Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/simp-prune-tools-prompt-surface

# Conflicts:
#	docs/config-catalog.md
#	docs/cordis-catalog/services.md
#	packages/core/agent-loop/src/loop.ts
#	packages/core/session/README.md
#	packages/core/session/tests/derived-cache.spec.ts
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
2026-07-14 17:30:34 +08:00
562 changed files with 4438 additions and 12565 deletions

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,6 @@
/**
* Tool registry and execution pipeline. Plugins register tools; the registry
* feeds schemas into the system prompt, and `execute()` dispatches each call
* through `tools/pre-execute` (the extensible allow/deny gate) → monotonic
* registered guards → `tools/execute` (an around-dispatch wrapper for
* timeout/retry/metrics plugins) → `tools/post-execute` (inspect/replace the
* result, attach context) → the observe-only `tools/result` notification.
*
* The registry also owns HOW its tools are presented to the model — its
* `mode` config: `'native'` (every tool as a wire function definition,
* today's behavior and the default), `'code'` (the registry's canonical wire
* contribution is one tool, `run_code`, plus a generated TypeScript SDK prompt section), or
* `'both'`. See `code-mode.ts` (the tool + dispatch bridge) and
* `ts-types.ts` (the SDK codegen); design in the Code Mode RFC.
*
* Tool registry, model presentation modes, and pre/guard/around/post/result
* execution pipeline.
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-tools
*/
@@ -83,79 +71,34 @@ declare module 'cordis' {
interface Events {
/**
* Waterfall BEFORE a tool runs — the gate where sandbox, permission, and
* hook plugins allow or deny a call (Claude Code's `PreToolUse`). Listeners
* receive `(exec, next)`: call `next()` to delegate to the default (allow),
* or return a {@link PreToolDecision} without calling `next()` to
* short-circuit. A `deny` skips dispatch and yields an `isError` result; the
* tool body never runs. Input rewrite is deliberately NOT offered here (see
* {@link PreToolDecision}); `ask` is serviced by the `ctx.approval` seam
* when one is mounted, and degrades to deny otherwise.
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`) keys the carrier by `exec.agent`: a
* listener registered through `agent.ctx` fires only for that agent's
* calls, while a plain plugin listener fires for every call (including
* agent-less ones, which dispatch subject-less).
* Allow, deny, or ask before dispatch. `next()` delegates to allow; missing
* approval support turns `ask` into denial.
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): agent-scoped listeners receive only that agent's calls.
* @param exec - the pending call (name, parsed arguments, caller agent).
* @mode waterfall
*/
'tools/pre-execute'(this: Scoped<ToolRegistry>, exec: ToolExecution, next: () => Promise<PreToolDecision>): Promise<PreToolDecision>
/**
* Around-dispatch waterfall wrapping the registry's core tool dispatch,
* between the `tools/pre-execute` gate and the `tools/post-execute` seam. A
* listener receives `(exec, next)`: call `next()` to delegate to dispatch
* (returning its {@link ToolExecutionResult}, optionally wrapped), or return a
* replacement result without calling `next()` to short-circuit dispatch. The
* base `next()` IS the dispatch-with-normalization thunk — a thrown tool (or
* unknown tool) is already normalized to an `isError` result by the time a
* listener's `await next()` returns, so a wrapper never sees a raw throw from
* the tool body. This is the seam a timeout/retry/metrics plugin wraps: it can
* set or replace the one mutable field, `exec.signal` (e.g. with a per-call
* deadline), BEFORE `next()`, restore/delete it afterward, and inspect the result AFTER. Call identity
* (`token`, `callId`, `name`, `arguments`, `agent`, and `parent`) is immutable throughout the
* pipeline so a wrapper cannot change which tool and scope the pipeline
* accepted. (Cordis `next()` ignores passed arguments and re-invokes
* downstream with the shared payload, so a wrapper changes `exec.signal` in
* place rather than passing a new object to `next()`.)
* Multiple listeners compose by registration order — an outer one wraps the
* inner ones plus dispatch.
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): the carrier is keyed by
* `exec.agent` — a listener registered through `agent.ctx` wraps only that
* agent's calls; a plain plugin listener wraps every call (including
* agent-less ones, which dispatch subject-less).
* Around-dispatch waterfall for timeout, retry, or metrics. `next()` returns
* a normalized result; wrappers may change only `exec.signal`, while call
* identity remains immutable.
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): agent-scoped listeners receive only that agent's calls.
* @param exec - the allowed call about to dispatch (name, parsed arguments, caller agent, signal).
* @mode waterfall
*/
'tools/execute'(this: Scoped<ToolRegistry>, exec: ToolExecution, next: () => Promise<ToolExecutionResult>): Promise<ToolExecutionResult>
/**
* Waterfall AFTER a tool runs — where hook plugins inspect the result and
* accept it (optionally REPLACING the model-facing content, and/or attaching
* `additionalContext` for the next request) or block it with corrective
* `feedback` (Claude Code's `PostToolUse`). Listeners receive
* `(exec, result, next)`: call `next()` to delegate to the default (accept
* unchanged), or return a {@link PostToolDecision} to override. Core tool
* dispatch runs earlier as the base `next()` of the `tools/execute`
* waterfall, all inside `execute`'s outer try/catch (and the tool body keeps
* its own inner try/catch, so a thrown tool still reaches `post-execute` as an
* `isError` result).
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): the carrier is keyed by
* `exec.agent` — a listener registered through `agent.ctx` fires only for
* that agent's calls; a plain plugin listener fires for every call
* (including agent-less ones, which dispatch subject-less).
* Accept, replace, enrich, or block a normalized dispatch result. `next()`
* accepts it unchanged; thrown tools still reach this seam as errors.
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): agent-scoped listeners receive only that agent's calls.
* @param exec - the call that just ran (name, parsed arguments, caller agent).
* @param result - the dispatch outcome a listener may accept, replace, or block.
* @mode waterfall
*/
'tools/post-execute'(this: Scoped<ToolRegistry>, exec: ToolExecution, result: Readonly<ToolExecutionResult>, next: () => Promise<PostToolDecision>): Promise<PostToolDecision>
/**
* Synchronous notification of the authoritative FINAL tool outcome, after the
* complete pre/execute/post pipeline, final lossless-JSON validation, and
* outer error normalization.
* Unlike the three waterfalls, this seam cannot transform the result: each
* listener receives the now-frozen execution object and a deep-frozen result
* snapshot; listener failures are contained and logged, and
* {@link ToolRegistry.execute} still returns the outcome.
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): keyed by
* `exec.agent`, using the same carrier as the pipeline.
* Observe the frozen, lossless-JSON final outcome. Listener failures are contained.
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): keyed by `exec.agent`.
* @param exec - the execution object that traversed the pipeline.
* @param result - a deep-frozen snapshot of the final returned result.
* @mode emit
@@ -174,18 +117,10 @@ declare module 'cordis' {
}
}
// TODO(review): revisit these shapes when concurrency metadata becomes useful
// TODO(concurrency): revisit these shapes when concurrency metadata becomes useful
// (for example, a read-only hint that would permit safe parallel execution).
/**
* What a tool's `execute` returns. The bare {@link ContentBlock}`[]` form is the
* common case (model-facing content only); the object form additionally attaches
* a tool-private `meta` presentation payload that the registry threads onto the
* `tool/result` session event and hands back to the tool's `presentResult`.
* `meta` is opaque to the core (`unknown` — the tool owns and narrows its shape),
* and MUST be JSON-serializable: it persists on the durable log (the session
* enforces this at `append`), so replay reproduces the card.
*/
/** Tool output, optionally with lossless-JSON presentation metadata persisted for replay. */
export type ToolExecuteReturn = ContentBlock[] | { content: ContentBlock[]; meta?: unknown }
/** A registered tool: its schema plus the execution function. */
@@ -236,12 +171,7 @@ export interface ToolResult {
declare const toolExecutionTokenBrand: unique symbol
/**
* Opaque identity for one trip through the tool pipeline. Nested
* transports carry the enclosing execution's token instead of its live object,
* so observe-only result listeners can correlate calls without gaining a
* mutation path into an outer around-dispatch wrapper.
*/
/** Opaque call identity that permits correlation without exposing mutable execution state. */
export type ToolExecutionToken = symbol & { readonly [toolExecutionTokenBrand]: true }
/**
@@ -307,14 +237,8 @@ export interface ToolExecutionResult {
*/
error?: ToolErrorInfo
/**
* Extra model-facing context a `tools/post-execute` listener attached for the
* NEXT request (Claude Code's PostToolUse `additionalContext`). It is NOT part
* of this call's `content` — `content`/`feedback` shape the tool RESULT, but
* `additionalContext` is a SEPARATE `context/message`. A step can carry
* multiple tool calls, so the loop BUFFERS every call's `additionalContext`
* and appends them only AFTER all `tool/result`s for the step, keeping
* tool-call/result adjacency intact. Carried on the result purely to ferry it
* from `execute()` up to the loop's per-step buffer.
* Model-facing context for the next request, separate from this tool result.
* The loop buffers it until all step results are logged, preserving pairing.
*/
additionalContext?: HookContext
/**
@@ -327,19 +251,10 @@ export interface ToolExecutionResult {
}
/**
* The decision a `tools/pre-execute` listener returns for one pending call.
* Maps onto Claude Code's `PreToolUse` `permissionDecision`.
*
* - `allow` proceeds to dispatch. (Input rewrite — changing `exec.arguments` —
* is deliberately NOT offered: `tool/call` and `assistant/message` are logged
* BEFORE execution and live consumers, e.g. the ACP bridge and `dsh-tool-bash`
* presentation, read the pre-execution arguments, so an execution-only rewrite
* would desync the UI from what RAN. That consistency redesign is its own
* `proposed` RFC; `TODO(pre-tool-input-rewrite)` anchors it at the call site.)
* - `deny` skips dispatch; the loop records an `isError` result carrying `reason`.
* - `ask` is the permission-prompt intent: serviced as a one-shot decision by
* the `ctx.approval` seam when one is mounted (`allowed-once` proceeds to
* dispatch; every other outcome denies), degrading to `deny` when none is.
* Pre-dispatch decision. `allow` runs the call; `deny` materializes an error;
* `ask` runs only after an approval service returns `allowed-once` and otherwise
* denies. Input rewriting is excluded because arguments are already logged and
* presented.
*/
export type PreToolDecision =
| { kind: 'allow' }
@@ -347,16 +262,8 @@ export type PreToolDecision =
| { kind: 'ask'; reason?: string }
/**
* The decision a `tools/post-execute` listener returns for one finished call.
* Maps onto Claude Code's `PostToolUse` decision.
*
* - `accept` keeps the call successful; optional `content` REPLACES the
* model-facing result (clean: `tool/result` is logged AFTER `execute()`
* returns, so a replaced result is the single source of truth for both derived
* history and UI). Optional `additionalContext` rides to the next request.
* - `block` turns the call into an `isError` result whose content is the
* corrective `feedback` (the model is told the call was rejected and why),
* optionally also attaching `additionalContext`.
* Post-dispatch decision: accept or replace content, attach context for the next
* request, or block by turning corrective feedback into an error result.
*/
export type PostToolDecision =
| { kind: 'accept'; content?: ContentBlock[]; additionalContext?: HookContext }
@@ -399,35 +306,17 @@ export type ToolPresentationMode = 'native' | 'code' | 'both'
/** Plugin config: how the registered tools are presented to the model. */
export interface Config {
/**
* The presentation mode. `'native'` (the default) contributes every
* visible end capability as a native wire function definition. Under
* `'code'` this registry contributes exactly ONE wire tool,
* `run_code`, plus the generated `tools:sdk` prompt section declaring every other tool as a
* TypeScript API the program calls. `'both'` contributes every native
* definition AND `run_code` + the SDK section. Non-native modes require a
* loaded `ctx.codeRuntime` whose `language` is `'typescript'` — a missing
* or mismatched runtime rejects every prompt assembly with an actionable
* error (misconfiguration fails loud, before any model request). A
* configured `systemPrompt.toolOrder` naming native tools likewise rejects
* every assembly under `'code'` (those names are no longer contributed) —
* a deployment switching modes updates its order config or drops it.
* Model presentation. `native` (default) sends every visible schema; `code`
* sends only `run_code` plus a generated SDK prompt; `both` sends both forms.
* Code modes require a TypeScript runtime and fail prompt assembly when it is
* absent or mismatched. Under `code`, native names in `toolOrder` are invalid.
*/
mode?: ToolPresentationMode
}
/**
* A per-scope restriction over the GLOBAL tool surface, registered via
* {@link ToolRegistry.restrict}. `allow` keeps only the listed global tools;
* `deny` removes the listed ones; both present = allow first, then deny.
* Restrictions never touch scoped registrations — a tool registered through
* the same scope is merged after the global filter (which is what keeps e.g. a
* structured-output capture tool alive under an allow-list). The readonly
* filter values compile to private sets at registration, but resolution uses the live global registry:
* a later global name passes a deny-only filter unless explicitly denied and
* fails an allow-list unless explicitly allowed. The
* reserved `run_code` presentation transport is likewise outside capability
* filtering, and naming it explicitly is rejected. Multiple restrictions on
* one scope compose by intersection: every one must admit.
* Per-scope filter over global tools. Restrictions intersect and do not affect
* scoped registrations or the reserved Code Mode transport.
*/
export interface ToolRestriction {
/** Global tool names that stay visible; everything else is removed. */
@@ -468,26 +357,8 @@ interface ToolGuardRegistration {
}
/**
* Tool registry (`ctx.tools`): tool plugins register definitions; the agent
* loop executes calls through the `tools/pre-execute` → guards →
* `tools/execute` → `tools/post-execute` → `tools/result` pipeline. The
* registry contributes its schemas into the system-prompt assembly — WHICH
* schemas is governed by its `mode` config
* (see {@link Config.mode}); under a non-native mode it also owns the reserved
* `run_code` presentation transport and the `tools:sdk` prompt section.
*
* Two registration layers (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): a registration through a
* plain plugin context is GLOBAL (visible to every agent); one through a
* scoped context (`agent.ctx`) is filed in that scope's layer — visible to
* that agent alone, disposed with the scope, and SHADOWING a global tool of
* the same name for that agent (most-specific-wins; within one layer a
* duplicate name still throws). {@link restrict} masks the global layer per
* scope. One private visibility resolver feeds the registry's prompt
* contribution, {@link get}, and {@link execute} — and, under a non-native
* mode, the SDK section and `run_code`'s bindings — so those registry-owned
* presentation and dispatch paths agree. An expert `system-prompt/assemble`
* listener may deliberately replace the final wire composition and owns any
* resulting divergence.
* Tool registry and execution pipeline. Scoped registrations shadow globals;
* one visibility resolver feeds presentation, lookup, and dispatch.
*/
export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
static inject = ['systemPrompt']
@@ -525,13 +396,7 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
ctx.systemPrompt.section({
name: 'tools:sdk',
order: SDK_SECTION_ORDER,
// A lazy thunk over the live registry, per assembly CONTEXT:
// regenerated at each assembly over the CALLING SCOPE's visible set
// (scoped tools join, restricted globals vanish — the SDK declares
// exactly what that agent's programs can call), in lexicographic
// tool order, so an unchanged tool set renders byte-identical text
// (prefix-cache-friendly) and a mid-session registration surfaces
// exactly like a native-mode tool change.
// Regenerate from the calling scope's visible tools in stable order.
text: (context) => {
this.requireCodeRuntime()
return renderToolsSdk(this.schemas(context.scope).filter(schema => schema.name !== RUN_CODE_NAME))
@@ -541,22 +406,8 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
}
/**
* The registry's contribution to the wire tool list, per {@link Config.mode},
* as ONE SCOPE sees it (scoped layer joins, shadowing and restrictions
* applied — {@link schemas}). Because `PromptAssembly.tools` is what the
* loop's request header snapshots, the mode's collapse is logged and
* reconstructable for free. Under a non-native mode this is also the loud
* misconfiguration gate: no usable code runtime → every assembly rejects
* before any model request.
*
* The `knownNames` universe distinguishes the two ways a tool can be off
* the wire: a per-scope RESTRICTION is runtime state, so `knownNames` stays
* pre-restriction and a restricted-away tool in `toolOrder` is a normal
* absence — while the MODE collapse is deployment config, so under
* `mode: 'code'` the universe is `[run_code]` and a `toolOrder` naming a
* native tool is dead configuration that fails every assembly loud. Under
* `mode: 'both'`, the provider adds the reserved transport to the
* capability-only known-name universe for `toolOrder` validation.
* Build one scope's wire schemas and names for prompt-order validation.
* Restrictions do not make known tools invalid, but a mode collapse does.
*/
private wireSchemas(scope?: ScopeKey): ToolProviderResult {
const view = this.view(scope)
@@ -594,23 +445,10 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
}
/**
* Register a tool. The layer is decided by the CALLING context: a plain
* plugin context registers globally; a scoped context (`agent.ctx`)
* registers into that scope's layer — visible to that agent alone, disposed
* with the scope, and shadowing a same-named global tool for that agent.
* Throws if the SAME layer already has the name (cross-layer name twins are
* the shadowing feature, not an error; the global-duplicate message names
* `agent.ctx` as the per-agent alternative), or if a non-native mode reserves
* the `run_code` name for its presentation transport. The visible schema set
* flows into prompt assembly automatically. Definitions are trusted typed
* same-process contributions; JSON materialization happens when the schema or
* result reaches its model/log boundary. Emits `tools/change` on
* register/unregister.
* @param definition - the tool's schema plus its execute (and optional
* presentation) functions.
* @returns the disposer that unregisters the tool. The exact
* Cordis effect disposer (single-shot): composite (generator) effects may
* yield it directly — exact identity nests the teardown in order.
* Register globally or in the calling agent scope. Scoped tools shadow
* globals; duplicates within one layer and the reserved `run_code` name fail.
* @param definition - the tool schema, execution, and optional presentation functions.
* @returns the exact disposer that unregisters the tool.
*/
register(definition: ToolDefinition): () => void {
const scope = scopeOf(this.ctx)
@@ -631,52 +469,26 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
: `tool "${name}" is already registered in this scope`)
}
layer.set(name, definition)
// Yield the rollback BEFORE emitting `tools/change`: a generator effect
// collects each yielded disposer before the next step runs, so a throwing
// `tools/change` listener removes the tool instead of leaking it (a leak
// would wedge the duplicate-name check until restart). The duplicate
// throw above fires before any mutation — it leaks nothing.
// Install rollback before notifying listeners.
yield () => {
layer.delete(name)
// An emptied scope layer is dropped so a disposed scope leaves no
// residue keyed by its (dead) key.
// Drop empty scope layers.
if (scope !== undefined && layer.size === 0) this.scoped.delete(scope)
this.ctx.emit('tools/change')
}
this.ctx.emit('tools/change')
}.bind(this), 'tools.register()')
// The EXACT cordis effect disposer, not a wrapper: a composite (generator)
// effect that owns a teardown ORDER must be able to yield THIS function —
// cordis nests a disposer out of the fiber's concurrent sibling list by
// exact function identity, so a wrapper would silently break the nesting
// (the agents.register() lesson). Cleanup is synchronous because this
// registration installs only synchronous state and notifications.
// Return the exact disposer so composite effects preserve teardown order.
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-misused-promises -- synchronous cleanup; direct return preserves disposer identity
return dispose
}
/**
* Restrict the GLOBAL tool surface for the calling scope. Must be called
* through a scoped context (`agent.ctx`) — restricting "everyone" is not a
* thing (throw), and an empty filter (neither `allow` nor `deny`) is a no-op
* that can only be a bug (throw — the materialized-empty-config trap).
* Validates every listed name against the CURRENT global end-capability
* universe and throws on an unknown or scope-local name (fail loud
* beats a typo silently filtering nothing) — register restrictions after the
* global tools they mask exist (the agent-creation `setup` window satisfies
* this). A non-native mode's reserved `run_code` presentation transport is
* not a filterable capability; naming it explicitly throws, while omitting
* it from an allow-list cannot remove it. The readonly arrays are compiled to
* private sets at registration. Resolution still uses the live global registry, so a later
* global name passes a deny-only filter unless named and fails an allow-list
* unless named. Multiple restrictions compose by intersection. Scoped
* registrations are merged after restrictions and therefore remain visible.
* Disposed with the calling fiber (revocable independently); emits
* `tools/change`.
* Restrict global tools for the calling agent scope. Empty filters, unknown
* names, scope-local names, and reserved transport names fail. Restrictions
* intersect; scoped registrations remain visible.
* @param filter - global-surface mask: `allow` (keep only) and/or `deny` (remove).
* @returns the disposer that lifts this restriction. The exact
* Cordis effect disposer (single-shot): composite (generator) effects may
* yield it directly — exact identity nests the teardown in order.
* @returns the exact disposer that lifts this restriction.
*/
restrict(filter: ToolRestriction): () => void {
const scope = scopeOf(this.ctx)
@@ -714,12 +526,7 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
}
this.ctx.emit('tools/change')
}.bind(this), 'tools.restrict()')
// The EXACT cordis effect disposer, not a wrapper: a composite (generator)
// effect that owns a teardown ORDER must be able to yield THIS function —
// cordis nests a disposer out of the fiber's concurrent sibling list by
// exact function identity, so a wrapper would silently break the nesting
// (the agents.register() lesson). Cleanup is synchronous because this
// registration installs only synchronous state and notifications.
// Return the exact disposer so composite effects preserve teardown order.
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-misused-promises -- synchronous cleanup; direct return preserves disposer identity
return dispose
}
@@ -841,15 +648,8 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
}
/**
* The model-facing schemas of everything `scope` can see — exactly the
* fields (`name`, `description`, `parameters`) this registry contributes to
* system-prompt assembly before its expert transformation waterfall.
* Constructed EXPLICITLY rather than by stripping
* known non-schema members: a `ToolDefinition` also carries `execute` and the
* optional `presentCall`/`presentResult` UI callbacks, and those (especially
* the functions) must never leak into a model request. An allowlist can't
* drift when a new non-schema member is added to the definition; a denylist
* (rest-destructure) would silently leak it.
* Project visible definitions onto the allowlisted model-facing schema fields,
* excluding execution and presentation callbacks.
* @param scope - the viewing scope (the agent); omitted = the global view.
* @returns one deep-cloned schema per visible tool.
*/
@@ -868,27 +668,13 @@ export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
}
/**
* Execute one tool call through the `tools/pre-execute` → guards →
* `tools/execute` (around dispatch) → `tools/post-execute` → `tools/result`
* pipeline. `pre-execute` is the extensible gate
* (allow/deny/ask), `tools/execute` wraps core dispatch (a timeout/retry/metrics
* seam), and `post-execute` is the inspect/transform seam; core dispatch sits
* as the base `next()` of the `tools/execute` waterfall. The whole thing is
* wrapped in one outer try/catch so a throwing listener (in any waterfall)
* becomes an `isError` result instead of failing the turn; the tool body ALSO
* keeps its own inner try/catch, so a thrown tool becomes an `isError` result
* that `tools/execute` and `post-execute` listeners can still inspect. If the
* tool is not registered (or not visible to the calling agent — a
* restricted-away global is exactly as absent as a nonexistent one), the
* result is an `isError` carrying a `UNKNOWN_TOOL` structured error. A thrown
* {@link HarnessError} surfaces its `{ name, code }` on the result. Before
* the final observe-only notification, the authoritative outcome is
* materialized as a detached lossless-JSON snapshot; an invalid outcome is
* normalized to an error.
* Execute through pre-policy, guards, around-dispatch, post-policy, and final
* notification. Tool and listener failures resolve as materialized error
* results; an invisible tool reports `UNKNOWN_TOOL`. The returned outcome is
* the same lossless, frozen snapshot final observers receive.
* @param exec - the typed same-process call input. The registry assigns its
* correlation token before policy begins.
* @returns the materialized final result after every waterfall; listener and
* tool failures resolve as `isError` results rather than rejections.
* @returns the materialized final result.
*/
async execute(exec: ToolExecutionInput): Promise<ToolExecutionResult> {
const token = createExecutionToken()