docs: audit package limitations on current stack
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@@ -19,3 +19,10 @@ Scoped-context registration primitive. `createScope(ctx, key)` mints a Cordis co
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Ownership and visibility derive from ONE fact — which context a registration went through. An explicit `{ scope }` registration parameter could express "visible to X, disposed with Y", which is almost always a bug; the scoped context makes it unrepresentable. Rationale and alternatives: [the agent-scope RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-07-08-agent-scope-contexts.md).
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Handing out a scoped context hands out the minting plugin's service-resolution capability (resolution walks the minting fiber's dependency chain, not the holder's) — mint scopes from a plugin whose `inject` surface is what scope holders should reach.
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## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
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- **Only scope-aware surfaces isolate state** — registries must file by `scopeOf()` and events must dispatch through `scopeTarget()`; an arbitrary Cordis service remains context-global merely because it is called through a scoped context.
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- **A context carries one nearest scope key** — nested scopes shadow their parent's tag rather than forming hierarchical or multi-membership policy sets.
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- **Dispatch carriers preserve behavior, not identity** — listener `this` can call the subject's methods, but `this !== subject` and a method read returns a newly bound function.
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- **Service reachability comes from the scope minter** — handing out `Scope.ctx` also hands out the minting plugin's injected service surface, so a broader minter cannot later be narrowed by the holder.
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