test(sandbox-policy): record wording evidence
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
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// keyless. Assertions read the exact durable request headers and tool calls,
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// so assistant prose alone cannot satisfy the scenario.
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import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
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import type { Browser, Page } from 'playwright'
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import { chromium } from 'playwright'
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@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ const PROMPTS = [
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'Can you create or edit a normal file right now under the current policy? Answer directly in one sentence. Do not call a tool just to discover the policy.',
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'Does the DSH file sandbox currently restrict file operations? Answer directly in one sentence. Do not call tools.',
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'Reply with exactly WORKSPACE_POLICY_SEEN. Do not call tools.',
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'Create policy-neutral.txt in the current workspace containing exactly POLICY_NEUTRAL_OK, verify its contents, then report completion.',
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] as const
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const PRESET_LABELS = ['Read Only', 'Danger Full Access', 'Workspace Write'] as const
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@@ -38,20 +40,27 @@ function requestSystems(events: readonly SessionEvent[]): string[] {
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function assistantTexts(events: readonly SessionEvent[]): string[] {
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return events.flatMap((event) => {
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if (event.type !== 'assistant/message') return []
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return [event.data.message.content.flatMap(block => block.type === 'text' ? [block.text] : []).join('').replaceAll('**', '')]
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const text = event.data.message.content.flatMap(block => block.type === 'text' ? [block.text] : []).join('').replaceAll('**', '')
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return text.length === 0 ? [] : [text]
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})
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}
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function callArgs(event: Extract<SessionEvent, { type: 'tool/call' }>): Record<string, unknown> {
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return JSON.parse(event.data.arguments) as Record<string, unknown>
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}
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describe('web e2e: current sandbox policy reaches the model before tools', () => {
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let scaffold: WebScaffold
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let browser: Browser
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let page: Page
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let tripwire: ReturnType<typeof watchConsole>
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let disposeApproval: (() => void) | undefined
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let sessionWorkspace: string | undefined
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const sessionEvents: SessionEvent[] = []
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beforeAll(async () => {
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scaffold = await launchWebScaffold(MODE === 'record' ? {} : { replayFixture: FIXTURE })
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disposeApproval = scaffold.ctx.on('approval/request', () => Promise.resolve('allowed-once'), { prepend: true })
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scaffold.ctx.on('session/event', (session, event: SessionEvent) => {
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sessionWorkspace = session.header.cwd
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sessionEvents.push(event)
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@@ -66,6 +75,7 @@ describe('web e2e: current sandbox policy reaches the model before tools', () =>
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afterAll(async () => {
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await browser?.close()
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disposeApproval?.()
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await scaffold?.close()
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})
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@@ -90,13 +100,21 @@ describe('web e2e: current sandbox policy reaches the model before tools', () =>
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await expect.poll(() => input.isEnabled(), { timeout: 10_000 }).toBe(true)
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}
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await input.fill('/permission read-only')
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await input.press('Enter')
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await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Access mode, current: Read Only' }).waitFor({ timeout: 10_000 })
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const settled = scaffold.whenTurnSettled()
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await input.fill(PROMPTS[3])
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await input.press('Enter')
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sessionId = await settled
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if (sessionId === undefined) throw new Error('permission-policy scenario completed no model turn')
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if (MODE === 'record') await recordFixture(scaffold, sessionId, FIXTURE)
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}, 240_000)
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it.skipIf(MODE === 'record')('records each effective policy before the corresponding model behavior', () => {
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it.skipIf(MODE === 'record')('records each effective policy before the corresponding model behavior', async () => {
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const systems = requestSystems(sessionEvents)
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expect(systems).toHaveLength(3)
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expect(systems).toHaveLength(4)
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expect(systems[0]).toContain('Current DSH file policy: read-only. The write and edit tools and one-shot bash commands cannot modify files under this policy.')
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expect(systems[1]).toContain('Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools or one-shot bash commands.')
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expect(systems[1]).toContain('Approval prompts are disabled in this session')
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@@ -104,13 +122,27 @@ describe('web e2e: current sandbox policy reaches the model before tools', () =>
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if (sessionWorkspace === undefined) throw new Error('permission-policy scenario observed no session workspace')
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expect(systems[2]).toContain(`Current DSH file policy: workspace-write. The write and edit tools and one-shot bash commands may modify files under the session workspace: ${JSON.stringify(canonicalPath(sessionWorkspace))}. Some platform temporary areas may also be writable.`)
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expect(systems[2]).not.toContain('Approval prompts are disabled in this session')
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expect(systems[3]).toContain('Current DSH file policy: read-only.')
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const answers = assistantTexts(sessionEvents)
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expect(answers).toHaveLength(3)
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expect(answers.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(4)
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expect(answers[0]).toMatch(/cannot create or edit (?:a )?normal files?|writes?.*denied/i)
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expect(answers[1]).toMatch(/does not.*restrict file operations|not restrict.*file operations/i)
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expect(answers[1]).toMatch(/does not restrict.*(?:write\/edit tools|write and edit tools).*one-shot bash commands/i)
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expect(answers[2]).toBe('WORKSPACE_POLICY_SEEN')
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expect(sessionEvents.filter(event => event.type === 'tool/call')).toHaveLength(0)
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const calls = sessionEvents.filter(
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(event): event is Extract<SessionEvent, { type: 'tool/call' }> => event.type === 'tool/call',
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)
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expect(calls.every(call => call.data.turn === 4)).toBe(true)
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expect(calls.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2)
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const firstCall = calls[0]
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if (firstCall === undefined) throw new Error('neutral policy task produced no tool call')
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expect(callArgs(firstCall)['sandbox_permissions']).toBeUndefined()
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expect(calls.some(call => callArgs(call)['sandbox_permissions'] !== undefined)).toBe(true)
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expect(sessionEvents.some(event => event.type === 'tool/result'
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&& JSON.stringify(event.data).includes('[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]'))).toBe(true)
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expect(sessionEvents.some(event => event.type === 'approval/asked')).toBe(true)
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if (sessionWorkspace === undefined) throw new Error('permission-policy scenario observed no session workspace')
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expect(await readFile(join(sessionWorkspace, 'policy-neutral.txt'), 'utf8')).toBe('POLICY_NEUTRAL_OK')
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})
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it.skipIf(MODE === 'record')('stays clean and keeps the fixture inventory closed', async () => {
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