feat(tool-pwsh): teach the confined named-pipe capture boundary to the model
Under read-only and workspace-write the Windows ACL sandbox leaves programs unable to open named pipes, so a piped-stdio spawn fails with EPERM. State that boundary in the pwsh tool description next to the ConstrainedLanguage contract, pin it in the tool tests, and bring the package README and both implemented Agent Notes current with it.
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## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
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- **ConstrainedLanguage under the Windows sandbox** — when the [Windows ACL sandbox](../../sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md) confines a call (read-only or workspace-write), the restricted token puts pwsh into ConstrainedLanguage mode: `Add-Type`, non-core .NET statics (`[System.IO.*]::`, `[math]::`), COM objects, and reflection fail with "only core types" errors, and the mode cannot be lifted from inside. The tool description teaches this contract to the model; the backend README owns the full limitation.
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- **ConstrainedLanguage and named-pipe capture under the Windows sandbox** — when the [Windows ACL sandbox](../../sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md) confines a call (read-only or workspace-write), the restricted token puts pwsh into ConstrainedLanguage mode: `Add-Type`, non-core .NET statics (`[System.IO.*]::`, `[math]::`), COM objects, and reflection fail with "only core types" errors, and the mode cannot be lifted from inside. The same modes deny named-pipe opens, so a piped-stdio spawn inside a confined command fails with EPERM. The tool description teaches both contracts to the model; the backend README owns the full limitations.
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- **No persistent shell or PTY** — every call starts a fresh `pwsh -Command`; the PTY backends are Linux/macOS-only today, and a Windows ConPTY persistent shell is roadmap work.
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- **PowerShell-dialect contract** — the model must write PowerShell (native paths, `$env:` variables), not bash; there is no dialect translation.
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- **Session-cwd identity is not canonicalized** — the workdir base is the session header cwd as-is, unlike the bash tool's sandbox-root-canonicalized identity. Under a confining executor the policy's workspace root IS canonicalized (by the shared policy service), so the workdir and the confinement root can diverge when the raw session cwd differs from its canonical form — a parity gap deferred to the shared shell-tool base extraction.
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