Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into worktree/agent-loop-testkit

# Conflicts:
#	packages/README.md
This commit is contained in:
Yichen Jiang
2026-07-17 19:13:37 +08:00
250 changed files with 14581 additions and 810 deletions

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@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Design surveyed against the bash tools of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, and pi;
- **Spawn per call, no shell state** — every call is a fresh non-login `bash -c` (deterministic; no rc files). All four surveyed tools spawn per call. `XXX(stateful-shell)` in `src/run.ts` records the two proven stateful designs (Claude Code's cwd-only persistence; Codex's PTY exec sessions) for when real workflows demand them.
- **Process-group kills with escalation** — children are spawned `detached` (own process group); kills send SIGTERM to the group, then SIGKILL after the `graceMs` grace (default 3s — OpenCode's escalation; pipelines and subshells die with the parent). ESRCH is tolerated; daemons that re-parent away from the group can still survive — same caveat as the surveyed tools.
- **Tail-keep truncation + spill files** — output beyond `maxOutputBytes` keeps the in-memory TAIL (errors/results cluster at the end — pi/OpenCode rationale) while the FULL stream is appended to a temp file whose path is reported when available. If the final spill close reports a delayed writeback failure, the executor still returns the tail but withholds the path rather than advertising a possibly incomplete file.
- **Tail-keep truncation + spill files** — output beyond `maxOutputBytes` keeps the in-memory TAIL (errors/results cluster at the end — pi/OpenCode rationale) while the FULL stream is appended to a temp file whose path is reported when available. A foreground `BashExecRequest.stdoutMaxBytes` can raise stdout's capture budget for one trusted caller; stderr and background tasks still use `maxOutputBytes`. If the final spill close reports a delayed writeback failure, the executor still returns the tail but withholds the path rather than advertising a possibly incomplete file.
- **Model-friendly env + credential scrub** — `process.env` minus credential-shaped vars (`*KEY*`/`*SECRET*`/`*TOKEN*`), then `NO_COLOR=1 TERM=dumb PAGER=cat GIT_PAGER=cat` (Codex's hardcoded set) so pagers and ANSI color don't garble results. This scrub is the security control that keeps the harness's *ambient* credentials out of a spawned command. A spec's `env` is merged LAST (after the scrub), so a caller's explicit entry — a value it already holds — wins even on a credential-shaped name. The spec's `stdin`, when supplied, is written to the child and closed; with none supplied, fd 0 is `/dev/null` — the exact pre-seam default, so a command that probes stdin's file type is unaffected. Both `env`/`stdin` are set by in-process plugins (the hooks bridges); the model-facing tool doesn't expose them. See [the bash-stdin-env RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md).
- **Background processes** — `start()` returns a live `BashProcess` handle immediately, no timeout applies (Claude Code detaches timeouts when backgrounding), the handle's `readOutput()` is incremental with whole-stream byte offsets, and disposal kills every running process and awaits its exit. Everything task-shaped (ids, ownership, polling, notices) lives in the generic [`ctx.tasks` runtime](../../tasks/tasks/README.md), which the tool layer registers the handle with — this executor never sees a session or a registry.

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@@ -92,10 +92,13 @@ export class LocalBashExecutor extends BashExecutor {
this.config.maxTimeoutMs,
'bash-local: request.timeoutMs',
)
const stdoutMaxBytes = request.stdoutMaxBytes ?? this.config.maxOutputBytes
assertPositiveFinite('request.stdoutMaxBytes', stdoutMaxBytes)
return {
command: request.command,
workdir: request.workdir ?? this.config.cwd ?? process.cwd(),
timeoutMs,
stdoutMaxBytes,
...request.signal ? { signal: request.signal } : {},
// Explicit environment values are merged after credential scrubbing in run.ts.
...request.stdin !== undefined ? { stdin: request.stdin } : {},
@@ -111,7 +114,8 @@ export class LocalBashExecutor extends BashExecutor {
const outcome = await runBash({
command: spec.command,
cwd: spec.workdir,
maxOutputBytes: this.config.maxOutputBytes,
stdoutMaxBytes: spec.stdoutMaxBytes,
stderrMaxBytes: this.config.maxOutputBytes,
graceMs: this.config.graceMs,
signal: d.signal,
stdin: spec.stdin,
@@ -128,7 +132,8 @@ export class LocalBashExecutor extends BashExecutor {
const running = runBash({
command: spec.command,
cwd: spec.workdir,
maxOutputBytes: this.config.maxOutputBytes,
stdoutMaxBytes: this.config.maxOutputBytes,
stderrMaxBytes: this.config.maxOutputBytes,
graceMs: this.config.graceMs,
signal: spec.signal,
stdin: spec.stdin,

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@@ -52,8 +52,10 @@ export function childEnv(extra?: Record<string, string>): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {
export interface SpawnSpec {
command: string
cwd: string
/** Per-stream in-memory cap; overflow spills to disk (tail kept in memory). */
maxOutputBytes: number
/** Stdout in-memory cap; overflow spills to disk (tail kept in memory). */
stdoutMaxBytes: number
/** Stderr in-memory cap; overflow spills to disk (tail kept in memory). */
stderrMaxBytes: number
/** Grace period between the SIGTERM and the SIGKILL escalation on a kill. */
graceMs: number
/**
@@ -283,8 +285,8 @@ export function runBash(spec: SpawnSpec, internals: RunInternals = {}): RunningB
? spawn('bash', ['-c', spec.command], { cwd: spec.cwd, env, stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'], detached: true })
: spawn('bash', ['-c', spec.command], { cwd: spec.cwd, env, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], detached: true })
const stdout = new OutputCollector(spec.maxOutputBytes, 'stdout', spillDir)
const stderr = new OutputCollector(spec.maxOutputBytes, 'stderr', spillDir)
const stdout = new OutputCollector(spec.stdoutMaxBytes, 'stdout', spillDir)
const stderr = new OutputCollector(spec.stderrMaxBytes, 'stderr', spillDir)
child.stdout.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => { stdout.push(chunk) })
child.stderr.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => { stderr.push(chunk) })

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@@ -71,6 +71,23 @@ describe('LocalBashExecutor.run', () => {
const { bash } = await setup()
expect(() => bash.resolve({ command: 'true', timeoutMs: Number.NaN })).toThrow(/request\.timeoutMs/)
expect(() => bash.resolve({ command: 'true', timeoutMs: -1 })).toThrow(/request\.timeoutMs/)
expect(() => bash.resolve({ command: 'true', stdoutMaxBytes: Number.NaN })).toThrow(/request\.stdoutMaxBytes/)
expect(() => bash.resolve({ command: 'true', stdoutMaxBytes: -1 })).toThrow(/request\.stdoutMaxBytes/)
})
it('defaults stdoutMaxBytes to maxOutputBytes and lets foreground callers raise stdout only', async () => {
const { bash } = await setup({ maxOutputBytes: 100 })
expect(bash.resolve({ command: 'true' }).stdoutMaxBytes).toBe(100)
const result = await bash.run(bash.resolve({
command: 'printf "%.0sx" $(seq 1 500); printf "%.0se" $(seq 1 500) >&2',
stdoutMaxBytes: 500,
}))
expect(result.stdout.truncated).toBe(false)
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('x'.repeat(500))
expect(result.stderr.truncated).toBe(true)
expect(result.stderr.text.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(100)
})
it('per-call timeout takes precedence under the cap and kills on expiry', async () => {

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@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ function spec(command: string, overrides: Partial<Parameters<typeof runBash>[0]>
return {
command,
cwd: process.cwd(),
maxOutputBytes: 64_000,
stdoutMaxBytes: 64_000,
stderrMaxBytes: 64_000,
graceMs: 3_000,
...overrides,
}
@@ -224,10 +225,24 @@ describe('stdin and extra env (set by in-process plugins)', () => {
})
describe('output truncation and spill', () => {
it('applies stdout and stderr caps independently', async () => {
const result = await runBash(
spec('printf "%.0sx" $(seq 1 500); printf "%.0se" $(seq 1 500) >&2', {
stdoutMaxBytes: 500,
stderrMaxBytes: 100,
}),
{ spillDir },
).done
expect(result.stdout.truncated).toBe(false)
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('x'.repeat(500))
expect(result.stderr.truncated).toBe(true)
expect(result.stderr.text.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(100)
})
it('keeps the tail and spills the full stream to disk', async () => {
// 200 numbered lines of ~10 bytes; cap at 500 bytes keeps a late tail.
const result = await runBash(
spec('for i in $(seq 1 200); do printf "line-%04d\\n" $i; done', { maxOutputBytes: 500 }),
spec('for i in $(seq 1 200); do printf "line-%04d\\n" $i; done', { stdoutMaxBytes: 500, stderrMaxBytes: 500 }),
{ spillDir },
).done
expect(result.stdout.truncated).toBe(true)
@@ -242,7 +257,7 @@ describe('output truncation and spill', () => {
it('does not truncate output exactly at the cap', async () => {
const result = await runBash(
spec('printf "%.0sx" $(seq 1 500)', { maxOutputBytes: 500 }),
spec('printf "%.0sx" $(seq 1 500)', { stdoutMaxBytes: 500, stderrMaxBytes: 500 }),
{ spillDir },
).done
expect(result.stdout.truncated).toBe(false)
@@ -253,7 +268,7 @@ describe('output truncation and spill', () => {
it('settles with the tail and no spill path when final spill close fails', async () => {
failNextClose.value = true
const result = await runBash(
spec('for i in $(seq 1 200); do printf "line-%04d\\n" $i; done', { maxOutputBytes: 500 }),
spec('for i in $(seq 1 200); do printf "line-%04d\\n" $i; done', { stdoutMaxBytes: 500, stderrMaxBytes: 500 }),
{ spillDir },
).done
expect(failNextClose.value).toBe(false)
@@ -364,7 +379,7 @@ describe('environment and spill-file hardening', () => {
it('creates spill files with owner-only permissions and random names', async () => {
const result = await runBash(
spec('for i in $(seq 1 200); do printf "line-%04d\\n" $i; done', { maxOutputBytes: 500 }),
spec('for i in $(seq 1 200); do printf "line-%04d\\n" $i; done', { stdoutMaxBytes: 500, stderrMaxBytes: 500 }),
{ spillDir },
).done
const path = result.stdout.spillPath!
@@ -375,7 +390,7 @@ describe('environment and spill-file hardening', () => {
it('defaults spills into a private per-process directory', async () => {
const result = await runBash(
spec('for i in $(seq 1 200); do printf "line-%04d\\n" $i; done', { maxOutputBytes: 500 }),
spec('for i in $(seq 1 200); do printf "line-%04d\\n" $i; done', { stdoutMaxBytes: 500, stderrMaxBytes: 500 }),
).done
const dir = dirname(result.stdout.spillPath!)
expect(dir).toMatch(/dsh-bash-/)

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@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Implementations subclass `BashExecutor` and implement the abstract methods. Disp
## Vocabulary
`BashExecRequest` (command, workdir?, timeoutMs?, signal?, stdin?, env?, sandboxMode?) resolves to `BashExecSpec` (command, workdir, timeoutMs, signal?, stdin?, env?, sandboxMode) before execution. `sandboxMode` is optional on the request and required-but-nullable on the resolved spec: it carries an approved one-shot escalation or the session's standing override; a sandboxing executor stamps its configured default when absent, while a non-sandboxing executor carries the field and confines nothing.
`BashExecRequest` (command, workdir?, timeoutMs?, stdoutMaxBytes?, signal?, stdin?, env?, sandboxMode?) resolves to `BashExecSpec` (command, workdir, timeoutMs, stdoutMaxBytes, signal?, stdin?, env?, sandboxMode) before execution. `stdoutMaxBytes` is a trusted foreground-run capture budget for consumers that must parse complete bounded stdout; the model-facing bash tool does not expose it. `sandboxMode` is optional on the request and required-but-nullable on the resolved spec: it carries an approved one-shot escalation or the session's standing override; a sandboxing executor stamps its configured default when absent, while a non-sandboxing executor carries the field and confines nothing.
The seam also owns the per-session mode override vocabulary: the log-only `'bash/sandbox-mode'` session event, the pure `effectiveSandboxMode(events)` fold, and the `setSandboxMode(session, mode)` write path. `run()` returns `BashRunResult`; `start()` returns `BashProcess`, whose incremental read and kill methods are adapted by `dsh-tool-bash` into a generic task registration. A sandboxing executor stamps `BashSandboxInfo` on foreground results and settled process handles. See `src/types.ts` and [core-data-structures/bash.md](../../../docs/core-data-structures/bash.md).

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@@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ export interface BashExecRequest {
workdir?: string | undefined
/** Timeout override in milliseconds (implementations cap it). */
timeoutMs?: number | undefined
/**
* Foreground stdout capture budget in bytes. Absent uses the executor's
* default output cap. Trusted in-process consumers use this when they must
* parse complete stdout up to their own bounded limit; the model-facing bash
* tool does not expose it as a parameter.
*/
stdoutMaxBytes?: number | undefined
/** Abort signal — implementations kill the command when it fires. */
signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
/**
@@ -67,6 +74,11 @@ export interface BashExecSpec {
command: string
workdir: string
timeoutMs: number
/**
* Resolved foreground stdout capture budget in bytes. `run()` uses it for
* stdout; background tasks and stderr keep the executor's own output cap.
*/
stdoutMaxBytes: number
/** Abort signal — implementations kill the command when it fires. */
signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
/** Bytes to write to stdin before closing it; absent means no stdin. */
@@ -96,9 +108,19 @@ export interface BashRunResult {
exitCode: number | null
/** Terminating signal (e.g. 'SIGTERM'); null on normal exit. */
signal: NodeJS.Signals | null
/** True when the executor's own timeout killed the command. */
/**
* True when the executor's own timeout was the FIRST cause to cut the command
* short. Mutually exclusive with {@link aborted}: one fused deadline drives
* both the timeout and the caller's cancellation, so a timeout and an abort
* racing before process close report the single first-abort cause, not both
* (see the [timeout-library RFC](../../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-07-06-timeout-deadline-library.md)).
*/
timedOut: boolean
/** True when the caller's AbortSignal killed the command. */
/**
* True when the caller's `AbortSignal` was the FIRST cause to kill the command
* (and it was not the executor's own timeout). Mutually exclusive with
* {@link timedOut} — see there for the first-cause classification.
*/
aborted: boolean
/** The effective timeout applied to this run (after defaulting/capping). */
timeoutMs: number

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@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ class StubExecutor extends BashExecutor {
command: request.command,
workdir: request.workdir ?? '/stub',
timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 1000,
stdoutMaxBytes: request.stdoutMaxBytes ?? 64_000,
...request.signal ? { signal: request.signal } : {},
sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode,
}
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ describe('BashExecutor service seam', () => {
const ctx = new Context()
await ctx.plugin(StubExecutor)
const spec = ctx.bash.resolve({ command: 'echo hi' })
expect(spec).toEqual({ command: 'echo hi', workdir: '/stub', timeoutMs: 1000, sandboxMode: undefined })
expect(spec).toEqual({ command: 'echo hi', workdir: '/stub', timeoutMs: 1000, stdoutMaxBytes: 64_000, sandboxMode: undefined })
const result = await ctx.bash.run(spec)
expect(result.exitCode).toBe(0)

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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The tool owns its `presentCall`/`presentResult` render intent. A foreground call
## The tool builds its request from named args only
The `BashExecRequest` seam carries optional `stdin` and `env`, used by trusted in-process plugins. This tool does **not** expose or forward them: it builds requests from named command/workdir/timeout/signal/sandbox fields only. This is not a trust boundary; the local executor's ambient credential scrub is the security control.
The `BashExecRequest` seam carries optional `stdoutMaxBytes`, `stdin`, and `env`, used by trusted in-process plugins. This tool does **not** expose or forward them: it builds requests from named command/workdir/timeout/signal/sandbox fields only. This is not a trust boundary; the local executor's ambient credential scrub is the security control.
## Permissions and escalation

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@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ class RecordingSandboxExecutor extends BashExecutor {
return {
command: request.command,
workdir: request.workdir ?? process.cwd(),
stdoutMaxBytes: request.stdoutMaxBytes ?? 64_000,
timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 1000,
...request.signal ? { signal: request.signal } : {},
sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode ?? 'read-only',
@@ -140,7 +141,13 @@ class CountingStartExecutor extends BashExecutor {
starts = 0
resolve(request: BashExecRequest): BashExecSpec {
return { command: request.command, workdir: request.workdir ?? '/x', timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 0, sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode }
return {
command: request.command,
workdir: request.workdir ?? '/x',
timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 0,
stdoutMaxBytes: request.stdoutMaxBytes ?? 64_000,
sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode,
}
}
run(): Promise<BashRunResult> { return Promise.reject(new Error('unused')) }
@@ -927,11 +934,12 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
/**
* Records every {@link BashExecRequest} the consumer hands to `resolve()`, so a
* test can assert what the model-facing tool DID and DID NOT forward. The `bash`
* tool does not expose `stdin`/`env` as parameters (bash syntax already gives a
* model that power), so it must build its request from named args only and
* tool does not expose trusted-plugin fields (`stdoutMaxBytes`, `stdin`, or
* `env`) as parameters, so it must build its request from named args only and
* never spread unknown tool-call keys into it. This guard's job is to catch a
* future refactor that blindly forwards `...args` — which would silently thread
* model input into the post-scrub `env` merge — NOT to defend a trust boundary
* model input into the post-scrub `env` merge or per-run capture budget — NOT
* to defend a trust boundary
* (the credential scrub in dsh-bash-local is the security control; see the
* bash-stdin-env RFC). Foreground `run()` returns a canned result; `start()`
* hands back an already-settled fake handle so the task registration completes.
@@ -944,6 +952,7 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
command: request.command,
workdir: request.workdir ?? process.cwd(),
timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 0,
stdoutMaxBytes: request.stdoutMaxBytes ?? 64_000,
...request.signal ? { signal: request.signal } : {},
...request.stdin !== undefined ? { stdin: request.stdin } : {},
...request.env !== undefined ? { env: request.env } : {},
@@ -980,7 +989,7 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
return { ctx, bash: ctx.bash as RecordingBashExecutor }
}
it('does not forward env/stdin even when the model includes them as extra arguments', async () => {
it('does not forward trusted-only fields even when the model includes them as extra arguments', async () => {
const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording()
// Unknown `env` and `stdin` keys are ignored by the schema and named request construction.
// This preserves the request shape; it is not a security boundary because shell syntax can
@@ -993,6 +1002,7 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
description: 'echo',
env: { SNEAKY_API_KEY: 'leak' },
stdin: 'malicious payload',
stdoutMaxBytes: 999_999,
},
})
expect(bash.requests).toHaveLength(1)
@@ -1000,9 +1010,10 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
expect(request.command).toBe('echo hi')
expect('env' in request).toBe(false)
expect('stdin' in request).toBe(false)
expect('stdoutMaxBytes' in request).toBe(false)
})
it('a background bash call likewise carries no env/stdin', async () => {
it('a background bash call likewise carries no trusted-only fields', async () => {
const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording()
const result = await ctx.tools.execute({
callId: CallId('no-forward-2'),
@@ -1013,6 +1024,7 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
run_in_background: true,
env: { TOKEN: 'leak' },
stdin: 'x',
stdoutMaxBytes: 999_999,
},
})
// The call really went down the background path (the recorder sees the real
@@ -1024,5 +1036,6 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
expect(request.command).toBe('sleep 1')
expect('env' in request).toBe(false)
expect('stdin' in request).toBe(false)
expect('stdoutMaxBytes' in request).toBe(false)
})
})