Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/pr-555-ci-fix

# Conflicts:
#	docs/module-graph.i18n.yaml
#	docs/module-graph.md
#	docs/module-graph.zh.md
#	packages/client/ui-conversation/src/client/input/hub.ts
#	packages/client/ui-conversation/tests/input-bar.spec.tsx
#	packages/client/ui-conversation/tests/service-orchestration.spec.ts
This commit is contained in:
creatixchu
2026-08-10 15:19:32 +08:00
259 changed files with 8182 additions and 626 deletions

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@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
/**
* windows-acl write grants: the SERVER-LIFETIME ACE materialization
* (standing workspace grant per workspace, revocable private-temp grant per
* session) plus the derived private-temp identity, through the REAL
* LocalSandboxProvider.confine(). Win32 surface mocked at the package
* boundary (the workspace-derived SID mocked to a constant); the real-FFI
* grant behavior lives in sandbox-windows-acl's win32 tests.
*/
import { existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, symlinkSync } from 'node:fs'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { basename, join } from 'node:path'
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import { Context } from 'cordis'
import type { SandboxPolicy } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
import { SessionId } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
import { LocalSandboxProvider, sessionTempDir } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local'
/** Cross-file state shared with the vi.mock factory (hoisting contract). */
const mockState = vi.hoisted(() => ({
grants: [] as Array<{ writeSid: string; added: Array<{ path: string; standing: boolean }>; disposed: boolean }>,
addFailure: undefined as Error | undefined,
/** Restricts {@link addFailure} to this path (undefined = every add throws). */
addFailurePath: undefined as string | undefined,
disposeFailure: undefined as Error | undefined,
}))
vi.mock('@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl', () => {
class MockAclWriteGrant {
readonly writeSid: string
readonly added: Array<{ path: string; standing: boolean }> = []
disposed = false
constructor(writeSid: string) {
this.writeSid = writeSid
mockState.grants.push(this)
}
static create(writeSid: string): MockAclWriteGrant {
return new MockAclWriteGrant(writeSid)
}
add(path: string, standing = false): void {
if (mockState.addFailure !== undefined && (mockState.addFailurePath === undefined || mockState.addFailurePath === path)) {
throw mockState.addFailure
}
this.added.push({ path, standing })
}
dispose(): void {
if (mockState.disposeFailure !== undefined) throw mockState.disposeFailure
this.disposed = true
}
}
return { AclWriteGrant: MockAclWriteGrant, workspaceWriteSid: () => 'S-1-4-42-42' }
})
/** The workspace-derived write SID the mock pins for every workspace. */
const DERIVED_SID = 'S-1-4-42-42'
async function setup() {
const ctx = new Context()
const fiber = await ctx.plugin(LocalSandboxProvider, {})
const sandbox = ctx.sandbox as LocalSandboxProvider
sandbox.internals = { platform: 'win32', windowsAclRunnerArgs: ['node', 'windows-acl-runner.js'] }
return { ctx, sandbox, fiber }
}
/** A workspace root the policy carries. */
function workspaceRoot(): string {
return mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-acl-grants-ws-'))
}
describe('windows-acl write grants (LocalSandboxProvider)', () => {
const scratch: string[] = []
beforeEach(() => {
mockState.grants = []
mockState.addFailure = undefined
mockState.addFailurePath = undefined
mockState.disposeFailure = undefined
})
const cleanup = () => {
for (const dir of scratch.splice(0)) rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
}
it('workspace-write: first confine materializes ONCE (standing workspace + revocable private temp), the derived temp dir rides the argv', async () => {
try {
const { sandbox, fiber } = await setup()
const ws = workspaceRoot()
scratch.push(ws)
const tempDir = sessionTempDir(SessionId('sess-1'), ws)
scratch.push(tempDir)
const policy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('sess-1') }
const confined = sandbox.confine(['pwsh', '/Command', 'x'], policy)
expect(confined.argv).toEqual([
'node', 'windows-acl-runner.js',
'--workspace', ws,
'--temp', tempDir,
'--mode', 'workspace-write',
'--write-sid', DERIVED_SID,
'--',
'pwsh', '/Command', 'x',
])
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(2)
expect(mockState.grants[0]).toMatchObject({
writeSid: DERIVED_SID,
added: [{ path: ws, standing: true }], // standing: the reuse cache, never revoked
disposed: false,
})
expect(mockState.grants[1]).toMatchObject({
writeSid: DERIVED_SID,
added: [{ path: tempDir, standing: false }],
disposed: false,
})
expect(existsSync(tempDir)).toBe(true) // created exclusively
// Reuse: the second confine is the map hits.
sandbox.confine(['pwsh', '/Command', 'x'], policy)
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(2)
await fiber.dispose()
// dispose() runs on BOTH grants: the standing workspace ACE is left in
// place (the mock marks it disposed only as instance teardown).
expect(mockState.grants[0]!.disposed).toBe(true)
expect(mockState.grants[1]!.disposed).toBe(true)
} finally {
cleanup()
}
})
it('mode switch: read-only materializes nothing, the upgrade materializes ONCE with the derived SID, the downgrade keeps the standing grant', async () => {
try {
const { sandbox } = await setup()
const ws = workspaceRoot()
scratch.push(ws)
const tempDir = sessionTempDir(SessionId('sess-switch'), ws)
scratch.push(tempDir)
const readOnly: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('sess-switch') }
const workspaceWrite: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('sess-switch') }
// read-only first: nothing materialized, ambient temp.
const confinedRo = sandbox.confine(['true'], readOnly)
expect(confinedRo.argv).toEqual([
'node', 'windows-acl-runner.js',
'--workspace', ws,
'--temp', tmpdir(), // NOT the private subdir: read-only grants nothing
'--mode', 'read-only',
'--write-sid', DERIVED_SID,
'--',
'true',
])
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(0)
expect(existsSync(tempDir)).toBe(false)
// Upgrade: first workspace-write materializes with the derived SID.
const upgraded = sandbox.confine(['true'], workspaceWrite)
expect(upgraded.argv).toEqual([
'node', 'windows-acl-runner.js',
'--workspace', ws,
'--temp', tempDir,
'--mode', 'workspace-write',
'--write-sid', DERIVED_SID,
'--',
'true',
])
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(2)
expect(mockState.grants[0]).toMatchObject({ writeSid: DERIVED_SID, added: [{ path: ws, standing: true }], disposed: false })
expect(mockState.grants[1]).toMatchObject({
writeSid: DERIVED_SID,
added: [{ path: tempDir, standing: false }],
disposed: false,
})
expect(existsSync(tempDir)).toBe(true)
// Reuse: map hits.
sandbox.confine(['true'], workspaceWrite)
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(2)
// Downgrade: standing grant KEPT (inert under read-only, free re-upgrade).
sandbox.confine(['true'], readOnly)
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(2)
expect(mockState.grants[0]!.disposed).toBe(false)
} finally {
cleanup()
}
})
it('resume: a fresh provider derives the SAME temp dir for the same session and workspace and re-grants it', async () => {
try {
const ws = workspaceRoot()
scratch.push(ws)
const first = await setup()
const policy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('resumed') }
const firstConfined = first.sandbox.confine(['true'], policy)
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(2)
// Clean restart: dispose revokes the temp ACE and removes the private
// temp directory, so the fresh provider's exclusive creation succeeds.
await first.fiber.dispose()
mockState.grants = []
const second = await setup()
const secondConfined = second.sandbox.confine(['true'], policy)
expect(secondConfined.argv).toEqual(firstConfined.argv)
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(2)
expect(mockState.grants[1]).toMatchObject({
writeSid: DERIVED_SID,
added: [{ path: sessionTempDir(SessionId('resumed'), ws), standing: false }],
})
await second.fiber.dispose()
} finally {
cleanup()
}
})
it('fork: a different session id derives a DIFFERENT private temp identity over the same workspace', async () => {
try {
const { sandbox } = await setup()
const ws = workspaceRoot()
scratch.push(ws)
const parentPolicy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('parent') }
const childPolicy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('child') }
sandbox.confine(['true'], parentPolicy)
const parentTemp = sessionTempDir(SessionId('parent'), ws)
scratch.push(parentTemp)
sandbox.confine(['true'], childPolicy)
const childTemp = sessionTempDir(SessionId('child'), ws)
scratch.push(childTemp)
// Fresh temp identity, NOT the parent's (the workspace SID is shared by
// derivation — the workspace is the same, so the standing grant is the
// map hit and only the child's temp grant joins).
expect(childTemp).not.toBe(parentTemp)
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(3)
expect(mockState.grants[2]).toMatchObject({ added: [{ path: childTemp, standing: false }] })
} finally {
cleanup()
}
})
it('creates the private temp dir EXCLUSIVELY: a pre-existing entry or a reparse point fails EEXIST, never receiving the temp grant', async () => {
try {
const { sandbox } = await setup()
const ws = workspaceRoot()
scratch.push(ws)
// Pre-existing entry: exclusive mkdir throws EEXIST instead of adopting it.
const preexisting = sessionTempDir(SessionId('preexisting'), ws)
mkdirSync(preexisting)
scratch.push(preexisting)
const prePolicy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('preexisting') }
expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], prePolicy)).toThrow(/EEXIST/)
// The standing workspace grant is the intended end state and stays; the
// failed temp grant self-disposes.
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(2)
expect(mockState.grants[0]!.disposed).toBe(false)
expect(mockState.grants[1]!.disposed).toBe(true) // self-revoked
// Reparse point: same EEXIST (exclusive mkdir never follows links).
const target = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-acl-junction-target-'))
scratch.push(target)
const linkPath = sessionTempDir(SessionId('reparse'), ws)
symlinkSync(target, linkPath)
scratch.push(linkPath)
const linkPolicy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('reparse') }
expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], linkPolicy)).toThrow(/EEXIST/)
// Same workspace as the preexisting case: the standing workspace grant
// is the map hit (not recreated) — only the failed temp grant joins.
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(3)
expect(mockState.grants[2]!.disposed).toBe(true)
// Temp-side cleanup failure: the standing workspace grant stays (map
// hit), the exclusive mkdir fails, AND the temp grant's dispose also
// fails — the temp cleanup AggregateError propagates.
mockState.grants = []
mockState.disposeFailure = new Error('temp cleanup exploded')
const dupTemp = sessionTempDir(SessionId('temp-cleanup-fail'), ws)
mkdirSync(dupTemp)
scratch.push(dupTemp)
const dupPolicy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('temp-cleanup-fail') }
expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], dupPolicy)).toThrow(/temp grant materialization failed and its cleanup also failed/)
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(1) // only the failed temp grant (the workspace grant was the map hit)
} finally {
cleanup()
}
})
it('a grant failure mid-materialization disposes the failed grant and rethrows (AggregateError when the cleanup also fails)', async () => {
try {
const { sandbox } = await setup()
const ws = workspaceRoot()
scratch.push(ws)
scratch.push(sessionTempDir(SessionId('sess-add-fail'), ws))
const policy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('sess-add-fail') }
// add() throws on the FIRST (workspace) grant: cleanup dispose() runs, original error propagates.
mockState.addFailure = new Error('grant exploded')
expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], policy)).toThrow('grant exploded')
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(1)
expect(mockState.grants[0]!.disposed).toBe(true)
// add() AND dispose() both throw: AggregateError.
mockState.grants = []
mockState.addFailure = new Error('grant exploded again')
mockState.disposeFailure = new Error('cleanup exploded')
expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], policy)).toThrow(AggregateError)
} finally {
cleanup()
}
})
it('a temp add failure after the exclusive mkdir removed the half-created directory again', async () => {
try {
const { sandbox } = await setup()
const ws = workspaceRoot()
scratch.push(ws)
const tempDir = sessionTempDir(SessionId('sess-temp-add-fail'), ws)
const policy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('sess-temp-add-fail') }
// The workspace grant succeeds; only the TEMP grant's add throws (the
// path-targeted failure keeps the workspace branch intact).
mockState.addFailurePath = tempDir
mockState.addFailure = new Error('temp add exploded')
expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], policy)).toThrow('temp add exploded')
expect(existsSync(tempDir)).toBe(false) // the half-created directory is removed again
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(2)
expect(mockState.grants[0]!.disposed).toBe(false) // the standing workspace grant stays
expect(mockState.grants[1]!.disposed).toBe(true) // the failed temp grant self-disposes
} finally {
cleanup()
}
})
it('agentless calls stay self-managed: no --write-sid, the ambient temp root, no grants', async () => {
try {
const { sandbox, fiber } = await setup()
const policy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: '/ws' }
const confined = sandbox.confine(['pwsh', '/Command', 'x'], policy)
expect(confined.argv).toEqual([
'node', 'windows-acl-runner.js',
'--workspace', '/ws',
'--temp', tmpdir(),
'--mode', 'workspace-write',
'--',
'pwsh', '/Command', 'x',
])
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(0)
await fiber.dispose()
} finally {
cleanup()
}
})
it('a failing dispose at provider teardown is reported via ctx.logger.warn and never thrown into teardown', async () => {
try {
const { ctx, sandbox, fiber } = await setup()
const ws = workspaceRoot()
scratch.push(ws)
scratch.push(sessionTempDir(SessionId('sess-dispose'), ws))
const policy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('sess-dispose') }
sandbox.confine(['true'], policy)
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(2)
mockState.disposeFailure = new Error('revoke exploded')
const warn = vi.spyOn(ctx.logger, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => undefined)
await fiber.dispose()
// BOTH grants (standing workspace + revocable temp) fail their dispose.
expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('cleanup completed with 2 failure(s)'))
expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ message: 'revoke exploded' }))
} finally {
cleanup()
}
})
it('a failing private-temp removal at provider teardown is reported via ctx.logger.warn and never thrown into teardown', async () => {
try {
const { ctx, sandbox, fiber } = await setup()
const ws = workspaceRoot()
scratch.push(ws)
scratch.push(sessionTempDir(SessionId('sess-rm-fail'), ws))
const policy: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: SessionId('sess-rm-fail') }
sandbox.confine(['true'], policy)
expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(2)
sandbox.internals.rmTempDir = () => { throw new Error('rm exploded') }
const warn = vi.spyOn(ctx.logger, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => undefined)
await fiber.dispose()
// Both grants dispose cleanly; only the directory removal fails.
expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('cleanup completed with 1 failure(s)'))
expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ message: 'rm exploded' }))
} finally {
cleanup()
}
})
it('sessionTempDir derives the same well-shaped name for the same session and workspace, distinct otherwise', () => {
const base = sessionTempDir(SessionId('sess-a'), '/ws/a')
expect(basename(base)).toMatch(/^dsh-[0-9a-f]{16}$/)
expect(sessionTempDir(SessionId('sess-a'), '/ws/a')).toBe(base)
expect(sessionTempDir(SessionId('sess-b'), '/ws/a')).not.toBe(base) // different session
expect(sessionTempDir(SessionId('sess-a'), '/ws/b')).not.toBe(base) // different workspace
// The separator prevents id/workspace collisions from merging inputs.
expect(sessionTempDir(SessionId('ab'), '/ws/c')).not.toBe(sessionTempDir(SessionId('a'), '/ws/bc'))
})
})

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@@ -209,13 +209,10 @@ describe('the platform chains', () => {
expect(probeSeatbelt).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('win32 is a reserved EMPTY chain: fails closed identically until a Windows runner fills it', async () => {
// The slot exists so Windows support is an additive fill-in (chain entry
// + runner union member), never a redesign — and reserving it must not
// weaken the fail-closed end in the meantime.
const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { platform: 'win32' })
expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)).toThrow(expect.objectContaining({ code: SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE }))
})
// The win32 chain's argv contract, denial dialect, and runner-failure rules
// live in @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl/tests/provider-chain.spec.ts
// (platform-independent assertions that run in every CI lane, including
// Windows where this package's POSIX-only suites are excluded).
it('caches the verdict for the provider lifetime: one chain walk across wraps', async () => {
const probeBwrap = vi.fn(() => true)
@@ -368,3 +365,63 @@ describe('the default seatbelt probe (sandbox-exec contract)', () => {
expect(() => sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)).toThrow(expect.objectContaining({ code: SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE }))
})
})
describe('the windows-acl probe (runner invocation contract)', () => {
// The product chain reaches windows-acl only unprobed (win32's sole
// candidate), so the probe case and the runner-entry resolution are pinned
// through the chain seam, mirroring the seatbelt default-probe contract.
it('selects the rung when the injected probe passes, speaking the ACL dialect', async () => {
const probeWindowsAcl = vi.fn(() => true)
const { sandbox } = await setup({}, {
chain: ['windows-acl', 'bwrap'],
probeWindowsAcl,
probeBwrap: () => false,
windowsAclRunnerArgs: ['node', 'windows-acl-runner.js'],
})
const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)
expect(probeWindowsAcl).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
expect(confined.argv.slice(-4)).toEqual(['--mode', 'read-only', '--', 'true'])
expect(confined.enforcement).toBe('full')
expect(confined.denialSignatures).toEqual(['access is denied', 'access to the path', 'permission denied'])
expect(confined.runnerFailureRules).toEqual([{ allowedExitCodes: [127], fatalSignatures: ['windows-acl-run: '] }])
})
it('reads a failing probe as unusable and walks to the next rung', async () => {
const probeWindowsAcl = vi.fn(() => false)
const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['windows-acl', 'bwrap'], probeWindowsAcl, probeBwrap: () => true })
const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)
expect(confined.argv[0]).toBe('bwrap')
expect(probeWindowsAcl).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
})
it('runs the REAL default probe against the resolved runner invocation when none is injected', async () => {
// The default probe spawns the exact runner argv confine would use — the
// runner source through tsx on a lib-less checkout. The windows-acl
// runner cannot init off win32, so the probe reads unusable and the walk
// falls through to the injected bwrap verdict on every host.
const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['windows-acl', 'bwrap'], probeBwrap: () => true })
const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)
expect(confined.argv[0]).toBe('bwrap')
}, 30_000)
it('reads an empty runner invocation as unusable (the probe\'s empty-argv guard)', async () => {
// windowsAclRunnerInvocation always yields [node, ...] in product; an
// override returning [] exercises the default probe's empty-argv guard.
const { sandbox } = await setup({}, { chain: ['windows-acl', 'bwrap'], probeBwrap: () => true, windowsAclRunnerArgs: [] })
const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)
expect(confined.argv[0]).toBe('bwrap')
})
it('prefers the built lib/runner.js entry when the resolved file exists', async () => {
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dsh-fake-acl-entry-'))
const builtEntry = join(dir, 'runner.js')
writeFileSync(builtEntry, '')
const { sandbox } = await setup({}, {
chain: ['windows-acl', 'bwrap'],
probeWindowsAcl: () => true,
windowsAclRunnerEntry: builtEntry,
})
const confined = sandbox.confine(['true'], RO)
expect(confined.argv.slice(0, 2)).toEqual([process.execPath, builtEntry])
})
})

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@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ const platformPackageName = `@deepseek-ai/node-addon-landlock-run-linux-${proces
/** The harness closure the consumer needs; native tarballs are packed through their mode-preserving release script. */
const WORKSPACE_CLOSURE = [
'packages/sandbox/sandbox-local',
// sandbox-local's win32 chain rung is a runtime dependency: a packed
// consumer resolves it like any other @deepseek-ai peer (koffi arrives
// from the registry).
'packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl',
'packages/sandbox/sandbox',
'packages/llm/llm',
'packages/attachment/attachment',