Merge pull request #1600 from deepseek-harness/codex/product-providers-pr2-claude-code
Add the Claude Code subagent provider
This commit is contained in:
pku-xht
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-27-dispose-ladder-to-consumer.md
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2026-07-27-dispose-ladder-to-consumer.md: 97b551ff509e3b424f6bf5725939cf54acc961a7
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2026-07-27-dispose-ladder-to-consumer.zh.md: 7fff744e64109549a65d4f5bb17ff2d6ddfc6888
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2026-07-27-dispose-ladder-to-consumer.md: e9af88e8e7ef962213a74e96a249241cbe8d5994
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2026-07-27-dispose-ladder-to-consumer.zh.md: 89f8e107c56d42787c59bc6f8fa8fc7b3ef73208
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ English | [中文](2026-07-27-dispose-ladder-to-consumer.zh.md)
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## Decision
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The ladder moves to its one consumer. `dsh-subagent-acp` owns `disposeAcpChild(child, eofGraceMs, graceMs)`, built entirely on the seam's public verbs: close `stdin`, bound a `waitForExit` on `eofGraceMs`, then `terminate()` (whose SIGTERM→spec-grace→SIGKILL escalation already encodes the signal tiers), then a final bounded whole-tree wait that throws if survivors remain. The seam keeps `kill`/`terminate`/`waitForExit` — mechanisms, not policy — and `waitForExit(signal?)` is exactly the quiescence probe a consumer ladder needs to hold each tier on real tree exit. `dsh-subprocess-local` drops its `dsh-timeout` dependency; the seam's handle loses one method and one exported interface.
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The ladder moves to its one consumer. `dsh-subagent-acp` owns `disposeAcpChild(child, eofGraceMs)`, built entirely on the seam's public verbs: close `stdin`, bound a `waitForExit` on `eofGraceMs`, then call `terminate()`, whose SIGTERM→spec-grace→SIGKILL escalation already owns the signal timer, and await an unbounded `waitForExit()` for the subprocess owner's whole-tree exit proof. The seam keeps `kill`/`terminate`/`waitForExit` — mechanisms, not policy — and `waitForExit(signal?)` is exactly the quiescence probe a consumer ladder needs to hold the cooperative tier on real tree exit without deriving another timer from the termination grace. The seam's handle loses one method and one exported interface.
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## Alternatives considered
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@@ -20,4 +20,4 @@ The ladder moves to its one consumer. `dsh-subagent-acp` owns `disposeAcpChild(c
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## Consequences
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Bought: the seam is one method and one type smaller; implementations owe four verbs and no teardown policy; `dsh-subprocess-local` loses a dependency; the ladder's tier windows live beside the config fields that tune them. Cost: a future backend wanting EOF-first teardown writes ~20 lines against the verbs (or lifts the ACP helper); the ladder's tier-tier tests moved from the seam suite to the ACP suite, and the seam suite pins the verbs the ladder composes (bounded `waitForExit` false-then-true across an escalation) instead of the composed policy.
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Bought: the seam is one method and one type smaller; implementations owe four verbs and no teardown policy; the cooperative EOF window lives beside the ACP config field that tunes it, while the subprocess owner alone owns the termination window and final join. Cost: a future backend wanting EOF-first teardown writes ~20 lines against the verbs (or lifts the ACP helper); the ladder's tier tests live in the ACP suite, and the seam suite pins the verbs the ladder composes (bounded `waitForExit` false before escalation and an unbounded whole-tree join after it) instead of the composed policy.
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Status: implemented
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## 决策
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阶梯移入其唯一消费方。`dsh-subagent-acp` 拥有 `disposeAcpChild(child, eofGraceMs, graceMs)`，完全构建在 seam 的公开动词之上：关闭 `stdin`，以 `eofGraceMs` 约束一次 `waitForExit`，随后 `terminate()`（其 SIGTERM→spec 宽限期→SIGKILL 升级已编码了信号层级），最后进行有界的整树等待，若仍有存活进程则抛出。seam 保留 `kill`／`terminate`／`waitForExit`——机制而非策略——而 `waitForExit(signal?)` 恰是消费方阶梯在每一层确认进程树真正退出所需的完全停稳探针。`dsh-subprocess-local` 卸下 `dsh-timeout` 依赖；seam 的句柄少了一个方法和一个导出接口。
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阶梯移入其唯一消费方。`dsh-subagent-acp` 拥有 `disposeAcpChild(child, eofGraceMs)`，完全构建在 seam 的公开动词之上：关闭 `stdin`，以 `eofGraceMs` 约束一次 `waitForExit`，随后调用 `terminate()`（其 SIGTERM→spec 宽限期→SIGKILL 升级已拥有信号定时器），再无界等待 `waitForExit()`，由子进程责任方证明整棵进程树已经退出。seam 保留 `kill`／`terminate`／`waitForExit`——机制而非策略——而 `waitForExit(signal?)` 恰是消费方阶梯在协作层确认进程树真正退出所需的停稳探针，无需从终止宽限期再派生一个定时器。seam 的句柄少了一个方法和一个导出接口。
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## 曾考虑的替代方案
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## 后果
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换来的是：seam 少了一个方法和一个类型；实现只需提供四个动词，无需提供拆卸策略；`dsh-subprocess-local` 少了一个依赖；阶梯的层级时间窗与调节它们的配置字段住在一起。代价：未来想要 EOF 打头拆卸的后端需针对这些动词写约 20 行（或直接搬 ACP 的辅助函数）；阶梯的层级测试从 seam 套件移入 ACP 套件，seam 套件转而钉住阶梯所组合的动词（升级前后有界 `waitForExit` 先假后真），而非组合后的策略。
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买到的：seam 少了一个方法和一个类型；实现只欠四个动词，不欠拆卸策略；协作式 EOF 时间窗与调节它的 ACP 配置字段住在一起，而终止时间窗与最终的整树退出等待仅由子进程责任方拥有。代价：未来想要 EOF 打头拆卸的后端需针对这些动词写约 20 行（或直接搬 ACP 的辅助函数）；阶梯的层级测试位于 ACP 套件，seam 套件转而钉住阶梯所组合的动词（升级前有界 `waitForExit` 返回假，升级后无界等待整棵进程树退出），而非组合后的策略。
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@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-06-21-subagent-capability-seam.md
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2026-06-21-subagent-capability-seam.md: 043092884731c403a11b71ef8b5a410e9e5af7e0
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2026-06-21-subagent-capability-seam.zh.md: 6a4a5798199ca7d6d7c011668a319d65a0553208
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2026-06-21-subagent-capability-seam.md: 752e639b09ea2ac0ba19841ddfe38b15b44d22e9
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2026-06-21-subagent-capability-seam.zh.md: 6009aeda6773357a4217f8956fb510c2116bbe3f
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Status: implemented
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English | [中文](2026-06-21-subagent-capability-seam.zh.md)
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> The full seam is shipped: the `dsh-subagent` interface and `dsh-tool-subagent` consumer; the two in-process backends (`dsh-subagent-spawn`, `dsh-subagent-fork`); the nested-agent snapshot infrastructure ([per-session snapshot replay](../testing/2026-06-22-subagent-snapshot-replay.md)); and the out-of-process `dsh-subagent-acp` backend ([its Agent Note](2026-06-22-acp-subagent-backend.md)).
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> The full seam is shipped: the `dsh-subagent` interface and `dsh-tool-subagent` consumer; the two in-process backends (`dsh-subagent-spawn`, `dsh-subagent-fork`); the nested-agent snapshot infrastructure ([per-session snapshot replay](../testing/2026-06-22-subagent-snapshot-replay.md)); and the out-of-process ACP, Codex, and Claude Code backends ([ACP Agent Note](2026-06-22-acp-subagent-backend.md), [product-provider Agent Note](2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md)).
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## Problem
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@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ The distinctive requirement — the one that shapes the whole design — is that
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- **in-process** — a child concrete `Agent` on the same `Context` (the cheapest, and nearly free given the existing agent factory);
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- **ACP** — act as an ACP *client* driving another agent process (which can be another instance of ourselves);
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- later: **A2A**, the **Codex app-server**, and the **Claude Code Agent SDK** — each the same out-of-process "start a child, prompt it, stream updates, cancel" shape as the ACP backend.
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- **Codex app-server and Claude Code Agent SDK** — current one-shot siblings that apply the same named-provider seam to official product processes ([product-provider Agent Note](2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md));
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- later: **A2A** using the same out-of-process "start a child, prompt it, settle, cancel" shape.
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## Alternatives considered
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@@ -34,6 +35,8 @@ A new package group `packages/subagent/`:
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-spawn` | implementation: a fresh in-process child via `ctx.agents.create` |
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-fork` | implementation: an in-process child seeded with a snapshot of the parent's log |
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-acp` | implementation: an ACP client driving a configured child process |
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-codex` | implementation: a one-shot official Codex app-server process |
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-claude-code` | implementation: a one-shot official Claude Code process through the Agent SDK |
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-subagent` | consumer: the model-facing `subagent` tool over `ctx.subagents` |
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### The primitive: async `start → SubagentRun`
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### Child isolation and the parent log
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Each subagent runs in its **own `Session`** (own id, `parentSession` lineage), persisted independently. The parent's log records only the spawn `tool/call` and its `tool/result` (the child's final output) — the child's internal steps and tool calls stay in the child's own session, never injected into the parent log. This is the only design that is identical across transports: an ACP child's internal events physically cannot be injected into our parent log, so making in-process behave the same keeps the seam transport-agnostic.
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Each in-process subagent runs in its **own `Session`** (own id, `parentSession` lineage), persisted independently. Remote ACP and one-shot product providers instead mint a parent-scoped lifecycle id and expose no local `Agent` or child `Session`; their internal state remains in the remote process. Across both forms, the parent's log records only the spawn `tool/call` and its `tool/result` (the child's final output), while child steps and tool calls remain outside the parent log.
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### Synchronous collect (first cut)
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[English](2026-06-21-subagent-capability-seam.md) | 中文
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> 完整 seam 已交付：`dsh-subagent` 接口与 `dsh-tool-subagent` 消费方；两个进程内后端（`dsh-subagent-spawn`、`dsh-subagent-fork`）；嵌套 agent 快照基础设施（[逐会话快照回放](../testing/2026-06-22-subagent-snapshot-replay.md)）；以及进程外后端 `dsh-subagent-acp`（[其 Agent Note](2026-06-22-acp-subagent-backend.md)）。
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> 完整 seam 已交付：`dsh-subagent` 接口与 `dsh-tool-subagent` 消费方；两个进程内后端（`dsh-subagent-spawn`、`dsh-subagent-fork`）；嵌套 agent 快照基础设施（[逐会话快照回放](../testing/2026-06-22-subagent-snapshot-replay.md)）；以及进程外的 ACP、Codex 与 Claude Code 后端（[ACP Agent Note](2026-06-22-acp-subagent-backend.md)、[产品提供方 Agent Note](2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md)）。
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## 问题
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@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ harness 有一个长期搁置的 seam 用于 **subagent**：一个 agent（智
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- **进程内**：在同一个 `Context` 上创建一个具体的子 `Agent`（最廉价，且鉴于现有 agent 工厂几乎零成本）；
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- **ACP**：作为 ACP *客户端*驱动另一个 agent 进程（可以是自身的另一个实例）；
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- 后续：**A2A**、**Codex app-server** 与 **Claude Code Agent SDK**——每种都与 ACP 后端相同的进程外形状：「启动子 agent、发送提示词、流式接收更新、取消」。
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- **Codex app-server 与 Claude Code Agent SDK**：当前的一次性兄弟提供方，将同一个命名提供方 seam 应用于官方产品进程（[产品提供方 Agent Note](2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md)）；
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- 后续：**A2A**，采用同样的进程外形态：「启动子 agent、发送提示词、结算、取消」。
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## 曾考虑的替代方案
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@@ -34,6 +35,8 @@ bash seam（[能力 seam](../architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md)）在
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-spawn` | 实现：通过 `ctx.agents.create` 创建全新的进程内子 agent |
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-fork` | 实现：用父 agent 日志快照初始化的进程内子 agent |
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-acp` | 实现：作为 ACP 客户端驱动已配置的子进程 |
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-codex` | 实现：一次性官方 Codex app-server 进程 |
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-claude-code` | 实现：通过 Agent SDK 运行的一次性官方 Claude Code 进程 |
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| `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-subagent` | 消费方：基于 `ctx.subagents` 的面向模型的 `subagent` 工具 |
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### 原语：异步 `start → SubagentRun`
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@@ -51,7 +54,7 @@ bash seam（[能力 seam](../architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md)）在
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### 子 agent 隔离与父日志
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每个 subagent 运行在**自己的 `Session`** 中（独立 id、`parentSession` 谱系），独立持久化。父日志仅记录 spawn `tool/call` 及其 `tool/result`（子 agent 的最终输出）——子 agent 的内部步骤和工具调用留在子 agent 自己的会话中，绝不注入父日志。这是唯一在所有传输方式下行为一致的设计：ACP 子 agent 的内部事件在物理上无法注入我们的父日志，因此让进程内行为保持一致，使 seam 真正与传输方式无关。
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每个进程内 subagent 运行在**自己的 `Session`** 中（独立 id、`parentSession` 谱系），独立持久化。远端 ACP 和一次性产品提供方则会生成一个父级作用域的生命周期 id，且不暴露本地 `Agent` 或子 `Session`；其内部状态留在远端进程中。两种形式下，父日志都仅记录 spawn `tool/call` 及其 `tool/result`（子 agent 的最终输出），而子 agent 的步骤和工具调用均留在父日志之外。
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### 同步收集（首版）
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-06-22-acp-subagent-backend.md
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2026-06-22-acp-subagent-backend.md: 5f12aa1c08d4f4cfaa35f2f7f4b09ad341c3eae8
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2026-06-22-acp-subagent-backend.zh.md: ba9d4255723367ab4afc5ab87e056f12f5c3a285
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2026-06-22-acp-subagent-backend.md: c994ebfa69649bb9e79d3aa389a0e13c178131c7
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2026-06-22-acp-subagent-backend.zh.md: 62d631e95b5d1f299bed1fd00353b5ac9349b9a0
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@@ -57,6 +57,6 @@ Persistent-process pooling (reuse a warm child across runs) is a performance opt
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Every run pays a fresh subprocess (spawn + `initialize` + `newSession`). The parent surfaces only the child's final answer: `session/update` thoughts and tool-call cards are consumed and dropped, and permission prompts never reach a human — the configured policy answers them. The child's environment is credential-scrubbed by default, so its own model key is supplied explicitly via `config.env`.
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## Future providers
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## Product-provider siblings
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The same out-of-process spawn/prompt/stream/cancel shape generalizes to other transports named in the seam Agent Note — A2A, the Codex app-server, and the Claude Code Agent SDK — each a sibling provider registered by name. The ACP backend is the proof that the seam supports the boundary; those are mechanically similar.
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The [Codex app-server and Claude Code Agent SDK providers](2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md) apply the same out-of-process spawn/prompt/settle/cancel boundary as siblings registered by name. A2A remains a future sibling transport; the ACP backend proves that the common seam supports this boundary without owning product-private protocols.
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@@ -57,6 +57,6 @@ ACP `StopReason` → harness `SubagentStopReason`：`end_turn`→`completed`、`
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每次运行都要付出一个全新子进程的代价（spawn + `initialize` + `newSession`）。父进程仅暴露子 agent 的最终回答：`session/update` 中的思考和工具调用卡片被消费后丢弃，权限提示从不到达人类——由配置的策略应答。子进程环境默认经过凭证清洗，因此其自身的模型密钥需通过 `config.env` 显式提供。
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## 后续提供方
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## 兄弟产品提供方
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同样的进程外启动/提示词/流式输出/取消形态可泛化到 seam Agent Note 中列出的其他传输方式——A2A、Codex app-server 和 Claude Code Agent SDK——每个都是按名称注册的兄弟提供方。ACP 后端证明了 seam 支持跨进程边界；其余在机制上类似。
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[Codex app-server 与 Claude Code Agent SDK 提供方](2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md)作为按名称注册的兄弟提供方，采用同样的进程外启动/提示词/结算/取消边界。A2A 仍是未来的兄弟传输方式；ACP 后端证明了通用 seam 能够支持这项边界，而无需负责产品私有协议。
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# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md
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2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md: e81d1fb14f719331c503dba539d6a5ec0f1eed4f
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2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.zh.md: 3c78e8d5a4ca1a86942971721ad05c631901f231
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@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
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# Agent Note: Claude Code and Codex subagent backends
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Status: implemented
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English | [中文](2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.zh.md)
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## Problem
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The named [`ctx.subagents`](2026-06-21-subagent-capability-seam.md) registry lets a parent agent delegate work without knowing how the child runs, but the harness needs first-party routes to the real Codex and Claude Code products. Each route must hand the product one self-contained task, let it work in the parent Session's workspace, return a final answer or an explicit failure or cancellation, and leave no managed product process behind.
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The product integrations must not become second owners for task text, cwd, cancellation, result settlement, or process trees. Required evidence therefore separates three facts: a keyless real-product test proves the official integration, native authentication shape, deterministic answer, and teardown; a Loader composition test proves that the public package and documented tool configuration load without starting the product; and a credentialed e2e proves that the production provider and real product can obtain a unique answer from the real DeepSeek service. Direct model HTTP or a product double cannot replace either product-running tier, and a hand-mounted plugin cannot replace the Loader tier.
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## Decision
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|
||||
The harness publishes two sibling one-shot providers as independently installable, opt-in packages. A user loads a provider and the existing common subagent tool in their own `cordis.yml`: `subagent_codex` binds `codex`, while `subagent_claude_code` binds `claude-code`. The shipped CLI dependency closure and base, Web, and headless configurations load neither provider. Each tool accepts only a standalone text task; product selection and background execution are not model arguments.
|
||||
|
||||
Both providers report `inheritsParentContext: false`, advertise no optional start capabilities, and pass the parent Session cwd without copying the parent conversation. Their documented tools disable background execution and use `maxDepth: 'provider-managed'`, leaving recursion policy with the out-of-process product instead of sending a limit the provider cannot enforce. Every call creates a fresh product process and a non-resumable product conversation. The shared subagent service continues to own request resolution, lifecycle events, result settlement, and foreground collection; the shared subprocess service owns credential scrubbing, process-tree termination, and whole-tree exit observation.
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
fixed tool → shared subagent service → product provider → official product process
|
||||
← final answer / explicit error / cancellation ← terminal product fact
|
||||
→ foreground disposal → shared process-tree termination → whole-tree exit
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Ownership and lifecycle
|
||||
|
||||
| Phase | Shared owner | Product-specific responsibility | Observable result |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Resolve | `dsh-tool-subagent` and `ctx.subagents` | Validate the product's text-only input and derive native startup parameters | Unsupported context or malformed input fails before a run is published |
|
||||
| Start | `dsh-subprocess` owns every acquired process tree | Reach the smallest native point at which the product conversation and process can both be controlled | `start()` publishes one existing `SubagentRun`, or cleans up and rejects |
|
||||
| Run | The product owns its native protocol facts; the holder owns their mapping | Submit exactly one task and derive an existing shared stop reason; Codex uses `max-tokens` only for explicit context exhaustion | The parent receives only a final answer or an explicit failure |
|
||||
| Dispose | The foreground consumer requests release; `dsh-subprocess` proves exit | Close the native protocol and express any best-effort native cancellation | Disposal is idempotent and returns only after the whole process tree exits |
|
||||
|
||||
## Codex provider
|
||||
|
||||
`@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-codex` registers the fixed `codex` provider and starts `codex app-server --stdio` from `PATH`. Its public configuration contains only an explicit `env` overlay and a positive finite `disposeGraceMs` no greater than the repository's shared `MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS`. Installation, login, `CODEX_HOME`, model selection, base URL, sandbox, approval policy, and product-session settings remain native Codex or deployment responsibilities.
|
||||
|
||||
Before publication, the provider validates a non-empty text-only task, starts the managed app-server in the parent workspace, completes `initialize` → `initialized`, and creates an `ephemeral: true` thread. The published run owns exactly one `turn/start`; its thread and turn ids remain private and are never persisted in the parent Session.
|
||||
|
||||
`turn/completed` is the authoritative remote terminal fact. The latest `agentMessage` with `phase: "final_answer"` wins, and that selected message must contain nonblank text. When the product emits no explicit final phase, the latest message with `phase: null` is the compatibility fallback and must likewise be nonblank; commentary never replaces either answer. A failed turn with `error.codexErrorInfo: "contextWindowExceeded"` becomes `max-tokens`. A completed turn without an answer, every other failed or interrupted remote turn, malformed required fields in a recognized app-server frame, protocol closure, early process exit, or unknown server request becomes `error`; this version has no native refusal terminal and therefore produces no `refusal`. Local cancellation wins its race and remains `aborted`.
|
||||
|
||||
For command and file approvals, the unattended wire selects a non-approval decision offered by the request, preferring `cancel`; the stable 0.146.0 request shape without an offered-decision list falls back to `decline`. It grants no requested permissions for the turn, answers user-input requests with no answers, and declines MCP elicitation. A request with no legal unattended response, or any unknown server request, fails the run instead of waiting for a user interface the provider does not supply.
|
||||
|
||||
An unpublished startup failure closes the wire, terminates the acquired process tree, waits for exit, and then rejects `start()`. Published disposal best-effort interrupts a known turn, closes the wire, ends stdin, invokes the shared termination escalation, and waits for whole-tree exit. Result failure and teardown failure stay independently observable.
|
||||
|
||||
Codex 0.146.0 speaks the Responses protocol, while DeepSeek's public OpenAI-compatible endpoint speaks Chat Completions. The credentialed Codex e2e therefore uses a loopback-only, test-private bridge for one no-tool nonce request: real Codex sends Responses to the bridge, the bridge forwards the received bearer credential and extracted task to the fixed official DeepSeek endpoint, and it wraps the real text in the minimal Responses SSE lifecycle. The bridge is neither a production proxy nor evidence that Codex connects to DeepSeek Chat Completions natively.
|
||||
|
||||
## Claude Code provider
|
||||
|
||||
`@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-claude-code` registers the fixed `claude-code` provider and invokes `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk@0.3.220`. The SDK's platform `optionalDependency` supplies the real Claude Code 2.1.220 CLI. The provider uses the official `query()` entrypoint and passes the SDK's `spawnClaudeCodeProcess` command, arguments, cwd, environment, and forwarded signal unchanged to `dsh-subprocess`; its private `SpawnedProcess` adapter exposes only the stream, event, kill, and exit facts the SDK requires.
|
||||
|
||||
The public configuration contains the same two deployment-owned values as the Codex sibling: an explicit `env` overlay and a positive finite `disposeGraceMs` no greater than the repository's shared `MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS`. Each run creates its own `AbortController`, sets `persistSession: false`, and disables `AskUserQuestion`. The provider deliberately omits `settingSources`, so the SDK reads the host's normal user, project, and local Claude settings relative to the parent Session cwd. It neither copies nor filters those settings and does not create or modify login state. It supplies no `canUseTool`, elicitation, or dialog callback, so unattended interactions fail through the SDK rather than waiting for a user interface the provider does not own.
|
||||
|
||||
The provider publishes only after both the SDK `Query` and a live managed CLI handle exist. It consumes the complete SDK stream and completes only when a `result` message has `subtype: "success"`, `is_error: false`, and a nonblank `result`, and the iterator then ends normally. Every SDK error subtype, an error-marked success, a missing result, iterator failure, protocol failure, or process failure becomes `error`. SDK turn, budget, and structured-output limits are not token-window facts, and the SDK exposes no native refusal terminal, so this provider produces neither `max-tokens` nor `refusal`. Local cancellation wins and becomes `aborted`.
|
||||
|
||||
Startup rollback and published disposal close the SDK query, abort the per-run controller, invoke shared process-tree termination, and wait for whole-tree exit. `Query.close()` expresses graceful protocol intent but does not replace the subprocess owner's exit proof. Query-close failure, process failure, and teardown failure remain independently observable.
|
||||
|
||||
The credentialed Claude Code e2e uses the official DeepSeek Claude Code contract directly: the runtime-only DeepSeek key becomes `ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN`, the fixed official base gains `/anthropic`, and the main and subagent model variables select the documented DeepSeek models. It starts the production provider and real SDK/CLI, requires one random nonce as the complete answer, persists no credential in settings, and waits for every managed handle to exit.
|
||||
|
||||
## Distribution and evidence
|
||||
|
||||
Each product owns branch-complete package tests, a required keyless real-product spec, a Loader composition e2e, and a credentialed DeepSeek e2e. The keyless product tier uses the exact official distribution under test, a non-empty fake product key, an isolated temporary workspace and product home, and a loopback fixed-answer model. Missing product requests, wrong authentication, altered task text, a non-exact answer, a skipped real product, or a surviving managed handle fails the required test. The Loader tier boots the README-shaped user configuration, verifies both fixed foreground-only tools in one context, and starts neither product process. The credentialed tier starts the same production provider and real product with a runtime-only key, requires a unique nonce from the fixed official DeepSeek service, and proves quiescence again; it self-skips only when a local operator supplied no key, while trusted CI preflights the secret.
|
||||
|
||||
The Codex evidence pins `@openai/codex@0.146.0` and `codex-cli 0.146.0`. Its real-product spec observes the exact Bearer key, original task, byte-exact final answer, unattended command rejection with no file side effect, local cancellation, and whole-tree exit. Production still supplies `codex` on `PATH`.
|
||||
|
||||
The Codex credentialed e2e registers the production provider, starts the same real app-server, and requests one random nonce through the test-private bridge described above. It fixes the external endpoint and model, stores no credential or request payload, requires exactly one completed upstream response, compares the trimmed product answer byte-for-byte with the nonce, and waits for every managed handle to exit.
|
||||
|
||||
The Claude Code evidence pins Agent SDK 0.3.220 and its platform-distributed Claude Code 2.1.220 CLI. Its real-product spec observes the exact `x-api-key`, original task, byte-exact final answer, inherited temporary host-setting marker, process failure, local cancellation, and whole-tree exit. The Loader e2e resolves both product packages by name while neither product command is available and records zero child starts.
|
||||
|
||||
The Claude Code credentialed e2e maps the key and fixed official endpoint only in the provider's in-memory environment, uses the documented `deepseek-v4-pro[1m]` and `deepseek-v4-flash` model variables, and traverses the production provider, official SDK, and real CLI. It compares the trimmed result with a random nonce and proves whole-tree exit without calling the Messages API directly from the test.
|
||||
|
||||
The project owner's distribution authorization is scoped to the official `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` identity and the official Claude Code CLI/platform payloads each SDK version declares through `optionalDependencies`. [`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md`](../../../../THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md) derives and discloses the current payload set without reclassifying its declared terms as permissive. Version, license-field, and payload-set changes still undergo ordinary dependency, lockfile, compatibility, terms, and notices review; unrelated non-permissive runtime packages continue to fail closed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**Direct model HTTP, `codex exec`, or a hand-written Claude CLI protocol.** These paths bypass the products' official extensible integration surfaces and cannot prove native configuration, tools, approvals, result semantics, or teardown. Each provider uses its official product integration instead.
|
||||
|
||||
**A shared product-process helper package.** The existing subagent and subprocess seams already own every shared task, result, environment, and process-tree concern. A new helper would duplicate ownership without deleting either private product adapter, so each adapter calls the existing seams directly.
|
||||
|
||||
**A model-visible product selector.** Product availability and authentication are deployment facts. Two fixed tools keep each schema and provider binding explicit and avoid adding dynamic selection state to the common service.
|
||||
|
||||
**Product doubles as required evidence.** Doubles cover exhaustive private protocol branches but do not prove package exports, official distributions, authentication, or real process behavior. Required evidence drives each official product against a loopback model fixture.
|
||||
|
||||
**Plugin-managed login, product home, models, settings, or permissions.** Those choices would create another authority beside each product's native configuration and enlarge a one-shot provider into account management. The providers expose only an explicit environment overlay and teardown grace; unattended interaction fails closed.
|
||||
|
||||
**Continuation, progress, background collection, and shared parent context.** The delivered user result is one self-contained task and one final answer. Product sessions, resume, follow-up, intermediate messages, parent transcript transfer, structured output, and background collection need separate user contracts and are not prebuilt.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
Users can install either or both product providers, bind stable foreground tools in their own Cordis configuration, and delegate one self-contained task through the existing subagent contract. Official product integrations preserve native settings and behavior while shared services retain the sole ownership of task settlement and process-tree quiescence.
|
||||
|
||||
Every delegation pays for a fresh product process and independent model context, and only final text reaches the parent. Product-native configuration makes behavior depend on the deployment's installed product, account state, and workspace settings. Credentialed e2e runs also spend external API quota and depend on the official DeepSeek endpoint; deterministic protocol, failure, cancellation, and approval coverage remains in the keyless tier. The providers do not resume sessions, stream progress, accept new human interaction, roll back tool or file side effects, or impose a wall-clock timeout.
|
||||
|
||||
Compatibility is pinned by package-level unit coverage, keyless real-product loopback tests, credentialed DeepSeek nonce tests, public Loader composition, built-package and NodeNext consumer checks, generated documentation and notices, and the repository CI matrix. A supported product or DeepSeek endpoint/model baseline change must refresh those facts; production performs no separate runtime version probe.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Claude Code 与 Codex subagent 后端
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
[English](2026-08-04-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md) | 中文
|
||||
|
||||
## 问题
|
||||
|
||||
命名的 [`ctx.subagents`](2026-06-21-subagent-capability-seam.md) 注册表让父 agent（智能体）无需了解子级的运行方式即可委派工作，但 harness 需要通往真实 Codex 与 Claude Code 产品的第一方路径。每条路径都必须向产品交付一项自包含任务，让它在父会话的工作区中执行，返回最终回答或明确的失败或取消结果，并且不留下任何受管的产品进程。
|
||||
|
||||
产品集成不得成为任务文本、cwd、取消、结果结算或进程树的第二责任方。因此，所需证据要区分三个事实：无密钥真实产品测试证明官方集成、原生身份验证形态、确定性答案与资源清理；Loader 组合测试证明公开包（package）和文档所示的工具配置无需启动产品即可加载；带密钥 e2e 证明生产提供方与真实产品能够从真实 DeepSeek 服务取得唯一答案。直接发起模型 HTTP 请求或使用产品替身无法取代上述任一产品运行层级；手工挂载插件无法取代 Loader 层级。
|
||||
|
||||
## 决策
|
||||
|
||||
harness 将两个一次性兄弟提供方作为可独立安装、选择启用的包交付。用户在自己的 `cordis.yml` 中加载提供方与现有的通用 subagent 工具：`subagent_codex` 绑定 `codex`，`subagent_claude_code` 绑定 `claude-code`。随产品交付的 CLI（命令行界面）依赖闭包，以及基础、Web 与 headless 配置都不会加载任一提供方。每个工具只接受独立文本任务；产品选择与后台执行都不作为模型参数。
|
||||
|
||||
这两个提供方都报告 `inheritsParentContext: false`，不声明任何可选的启动能力，并传递父会话 cwd，但不会复制父级对话。文档所示的工具会禁用后台执行，并使用 `maxDepth: 'provider-managed'`，将递归策略留给进程外产品，而不是发送提供方无法强制执行的限制。每次调用都会创建一个全新的产品进程和一次不可续接的产品对话。共享 subagent 服务继续负责请求解析、生命周期事件、结果结算和前台收集；共享子进程服务负责凭证清洗、进程树终止以及整棵进程树的退出观测。
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
fixed tool → shared subagent service → product provider → official product process
|
||||
← final answer / explicit error / cancellation ← terminal product fact
|
||||
→ foreground disposal → shared process-tree termination → whole-tree exit
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 归属与生命周期
|
||||
|
||||
| 阶段 | 共享责任方 | 产品特定职责 | 可观察结果 |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| 解析 | `dsh-tool-subagent` 与 `ctx.subagents` | 验证产品的纯文本输入并推导原生启动参数 | 不受支持的上下文或格式错误的输入会在发布运行前报错 |
|
||||
| 启动 | `dsh-subprocess` 负责每棵已获取的进程树 | 到达能够同时控制产品对话与进程的最小原生控制点 | `start()` 发布一个已存在的 `SubagentRun`，否则清理后拒绝调用 |
|
||||
| 运行 | 产品负责其原生协议事实；持有方负责映射这些事实 | 只提交一项任务，并推导出一种现有的共享停止原因；Codex 仅在明确发生上下文耗尽时使用 `max-tokens` | 父级只会收到最终回答或明确失败 |
|
||||
| dispose（资源释放） | 前台消费方请求释放；`dsh-subprocess` 证明进程已退出 | 关闭原生协议，并发出尽力而为的原生取消请求 | 释放操作具有幂等性，且仅在整棵进程树退出后才返回 |
|
||||
|
||||
## Codex 提供方
|
||||
|
||||
`@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-codex` 注册固定的 `codex` 提供方，并启动 `codex app-server --stdio`，该命令从 `PATH` 解析。其公开配置仅包含显式的 `env` 覆盖项和须为正有限值的 `disposeGraceMs`，且后者不得大于仓库共享的 `MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS`。安装、登录、`CODEX_HOME`、模型选择、基础 URL、沙箱、审批策略和产品会话设置仍由 Codex 原生机制或部署环境负责。
|
||||
|
||||
发布前，提供方会验证非空的纯文本任务，在父级工作区中启动受管的 app-server，完成 `initialize` → `initialized` 握手，并创建一个 `ephemeral: true` 线程。已发布的运行只拥有一次 `turn/start`；其线程 ID 与轮次 ID 保持私有，绝不会持久化到父会话。
|
||||
|
||||
`turn/completed` 是权威的远端终止事实。以最后一条带有 `phase: "final_answer"` 的 `agentMessage` 为准，且选中的消息必须包含非空白文本。若产品没有发出明确的最终阶段，则以最后一条 `phase: null` 的消息作为兼容性回退，该消息也必须包含非空白文本；过程说明绝不会取代上述任一答案。带有 `error.codexErrorInfo: "contextWindowExceeded"` 的失败轮次会成为 `max-tokens`。轮次完成却没有答案、其他任何远端失败或中断轮次、已识别的 app-server 帧中必需字段格式错误、协议关闭、进程提前退出或未知的服务器请求，都会产生 `error`；本版本没有原生的拒绝终止状态，因此不会产生 `refusal`。本地取消在竞态中胜出并保持为 `aborted`。
|
||||
|
||||
对于命令与文件审批，无人值守的协议连接会从请求给出的决策选项中选择一项不予批准的决策，并优先选择 `cancel`；稳定的 0.146.0 请求形态没有决策选项列表，因此回退到 `decline`。它不授予该轮次请求的任何权限，不向用户输入请求提供任何答案，并拒绝 MCP elicitation。若请求在无人值守模式下没有合法响应，或是未知服务器请求，此次运行就会失败，而不会等待本提供方没有提供的用户界面。
|
||||
|
||||
若启动在发布前失败，提供方会关闭协议连接、终止已获取的进程树并等待其退出，然后拒绝 `start()`。对已发布的运行执行资源释放时，提供方会尽力中断已知轮次、关闭协议连接、结束标准输入、调用共享的逐级终止机制，并等待整棵进程树退出。结果失败与清理失败仍可彼此独立地观察。
|
||||
|
||||
Codex 0.146.0 使用 Responses 协议，而 DeepSeek 的公开 OpenAI 兼容端点使用 Chat Completions。因此，带密钥 Codex e2e 会采用一个仅限回环、仅供测试内部使用的桥接层来处理一次不使用工具的随机数请求：真实 Codex 将 Responses 发送到桥接层，桥接层把收到的 Bearer 凭据与提取出的任务转发到固定的 DeepSeek 官方端点，再将真实文本包装进最小化的 Responses SSE（Server-Sent Events）生命周期。该桥接层既不是生产代理，也不能作为 Codex 原生连接 DeepSeek Chat Completions 的证据。
|
||||
|
||||
## Claude Code 提供方
|
||||
|
||||
`@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-claude-code` 注册固定的 `claude-code` 提供方，并调用 `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk@0.3.220`。SDK 的平台 `optionalDependency` 提供真实的 Claude Code 2.1.220 CLI。提供方使用官方 `query()` 入口点，并将 SDK 的 `spawnClaudeCodeProcess` 命令、参数、cwd、环境和转发的信号原样传入 `dsh-subprocess`；其私有 `SpawnedProcess` 适配器只公开 SDK 所需的流、事件、终止和退出事实。
|
||||
|
||||
公开配置包含与 Codex 兄弟提供方相同、由部署方负责的两个值：显式的 `env` 覆盖项，以及须为正有限值且不得大于仓库共享 `MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS` 的 `disposeGraceMs`。每次运行都会创建自己的 `AbortController`，设置 `persistSession: false` 并禁用 `AskUserQuestion`。提供方故意省略 `settingSources`，因此 SDK 会相对于父会话 cwd 读取宿主机常规的用户、项目和本地 Claude 设置。它既不复制也不过滤这些设置，也不会创建或修改登录状态。提供方不设置 `canUseTool`、elicitation 或对话回调，因此无人值守交互会经 SDK 失败，而不会等待本提供方不负责的用户界面。
|
||||
|
||||
只有在 SDK `Query` 与受管的活动 CLI 句柄都已存在后，提供方才会发布运行。它会消费完整的 SDK 流；只有 `result` 消息具有 `subtype: "success"`、`is_error: false` 和非空白 `result`，且迭代器随后正常结束时，运行才会完成。所有 SDK 错误子类型、标记为错误的成功消息、结果缺失、迭代器失败、协议失败或进程失败都会成为 `error`。SDK 的轮次、预算和结构化输出限制不表示 token 窗口耗尽，而且 SDK 没有原生的拒绝终止状态，因此本提供方不会产生 `max-tokens` 或 `refusal`。本地取消会胜出并成为 `aborted`。
|
||||
|
||||
启动回滚和已发布运行的资源释放都会关闭 SDK query、中止该次运行的控制器、调用共享的进程树终止机制，并等待整棵进程树退出。`Query.close()` 表达优雅的协议关闭意图，但不能取代子进程责任方的退出证明。Query 关闭失败、进程失败和清理失败仍可彼此独立地观察。
|
||||
|
||||
带密钥 Claude Code e2e 直接使用官方 DeepSeek Claude Code 契约：仅在运行时提供的 DeepSeek 密钥会映射为 `ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN`，固定的官方基础 URL 会追加 `/anthropic`，主模型与 subagent 模型变量会选择文档所示的 DeepSeek 模型。该测试会启动生产提供方与真实 SDK 和 CLI，要求一个随机数作为完整答案，不会把任何凭据持久化到设置中，并等待所有受管句柄退出。
|
||||
|
||||
## 分发与证据
|
||||
|
||||
每个产品都负责覆盖所有分支的包测试、一项必跑的无密钥真实产品测试、一项 Loader 组合 e2e 和一项带密钥 DeepSeek e2e。无密钥产品层级使用被测的确切官方发行版、非空的伪产品密钥、隔离的临时工作区与产品主目录，以及能返回固定答案的回环模型。产品请求缺失、身份验证错误、任务文本被改动、答案不完全一致、真实产品被跳过或受管句柄仍存活，都会使这项必跑测试失败。Loader 层级会启动 README 所示形态的用户配置，在同一个上下文中验证两个固定且只支持前台执行的工具，并且不会启动任何产品进程。带密钥层级会使用仅在运行时提供的密钥启动同一生产提供方与真实产品，要求从固定的 DeepSeek 官方服务取得唯一随机数，并再次证明完全停稳；仅当本地操作者未提供密钥时才会自行跳过，而受信任的 CI 会预检该 secret。
|
||||
|
||||
Codex 证据锁定 `@openai/codex@0.146.0` 与 `codex-cli 0.146.0`。其真实产品测试会观测确切的 Bearer 密钥、原始任务、逐字节完全一致的最终回答、不会产生文件副作用的无人值守命令拒绝、本地取消以及整棵进程树退出。生产环境仍提供 `codex`，并通过 `PATH` 解析。
|
||||
|
||||
带密钥 Codex e2e 会注册生产提供方，启动同样的真实 app-server，并通过上述测试专用桥接层请求一个随机数。该测试固定外部端点与模型，不存储任何凭据或请求载荷，要求上游恰好完成一次响应，将去除首尾空白后的产品答案与该随机数逐字节比较，并等待所有受管句柄退出。
|
||||
|
||||
Claude Code 证据锁定 Agent SDK 0.3.220 及其平台分发的 Claude Code 2.1.220 CLI。其真实产品测试会观测确切的 `x-api-key`、原始任务、逐字节完全一致的最终回答、继承的临时宿主设置标记、进程失败、本地取消以及整棵进程树退出。Loader e2e 会在两个产品命令均不可用时按名称解析两个产品包，并记录零次子级启动。
|
||||
|
||||
带密钥 Claude Code e2e 仅在提供方的内存环境中映射密钥与固定的官方端点，把模型变量设为文档所示的 `deepseek-v4-pro[1m]` 与 `deepseek-v4-flash`，并实际经过生产提供方、官方 SDK 与真实 CLI。它将去除首尾空白后的结果与一个随机数比较，并证明整棵进程树退出，且测试不会直接调用 Messages API。
|
||||
|
||||
项目所有者的分发授权范围限定为官方 `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` 身份，以及每个 SDK 版本通过 `optionalDependencies` 声明的官方 Claude Code CLI 与平台载荷。[`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md`](../../../../THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md) 会推导并披露当前载荷集合，但不会将其声明条款重新归类为宽松条款。版本、许可证字段和载荷集合发生变化时，仍须经过常规的依赖、锁文件、兼容性、条款和声明评审；无关的非宽松运行时包继续以默认拒绝方式失败。
|
||||
|
||||
## 曾考虑的替代方案
|
||||
|
||||
**直接模型 HTTP、`codex exec` 或手写的 Claude CLI 协议。** 这些路径会绕过产品的官方可扩展集成接口，无法证明原生配置、工具、审批、结果语义或资源清理。每个提供方都改用相应的官方产品集成。
|
||||
|
||||
**共享产品进程辅助包。** 现有 subagent 与子进程 seam 已负责围绕任务、结果、环境和进程树的全部共享职责。新辅助包无法删除任一私有产品适配器，只会造成责任重复，因此每个适配器都会直接调用现有 seam。
|
||||
|
||||
**面向模型的产品选择器。** 产品可用性和身份验证属于部署事实。两个固定工具使各自的 schema 与提供方绑定保持明确，也避免在通用服务中添加动态选择状态。
|
||||
|
||||
**以产品替身作为强制证据。** 替身可以穷尽覆盖私有协议分支，但无法证明包导出、官方发行版、身份验证或真实进程行为。强制证据会驱动每个官方产品连接回环模型 fixture（测试前置数据）。
|
||||
|
||||
**由插件管理登录、产品主目录、模型、设置或权限。** 这些选择会在每个产品的原生配置之外建立另一套权威来源，并将一次性提供方扩张为账户管理功能。提供方只公开显式环境覆盖项和清理宽限期；无人值守交互会以默认拒绝方式失败。
|
||||
|
||||
**续接、进度、后台收集和共享父级上下文。** 已交付的用户结果是一项自包含任务和一个最终回答。产品会话、恢复、后续交互、中间消息、父级 transcript（文本记录）传递、结构化输出和后台收集都需要独立的用户契约，当前实现不会预先构建这些功能。
|
||||
|
||||
## 后果
|
||||
|
||||
用户可以安装任一或两个产品提供方，在自己的 Cordis 配置中绑定稳定的前台工具，并通过现有 subagent 契约委派一项自包含任务。官方产品集成会保留原生设置与行为，而共享服务继续独占任务结算与进程树完全停稳的责任。
|
||||
|
||||
每次委派都要承担新建产品进程和独立模型上下文的开销，且只有最终文本会到达父级。产品原生配置使行为取决于部署环境中安装的产品、账户状态和工作区设置。带密钥 e2e 运行还会消耗外部 API 配额，并依赖 DeepSeek 官方端点；对协议、失败、取消与审批的确定性覆盖仍由无密钥层级承担。提供方不会恢复会话、以流式方式传送进度、接受新的人工交互、回滚工具或文件副作用，也不会施加按实际经过时间触发的超时。
|
||||
|
||||
兼容性由包级单元测试覆盖率、无密钥真实产品回环测试、带密钥 DeepSeek 随机数测试、公开 Loader 组合、已构建包与 NodeNext 消费方检查、生成的文档与声明以及仓库 CI 矩阵共同锁定。更改受支持的产品基线或 DeepSeek 端点／模型基线时必须刷新这些事实；生产环境不会另行执行运行时版本探测。
|
||||
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/process/2026-07-30-generated-third-party-notices.md
|
||||
2026-07-30-generated-third-party-notices.md: e480954d29d5dc09ef8ecd4069059a1f0c8b1043
|
||||
2026-07-30-generated-third-party-notices.zh.md: 78ba7250e797c57048078d1b4f62b7a9a5d9d561
|
||||
2026-07-30-generated-third-party-notices.md: cbabd1142ad292f78a3184723182a834dfb234fc
|
||||
2026-07-30-generated-third-party-notices.zh.md: b135c3626b661f1a5b0317a90b700a26d679bf1e
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ A hand-written inventory answers none of those durably. Roughly a hundred rows o
|
||||
|
||||
One trigger gap is accepted rather than worked around: lefthook inspects only files present on disk, so **deleting** a manifest runs no job, and removing a package reaches the assertion in the test lane instead. Reconstructing the staged file list to include deletions was tried and does not work — lefthook filters the list against the working tree either way. The assertion is the backstop for exactly this case.
|
||||
|
||||
The file discloses **direct** dependencies only. The complete npm closure with pinned versions already lives in `pnpm-lock.yaml` (`pnpm licenses list` renders it) and the Python closure in `python/sdk/uv.lock`; re-materializing either as prose would be a second, worse copy.
|
||||
The file discloses **direct** dependencies by default. The complete npm closure with pinned versions already lives in `pnpm-lock.yaml` (`pnpm licenses list` renders it) and the Python closure in `python/sdk/uv.lock`; re-materializing either as prose would be a second, worse copy. The one explicit transitive disclosure is the official Claude platform payload set declared by `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` through `optionalDependencies`, because those packages carry the distributed Claude Code executable rather than ordinary library implementation detail.
|
||||
|
||||
**Tiering is by declaring area, not by manifest section.** A package is a runtime dependency when any manifest outside `DEV_ONLY_AREAS` — the root manifest, `packages/support/`, `packages/client/test-runtime/`, `website/`, `examples/`, `native/` — names it under `dependencies` or `optionalDependencies`. Section names alone are wrong in both directions: a test-support package declares `vitest` under `dependencies` without shipping it, and the `bin/dsh` launcher execs through `tsx`, which no manifest declares as a runtime dependency at all (the generator marks it runtime explicitly).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,10 +26,14 @@ The runtime tier deliberately covers **every mountable plugin**, not just what t
|
||||
|
||||
The manifest set is derived from the `packages:` members each `pnpm-workspace.yaml` declares — the root one and the nested Landlock workspace's — so a new member area is read the day it is declared rather than the day someone remembers to extend a list. License and repository metadata come from the installed pnpm stores, both the root one and the Landlock workspace's, so the generator requires an installed tree and fails loud when a package resolves to neither, rather than emitting an empty cell. `OVERRIDES` carries the packages whose published manifest cannot answer — Rust-built npm bins that omit `license`, and the `modelcontextprotocol/servers` packages whose repository is mid MIT→Apache-2.0 relicensing, so their effective terms are per-contribution. A runtime dependency whose license is not on the permissive list is a hard error: shipping copyleft is a distribution decision, not something a regenerated table may absorb silently. Vendored packages are cross-checked against `vendor/README.md` and rejected if any is not MIT, and `pnpm-workspace.yaml`'s `patchedDependencies` are listed under the runtime table because pnpm applies those patches at install time — shipped artifacts carry modified copies of `@earendil-works/pi-tui` and `node-pty`, and the patch files are the record of what changed.
|
||||
|
||||
The project owner separately authorizes distribution of every official `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` version and the official Claude Code CLI/platform payloads that version declares through `optionalDependencies`. The generator represents this as one exact direct-package identity exception, not as a permissive-license override: `SEE LICENSE IN README.md` and `SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md` remain non-permissive classifications, and every unrelated non-permissive runtime still fails closed. When the SDK is present, the generator reads its installed manifest, rejects optional identities outside the official SDK payload prefix, derives the current SDK, CLI, and payload versions, verifies the installed host payload's identity, version, and declared-license field, and renders the complete SDK-declared payload set in a separate notices section. Version, declared-license, and payload-set changes do not require new identity authorization, but they still require ordinary dependency, lockfile, compatibility, terms, and notices review.
|
||||
|
||||
## Testing
|
||||
|
||||
The same spec that asserts freshness pins the tiering rule against fixture manifests — including the two cases that motivate it, a `dependencies` entry of a test-support package and a plugin package no app mounts. It also pins the parsers against the shapes that would otherwise drop a package without a word: a `vendor/README.md` table that stops covering a vendored directory, a requirement array holding extras (`"httpx[http2]"`), a requirement with no version at all, an author-named `[dependency-groups]` table, and a workspace member area absent from any hardcoded list. Each of those is a silent-omission path, which is the failure mode a disclosure file cannot afford.
|
||||
|
||||
The Claude distribution tests prove that only the exact direct SDK identity bypasses the ordinary non-permissive-runtime rejection, that the bypass does not change license classification, and that the payload set comes from the SDK manifest rather than a version or platform allowlist. Wrong SDK identities, missing payloads, and unrelated optional package identities all fail.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**Keep the hand-written file and review it at release time.** Reviewing a hundred derived rows by eye is exactly the work a generator does correctly, and the file's own claim — that it lists every direct dependency — would be unverified between releases.
|
||||
@@ -42,6 +46,8 @@ The same spec that asserts freshness pins the tiering rule against fixture manif
|
||||
|
||||
**Tier by reachability from the shipped assemblies only** (`apps/*` plus `python/sdk-runtime`). This produces a tighter runtime tier, but classifies the MCP client and the OpenTelemetry exporter as development-only even though a user running the installed repository can mount them. It understates the disclosure, which is the wrong direction to err for a legal notice.
|
||||
|
||||
**Treat the Claude SDK terms as permissive or add a reusable non-permissive allowlist.** Either shape would misstate the upstream declaration and let an unrelated runtime inherit authorization it was never granted. The narrow exception keys only the official direct SDK identity, while its optional payload identities are accepted solely as data declared by that SDK and remain visibly non-permissive.
|
||||
|
||||
**Emit the notices as a bilingual pair.** Every other root document is paired, but the file is a table of upstream package names, SPDX identifiers, and URLs; the translatable surface is a handful of section blurbs. `scripts/translation-pairing.ts` scopes discovery to `README*`, `.agents/notes/**`, `docs/**`, and `python/**`, so a root non-README file is outside the bilingual corpus by construction, and the README pair carries the bilingual entry points into it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
@@ -51,3 +57,5 @@ A dependency edit now carries a regenerated notices file into the same commit. C
|
||||
The generator needs an installed tree, which makes it heavier than a pure-source generator, and a new package with unusable published metadata needs an `OVERRIDES` entry rather than silently rendering a blank license. Both failures are loud and name the remedy.
|
||||
|
||||
The tiering rule is a policy encoded in one constant. Adding a workspace area that never ships — a second test-infrastructure tier, another site — requires extending `DEV_ONLY_AREAS`, or its dependencies will be disclosed as runtime.
|
||||
|
||||
The Claude identity exception is deliberately narrower than the payload disclosure it activates. Upgrading the SDK needs no new owner authorization, but regeneration fails unless the installed SDK exposes its version, CLI version, and at least one official platform payload, and unless the current host payload matches the SDK declaration. Maintainers still review changed terms and compatibility; the generator prevents the authorization from silently widening to another package.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
有一处触发缺口是接受而非绕过的：lefthook 只检视磁盘上存在的文件，因此**删除**清单文件不会触发任何任务，移除一个包会落到测试 lane 的断言上。重构暂存文件列表以纳入删除的做法试过，不成立——无论怎么给列表，lefthook 都会拿工作树过滤一遍。这个场景正由断言兜底。
|
||||
|
||||
文件只披露**直接**依赖。完整的 npm 闭包连同锁定版本已记录在 `pnpm-lock.yaml`（`pnpm licenses list` 可渲染），Python 闭包记录在 `python/sdk/uv.lock`；再用散文誊一遍只会得到一份更差的副本。
|
||||
文件默认只披露**直接**依赖。完整的 npm 闭包连同锁定版本已记录在 `pnpm-lock.yaml`（`pnpm licenses list` 可渲染），Python 闭包记录在 `python/sdk/uv.lock`；再用散文誊一遍只会得到一份更差的副本。唯一明确披露的传递依赖，是 `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` 通过 `optionalDependencies` 声明的官方 Claude 平台载荷集合，因为这些包承载随产品分发的 Claude Code 可执行文件，而非普通的库实现细节。
|
||||
|
||||
**分层依据是声明方所在区域，而非清单字段名。** 只要 `DEV_ONLY_AREAS` 之外的任一清单——即根清单、`packages/support/`、`packages/client/test-runtime/`、`website/`、`examples/`、`native/` 之外——在 `dependencies` 或 `optionalDependencies` 里点名某个包，它就是运行时依赖。单看字段名在两个方向上都会出错：测试支撑包把 `vitest` 写在 `dependencies` 里却并不交付它；而 `bin/dsh` 启动器 exec 经过的 `tsx`，根本没有任何清单把它声明为运行时依赖，只能由生成器显式标记。
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,10 +26,14 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
清单集合由两个 `pnpm-workspace.yaml`——根工作区与嵌套的 Landlock 工作区——各自声明的 `packages:` 成员派生，因此新增成员区域在声明当天就会被读取，而不必等谁想起来去补一份列表。许可证与仓库地址取自已安装的 pnpm store，根 store 与 Landlock 工作区的 store 都会查；某个包两处都解析不到时直接失败，而不是留下空单元格。`OVERRIDES` 收录已发布清单答不上来的包：用 Rust 构建、发布时省略 `license` 字段的 npm 可执行包，以及 `modelcontextprotocol/servers` 系列——该仓库正处在 MIT 向 Apache-2.0 的重新许可过程中，实际条款按贡献逐条而定。运行时依赖的许可证若不在宽松清单内即为硬失败：交付 copyleft 是一项分发决策，不该被一次重新生成悄悄吸收。被源码收编的包会与 `vendor/README.md` 交叉核对，出现非 MIT 即报错；`pnpm-workspace.yaml` 的 `patchedDependencies` 列在运行时表格之后，因为 pnpm 在安装期就会打上这些补丁——交付产物携带的是改动过的 `@earendil-works/pi-tui` 与 `node-pty`，补丁文件本身就是改动的完整记录。
|
||||
|
||||
项目所有者另行授权分发每个官方 `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` 版本，以及该版本通过 `optionalDependencies` 声明的官方 Claude Code CLI 与平台载荷。生成器将其表示为一项精确匹配直接包身份的例外，而非宽松许可证覆盖项：`SEE LICENSE IN README.md` 与 `SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md` 仍归类为非宽松，所有无关的非宽松运行时依赖仍以默认拒绝方式失败。存在该 SDK 时，生成器会读取其已安装清单，拒绝不符合官方 SDK 载荷前缀的可选包身份，推导当前 SDK、CLI 与载荷版本，核验已安装宿主载荷的身份、版本和声明许可证字段，并在单独的声明章节中渲染 SDK 声明的完整载荷集合。版本、声明许可证和载荷集合发生变化时无需新的身份授权，但仍须经过常规的依赖、锁文件、兼容性、条款和声明评审。
|
||||
|
||||
## Testing
|
||||
|
||||
断言新鲜度的同一个 spec 也用夹具清单钉住分层规则，覆盖促成该规则的两个场景：测试支撑包的 `dependencies` 条目，以及没有任何应用挂载的插件包。它还把各解析器钉在那些原本会让某个包无声消失的形态上：不再覆盖全部收编目录的 `vendor/README.md` 表、含 extras 的依赖数组（`"httpx[http2]"`）、完全不带版本的依赖、作者自取名字的 `[dependency-groups]` 表，以及任何硬编码列表都不含的工作区成员区域。这些都是静默漏报路径——正是披露文件最担不起的失败方式。
|
||||
|
||||
Claude 分发测试证明：只有精确匹配的直接 SDK 身份会绕过通常的非宽松运行时拒绝；该绕过不会改变许可证分类；载荷集合来自 SDK 清单，而非版本或平台允许列表。SDK 身份错误、载荷缺失或存在无关的可选包身份时，测试都会失败。
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
**保留手写文件，发版时人工过一遍。** 用肉眼审阅上百行推导数据，恰恰是生成器能做对的活；而且在两次发版之间，文件自称「列出全部直接依赖」这句话无人验证。
|
||||
@@ -42,6 +46,8 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
**只按已交付装配的可达性分层**（`apps/*` 加 `python/sdk-runtime`）。这样得到的运行时层更紧凑，但会把 MCP 客户端与 OpenTelemetry 导出器判为仅开发用途——而运行已安装仓库的用户完全可以挂载它们。这会低估披露，对法务通告来说错在了更危险的一侧。
|
||||
|
||||
**将 Claude SDK 条款视为宽松条款，或新增可复用的非宽松允许列表。** 两种方案都会误述上游声明，并让无关运行时依赖继承从未授予它的授权。这项窄例外只匹配官方直接 SDK 身份；其可选载荷身份仅作为该 SDK 声明的数据被接受，并继续明确归类为非宽松。
|
||||
|
||||
**把披露文件做成双语对。** 其他根文档都是成对的，但这份文件是上游包名、SPDX 标识与网址构成的表格，可翻译的只有寥寥几段章节导语。`scripts/translation-pairing.ts` 的发现范围限定在 `README*`、`.agents/notes/**`、`docs/**` 与 `python/**`，根目录下的非 README 文件在构造上就不属于双语语料；双语入口由 README 对承担。
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
@@ -51,3 +57,5 @@ Status: implemented
|
||||
生成器需要已安装的工作树，因此比纯源码生成器更重；发布元数据不可用的新包需要补一条 `OVERRIDES`，而不是默默渲染出空白许可证。这两类失败都会明确报错并指出补救方式。
|
||||
|
||||
分层规则是编码在一个常量里的政策。若新增了不参与交付的工作区区域——第二层测试基础设施、另一个站点——就要同步扩展 `DEV_ONLY_AREAS`，否则其依赖会被当作运行时依赖披露出去。
|
||||
|
||||
Claude 身份例外刻意比其启用的载荷披露范围更窄。升级 SDK 无需新的所有者授权，但如果已安装的 SDK 未公开自身版本、CLI 版本和至少一个官方平台载荷，或当前宿主载荷与 SDK 声明不符，重新生成就会失败。维护者仍须评审发生变化的条款与兼容性；生成器会阻止授权悄然扩大到其他包。
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
|
||||
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
|
||||
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
|
||||
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/proposed/feature/2026-07-07-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md
|
||||
2026-07-07-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md: ee8576f97a9fdef8c88dcad3a73f28b63ca3ebe1
|
||||
2026-07-07-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.zh.md: bd76a8f34d86b704494b56331c47ea89bfc8a0aa
|
||||
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Claude Code and Codex subagent backends (out-of-process delegation to external coding agents)
|
||||
|
||||
Status: proposed
|
||||
|
||||
English | [中文](2026-07-07-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.zh.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
The subagent seam ([the seam Agent Note](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-21-subagent-capability-seam.md)) hosts multiple named providers on `ctx.subagents`, and the ACP backend ([the ACP backend Agent Note](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-22-acp-subagent-backend.md)) proved the seam generalizes across a process boundary; its Future-providers section explicitly named the Codex app-server and the Claude Code Agent SDK as mechanically similar siblings. Those two are the engines actually worth delegating to today: a harness turn should be able to hand a self-contained task to a real Claude Code or a real Codex — a separate product with its own model, tools, and sandbox — and get back one final answer, without the parent deployment leaking its secrets into the child or the child's behavior silently depending on whatever `~/.claude` / `~/.codex` state exists on the host machine.
|
||||
|
||||
## Proposal
|
||||
|
||||
Two sibling provider packages, structural variants of the ACP backend, plus one extraction:
|
||||
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-claude-code` — drives a Claude Code child through `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk`'s `query()` (the SDK runs in the parent process and spawns its bundled `claude` CLI as the subprocess). Provider name `claude-code`: the child is the Claude Code *product*, not an Anthropic model adapter — "claude" stays reserved for a future `dsh-llm` adapter.
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-codex` — spawns `codex app-server` and drives one thread/turn over its JSON-RPC-over-stdio protocol with a hand-rolled newline-JSON client (~200–300 lines) in the package.
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-process` — a pure library (the `subagent-inprocess` precedent) extracting what `dsh-subagent-acp` already carries and both new backends need: the credential env scrub (`buildChildEnv`), the EOF → SIGTERM → SIGKILL dispose ladder, and new isolated-config-dir helpers (`mkdtemp` create, best-effort remove). The ACP backend migrates onto it; `bash-local`'s sibling copy is left alone to bound the change.
|
||||
|
||||
Both providers copy the ACP backend's seam posture verbatim: fresh child per `start`, exactly one prompt round-trip, capabilities all `false`, `inheritsParentContext: false`, `request.parent`/`request.agentOptions` ignored, `id = SessionId(randomUUID())`, `result` never rejects — child-level failure flattens to a stop reason and the original error goes to `ctx.logger` via an `onError` spec callback. Model exposure is zero new code: `dsh-tool-subagent` is loaded once per provider with a distinct `toolName` (`subagent_claude_code`, `subagent_codex`). No new session events are needed — the only model-visible artifact is the tool result, so reconstructability holds exactly as it did for ACP. To be explicit about the boundary: the session log reconstructs the model-visible transcript, not workspace mutation history — a child granted write access mutates files as an ambient side effect outside the log, exactly as the bash tools and the ACP backend already do; replay reproduces requests, not the disk.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verified interface facts (pinned versions)
|
||||
|
||||
Both integration surfaces were verified against pinned implementations before this proposal — types and bundled source read, keyless spikes run — not from vendor docs alone. The pins are the verification baseline, not a runtime contract: the backends perform no runtime version probe (no `codex --version` gate, no SDK version sniffing). Compatibility is enforced at development time — every dependency bump re-runs the keyless suites against the real load path — and at runtime by failing loudly: a protocol-level surprise settles `error` via `onError`, never a silent misbehavior.
|
||||
|
||||
**`@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` 0.3.202.** `options.env` REPLACES the child environment (no merge with `process.env`), which is exactly what the scrub needs. `settingSources` defaults to loading ALL filesystem settings — isolation requires explicitly passing `[]`. Result subtypes are `success` | `error_during_execution` | `error_max_turns` | `error_max_budget_usd` | `error_max_structured_output_retries`. On abort the SDK escalates the CLI child itself: stdin EOF immediately, SIGTERM ~2s later if the child ignores it (observed; no leftover processes) — no bespoke kill fallback needed. `outputFormat: {type: 'json_schema'}` and an `agents` option exist, giving future landing points for the seam's `outputSchema` capability and named subagent types; both are out of scope here.
|
||||
|
||||
**codex CLI 0.142.5, `codex app-server` (v2 vocabulary).** LF-delimited JSON, JSON-RPC 2.0 shapes with the `"jsonrpc"` header omitted.
|
||||
|
||||
- Lifecycle: `initialize{clientInfo}` + `initialized` → `thread/start` (accepts `cwd`, `model`, `sandbox`, `approvalPolicy`, `ephemeral`; succeeds unauthenticated) → `turn/start{threadId, input:[{type:'text',text}]}` returns an `inProgress` turn immediately; the terminal signal is the `turn/completed` notification carrying `Turn{status: completed|interrupted|failed|inProgress, error}`.
|
||||
- Approvals are server-initiated requests — `item/commandExecution/requestApproval`, `item/fileChange/requestApproval`, `item/permissions/requestApproval`, `item/tool/requestUserInput`, `mcpServer/elicitation/request` — answered with `accept`/`decline`-family decisions.
|
||||
- Auth: `account/login/start{type:'apiKey', apiKey}` is a first-class RPC and `account/read` reports `requiresOpenaiAuth` — and an unauthenticated `turn/start` does NOT fail fast (it hangs in retry), so the backend MUST pre-check auth and settle `error` loudly instead of waiting on the turn.
|
||||
- Isolation: `CODEX_HOME` redirection is honored (the `initialize` response echoes it, so tests can assert isolation), and `ephemeral: true` threads leave no session files at all.
|
||||
|
||||
## Isolation and credentials
|
||||
|
||||
Deployments authenticate with API keys only, and the child must not see the host user's Claude Code / Codex configuration: behavior has to be a function of `cordis.yml` alone. Each run gets a fresh `mkdtemp` config dir — `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` for Claude Code (paired with an explicit `settingSources: []`), `CODEX_HOME` for Codex — removed best-effort on dispose; a config field can pin a persistent dir instead. The child env reuses the ACP backend's `buildChildEnv` semantics verbatim via the extraction: the ambient env is forwarded MINUS credential-shaped vars (`/KEY|SECRET|TOKEN/i`), with `config.env` layered on top — so `PATH`, `HOME`, `TMPDIR`, locale, and proxy vars survive and the CLIs run normally, while only credential-shaped ambient vars are scrubbed (`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` enters explicitly through `config.env` for Claude Code), and the Codex key travels via the `account/login/start` RPC into the isolated `CODEX_HOME` rather than a hand-written `auth.json`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Permission and approval policy
|
||||
|
||||
Instead of collapsing to ACP's single `permission: allow|reject` knob, each backend exposes its engine's native vocabulary as config, with conservative defaults: Claude Code gets `permissionMode` (default `default`) plus `permission: allow|reject` (default `reject`) as the `canUseTool` auto-answer for whatever falls through; Codex gets `sandboxMode` (default `read-only`) and `approvalPolicy` (default `never`) plus the same `permission` fallback for approval requests that still arrive. Defaults are deliberately do-no-harm (the out-of-box child cannot write files); examples demonstrate opening up (`acceptEdits` / `workspace-write`). The mechanical rule: EVERY server-initiated request is settled programmatically and promptly — the enumerated approval/user-input/elicitation requests by the configured policy, an unknown request method with a JSON-RPC method-not-found error response (never left pending), unknown notifications consumed — so no child request can wedge a turn waiting on an answer that will never come. Prompts never reach a human in this cut, matching ACP.
|
||||
|
||||
## StopReason mapping
|
||||
|
||||
Claude Code: `success` → `completed`; `error_max_turns`, `error_during_execution`, `error_max_budget_usd`, `error_max_structured_output_retries` → `error` (aligning with the ACP call on `max_turn_requests`: an unfinished task is not success); generator abort → `aborted`; anything unknown → `error`. Codex: `Turn.status` `completed` → `completed`; `interrupted` → `aborted`; `failed` with `codexErrorInfo: 'contextWindowExceeded'` → `max-tokens`, any other `failed` → `error`; transport/spawn/auth-precheck failure → `error` (or `aborted` if cancel was requested). In both, `cancel()` is the ACP shape: flag + abort/interrupt + a cancel-settled race arm so an uncooperative child cannot stall the result.
|
||||
|
||||
Liveness posture, stated explicitly: teardown timing is config, turn duration is not. Both backends take the dispose ladder's grace periods as defaulted validated config fields (the ACP backend's `disposeEofGraceMs`/`disposeGraceMs` shape, carried by the extraction), but there is deliberately NO turn-duration or startup timeout — matching ACP, liveness during a turn belongs to the caller via `cancel()`/the abort signal, a subagent turn is legitimately minutes long, and the Codex auth precheck removes the one verified guaranteed-hang; a deployment wanting a wall-clock bound cancels from the parent.
|
||||
|
||||
## Testing
|
||||
|
||||
Named at every tier per the root AGENTS.md rule, and de-risked up front:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Keyless unit/integration**, mirroring the ACP spec list per backend (round-trip and output accumulation, every stop mapping, both cancel paths, already-aborted, permission auto-answer under both policies, unknown-message tolerance, bad-command spawn failure, HMR provider cleanup, export shape, isolation assertions on child env and temp-dir removal; Codex adds the auth-precheck failure path). Claude Code's harness is a scripted fake `claude` executable behind `pathToClaudeCodeExecutable` driven by the REAL SDK — a spike already passed end-to-end keyless in 24ms (the fake CLI answers one `control_request/initialize` and speaks plain stream-json, ~40 lines). Codex's harness is a scripted mock app-server subprocess speaking the verified wire protocol, the `mock-acp-server.ts` shape.
|
||||
- **With-key e2e** per backend: the real engine does real file work verified on disk, under a pinned opened-up config so acceptance and the do-no-harm defaults don't collide — `permissionMode: 'acceptEdits'` for Claude Code, `sandboxMode: 'workspace-write'` + `approvalPolicy: 'never'` for Codex; self-skips report exactly what is missing (binary vs key). CI has no secrets, so these run locally per the with-key policy.
|
||||
- **Snapshot**: deferred as `TODO(claude-code-subagent-replay)` / `TODO(codex-subagent-replay)` — the same distinct replay shape the ACP backend deferred ([the per-session replay Agent Note](../../implemented/testing/2026-06-22-subagent-snapshot-replay.md)); the keyless suites carry deterministic coverage meanwhile.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
### Why not the official `@openai/codex-sdk` instead of a hand-rolled client?
|
||||
|
||||
The dispose ladder and env scrub require owning the child process (spawn args, env, signals, exit await); the SDK hides the process. The wire format is trivial to frame (LF JSON), the shapes are generatable per pinned version (`codex app-server generate-json-schema`), and the repo precedent (`hook-protocol`) is to own thin protocol cores rather than wrap someone's runtime. The SDK would save protocol-evolution maintenance but costs the exact control this backend exists to have.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why not a model-visible `subagent_type` parameter (one Task-style tool)?
|
||||
|
||||
Claude Code's own Task tool puts the subagent type in the model-facing schema, selecting a prompt-plus-toolset persona. Here the choice is between EXECUTION ENGINES, and only the deployer knows which engines have credentials configured — so selection stays deployment config, preserving `dsh-tool-subagent`'s documented one-provider-per-tool contract. A persona-style type selector would be a separate Agent Note against the tool, not the backends.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why not login-state credentials and the user's own config?
|
||||
|
||||
Inheriting `~/.claude` / `~/.codex` (subscription login, user settings, skills, MCP servers) would make child behavior depend on host-machine state and punch an implicit exception through the "credentials enter explicitly via `config.env`, never ambiently" rule the ACP backend and bash executor established. API-key-only plus forced config-dir isolation keeps runs reproducible; deployments wanting shared state can point the config-dir field at a persistent directory deliberately.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why not a driver-injection seam for the Claude Code keyless tests?
|
||||
|
||||
Injecting a fake `query()` would mock our own boundary and leave the real SDK load path untested (the real-over-mock policy in docs/testing.md). The risk that justified considering it — the SDK↔CLI stream-json control protocol being internal — was retired by the spike: the fake-CLI harness works against the real pinned SDK today. If an SDK upgrade breaks the mock, the keyless suite fails the upgrade PR, which is the gate working.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why not ACP adapters (e.g. `claude-code-acp`) reusing the existing backend?
|
||||
|
||||
Community shims wrap both engines in ACP, which would make them "just config" on `dsh-subagent-acp`. But that inserts an unofficial third-party layer between the harness and the engine, erases the native control surfaces this Agent Note exposes (permissionMode, sandboxMode/approvalPolicy, config-dir isolation, apiKey RPC), and trades first-party protocol stability for a shim's release cadence. First-party surfaces — the Agent SDK and the app-server — are the supported integration points.
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptance criteria
|
||||
|
||||
On a machine with both engines and keys configured: a REPL-driven model completes one real file task through `subagent_claude_code` and one through `subagent_codex`, the tool result being the child's final answer, with only `tool/call` + `tool/result` in the parent session log. Keyless suites pass at 100% per-file coverage in a credential-less environment, asserting isolation (scrubbed child env, no temp config dirs left after dispose) and that child behavior is unchanged by the presence or absence of `~/.claude` / `~/.codex`. Cancelling a parent turn quiesces both backends in bounded time with no leftover child processes. E2e suites self-skip cleanly, naming the missing prerequisite.
|
||||
|
||||
## Risks
|
||||
|
||||
- `codex app-server` is CLI-flagged experimental and its v1/v2 vocabularies coexist; the client pins 0.142.5, implements v2 only, and consumes unknown methods/notifications without crashing, but a future codex bump can still force rework (regenerate schemas and re-run the keyless suite on every bump — the development-time enforcement behind the no-runtime-version-probe stance above).
|
||||
- The Claude Code fake-CLI mock rides an internal protocol: any SDK upgrade must go through the keyless suite, and a breaking control-protocol change means reworking the mock (fallback: the driver-injection seam rejected above becomes the escape hatch).
|
||||
- The SDK's optionalDependencies weigh ~280MB per platform — accepted, and confined to the one backend package.
|
||||
- The SDK's SIGKILL branch beyond EOF→SIGTERM was not observed and is trusted; e2e keeps a no-leftover-process assertion.
|
||||
- Codex is a deployment prerequisite (no npm-bundled binary); a missing or incompatible binary surfaces as a loud spawn/protocol `error`, not a version probe.
|
||||
- Every run pays a fresh child process and only the final answer surfaces — thoughts, tool cards, and usage are consumed and dropped; pooling, intermediate-progress surfacing, `sendMessage`/`resume`, `outputSchema` via the SDK's `outputFormat`, and named subagent types via the SDK's `agents` option are all deliberate deferrals.
|
||||
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Agent Note: Claude Code 与 Codex subagent 后端（向外部编码 agent 的进程外委派）
|
||||
|
||||
Status: proposed
|
||||
|
||||
[English](2026-07-07-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md) | 中文
|
||||
|
||||
## 问题
|
||||
|
||||
subagent seam（[seam Agent Note](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-21-subagent-capability-seam.md)）在 `ctx.subagents` 上托管多个命名提供方，ACP（Agent Client Protocol）后端（[ACP 后端 Agent Note](../../implemented/feature/2026-06-22-acp-subagent-backend.md)）证明了该 seam 能跨越进程边界泛化；其「未来提供方」一节明确将 Codex app-server 与 Claude Code Agent SDK 列为实现机制相似的同类方案。如今真正值得委派的就是这两个引擎：harness 的一个轮次应能把一个自包含任务交给真实的 Claude Code 或真实的 Codex——一个拥有自身模型、工具与沙箱的独立产品——并取回一个最终答案，同时父部署不向子进程泄漏密钥，子进程行为也不静默依赖宿主机上碰巧存在的 `~/.claude` / `~/.codex` 状态。
|
||||
|
||||
## 提案
|
||||
|
||||
两个兄弟提供方包，作为 ACP 后端的结构变体，另加一次提取：
|
||||
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-claude-code`：通过 `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` 的 `query()` 驱动一个 Claude Code 子进程（SDK 在父进程中运行，并将其内置的 `claude` CLI（命令行界面）作为子进程 spawn）。提供方名称为 `claude-code`：子进程是 Claude Code 这个*产品*，而非 Anthropic 模型适配器——「claude」保留给未来的 `dsh-llm` 适配器。
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-codex`：spawn `codex app-server`，通过其 JSON-RPC-over-stdio 协议驱动一个 thread 及其中的一个轮次，使用包内一个手写的换行 JSON 客户端（约 200–300 行）。
|
||||
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-process`：纯库（沿用 `subagent-inprocess` 的先例），提取 `dsh-subagent-acp` 已有且两个新后端都需要的内容：凭证环境清洗（`buildChildEnv`）、EOF → SIGTERM → SIGKILL 的 dispose（资源释放）阶梯，以及新的隔离配置目录辅助函数（`mkdtemp` 创建、尽力删除）。ACP 后端迁移到该库上；`bash-local` 的兄弟副本保持不动以限制变更范围。
|
||||
|
||||
两个提供方逐字复制 ACP 后端的 seam 姿态：每次 `start` 创建全新子进程、恰好一次提示词往返、所有能力均为 `false`、`inheritsParentContext: false`、忽略 `request.parent`/`request.agentOptions`、`id = SessionId(randomUUID())`，且 `result` 从不 reject——子进程级失败扁平化为 stop reason，原始错误则通过 `onError` spec 回调送到 `ctx.logger`。模型暴露无需新代码：每个提供方各加载一次 `dsh-tool-subagent`，使用不同的 `toolName`（`subagent_claude_code`、`subagent_codex`）。无需新的会话事件——唯一的模型可见产物是工具结果，因此可重建性与 ACP 完全相同。明确边界：会话日志重建模型可见的 transcript（文本记录），而不是工作区变更历史——获准写入的子进程将文件作为日志之外的环境副作用进行修改，与 bash 工具和 ACP 后端现有行为完全一致；回放复现请求，而非磁盘。
|
||||
|
||||
## 已验证的接口事实（固定版本）
|
||||
|
||||
两个集成面在本提案之前均已针对固定版本进行了验证——阅读类型与打包源码、运行无需密钥的 spike——而非仅依赖厂商文档。固定版本是验证基线，不是运行时契约：后端不执行运行时版本探测（无 `codex --version` 门禁、无 SDK 版本嗅探）。兼容性在开发时强制执行——每次依赖升级都会针对真实加载路径重跑无密钥套件——在运行时则通过显式失败来保障：协议层面的意外通过 `onError` 结算为 `error`，绝不静默异常。
|
||||
|
||||
**`@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` 0.3.202。** `options.env` 会替换子进程环境（不与 `process.env` 合并），恰好满足清洗需求。`settingSources` 默认加载所有文件系统设置——隔离要求显式传入 `[]`。结果子类型为 `success` | `error_during_execution` | `error_max_turns` | `error_max_budget_usd` | `error_max_structured_output_retries`。中止时 SDK 自行逐级加强对 CLI 子进程的终止措施：立即关闭 stdin，约 2 秒后若子进程未退出则发送 SIGTERM（已观察到；无残留进程）——无需自定义 kill 回退。`outputFormat: {type: 'json_schema'}` 和 `agents` 选项已存在，为 seam 的 `outputSchema` 能力和命名 subagent 类型提供了未来着陆点；两者均不在本 Agent Note 范围内。
|
||||
|
||||
**codex CLI 0.142.5，`codex app-server`（v2 词汇）。** LF 分隔的 JSON，JSON-RPC 2.0 形状但省略 `"jsonrpc"` 头。
|
||||
|
||||
- 生命周期：`initialize{clientInfo}` + `initialized` → `thread/start`（接受 `cwd`、`model`、`sandbox`、`approvalPolicy`、`ephemeral`；未认证即可成功）→ `turn/start{threadId, input:[{type:'text',text}]}` 立即返回一个 `inProgress` 的轮次；终止信号是携带 `Turn{status: completed|interrupted|failed|inProgress, error}` 的 `turn/completed` 通知。
|
||||
- 审批是服务端发起的请求——`item/commandExecution/requestApproval`、`item/fileChange/requestApproval`、`item/permissions/requestApproval`、`item/tool/requestUserInput`、`mcpServer/elicitation/request`——以 `accept`/`decline` 系列决策应答。
|
||||
- 认证：`account/login/start{type:'apiKey', apiKey}` 是一等 RPC，`account/read` 报告 `requiresOpenaiAuth`——且未认证的 `turn/start` 不会快速失败（它会挂在重试中），因此后端必须预检认证状态，并在失败时明确结算为 `error`，而非等待轮次。
|
||||
- 隔离：`CODEX_HOME` 重定向被尊重（`initialize` 响应会回显它，测试可据此断言隔离），`ephemeral: true` 的 thread 不留任何会话文件。
|
||||
|
||||
## 隔离与凭证
|
||||
|
||||
部署只使用 API key 认证，子进程不得看到宿主用户的 Claude Code / Codex 配置：行为必须只由 `cordis.yml` 决定。每次运行获得一个全新的 `mkdtemp` 配置目录——Claude Code 使用 `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`（并显式设置 `settingSources: []`），Codex 使用 `CODEX_HOME`——dispose 时尽力删除；配置字段也可以固定一个持久目录。子进程环境通过提取逐字复用 ACP 后端的 `buildChildEnv` 语义：转发环境变量，但移除凭证形态的变量（`/KEY|SECRET|TOKEN/i`），再叠加 `config.env`——因此 `PATH`、`HOME`、`TMPDIR`、locale 和代理变量保留，CLI 正常运行；只有环境中的凭证形态变量被清洗（Claude Code 的 `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` 通过 `config.env` 显式进入），Codex key 则通过 `account/login/start` RPC 进入隔离的 `CODEX_HOME`，而非手写 `auth.json`。
|
||||
|
||||
## 权限与审批策略
|
||||
|
||||
每个后端不压缩为 ACP 单一的 `permission: allow|reject` 旋钮，而把引擎原生词汇作为配置暴露，并采用保守默认值：Claude Code 获得 `permissionMode`（默认 `default`）以及 `permission: allow|reject`（默认 `reject`），后者作为所有未被前者处理的请求的 `canUseTool` 自动应答；Codex 获得 `sandboxMode`（默认 `read-only`）和 `approvalPolicy`（默认 `never`），以及同一个 `permission` 后备值，用来应答仍然到达的审批请求。默认值刻意做到不造成损害（开箱即用的子进程无法写文件）；示例演示如何开放权限（`acceptEdits` / `workspace-write`）。机械规则是：每一个服务端发起的请求都由程序迅速结算——枚举出的审批/用户输入/elicitation 请求按配置策略应答，未知请求方法用 JSON-RPC method-not-found 错误响应（绝不保持 pending），未知通知被消费——因此任何子进程请求都不会因等待永远不会到来的应答而卡住轮次。这一版中提示词不会到达人类，与 ACP 一致。
|
||||
|
||||
## StopReason 映射
|
||||
|
||||
Claude Code：`success` → `completed`；`error_max_turns`、`error_during_execution`、`error_max_budget_usd`、`error_max_structured_output_retries` → `error`（与 ACP 对 `max_turn_requests` 的处理对齐：未完成的任务不是成功）；生成器中止 → `aborted`；未知值 → `error`。Codex：`Turn.status` 为 `completed` → `completed`；`interrupted` → `aborted`；`failed` 且 `codexErrorInfo: 'contextWindowExceeded'` → `max-tokens`，其他 `failed` → `error`；传输/spawn/认证预检失败 → `error`（若已请求取消则为 `aborted`）。两者中，`cancel()` 采用 ACP 形状：标志位 + abort/interrupt + 一个 cancel-settled 竞争分支，使不合作的子进程无法阻塞结果。
|
||||
|
||||
活性姿态，明确声明：teardown 时序是配置项，轮次时长不是。两个后端将 dispose 阶梯的宽限期作为带默认值的已验证配置字段（ACP 后端的 `disposeEofGraceMs`/`disposeGraceMs` 形状，由提取库承载），但刻意不设轮次时长或启动超时——与 ACP 一致：轮次期间的活性由调用方通过 `cancel()`/abort signal 掌控，subagent 轮次持续数分钟也属合理，而 Codex 认证预检消除了唯一已验证的必然挂起场景；需要墙钟上限的部署从父侧取消即可。
|
||||
|
||||
## 测试
|
||||
|
||||
依照根 AGENTS.md 规则在每个层级明确命名，并预先消除风险：
|
||||
|
||||
- **无密钥单元/集成测试**：每个后端都镜像 ACP spec 清单（往返和输出累积、每种 stop 映射、两条取消路径、已中止、两种策略下的权限自动应答、未知消息容错、错误命令的 spawn 失败、HMR（热模块替换）提供方清理、导出形状、对子进程环境隔离和临时目录删除的断言；Codex 另加认证预检失败路径）。Claude Code harness 是通过 `pathToClaudeCodeExecutable` 接入真实 SDK 的脚本化假 `claude` 可执行文件——一个 spike 已在 24 ms 内完成端到端无密钥验证（假 CLI 应答一次 `control_request/initialize`，并使用普通 stream-json 通信，约 40 行）。Codex harness 是讲已验证协议格式的脚本化 mock app-server 子进程，沿用 `mock-acp-server.ts` 形状。
|
||||
- **有密钥 e2e 测试**：每个后端的真实引擎执行真实文件操作，并通过磁盘状态进行验证，固定使用开放后的配置，以免验收与不造成损害的默认值冲突——Claude Code 使用 `permissionMode: 'acceptEdits'`，Codex 使用 `sandboxMode: 'workspace-write'` + `approvalPolicy: 'never'`；自跳过会准确报告缺失的是二进制还是 key。CI 没有密钥，因此依照有密钥策略在本地运行。
|
||||
- **快照测试**：以 `TODO(claude-code-subagent-replay)` / `TODO(codex-subagent-replay)` 推迟——即 ACP 后端也推迟的独立回放形状（[按会话回放 Agent Note](../../implemented/testing/2026-06-22-subagent-snapshot-replay.md)）；在此期间由无密钥套件提供确定性覆盖。
|
||||
|
||||
## 曾考虑的替代方案
|
||||
|
||||
### 为什么不用官方 `@openai/codex-sdk` 而手写客户端？
|
||||
|
||||
dispose 阶梯和环境清洗要求拥有子进程（spawn 参数、env、信号、exit 等待）；SDK 隐藏了进程。协议格式（wire format）极其简单（LF JSON），形状可按固定版本生成（`codex app-server generate-json-schema`），仓库先例（`hook-protocol`）是拥有薄协议核心而非包装他人的运行时。SDK 能节省协议演进的维护成本，但代价是失去本后端存在的意义所在的精确控制。
|
||||
|
||||
### 为什么不用模型可见的 `subagent_type` 参数（单一 Task 风格工具）？
|
||||
|
||||
Claude Code 自身的 Task 工具将 subagent 类型放在模型可见的 schema 中，选择一个提示词 + 工具集人格。这里的选择是在执行引擎之间做出的，而只有部署者知道哪些引擎配置了凭证——因此选择留在部署配置层，保持 `dsh-tool-subagent` 文档中的「一个提供方对应一个工具」契约。人格风格的类型选择器应是针对工具的另一个 Agent Note，而非针对后端。
|
||||
|
||||
### 为什么不用登录态凭证和用户自身的配置？
|
||||
|
||||
继承 `~/.claude` / `~/.codex`（订阅登录、用户设置、skill（技能）、MCP 服务器）会使子进程行为依赖宿主机状态，并在 ACP 后端和 bash 执行器确立的「凭证通过 `config.env` 显式进入，绝不隐式继承」规则上打开一个隐式例外。仅 API key 加强制配置目录隔离使运行可复现；需要共享状态的部署可以有意将配置目录字段指向一个持久目录。
|
||||
|
||||
### 为什么不为 Claude Code 无密钥测试注入驱动层 seam？
|
||||
|
||||
注入假的 `query()` 会 mock 我们自己的边界，使真实 SDK 加载路径未被测试（docs/testing.md 中的 real-over-mock 策略）。曾考虑此方案的风险——SDK↔CLI 的 stream-json 控制协议是内部实现——已被 spike 消除：假 CLI harness 今天能对真实固定版本的 SDK 正常工作。如果 SDK 升级破坏了 mock，无密钥套件会让升级 PR（Pull Request）失败，这正是门禁在发挥作用。
|
||||
|
||||
### 为什么不用 ACP 适配器（如 `claude-code-acp`）复用既有后端？
|
||||
|
||||
社区 shim 将两个引擎包装为 ACP，这会使它们在 `dsh-subagent-acp` 上变成「仅配置」。但这在 harness 与引擎之间插入了一个非官方的第三方层，抹去了本 Agent Note 暴露的原生控制面（permissionMode、sandboxMode/approvalPolicy、配置目录隔离、apiKey RPC），并以 shim 的发布节奏替换了第一方协议的稳定性。第一方接口——Agent SDK 和 app-server——才是受支持的集成点。
|
||||
|
||||
## 验收标准
|
||||
|
||||
在两个引擎和密钥均已配置的机器上：一个 REPL 驱动的模型通过 `subagent_claude_code` 完成一个真实文件任务，通过 `subagent_codex` 完成另一个，工具结果为子进程的最终答案，父会话日志中仅有 `tool/call` + `tool/result`。无密钥套件在无凭证环境下以逐文件 100% 覆盖率通过，断言隔离（清洗后的子进程环境、dispose 后无残留临时配置目录），并断言 `~/.claude` / `~/.codex` 的存在与否不影响子进程行为。取消父轮次后，两个后端在有界时间内完全停稳，无残留子进程。e2e 套件干净地自跳过，命名缺失的前置条件。
|
||||
|
||||
## 风险
|
||||
|
||||
- `codex app-server` 被 CLI 标记为实验性，其 v1/v2 词汇共存；客户端固定 0.142.5、仅实现 v2、对未知方法/通知消费而不崩溃，但未来 codex 升级仍可能迫使返工（每次升级重新生成 schema 并重跑无密钥套件——这是上述「不做运行时版本探测」立场背后的开发时强制执行）。
|
||||
- Claude Code 假 CLI mock 依赖一个内部协议：任何 SDK 升级都必须通过无密钥套件，控制协议的破坏性变更意味着返工 mock（回退方案：上面否决的驱动注入 seam 成为逃生舱口）。
|
||||
- SDK 的 optionalDependencies 每平台约 280 MB——已接受，限制在单个后端包内。
|
||||
- SDK 的 SIGKILL 分支（EOF→SIGTERM 之后）未被观察到，信任其实现；e2e 保留无残留进程断言。
|
||||
- Codex 是部署前置条件（无 npm 内置二进制）；缺失或不兼容的二进制会明确报出 spawn/协议 `error`，而非版本探测。
|
||||
- 每次运行付出一个全新子进程的代价，且仅最终答案浮出——思考、工具卡片和用量被消费后丢弃；池化、中间进度浮出、`sendMessage`/`resume`、通过 SDK 的 `outputFormat` 实现 `outputSchema`、以及通过 SDK 的 `agents` 选项实现命名 subagent 类型，均为刻意推迟。
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user