feat(modes): per-session sandbox/approval switching — the session log as the store, ACP config options
effective(session) = findLast(the session own knob events)?.value ?? the composition-config default. One log-only event per knob, owned by its domain (bash/sandbox-mode in dsh-bash, approval/policy in dsh-approval), each exporting the same three-piece kit: the event declaration, a pure fold, and THE write path — a switch IS its event; no owner service, no facts map. Restart immunity and multi-session isolation fall out of the log replay by construction. Execution follows the fold on both sides: the bash tool stamps escalation grant > session override > executor default, and the approval seam prepends the never-gate that auto-rejects before any interactive answerer. Visibility is two layers per knob: a per-agent prompt section states the effective value on every request (logged through request/header*, so what-the-model-was-told replays from the log), and an agent/pre-step narrator injects at most one coalesced delta notice with positional attribution (user switch vs operator/config drift). The ACP bridge advertises one capability-gated select per composable knob with currentValue folded per session, validates set_config_option against the closed vocabularies, and anchors idle switches at the next turn prompt-submit under the turn-enclosure contract.
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@@ -41,8 +41,16 @@
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* through `ctx.approval` BEFORE anything executes and failing closed on every
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* unanswerable path. The fields exist only when the mounted executor reports
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* a confining default (`ctx.bash.sandboxMode`) — a lever is never advertised
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* that the composition cannot honor. Per-session mode switching is the
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* sandbox RFC's staged follow-up.
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* that the composition cannot honor.
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*
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* Per-session mode switching (the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching): a session may carry a
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* standing sandbox-mode override — the `bash/sandbox-mode` event fold from
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* `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash` — which this plugin makes real at EXECUTION: each
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* call is stamped `escalation grant > session override > executor default`.
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* The prompt deliberately does NOT state the mode and no switch is narrated:
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* the model learns the boundary from the denial marker (which names the mode
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* it ran under) exactly when it matters, instead of preemptively refusing
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* work a standing declaration would discourage.
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*
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* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash
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*/
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@@ -59,7 +67,7 @@ import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
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// stays optional at runtime, same pattern as dsh-tools' ask routing).
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import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-approval'
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import type { SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
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import { BashTaskId, OwnerToken } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
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import { BashTaskId, OwnerToken, effectiveSandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
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import type { BashRunResult, BashTask, CollectedOutput } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
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export const name = 'tool-bash'
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@@ -472,6 +480,19 @@ export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
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const defaultMode = ctx.bash.sandboxMode
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const escalationModes: readonly SandboxMode[] = defaultMode === undefined ? [] : ESCALATION_TARGETS
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/**
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* The session's standing mode override for an ordinary (non-escalating)
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* call: the `bash/sandbox-mode` fold of the calling agent's log, stamped
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* onto the request so EXECUTION follows the same effective mode the prompt
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* section states. Weakest precedence — an escalation grant (freshly
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* approved for exactly this call) outranks it, and without either the
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* executor's `resolve()` applies its configured default. Undefined for a
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* non-sandboxing executor (nothing honors it) and for agent-less callers
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* (no session to fold).
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*/
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const sessionOverride = (exec: ToolExecution): SandboxMode | undefined =>
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defaultMode === undefined || exec.agent === undefined ? undefined : effectiveSandboxMode(exec.agent.session.events)
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/**
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* Resolve a sandbox-escalation request through `ctx.approval` BEFORE
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* anything executes. Returns the granted mode to stamp onto the bash
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@@ -493,10 +514,12 @@ export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
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throw new Error('sandbox_permissions is not available in this composition (no sandboxing executor to escalate)')
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}
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// Strict widening is an EXECUTION check against the call's effective
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// mode, deliberately not a schema constraint (the enum is the closed
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// target vocabulary; the effective mode is per-call truth). A
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// non-widening request fails closed here and never prompts a human.
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const effectiveMode = defaultMode as SandboxMode
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// mode — session override ?? executor default, the same fold ordinary
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// calls are stamped with — deliberately not a schema constraint (the
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// enum is the closed target vocabulary; the effective mode is per-call
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// truth). A non-widening request fails closed here and never prompts a
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// human.
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const effectiveMode = (sessionOverride(exec) ?? defaultMode) as SandboxMode
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if (!(WIDER_MODES[effectiveMode] ?? []).includes(mode as SandboxMode)) {
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throw new Error(`sandbox escalation to "${mode}" is not strictly wider than this call's current "${effectiveMode}" mode`)
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}
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@@ -564,9 +587,11 @@ export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
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// An escalating call resolves approval BEFORE anything executes; every
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// non-grant outcome throws its distinct error text and runs nothing.
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// (validateBashArgs pinned the pairing, so the double narrow is exact.)
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// An ordinary call carries the session's standing override instead —
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// grant > session override > executor default (see sessionOverride).
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const sandboxMode = args.sandbox_permissions !== undefined && args.justification !== undefined
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? await approveEscalation(args.sandbox_permissions, args.justification, exec)
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: undefined
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: sessionOverride(exec)
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// Default the workdir to the calling agent's session cwd so each ACP
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// session runs in its own workspace (see resolveWorkdir); an explicit
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// model workdir still wins.
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