fix(config): close the review findings on configuration source ownership

Two had real security consequences:

The bootstrap rejection ran on npm dotenv's parser while process.loadEnvFile
applied the file with Node's own. Two independently maintained dialects meant
the check and the thing it guards could disagree: a name Node accepts but the
checker misses would reach process.env unchecked, and BASH_ENV there runs a
file of the project's choosing on every `bash -c` the bash tool issues. Parse
once with node:util's parseEnv — the same engine loadEnvFile uses — and assign
the entries already checked, which also drops the dotenv dependency.

llm-pi-ai still returned a literal profile.apiKey ahead of everything, and it
registers a settings namespace, so the defect removed from llm-deepseek
survived intact in its design twin. The field is gone from the profile schema,
the resolution path, and the tests.

The rest are consistency and documentation defects the review named:

- verify-config-source-ownership did not scan the Python runtime's bundled
  cordis.yml, which still inlined apiKey and baseURL. Both are covered now, and
  the line-anchored INLINE_DENY documents that it is a tripwire, not a parser.
- The deny list missed NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED, the askpass hooks, the
  GIT_CONFIG_* redirections, and PYTHONHOME — all implied by its own stated
  rule about what a variable does.
- Snapshot lookups folded case on Windows, where environment names are
  case-insensitive and an exact-match Map could miss a higher-ranked layer.
- The credentials note claimed a read-time permission check was "not taken"
  while this PR implemented it; the credentials-local README still described
  two layers, live process.env reads, dotenv-era limitations, and a renamed
  anchor; the llm-deepseek README still advertised the removed literal apiKey;
  and web.ts and base.cordis.yml kept personal-overlay wording.
- The ownership note's literal-apiKey claim now names its scope: the
  web-search providers keep a literal field but register no settings
  namespace, so nothing can shadow a stored credential through them.

packages/credentials/credentials-local/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/credentials/credentials-local/README.md
-README.md: ca2af9d8a514b43aeef19abec7cda4e44645bdaf
-README.zh.md: a8be53629853fe6fb7c39ef2281ac798b5624010
+README.md: 45c18714c9ca81d98d2c18c385c772545e2e15d1
+README.zh.md: 59e0158980cede3eb3f5590b00f858ddffcee328

packages/credentials/credentials-local/README.md

@@ -2,14 +2,20 @@
 
 English | [中文](README.zh.md)
 
-File-backed [credentials](../credentials/README.md) provider: two layers, one honest precedence.
+File-backed [credentials](../credentials/README.md) provider: four layers, one honest precedence.
 
 | Layer | Source id | Writable | Wins |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| Live process environment | `env` | no | always |
-| `$DSH_HOME/.credentials.yaml` document | `file` | yes (`set`/`unset`) | otherwise |
+| Inherited process environment | `env` | no | always |
+| `$DSH_HOME/.credentials.yaml` document | `file` | yes (`set`/`unset`) | over both `.env` layers |
+| `<invocation cwd>/.env` | `project-env` | not here | over the user `.env` |
+| `$DSH_HOME/.env` | `user-env` | not here | otherwise |
 
-The environment wins because a launch-time override (`DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=… dsh`, CI secrets, a dev shell sourcing the repo `.env`) is operator intent for this run — and because it cannot be edited from inside, it must be *visibly* read-only: `describe()` reports `source: 'env', writable: false`, and `set`/`unset` reject instead of writing a change the reader would never see. Resolution reads `process.env` live and never writes it back.
+The launching environment wins because a per-run override (`DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=… dsh`, a CI secret, a container `-e`) is operator intent for this run — and because it cannot be edited from inside, it must be *visibly* read-only: `describe()` reports `source: 'env', writable: false`, and `set`/`unset` reject instead of writing a change the reader would never see.
+
+Everything below it loses to the managed store, so a key written by the web page or TUI takes effect immediately even when an older key sits in a `.env`. Those two layers still resolve when nothing is stored, and `describe()` names them `project-env` or `user-env` with `writable: true` — storing a key replaces them as the effective source.
+
+Under the product CLI, resolution reads the launcher's frozen [environment snapshot](../../util/environment/README.md) rather than `process.env`: only the snapshot can say whether a value came from the launching shell or from a file. A composition the product CLI did not boot has the inherited environment as its only layer, which keeps embedders on the semantics they already had.
 
 ## Config
 
@@ -35,13 +41,17 @@ Writes patch the parsed document rather than rebuilding it, so comments and the
 
 Any string value round-trips, multi-line values included, so no entry is unwritable for want of a quoting style. An empty stored value is absent, per the seam rule — which is why an empty string in the document is rejected outright: `unset` removes a key, it does not blank it.
 
+## Permissions
+
+The provider creates the directory `0700` and creates or atomically replaces the document `0600`. It holds what it *reads* to that same bound: on POSIX a document carrying any group or other permission bit fails before its contents are parsed — at boot and on every reload — and the error names the `chmod 600` repair. Windows has no mode to inspect, so the check is skipped there rather than faked.
+
 ## Hot reload
 
 External edits publish `credentials/updated` per changed reference after the snapshot is replaced **wholesale** — an entry deleted on disk never lingers in memory. The provider's own writes are recognized by content and publish exactly their one commit event. An unreadable or invalid document at runtime keeps the last good snapshot and warns; an absent file is an empty store; an unreadable or invalid file at boot fails loud.
 
 ## Security boundary
 
-The document is `0600` under a `0700` directory, which stops other OS users — **not** the model. Tool processes (bash, the filesystem tools) run as the same user, and the shipped `workspace-write` file policy confines mutations rather than reads, so they can read this file exactly like any other file the user owns; no sandbox mode singles it out. What the harness does hold to is narrower: it never hands the model a resolved path to the document, and never loads it into the process environment — unlike `$DSH_HOME/.env`, which is the user's ordinary environment layer (see [app-boot's Personal config](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#personal-config)) — so reaching the value takes a deliberate read of a path the agent was not given.
+The document is `0600` under a `0700` directory, which stops other OS users — **not** the model. Tool processes (bash, the filesystem tools) run as the same user, and the shipped `workspace-write` file policy confines mutations rather than reads, so they can read this file exactly like any other file the user owns; no sandbox mode singles it out. What the harness does hold to is narrower: it never hands the model a resolved path to the document, and never loads it into the process environment — unlike `$DSH_HOME/.env`, which is the user's ordinary environment layer (see [app-boot's Harness home](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#the-harness-home)) — so reaching the value takes a deliberate read of a path the agent was not given.
 
 That is discretion, not a boundary. A deployment that must keep provider keys away from its own agent cannot get there with file permissions; an OS-keychain provider — a store the model's processes cannot read at all — is the deferred answer and belongs beside this provider as a sibling package.
 
@@ -55,9 +65,7 @@ No direct invalidation; credentials never enter a request prefix.
 
 ## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
 
-- **Multi-line entries refuse `set`/`unset`** — the line editor will not rewrite an entry it would corrupt; `describe` reports them `writable: false` and edits must go to the file directly.
 - **Same-reference concurrent writes are last-write-wins** — the writer lock and the read-modify-write keep concurrent writers from dropping each other's entries, but two writers editing one reference still resolve to the later write; there is no revision check.
 - **A same-UID process can read the document** — see [Security boundary](#security-boundary): the file-effect sandbox modes do not deny reads, and an OS-keychain provider is deferred.
-- **Unrepresentable values fail loud** — control characters, or a mix of both quote styles with backslashes, cannot round-trip the dotenv line format.
-- **Environment changes are invisible** — `process.env` is read live per resolution, but no event can announce a change there.
+- **Environment changes are invisible** — the snapshot is frozen at launch, so a variable exported after startup reaches neither resolution nor `describe`; changing an environment-sourced credential takes a restart.
 - **Atomic, not crash-durable** — inherited from `dsh-atomic-write`; the store re-reads on boot.

packages/credentials/credentials-local/README.zh.md

@@ -2,14 +2,20 @@
 
 [English](README.md) | 中文
 
-文件型[凭据](../credentials/README.md) provider：两层来源，一条诚实的优先级。
+文件型[凭据](../credentials/README.md) provider：四层来源，一条诚实的优先级。
 
 | 层 | 来源 id | 可写 | 优先 |
 |---|---|---|---|
-| 活跃进程环境 | `env` | 否 | 恒定优先 |
-| `$DSH_HOME/.credentials.yaml` 文档 | `file` | 是（`set`/`unset`） | 其余情况 |
+| 继承的进程环境 | `env` | 否 | 恒定优先 |
+| `$DSH_HOME/.credentials.yaml` 文档 | `file` | 是（`set`/`unset`） | 高于两个 `.env` 层 |
+| `<invocation cwd>/.env` | `project-env` | 不在此处 | 高于用户 `.env` |
+| `$DSH_HOME/.env` | `user-env` | 不在此处 | 其余情况 |
 
-环境优先，因为启动时覆盖（`DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=… dsh`、CI 机密、加载了仓库 `.env` 的开发 shell）代表本次运行的操作者意图——而它无法从进程内部修改，就必须*可见地*只读：`describe()` 报告 `source: 'env', writable: false`，`set`/`unset` 直接拒绝，而不是写下一个读取方永远看不到的变更。解析实时读取 `process.env`，绝不写回。
+启动环境优先，因为按次覆盖（`DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=… dsh`、CI 机密、容器 `-e`）代表本次运行的操作者意图——而它无法从进程内部修改，就必须*可见地*只读：`describe()` 报告 `source: 'env', writable: false`，`set`/`unset` 直接拒绝，而不是写下一个读取方永远看不到的变更。
+
+它之下的一切都输给受管存储，因此 Web 页面或 TUI 写入的密钥会立即生效，即使某个 `.env` 里还留着更旧的密钥。没有存储任何东西时这两层仍会解析，`describe()` 会把来源报告为 `project-env` 或 `user-env` 且 `writable: true`——存入一个密钥就会取代它们成为生效来源。
+
+在产品 CLI（命令行界面）下，解析读取的是启动器冻结的[环境快照](../../util/environment/README.md)而不是 `process.env`：只有快照才说得清某个值来自启动 shell 还是来自某个文件。并非由产品 CLI 启动的组合只有继承环境这一层，这让嵌入方保持它们原有的语义。
 
 ## 配置
 
@@ -35,13 +41,17 @@ OPENAI_API_KEY: sk-…
 
 任何字符串值都能往返，包括多行值，因此不会再有条目因为缺少可用引号样式而不可写。空的存储值等于不存在（seam 规则）——这也正是文档中的空字符串被直接拒绝的原因：`unset` 删除键，而不是把它置空。
 
+## 权限
+
+provider 以 `0700` 创建目录，以 `0600` 创建或原子替换文档。它对*读取*同样守住这条界线：在 POSIX 上，只要文档带有任何 group 或 other 权限位，就会在解析其内容之前失败——启动时与每次 reload 都检查——并在错误里给出 `chmod 600` 的修复命令。Windows 没有可检查的 mode，因此在那里跳过该检查而不是伪造它。
+
 ## 热重载
 
 外部编辑在快照**整体替换**后按变更引用逐个发布 `credentials/updated`——磁盘上删掉的条目绝不在内存滞留。provider 自己的写入按内容识别，只发布属于该次提交的一个事件。运行期文档不可读或无效时保留最后可用快照并告警；文件不存在即空存储；启动时不可读或无效则响亮失败。
 
 ## 安全边界
 
-文档在 `0700` 目录下以 `0600` 权限存放，这挡得住其他 OS 用户，**挡不住**模型。工具进程（bash、文件系统工具）以同一用户身份运行，而已交付的 `workspace-write` 文件策略限制的是修改而非读取，因此它们读这个文件与读该用户拥有的任何其他文件毫无二致；也没有任何沙箱模式会把它单独挑出来。harness 真正守住的更窄：它绝不把该文档的解析后路径交给模型，也绝不把它载入进程环境——这与用户的普通环境层 `$DSH_HOME/.env` 不同（见 [app-boot 的个人配置](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#personal-config)）——因此要拿到这个值，需要刻意去读一条并未交给 agent 的路径。
+文档在 `0700` 目录下以 `0600` 权限存放，这挡得住其他 OS 用户，**挡不住**模型。工具进程（bash、文件系统工具）以同一用户身份运行，而已交付的 `workspace-write` 文件策略限制的是修改而非读取，因此它们读这个文件与读该用户拥有的任何其他文件毫无二致；也没有任何沙箱模式会把它单独挑出来。harness 真正守住的更窄：它绝不把该文档的解析后路径交给模型，也绝不把它载入进程环境——这与用户的普通环境层 `$DSH_HOME/.env` 不同（见 [app-boot 的 Harness home](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#the-harness-home)）——因此要拿到这个值，需要刻意去读一条并未交给 agent 的路径。
 
 这是审慎，不是边界。必须让提供方密钥远离自身 agent 的部署无法靠文件权限做到；OS 钥匙串 provider——一个模型的进程根本读不到的存储——才是延后的答案，它应当作为平级包与本 provider 并列。
 
@@ -55,9 +65,7 @@ OPENAI_API_KEY: sk-…
 
 ## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
 
-- **多行条目拒绝 `set`/`unset`**——行编辑器不改写会被它破坏的条目；`describe` 把它们报为 `writable: false`，编辑必须直接落到文件上。
 - **同一引用的并发写入是后写胜出**——写锁加读-改-写让并发写入者不会丢掉彼此的条目，但两个写入者编辑同一个引用时仍以较后的写入为准；没有修订检查。
 - **同 UID 进程可以读取该文档**——见[安全边界](#security-boundary)：文件效果沙箱模式不会拒绝读取，OS 钥匙串 provider 仍是延后项。
-- **无法表示的值响亮失败**——控制字符，或同时混用两种引号又含反斜杠的值，无法在 dotenv 行格式中往返。
-- **环境变化不可见**——每次解析实时读取 `process.env`，但那里的变化不可能发出事件。
+- **环境变化不可见**：快照在启动时冻结，因此启动之后 export 的变量既不会进入解析，也不会进入 `describe`；要更换来自环境的凭据需要重启。
 - **原子但不保证崩溃持久**——继承自 `dsh-atomic-write`；存储在启动时重新读取。

packages/credentials/credentials-local/src/index.ts

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ import z from 'schemastery'
 import { watch as chokidarWatch } from 'chokidar'
 import { mkdir, readFile, stat } from 'node:fs/promises'
 import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path'
-import { Document, parseDocument } from 'yaml'
+import { Document, parseDocument, type YAMLError } from 'yaml'
 import { withFileLock, writeFileAtomic } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-atomic-write'
 import { resolveDshHome } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-paths'
 import { environmentOf } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-environment'
@@ -128,10 +128,10 @@ function isENOENT(error: unknown): boolean {
  * @param error - the parser's error.
  * @returns the error code with its line and column.
  */
-function describeYamlError(error: { code?: string; linePos?: [{ line: number; col: number }, ...unknown[]] }): string {
+function describeYamlError(error: YAMLError): string {
   const at = error.linePos?.[0]
   const where = at === undefined ? '' : ` at line ${String(at.line)}, column ${String(at.col)}`
-  return `${error.code ?? 'YAML_ERROR'}${where}`
+  return `${error.code}${where}`
 }
 
 /**

packages/credentials/credentials/src/index.ts

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ export function credentialRef(value: string): CredentialRef {
 export interface ResolvedCredential {
   /** The non-empty secret value. */
   value: string
-  /** Provider-defined source layer id (the local provider uses `env` and `file`). */
+  /** Provider-defined source layer id (the local provider uses `env`, `file`, `project-env`, and `user-env`). */
   source: string
 }