Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into cross-family-fs-sandbox
# Conflicts: # .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.i18n.yaml # .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md # .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md # docs/capability-seams.md # docs/cordis-catalog/events.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/event-producer-consumer.md # docs/module-graph.md # docs/persistence-catalog.md # docs/rfc/INDEX.md # examples/acp-agent/README.md # examples/acp-agent/fs.cordis.snapshot.yml # examples/acp-agent/fs.cordis.yml # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-rejected/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/hook-cc-pretool-ask/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-context/system-prompt.expected.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-context/tool-schemas.expected.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/system-prompt.expected.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/tool-schemas.expected.json # packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/package.json # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts # packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts # packages/fs/README.md # packages/fs/tool-fs/src/edit.ts # packages/fs/tool-fs/src/write.ts # packages/sandbox/README.md # pnpm-lock.yaml
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kingwl
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# @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox
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Abstract process-sandbox seam. Owns the `ctx.sandbox` service contract ([`SandboxProvider`](src/index.ts)) and the confinement vocabulary the harness shares: `SandboxMode` (`read-only` / `workspace-write` / `danger-full-access`, file effects only), `SandboxEnforcement` (`full` / `partial`, per kernel ABI), `SandboxPolicy` (per-CALL policy — mode + workspace root), and the fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error. Interface package of the [capability-seam split](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md): depends only on cordis (+ the harness error base), never on a backend.
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Abstract process-sandbox seam. Owns the `ctx.sandbox` service contract ([`SandboxProvider`](src/index.ts)) and the confinement vocabulary the harness shares: `SandboxMode` (`read-only` / `workspace-write` / `danger-full-access`, file effects only), `SandboxEnforcement` (`full` / `partial`, per kernel ABI), `SandboxPolicy` (per-CALL policy — mode + workspace root), and the fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error. Interface package of the [capability-seam split](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md): depends only on cordis (+ the harness error base), never on a backend.
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The contract in one line: `ctx.sandbox.confine(argv, policy)` returns the argv to spawn INSTEAD of your own — wrapped so the process (and everything it spawns) runs confined — plus two facts about the selected backend: the enforcement completeness it achieves and its denial dialect (`denialSignatures`, the stderr substrings its kernel prints on a denied file effect — what stderr-inferring consumers match instead of a cross-backend union); when no backend is usable it throws rather than passing the argv through unconfined.
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Policy rides the call, not the provider: two consumers may confine under different policies at the same instant (bash under `read-only` while a confined child agent keeps its state directory writable), and an approved escalated retry is just a new call with a wider policy.
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**Same-world confinement only.** A backend shares the host's filesystem and kernel (`bwrap`, Landlock, Seatbelt); `workspaceRoot` names a real host path. Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends of this seam — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups. The boundary and its rationale: [the sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
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**Same-world confinement only.** A backend shares the host's filesystem and kernel (`bwrap`, Landlock, Seatbelt); `workspaceRoot` names a real host path. Containers, microVMs, and remote executors are NOT backends of this seam — they replace whole capability implementations (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`) as environment-coherent groups. The boundary and its rationale: [the sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
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Implementations: [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`](../sandbox-local/) (Linux: `bwrap`, else the per-platform Landlock launcher; macOS: `sandbox-exec`/Seatbelt). Consumers: [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/) (wraps `['bash', '-c', command]`).
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@@ -14,16 +14,24 @@ Implementations: [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local`](../sandbox-local/) (Linux: `
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### Confinement error, indirectly
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**What the model sees**: Through [`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/README.md) and [`dsh-tool-bash`](../../bash/tool-bash/README.md), failure to enforce a requested mode produces code `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` and the exact error below. An execution-time runner failure adds ` Runner failure: <detail>`.
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#### What the model sees
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**Token effect**: Conditional error text is visible for that call and retained in history until compaction.
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Through [`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/README.md) and [`dsh-tool-bash`](../../bash/tool-bash/README.md), failure to enforce a requested mode produces code `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` and the exact error below. An execution-time runner failure adds ` Runner failure: <detail>`.
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#### Exact error
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##### Exact error
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```markdown
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sandbox mode "<mode>" is requested but no sandbox backend is usable on this host; refusing to run the command unconfined. Install bubblewrap or run a Landlock-enforcing kernel (Linux), ensure sandbox-exec is usable (macOS) — Windows has no confinement backend yet — or switch the consumer to danger-full-access.
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```
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#### Token effect
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Conditional error text is visible for that call and retained in history until compaction.
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#### KV Cache effect
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Append-only; newly visible content follows the reusable request prefix and does not invalidate existing KV-cache entries.
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## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
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- **File effects are the whole policy vocabulary** — the seam expresses no network, process, syscall, device, or credential restrictions.
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