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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into cross-family-fs-sandbox

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# Conflicts:
#	.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.i18n.yaml
#	.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md
#	.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md
#	docs/capability-seams.md
#	docs/cordis-catalog/events.md
#	docs/cordis-catalog/services.md
#	docs/event-producer-consumer.md
#	docs/module-graph.md
#	docs/persistence-catalog.md
#	docs/rfc/INDEX.md
#	examples/acp-agent/README.md
#	examples/acp-agent/fs.cordis.snapshot.yml
#	examples/acp-agent/fs.cordis.yml
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/session.jsonl
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-rejected/session.jsonl
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/hook-cc-pretool-ask/session.jsonl
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/session.jsonl
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-context/system-prompt.expected.md
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-context/tool-schemas.expected.json
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/system-prompt.expected.md
#	examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/tool-schemas.expected.json
#	packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts
#	packages/bash/tool-bash/package.json
#	packages/bash/tool-bash/src/index.ts
#	packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts
#	packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts
#	packages/fs/README.md
#	packages/fs/tool-fs/src/edit.ts
#	packages/fs/tool-fs/src/write.ts
#	packages/sandbox/README.md
#	pnpm-lock.yaml
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kingwl
2026-07-20 11:40:29 +08:00
parent 9a2ef4e229 023bed1a83
commit 2e7cdddb89
1293 changed files with 74019 additions and 16297 deletions
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packages/fs/fs-sandbox/README.md
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@@ -16,12 +16,16 @@ The per-call mode is the tool-stamped effective mode (session override or escala
The fence is a check in TRUSTED code over a MODEL-CONTROLLED path — the operations are the seam's own (open, rename), only the target path is untrusted, so canonicalize-then-contain is the complete answer to this surface. This mirrors the `code-runtime` stance: containment, not a security boundary. Kernel-grade isolation of untrusted CODE stays `ctx.bash`'s job ([`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/README.md)). The residual TOCTOU (an ancestor symlink swapped between the containment re-check and the syscall) is narrowed by re-canonicalizing immediately before the write and is accepted for this threat model; a kernel-tight boundary needs `openat2`-class primitives not worth their portability cost here.
A denial is a structured `FsError` (`FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`, carrying the effective mode) — no stderr text inference (unlike bash's kernel denials), because an in-process fence knows exactly what it refused. The model-facing `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker and the one-approved-wider retry live in the tool layer (`dsh-tool-fs`), exactly as bash's do. See [the cross-family fs sandbox RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md).
A denial is a structured `FsError` (`FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`, carrying the effective mode) — no stderr text inference (unlike bash's kernel denials), because an in-process fence knows exactly what it refused. The model-facing `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker and the one-approved-wider retry live in the tool layer (`dsh-tool-fs`), exactly as bash's do. See [the cross-family fs sandbox RFC](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md).
## Model Experience
Indirectly, through `dsh-tool-fs`, which renders this backend's `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED` refusals as the `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker plus the same-turn escalation hint.
#### KV Cache effect
No direct invalidation; the named consumer owns any request-prefix changes.
## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- **A policy fence, not a kernel boundary** — the check is trusted code over a model-controlled path, so the residual resolve-to-syscall TOCTOU is narrowed (by the in-place re-canonicalization) but not eliminated; adversarial host processes are out of scope. Kernel-grade isolation of untrusted code stays `ctx.bash`'s.