspace identity; CIM is unavailable in BOTH confined modes (AuthUsers dropped from both lists — the WMI namespace security check fails, and `Get-ComputerInfo` silently returns incomplete results) as the price of closing the C:\-root tree-creation escape in both; FAT-class (non-ACL) targets outside the granted roots remain writable under both modes (no security descriptors to intersect — a legacy residue treated as unsupported, warn-only, documented in the README); NULL-DACL directories are not identity-preserving under a grant+revoke round-trip (documented edge, the POC shares it); `whoami` and token-inspection cmdlets fail under the restricted token (diagnostic noise, documented); and BOTH confined modes run `pwsh` in ConstrainedLanguage mode — the restricted token trips PowerShell's lockdown detection, so `Add-Type`, non-core .NET statics (`[System.IO.*]::`, `[math]::`), COM objects, and reflection fail with "only core types" errors while `-f` formatting, property access, and core cmdlets/types keep working, and the language mode cannot be lifted back to FullLanguage from inside — taught to the model in the pwsh tool description and documented in the package README's Known Limitations; BOTH confined modes also deny named-pipe opens — libuv's piped-stdio spawns fail with EPERM (the POC-documented "no output redirection" boundary; inherited/ignored stdio and anonymous pipes work) — documented in the package README's Known Limitations and taught to the model in the pwsh tool description.
+Bought: write-only confinement with no new OS floor (`CreateRestrictedToken` predates the mxc releases by two decades), reads/network/process visibility untouched exactly as the mode vocabulary requires, and fail-closed errors carrying the API name and exact Win32 code. Sessions share the intentionally standing workspace capability but not their revocable temp capabilities; restart residue cannot block or authorize a resumed session. Cost: enforcement is structurally partial because Everyone-granted writes and NTFS hard-link aliases cannot be path-confined by this token shape; no read-side or network isolation; console isolation unavailable (hidden-console children die with `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED`; children share the host console); standing workspace ACE mutations (the reuse cache, plus inert residue when a workspace is renamed) and random temp litter after an unclean shutdown until OS hygiene reclaims it; EAGER full-tree workspace propagation (`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` walks every descendant immediately — tens of seconds on large workspaces), paid once per workspace per machine; CIM unavailable in both confined modes (Authenticated Users is absent, closing the C:\-root tree-creation escape); FAT-class non-ACL targets still writable; NULL-DACL directories not identity-preserving under a grant/revoke round trip; `whoami` and token-inspection cmdlets failing under the restricted token; read-only pwsh entering ConstrainedLanguage while workspace-write remains FullLanguage absent host policy; and named-pipe opens remaining denied, so libuv piped-stdio grandchildren fail with EPERM while inherited/ignored stdio and anonymous pipes work. The package README owns these operational limits.
 
 ## Testing
 
-The product-visible Windows roster flip is win32-only, so the keyless snapshot fixtures — which must replay on macOS/Linux — cannot cover it; the bundle composition specs ([`base.spec.ts`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts), [`windows-shell.spec.ts`](../../../../apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts)) plus the win32 real-runner suites (`packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/`, `packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/tests/`) are the substitute evidence, and the CI Windows lane owns the assembled signal. The grant machinery is pinned cross-platform by `packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-grants.spec.ts` (the derived private-temp identity — deterministic per session + workspace, distinct across sessions — one-shot materialization, exclusive temp creation with reparse-point rejection and self-cleanup on failure, clean-restart re-grant of the same derived directory, the standing-vs-revocable lifecycle across dispose and the mode-switch cycle, and the derived-SID argv contract — with the Win32 surface mocked) and on win32 by `workspace-sid.spec.ts` (derivation determinism/shape/distinctness), `grant.spec.ts` (real-DACL materialization: revocable paths revoke on dispose, standing paths survive it), the `acl.spec.ts` idempotent-grant fast-path and standing-ACE-after-dispose contract, the `failure-paths.spec.ts` suspension-orphan regression (AssignProcessToJobObject failure terminates the child), and the `runner.spec.ts` `--write-sid` contract (caller-owned grants, private temp subdir through TMP/TEMP, both-mode CIM-denial probes, the mode-downgrade regression — a standing grant ACE is inert under read-only and effective again on re-upgrade — the ambient-writable Public-probe regression (a C:\Users\Public subdirectory write is denied under both modes), and the ConstrainedLanguage pins in both modes, plus the grandchild-stdio matrix pins — inherited/ignored stdio spawns succeed while piped capture is DENIED in both modes). The runner-failure classification is exit-gated on 127 (a confined command that merely prints the `windows-acl-run:` signature on a non-127 exit is never misclassified as "the command did not run" — pinned in the pwsh-sandbox helper suite).
+The product-visible Windows roster flip is win32-only, so keyless snapshots that must replay on macOS/Linux cannot cover it; bundle composition specs plus the win32 real-runner suites are the substitute evidence, and the CI Windows lane owns the assembled signal. `sandbox-local/tests/acl-grants.spec.ts` pins random temp allocation, per-session/workspace reuse, fork/workspace separation, crash-resume non-collision, paired argv SIDs, failure cleanup, and standing-versus-revocable lifecycle with Win32 mocked. On Windows, `workspace-sid.spec.ts` pins workspace/temp derivation and domain separation; `acl.spec.ts` pins real DACL lifecycle; and `runner.spec.ts` pins paired-SID validation, sibling temp denial under a shared workspace SID, per-call agentless temp creation/removal, TMP/TEMP rewriting, mode downgrade, Public denial, Everyone/hard-link partial boundaries, mode-specific PowerShell language behavior, and grandchild stdio. ARM64 and emulated x64 native runs own the architecture-specific acceptance evidence.
 
 ## Related
 

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md

@@ -6,15 +6,15 @@ Status: implemented
 
 ## Problem
 
-[沙盒决策](2026-07-06-sandbox.md)把 `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` 留空，交付的 Windows profile 因为没有可用的隔离执行器而退化为 danger-full-access。win32 档必须实现沙盒词汇表承诺的两个文件效果模式——`read-only`（零写入）与 `workspace-write`（仅工作区根目录加后端定义的临时区域可写）——同时保持读、网络与进程可见性不受影响，因为所有模式都允许读取。
+最初的[沙箱决策](2026-07-06-sandbox.md)将 `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` 留空，因此交付的 Windows profile 因不存在隔离执行器而退化为 danger-full-access。win32 档必须约束沙箱词汇表中的两种文件效果模式——`read-only`（不显式授予任何可写根目录）与 `workspace-write`（允许写入工作区根目录及后端定义的临时区域）——并报告其机制无法约束的任何效果；读取、网络与进程可见性仍在这套词汇之外。
 
 ## Decision
 
-直接基于原始 ACL 机制实现该档：把调用者令牌复制为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 受限令牌（`CreateRestrictedToken`，`WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`），其 restricting SIDs 中包含写入 SID（`S-1-4-x-y`）；工作区与临时目录上写入 SID 的 Write ACE 就是全部写入白名单，因为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 只对写访问做交集检查，读保持调用者的完整环境访问。该机制来自 huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc（`10e4dfb`）的演示；本移植检查每一个 API 调用并 fail-closed（POC 因忽略返回值而 fail-open）。写入 SID 是**按工作区**的身份，由规范工作区路径确定性派生（`workspaceWriteSid`——sha256 → `S-1-4-x-y`），且**任何地方都不存储**：工作区根目录 ACE 因此每台机器每个工作区只物化一次——常驻 ACE 就是跨会话复用缓存，此后每次供给都命中精确 ACE 跳过（幂等重授权跳过急切的全树重传播——不做垃圾回收）——而不是每会话一次，这正是先前每会话随机 SID 每个会话都要付一次全树传播的代价。seam 从会话 id + 工作区派生会话的**私有**临时子目录（sha256、16 位 hex——任何地方都不存储，因此不存在篡改面）并独占创建；它在提供方 dispose 时移除，崩溃则把它留作 `%TEMP%` 垃圾，其下一次恢复会在独占创建处大声失败，直到临时目录卫生机制将其回收。seam 把工作区 ACE **常驻**物化（绝不撤销——就是缓存），把临时 ACE **可回收**物化（提供方 dispose（资源释放）时撤销，因此可继承 ACE 不会在环境临时根目录上比其会话的临时目录活得更久）。令牌的 restricting list 是保活组加上仅 workspace-write 下的写入 SID：read-only = [登录 SID、Everyone]，workspace-write = [登录 SID、Everyone、写入 SID]。保活不变式是登录 SID + Everyone（没有它们，早期 DLL init 会以 0xC0000142 死亡，CNG 会让 pwsh 以 0xE0434352 崩溃）。Read-only 不含写入 SID：先前 workspace-write 时期留下的常驻授权 ACE 保持**失效**（pass-2 检查只授予列表所携带的内容，因此 read-only 在 `/permission` 降级或崩溃后恢复的会话中始终保持严格零授权，而常驻 ACE 让重新升级保持零成本）。Authenticated Users 在**两种**列表中都缺席——WMI namespace 安全校验失败（0x80041003），因此 CIM 在每一种受限模式下都不可用，且 C:\-root 建树逃逸（驻留的 `AU:(AD)` + `AU:(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)` ACE）在两种模式下都被关闭；INTERACTIVE/LOCAL 同样在两种列表中都缺席（Public 树的写入被拒绝——由 runner 的 Public-probe 回归钉住）。Workspace-write 子进程看到的是私有的每会话临时子目录（`<temp>\dsh-<16 hex>`——由会话 id + 工作区派生、独占创建、拒绝 reparse point、提供方 dispose 时移除——TMP/TEMP 由 runner 重写——bwrap `--tmpfs /tmp` 语义）。受限令牌的**默认 DACL** 被扩展一条写入 SID 全权 ACE（`SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl)`）：此后不带显式安全描述符创建的新对象（匿名管道——CreatePipe、同步对象）自带 restricting SID ACE，创建时的写 pass-2 检查通过；**named pipe 例外**——其默认安全描述符是 Win32 层在用户态安装的默认 SD 模板（由 KernelBase 构建——owner/SYSTEM/Admins 全权、Everyone/ANONYMOUS 只读），令牌无法影响，因此受限孙进程的管道 stdio 捕获保持拒绝（POC 记载的边界，由 runner 套件钉住）。它以 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md)（后端加 `./runner` argv 前缀入口）、[`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md) 的 `win32` 链档、以及作为隔离执行器的 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) 交付；Windows 平台层在受限 pwsh 栈之上重新启用完整权限面（sandbox/sandbox-policy/permission/approval/fs-sandbox）。
+直接基于原始 ACL 机制实现该档：把调用者令牌复制为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 受限令牌（`CreateRestrictedToken`，`WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`），其 restricting SIDs 携带彼此独立的工作区能力与私有临时目录能力。`WRITE_RESTRICTED` 只对写访问做交集检查，因此读取保留调用者的环境访问，而写入还必须匹配这些能力 ACE 之一。该机制来自 huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc（`10e4dfb`）的演示；本移植检查每个 API 调用并 fail-closed（POC 因忽略失败而 fail-open）。工作区 SID 由规范工作区路径确定性派生（`workspaceWriteSid`——sha256 → `S-1-4-x-y`）；其常驻工作区 ACE 是跨会话复用缓存，精确 ACE 跳过可避免重复的急切全树传播。每个活跃的会话/工作区对则获得一个随机私有临时目录，以及一个从该路径派生的、经过域分离的 SID（`tempWriteSid`）；其 ACE 可回收，TMP/TEMP 指向该目录，令牌默认 DACL 列入该临时 SID，因此新建的临时对象不会获得共享的工作区能力。fork 因此无法写入同级会话的临时目录树。即使恢复的是同一会话，新的提供方也会选择新的路径和 SID，因此崩溃残留只是失效垃圾，而非冲突或继承的能力；无 agent（智能体）的调用会逐调用创建并移除同样的形态。环境临时根目录绝不会被隐式授权。如果工作区等于或包含临时根目录，调用会在任何 ACL 改动发生前失败，因为否则其可继承的常驻 ACE 会向每个私有子目录授权；直接 API 会拒绝可写根目录与实际私有临时目录在任一方向上的重叠。PowerShell 可借助这项私有临时目录能力完成启动时的 AppLocker 探针，因此在没有主机范围策略时，`workspace-write` 会保持 FullLanguage；`read-only` 无法创建探针文件，会保守地进入 ConstrainedLanguage。这一区别属于 PowerShell 启动行为，不是 ACL 边界的一部分。令牌列表为 read-only = [登录 SID、Everyone]，workspace-write = [登录 SID、Everyone、工作区 SID、可选临时 SID]。登录 SID + Everyone 是保活不变式（没有它们，早期 DLL 初始化会以 0xC0000142 死亡，CNG 会让 pwsh 以 0xE0434352 崩溃）。由于 Everyone 仍在列表中，向 Everyone 授予写访问的外部对象会通过两次检查；由于 NTFS ACL 属于文件对象，工作区内获授权的硬链接也会使同一对象的外部别名获得授权。拒绝所有硬链接会让普通 pnpm 工作区不可用，因此提供方报告 `enforcement: 'partial'`，原生套件则钉住这两个缺口。Read-only 不含任何能力 SID，因此常驻工作区 ACE 在模式降级后保持失效。Authenticated Users 在两种列表中都不存在——CIM 不可用，从而关闭 C:\-root 建树逃逸——INTERACTIVE/LOCAL 也不存在，因此 Public 树写入被拒绝。新建匿名管道和同步对象通过 `SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl)` 继承临时 SID（禁用临时目录时继承工作区 SID，read-only 下继承 Everyone）；named pipe 保持 Win32 层 owner/SYSTEM/Admins 全权、Everyone/ANONYMOUS 只读的模板，因此受限孙进程的管道 stdio 仍被拒绝。它以 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md)、[`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md) 的 `win32` 档，以及作为隔离执行器的 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) 交付。
 
 ## How the restriction works (why no new identity)
 
-身份路线靠"**谁**在跑子进程"来限制，本档靠"令牌派生"来限制。身份路线（landstrip 的 restricted-user、AppContainer）用全新账户或容器 SID 运行子进程，该身份在宿主的文件上从零条 ACE 开始——一切访问（包括读）默认拒绝，子进程要碰的每条路径都必须事后为那个身份补写 ACE 才能放行：这正是让两个备选方案出局的全盘 DACL 改造。受限令牌保留调用者自己的 SID 与 logon session：[`CreateRestrictedToken`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-createrestrictedtoken) 派生一个加入 restricting SIDs 与 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 标志的令牌，于是 Windows 做两次访问检查——一次按正常 SID，一次按 restricting SIDs——只有两次都放行，写类访问才被授予。读只凭正常检查即可通过（调用者的 SID 在其可读范围内本来就携带读权限），所以本档不需要任何读授权、也不需要新账户；写还必须额外通过孤儿 SID 检查，而只有工作区与临时目录的 ACE 能满足它。`DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN` 在令牌侧合成了新账户的受限用户效果，即使提升过的调用者派生的也是过滤令牌。同一原语其实也能限制读（`SidsToDisable` 把 SID 变为 deny-only），但受限读的令牌需要逐路径的读授权——恰好重新引入身份路线付出的代价——而沙盒词汇表从不要求读隔离。
+身份路线靠"**谁**在跑子进程"来限制，本档靠"令牌派生"来限制。身份路线（landstrip 的 restricted-user、AppContainer）用全新账户或容器 SID 运行子进程，该身份在宿主的文件上从零条 ACE 开始——一切访问（包括读）默认拒绝，子进程要碰的每条路径都必须事后为那个身份补写 ACE 才能放行：这正是让两个备选方案出局的全盘 DACL 改造。受限令牌保留调用者自己的 SID 与 logon session：[`CreateRestrictedToken`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-createrestrictedtoken) 派生一个加入 restricting SIDs 与 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 标志的令牌，于是 Windows 做两次访问检查——一次按正常 SID，一次按 restricting SIDs——只有两次都放行，写类访问才被授予。读只凭正常检查即可通过（调用者的 SID 在其可读范围内本来就携带读权限），所以本档不需要任何读授权、也不需要新账户；写还必须额外通过能力 SID 检查，而只有工作区与临时目录的 ACE 能满足它。`DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE | LUA_TOKEN` 在令牌侧合成了新账户的受限用户效果，即使提升过的调用者派生的也是过滤令牌。同一原语其实也能限制读（`SidsToDisable` 把 SID 变为 deny-only），但受限读的令牌需要逐路径的读授权——恰好重新引入身份路线付出的代价——而沙盒词汇表从不要求读隔离。
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ AppContainer 令牌没有环境读访问：每个可读路径都必须预先通
 
 ## Consequences
 
-所得：仅写隔离、不引入新的 OS 版本下限（`CreateRestrictedToken` 比 mxc 的版本早二十年）、读/网络/进程可见性完全不受影响（与模式词汇表一致）、fail-closed 错误携带 API 名与精确 Win32 错误码。所失：无读侧或网络隔离；控制台隔离不可用（隐藏控制台子进程以 `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED` 死亡；子进程共享宿主控制台）；被授权根目录上有驻留 ACE 改动（目录须为调用者所有；工作区 ACE 按设计永久常驻——复用缓存，工作区改名时成为不可见残留——临时 ACE 由提供方 dispose 连同派生的私有临时目录一起回收——崩溃会把两者都留下，下一次恢复会在独占创建处大声失败，直到临时目录卫生回收该目录）；授权物化是急切的全树传播（`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` 立即遍历每个后代——在大型工作区上耗时数十秒），因按工作区身份，每台机器每个工作区只付一次；CIM 在**两种**受限模式下都不可用（AuthUsers 从两种列表中被移除——WMI namespace 安全校验失败，`Get-ComputerInfo` 静默返回不完整结果），作为关闭两种模式下 C:\-root 建树逃逸的代价；位于被授权根目录之外的 FAT 类（无 ACL）目标在两种模式下仍可写（没有可做交集的安全描述符——作为历史残留处理：不支持、仅警告、已在 README 中记录）；NULL DACL 目录在 grant+revoke 往返下不保持身份（记录在案的边角，POC 亦有此行为）；`whoami` 与令牌检查 cmdlet 在受限令牌下失败（诊断噪音，已记录）；且**两种**受限模式都以 ConstrainedLanguage 模式运行 `pwsh`——受限令牌触发 PowerShell 的锁定检测，因此 `Add-Type`、非核心 .NET 静态调用（`[System.IO.*]::`、`[math]::`）、COM 对象与反射都会以“only core types”错误失败，而 `-f` 格式化、属性访问与核心 cmdlet/类型继续工作，语言模式也无法从内部提升回 FullLanguage——已在 pwsh 工具描述中教给模型，并记录在包 README 的 Known Limitations 中；**两种**受限模式同样拒绝 named-pipe 打开——libuv 的管道 stdio spawn 以 EPERM 失败（POC 记载的“无法重定向输出”边界；继承/忽略的 stdio 与匿名管道可用）——记录在包 README 的 Known Limitations 中，并在 pwsh 工具描述中教给模型。
+所得：仅写隔离、不引入新的 OS 版本下限（`CreateRestrictedToken` 比 mxc 的版本早二十年）、读/网络/进程可见性完全不受影响（与模式词汇表一致），且 fail-closed 错误携带 API 名与精确 Win32 错误码。会话共享有意常驻的工作区能力，但不共享各自可回收的临时能力；重启残留既不能阻塞恢复的会话，也不能向其授权。所失：强制执行在结构上只能是部分的，因为此令牌形态无法把 Everyone 授予的写入与 NTFS 硬链接别名限制在路径边界内；无读侧或网络隔离；控制台隔离不可用（隐藏控制台子进程以 `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED` 死亡；子进程共享宿主控制台）；工作区常驻 ACE 改动（复用缓存，以及工作区改名后的失效残留）与异常关闭后遗留的随机临时目录垃圾，直到 OS 卫生机制将其回收；工作区授权采用急切的全树传播（`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` 立即遍历每个后代——大型工作区上耗时数十秒），每台机器每个工作区只付一次；CIM 在两种受限模式下均不可用（Authenticated Users 不存在，从而关闭 C:\-root 建树逃逸）；FAT 类无 ACL 目标仍可写；NULL-DACL 目录在 grant/revoke 往返下不保持身份；`whoami` 与令牌检查 cmdlet 在受限令牌下失败；read-only pwsh 会进入 ConstrainedLanguage，而在没有主机策略时 workspace-write 保持 FullLanguage；named pipe 打开仍被拒绝，因此 libuv 管道 stdio 的孙进程以 EPERM 失败，而继承/忽略的 stdio 与匿名管道可用。包 README 负责记录这些运行限制。
 
 ## Testing
 
-产品可见的 Windows 阵容切换仅存在于 win32，而 keyless 快照夹具必须在 macOS/Linux 上可重放，因此无法覆盖它；替代证据是 bundle 组合 spec（[`base.spec.ts`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts)、[`windows-shell.spec.ts`](../../../../apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts)）加上 win32 真实 runner 套件（`packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/`、`packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/tests/`），组装态信号由 CI 的 Windows lane 负责。授权机制在跨平台侧由 `packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-grants.spec.ts` 钉住（派生的私有临时身份——按会话 + 工作区确定性、跨会话相异——一次性物化、独占临时目录创建并拒绝 reparse point、失败时自我清理、干净重启时对同一派生目录的重新授权、dispose 与模式切换循环中的常驻/可回收生命周期，以及派生 SID 的 argv 契约——mock 掉 Win32 表面），win32 侧由 `workspace-sid.spec.ts`（派生的确定性/形态/相异性）、`grant.spec.ts`（真实 DACL 物化：可回收路径在 dispose 时撤销、常驻路径存活）、`acl.spec.ts` 的幂等授权快速路径与 dispose 后常驻 ACE 契约、`failure-paths.spec.ts` 的 suspension-orphan 回归（AssignProcessToJobObject 失败会终止子进程）与 `runner.spec.ts` 的 `--write-sid` 契约（调用者所有目录的授权、经 TMP/TEMP 的私有临时子目录、两种模式下的 CIM 拒绝探针、模式降级回归——驻留授权 ACE 在 read-only 下失效并在重新升级后再度生效——环境可写 Public-probe 回归（对 C:\Users\Public 子目录的写入在两种模式下都会被拒绝），以及两种模式下对 ConstrainedLanguage 的钉定，加上孙进程 stdio 矩阵钉定——继承/忽略的 stdio spawn 成功，而管道捕获在两种模式下都被**拒绝**）钉住。runner 失败分类以 127 退出码为门槛（受限命令仅仅在非 127 退出时打印 `windows-acl-run:` 签名，也绝不会被误分类为"命令未运行"——由 pwsh-sandbox helper 套件钉住）。
+产品可见的 Windows 阵容切换仅存在于 win32，而必须在 macOS/Linux 上可重放的 keyless 快照无法覆盖它；替代证据是 bundle 组合 spec 加上 win32 真实 runner 套件，组装态信号由 CI 的 Windows lane 负责。`sandbox-local/tests/acl-grants.spec.ts` 在 mock Win32 的情况下钉住随机临时目录分配、按会话/工作区复用、fork/工作区分离、崩溃后恢复不冲突、成对 argv SID、失败清理，以及常驻/可回收生命周期。在 Windows 上，`workspace-sid.spec.ts` 钉住工作区/临时目录派生与域分离；`acl.spec.ts` 钉住真实 DACL 生命周期；`runner.spec.ts` 钉住成对 SID 验证、共享工作区 SID 时对同级会话临时目录的拒绝、无 agent 调用的逐调用临时目录创建/移除、TMP/TEMP 重写、模式降级、Public 拒绝、Everyone/硬链接部分边界、按模式区分的 PowerShell 语言行为与孙进程 stdio。ARM64 与模拟 x64 原生运行负责提供架构特定的验收证据。
 
 ## Related
 

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-web-session-log-export.i18n.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
+# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
+# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
+#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-web-session-log-export.md
+2026-08-10-web-session-log-export.md: 427b6478ac44fb28030aa932630f276de7bb2edc
+2026-08-10-web-session-log-export.zh.md: 63b9804a54cda7eea4ff793d78a925fe296d06cb

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-web-session-log-export.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Agent Note: Web session-log export as a host-streamed ZIP download
+
+Status: implemented
+
+English | [中文](2026-08-10-web-session-log-export.zh.md)
+
+## Problem
+
+The Trajectory view had no way to hand a debugging artifact to a human: the raw session log lived on disk and in the host, the client history face served folded projections (not raw entries), and a session with subagents spans many independent session logs. A bug report needs the complete raw log of the whole tree, in a shape that survives being emailed around.
+
+## Decision
+
+- **The export is a host-only download, not an RPC**: `GET /api/session.export?sessionId=…&includeDescendants=true` streams one ZIP attachment. Every file is a session's **stored artifact text verbatim**: `readRaw` on the persistence service reads the backend's own durable bytes (the JSONL backend decodes its physical zstd frames, or returns plaintext) — never a reconstruction from parsed events, so packed-chunk rows, key order, and line breaks survive byte-for-byte — under its original base name (`session.jsonl` at the root, `subagents/<id>/session.jsonl` for descendants). Compression runs on the host with fflate's streaming `Zip`/`ZipDeflate` API, each entry deflated in bounded chunks as it is produced, so the response is chunked as it is generated and the host never holds the whole archive in one buffer (at most one descendant's artifact text beyond the preloaded root), and production yields whenever the response queue fills, so a slow consumer bounds the accumulation (fflate's callback is synchronous — the drain point is the only backpressure). No manifest is written — every file is byte-identical to the durable artifact and self-describing through its own header line.
+- **Error vocabulary is HTTP-native**: missing services → 500, missing root session → 404 (both decided before any byte streams), a descendant without a stored artifact → the stream errors (fail-loud, never silent under-export). The carrier (`toFetchHandler`) already applies the `/api` trust fence; the GET branch sits beside the existing SSE GET routes, and `ApiProxy.downloads.sessionLog` (host-only, no wire envelope, absent from `IApiClient`) implements it.
+- **The UI just downloads**: the 导出 button fetches the endpoint and saves the response; the `session.log` RPC that an earlier iteration shipped was removed — the download endpoint is its only consumer, and the repo rule is no public interface without a current owner. The client bundle no longer carries fflate (the earlier browser-entry-alias pitfall is moot).
+- The 导出 button lives in the Trajectory toolbar; the plugin exposes `exportLog` through the view's inject face (components never touch ctx) and resolves the view tab label through the locale service (`轨迹` in Chinese, `Trajectory` in English). In-flight state disables the button; a failure surfaces in a visible alert bar under the toolbar.
+
+## Alternatives considered
+
+- **`session.log` data RPC + client-side zip** — shipped first, rejected with the user: the browser pulls the full raw JSON (≈10× the final zip size) and compresses on the main thread; for the 23 MB sessions in real use the host-side stream is strictly better. The RPC was deleted with the migration rather than left as a dead public surface.
+- **Single JSONL with envelope lines for multiple sessions** — rejected with the user: mixing sessions in one JSONL loses clean per-file boundaries; a ZIP keeps one canonical file per session.
+- **jszip** — heavier (~100 kB) and its dependency graph pulls readable-stream browser mappings; fflate is purpose-built and small.
+- **Vendoring fflate's browser entry** — the repo vendoring procedure targets cordis-scale pinned sources; a resolveId alias keeps the maintained dependency without shipping a copy (and host-side fflate needs no alias at all).
+
+## Consequences
+
+- Export fidelity: every exported file is byte-identical to the backend's durable artifact as of the read moment (a live session may append after the read; the export reflects the durable state at read time). The archive name is `dsh-session-<sanitized-id>.zip` and archive paths sanitize ids before they can shape entries.
+- `readRaw` joins the persistence service as a concrete default (`undefined` for backends without a per-session artifact, e.g. SQLite) with a JSONL-backend override that owns the compression decode. `ApiProxy.downloads.sessionLog` adds one host-only member to the contract plus a host-side query schema and a GET branch in the fetch handler — no RPC map row, envelope schema, or client `IApiClient` surface.
+- Fixture mode (no host) answers 404 for the export, so the button's error bar explains the gap instead of hanging; the navigation-panes golden snapshot includes the 导出 button.
+- Deferred: transcript.md and a report/feedback bundle remain future work; the byte-faithful, manifest-free shape keeps the v2 bundle extension cheap.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-web-session-log-export.zh.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Agent Note：Web 会话日志导出——宿主流式 ZIP 下载
+
+状态：implemented
+
+[English](2026-08-10-web-session-log-export.md) | 中文
+
+## 问题
+
+Trajectory 视图没有任何方式把调试工件交到人手里：原始会话日志存放在磁盘与宿主侧，客户端历史面只提供折叠后的投影（而非原始事件），而带子代理的会话横跨多个相互独立的会话日志。bug 报告需要整棵会话树的完整原始日志，并且形态要能在被转发后仍然可用。
+
+## 决策
+
+- **导出是宿主侧的下载面，不是 RPC**：`GET /api/session.export?sessionId=…&includeDescendants=true` 流式返回一个 ZIP 附件。每个文件都是会话**存储工件的逐字原文**：持久化服务新增的 `readRaw` 读取后端自己的持久化字节（jsonl 后端解码其物理 zstd 帧，或直接返回明文）——绝非从解析后事件重建，因此 chunk 打包、键序、换行全部逐字节保留——放在其原始基础文件名下（根为 `session.jsonl`，子代理为 `subagents/<id>/session.jsonl`）。压缩在宿主侧用 fflate 的流式 `Zip`/`ZipDeflate` API 完成，每个条目按有界分块边产出边压缩，响应随生成分块写出，宿主从不把整个归档放进单个缓冲区（除预载的根外，最多同时持有一条后代的工件文本），且每当响应队列填满时生产会让出，慢消费者因此只产生有界的积压（fflate 的回调是同步的——让出点是唯一的背压手段）。不写清单——每个文件都与持久化工件逐字节一致，并通过自身 header 行自描述。
+- **错误词汇是 HTTP 原生的**：服务缺失 → 500，根会话缺失 → 404（两者都在任何字节流出前判定），后代缺少存储工件 → 流失败（fail-loud，绝不静默少导出）。载体（`toFetchHandler`）已对 `/api` 应用信任围栏；GET 分支与既有 SSE GET 路由并列，由 `ApiProxy.downloads.sessionLog`（host-only、无 wire 信封、不在 `IApiClient` 上）实现。
+- **UI 只负责下载**：「导出」按钮 fetch 该端点并保存响应；早先迭代发布的 `session.log` RPC 已删除——下载端点是它唯一的消费者，仓库规则是不留无当前所有者的公共接口。客户端 bundle 不再携带 fflate（早先的浏览器入口别名坑随之消失）。
+- 「导出」按钮位于 Trajectory 工具栏；插件通过视图的 inject face 暴露 `exportLog`（组件从不接触 ctx），并通过 locale 服务解析视图标签页标题（中文「轨迹」、英文 "Trajectory"）。进行中状态会禁用按钮；失败会在工具栏下方的可见警示条中显示。
+
+## 考虑过的替代方案
+
+- **`session.log` 数据 RPC + 客户端打包**——先发布，后与用户共同否决：浏览器要拉取完整原始 JSON（约为最终 zip 的 10 倍）并在主线程压缩；对实际使用中 23 MB 级别的会话，宿主流式严格更优。迁移时把该 RPC 一并删除，而不是留作无消费者的公共接口。
+- **用信封行把多会话编码进单一 JSONL**——与用户共同否决：把多个会话混进一个 JSONL 会失去干净的按文件边界；ZIP 让每个会话保持一个规范文件。
+- **jszip**——更重（约 100 kB），依赖图还会拉入 readable-stream 的浏览器映射；fflate 专为此而生且体积小。
+- **将 fflate 浏览器入口 vendoring 进仓库**——仓库的 vendoring 流程面向 cordis 级别的固定源码；resolveId 别名在保持维护中的依赖的同时无需复制代码（宿主侧 fflate 根本不需要别名）。
+
+## 后果
+
+- 导出保真度：每个导出文件都与读取时刻的后端持久化工件逐字节一致（活跃会话可能在读取后继续追加；导出反映的是读取时的持久化状态）。压缩包名为 `dsh-session-<sanitized-id>.zip`，归档路径在塑造条目前会先净化会话 id。
+- `readRaw` 以具体默认（无每会话工件的后端如 SQLite 返回 `undefined`）加入持久化服务，jsonl 后端覆写并自持压缩解码。`ApiProxy.downloads.sessionLog` 为契约新增一个 host-only 成员，外加宿主侧 query schema，并在 fetch handler 加一个 GET 分支——没有 RPC map 行、信封 schema 或客户端 `IApiClient` 面。
+- fixture 模式（无宿主）对导出应答 404，按钮的错误条会解释这个缺口而非挂起；navigation-panes golden 快照包含「导出」按钮。
+- 暂缓：transcript.md 以及 report/feedback 打包留待后续；逐字节忠实、无清单的形态让 v2 的打包扩展保持廉价。