Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into cross-family-fs-sandbox
# Conflicts: # .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.i18n.yaml # .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md # .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md # docs/capability-seams.md # docs/cordis-catalog/events.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/event-producer-consumer.md # docs/module-graph.md # docs/persistence-catalog.md # docs/rfc/INDEX.md # examples/acp-agent/README.md # examples/acp-agent/fs.cordis.snapshot.yml # examples/acp-agent/fs.cordis.yml # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-rejected/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/hook-cc-pretool-ask/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-context/system-prompt.expected.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-context/tool-schemas.expected.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/system-prompt.expected.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/tool-schemas.expected.json # packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/package.json # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts # packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts # packages/fs/README.md # packages/fs/tool-fs/src/edit.ts # packages/fs/tool-fs/src/write.ts # packages/sandbox/README.md # pnpm-lock.yaml
This commit is contained in:
kingwl
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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{"type":"turn/start","seq":0,"time":1783600629541,"data":{"turn":1,"trigger":{"kind":"message","source":{"kind":"user"}}}}
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{"type":"user/message","seq":1,"time":1783600629541,"data":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"Reply with exactly the word: PONG. Do not use any tools."}],"source":{"kind":"user"}},"surfaceOp":"append"}
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{"type":"step/start","seq":2,"time":1783600629542,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1}}
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{"type":"request/header","seq":3,"time":1783600629542,"data":{"header":{"config":{"model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"system":"{{system}}","tools":"{{tools}}"},"reason":"initial"}}
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{"type":"request/header","seq":3,"time":1783600629542,"data":{"header":{"config":{"provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"system":"{{system}}","tools":"{{tools}}"},"reason":"initial"}}
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{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":4,"time":1783600630819,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"reasoning"}}}
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{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":5,"time":1783600630820,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":"The"}}}
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{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":6,"time":1783600630822,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"reasoning-delta","index":0,"text":" user"}}}
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@@ -31,6 +31,6 @@
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{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":29,"time":1783600631009,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"block-end","index":1,"block":{"type":"text","text":"PONG"}}}}
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{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":30,"time":1783600631009,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"usage","usage":{"inputTokens":3091,"outputTokens":23,"cacheReadTokens":0,"reasoningTokens":20}}}}
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{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":31,"time":1783600631009,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"stop"}}}}
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{"type":"assistant/message","seq":32,"time":1783600631011,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"content":[{"type":"reasoning","text":"The user wants me to reply with exactly the word \"PONG\" and not use any tools."},{"type":"text","text":"PONG"}],"usage":{"inputTokens":3091,"outputTokens":23,"cacheReadTokens":0,"reasoningTokens":20}},"sourceEventSeqs":[4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31],"surfaceOp":"append"}
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{"type":"assistant/message","seq":32,"time":1783600631011,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"content":[{"type":"reasoning","text":"The user wants me to reply with exactly the word \"PONG\" and not use any tools."},{"type":"text","text":"PONG"}],"provenance":{"provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"usage":{"inputTokens":3091,"outputTokens":23,"cacheReadTokens":0,"reasoningTokens":20}},"sourceEventSeqs":[4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31],"surfaceOp":"append"}
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{"type":"step/end","seq":33,"time":1783600631011,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1}}
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{"type":"turn/end","seq":34,"time":1783600631011,"data":{"turn":1,"reason":{"kind":"completed"}}}
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"protocolVersion":1,"agentInfo":{"name":"deepseek-harness-acp","version":"0.0.1"},"agentCapabilities":{"loadSession":true,"promptCapabilities":{"image":false,"audio":false,"embeddedContext":false}},"authMethods":[]}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","configOptions":[{"id":"permission","name":"Permissions","description":"Sets this session's sandbox and approval behavior.","category":"mode","type":"select","currentValue":"danger-full-access","options":[{"value":"workspace-write","name":"workspace-write","description":"Write inside the workspace and permitted temporary directories; wider retries require approval."},{"value":"danger-full-access","name":"danger-full-access","description":"Full file access without approval prompts."}]}]}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","configOptions":[{"id":"model","name":"Model","description":"Sets this session's provider and model.","category":"model","type":"select","currentValue":"[\"deepseek\",\"deepseek-v4-flash\"]","options":[{"value":"[\"deepseek\",\"deepseek-v4-flash\"]","name":"deepseek-v4-flash"},{"value":"[\"deepseek\",\"deepseek-v4-pro\"]","name":"deepseek-v4-pro"}]},{"id":"permission","name":"Permissions","description":"The session permission preset: each choice bundles a sandbox mode and an approval policy.","category":"mode","type":"select","currentValue":"danger-full-access","options":[{"value":"workspace-write","name":"workspace-write","description":"Write inside the workspace and permitted temporary directories; wider retries require approval."},{"value":"danger-full-access","name":"danger-full-access","description":"Full file access without approval prompts."}]}]}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"The"}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" user"}}}}
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{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" wants"}}}}
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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"initial": [
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{
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"name": "bash",
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"description": "Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. Commands may run under a file sandbox; a blocked file operation is reported as `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` — a policy denial, not a bug in the command; do not retry another way. Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; read its output with `task_output` and stop it with `task_kill`. Attempting a command the sandbox may deny is safe and expected: run it and read the marker rather than assuming the denial. When a command is denied and a wider mode would let it succeed, escalate immediately in the same turn — the one sanctioned exception to a denial: retry the exact same command once with `sandbox_permissions` (the narrowest wider mode that suffices) plus a one-sentence `justification`. Do not detour through chat to ask permission first — the approval prompt raised by that retry is how the user consents. If the session states approval prompts are disabled, there is no exception: a denial is final — do not set `sandbox_permissions`. Never escalate speculatively: ground the request in a real denial — normally the one this command just hit; escalating up front is fine only when this session already denied the same access. A rejected escalation is final for that command — stop and explain, never work around it — but it does not forbid attempting or escalating other commands later.",
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"description": "Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. Current harness environment facts are exposed through managed `$DSH_*` variables; inspect them when needed. Commands may run under a file sandbox; a blocked file operation is reported as `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` — a policy denial, not a bug in the command; do not retry another way. Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; read its output with `task_output` and stop it with `task_kill`. Attempting a command the sandbox may deny is safe and expected: run it and read the marker rather than assuming the denial. When a command is denied and a wider mode would let it succeed, escalate immediately in the same turn — the one sanctioned exception to a denial: retry the exact same command once with `sandbox_permissions` (the narrowest wider mode that suffices) plus a one-sentence `justification`. Do not detour through chat to ask permission first — the approval prompt raised by that retry is how the user consents. If the session states approval prompts are disabled, there is no exception: a denial is final — do not set `sandbox_permissions`. Never escalate speculatively: ground the request in a real denial — normally the one this command just hit; escalating up front is fine only when this session already denied the same access. A rejected escalation is final for that command — stop and explain, never work around it — but it does not forbid attempting or escalating other commands later.",
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"parameters": {
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"type": "object",
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"properties": {
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@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
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},
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{
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"name": "workflow",
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"description": "Run a JavaScript workflow script that orchestrates subagents at scale. Use this for work that fans out across many independent pieces — an audit over many files, a migration, multi-angle research, adversarial verification of findings — where you write the orchestration as a script instead of delegating turn by turn.\n\nThe workflow's identity rides the `meta` parameter as JSON: required `name` (short kebab-case) and `description` strings, optional `whenToUse` string and `phases` array (`{title, detail?, model?}`). The `script` parameter is the plain JavaScript body ONLY (NOT TypeScript, and NO `export const meta` statement — meta is a parameter, not code), running with top-level await; end with `return <value>` — the value must be JSON-serializable and is this tool's result.\n\nScript-body hooks:\n- `agent(prompt, opts?): Promise<any>` — run one subagent to completion. Without `opts.schema` it resolves to the child's final text; with `opts.schema` (an object-rooted JSON Schema using ONLY type/properties/required/additionalProperties/items/enum/const — no oneOf/pattern/format/numeric bounds) it resolves to the validated object. Resolves `null` when the child fails (filter with `.filter(Boolean)`). Other opts: `label` (display), `phase` (progress group), `model` (override). Anything else (`effort`/`isolation`/`agentType`) is rejected loudly.\n- `pipeline(items, ...stages): Promise<any[]>` — run each item through the stages independently with NO barrier between stages (prefer this for multi-stage work). Each stage receives `(prev, item, index)`. An ordinary stage throw drops that ITEM to `null` and skips its remaining stages.\n- `parallel(thunks): Promise<any[]>` — run zero-argument functions concurrently and await ALL of them (a barrier; use only when a stage genuinely needs every prior result together). A throwing thunk resolves to `null`.\n- `phase(title)` — start a progress phase; `log(message)` — narrate progress; `args` — the tool call's `args` input, verbatim.\n\nMisused hooks (bad arguments, unknown options, unsupported schemas, tripped caps) throw errors that ALWAYS kill the script — they never dissolve into a per-item `null`.\n\nConstraints: concurrency and total-agent caps apply; no filesystem, network, timers, or Node.js APIs are provided — the agents do the work, the script only coordinates them. The run executes in the foreground: this call returns when the whole script finishes.",
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"description": "Run a JavaScript workflow script that orchestrates subagents at scale. Use this for work that fans out across many independent pieces — an audit over many files, a migration, multi-angle research, adversarial verification of findings — where you write the orchestration as a script instead of delegating turn by turn.\n\nThe workflow's identity rides the `meta` parameter as JSON: required `name` (short kebab-case) and `description` strings, optional `whenToUse` string and `phases` array (`{title, detail?, provider?, model?}`). The `script` parameter is the plain JavaScript body ONLY (NOT TypeScript, and NO `export const meta` statement — meta is a parameter, not code), running with top-level await; end with `return <value>` — the value must be JSON-serializable and is this tool's result.\n\nScript-body hooks:\n- `agent(prompt, opts?): Promise<any>` — run one subagent to completion. Without `opts.schema` it resolves to the child's final text; with `opts.schema` (an object-rooted JSON Schema using ONLY type/properties/required/additionalProperties/items/enum/const — no oneOf/pattern/format/numeric bounds) it resolves to the validated object. Resolves `null` when the child fails (filter with `.filter(Boolean)`). Other opts: `label` (display), `phase` (progress group), and independent `provider`/`model` LLM target overrides (either may be provided alone). Anything else (`effort`/`isolation`/`agentType`) is rejected loudly.\n- `pipeline(items, ...stages): Promise<any[]>` — run each item through the stages independently with NO barrier between stages (prefer this for multi-stage work). Each stage receives `(prev, item, index)`. An ordinary stage throw drops that ITEM to `null` and skips its remaining stages.\n- `parallel(thunks): Promise<any[]>` — run zero-argument functions concurrently and await ALL of them (a barrier; use only when a stage genuinely needs every prior result together). A throwing thunk resolves to `null`.\n- `phase(title)` — start a progress phase; `log(message)` — narrate progress; `args` — the tool call's `args` input, verbatim.\n\nMisused hooks (bad arguments, unknown options, unsupported schemas, tripped caps) throw errors that ALWAYS kill the script — they never dissolve into a per-item `null`.\n\nConstraints: concurrency and total-agent caps apply; no filesystem, network, timers, or Node.js APIs are provided — the agents do the work, the script only coordinates them. The run executes in the foreground: this call returns when the whole script finishes.",
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"parameters": {
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"type": "object",
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"properties": {
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@@ -307,6 +307,10 @@
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"type": "string",
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"description": "Optional one-line description of the phase."
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},
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"provider": {
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"type": "string",
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"description": "Optional provider override this phase is expected to use."
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},
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"model": {
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"type": "string",
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"description": "Optional model override this phase is expected to use."
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@@ -368,5 +372,5 @@
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}
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}
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],
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"deltas": []
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"changes": []
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}
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