Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into worktree/fix-minimal-preset-prompt

# Conflicts:
#	docs/event-producer-consumer.i18n.yaml
#	docs/event-producer-consumer.md
#	docs/event-producer-consumer.zh.md

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md
-2026-07-06-approval-seam.md: 7c830d93f19a40ab193cfebabca854882ab68d62
-2026-07-06-approval-seam.zh.md: 9dedfddadc23b0da44b28e8750508653ee20bb83
+2026-07-06-approval-seam.md: 8aa9986139dae77e08c166b72545bfa688a389e0
+2026-07-06-approval-seam.zh.md: ef4ccf5fd2b54888a648737866ff6f5fe1678882

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ Costs and accepted limits:
 - **Who decides whether a call asks in the first place?** Policy producers: a hook returning `permissionDecision: ask`, any `tools/pre-execute` listener, or the sandbox escalation gate. The seam and the bridge only route and answer; neither injects its own judgment about what deserves a prompt.
 - **What happens when the user dismisses the prompt, or the turn aborts mid-ask?** Dismissal maps to `cancelled` with its own deny text. An already-aborted signal settles `cancelled` without dispatching; an abort during the ask discards the late answer. When both audit appends commit, either path records one pair, never two.
 - **What if the client answers with an option the harness never offered?** Any selection other than the offered `allow_once` maps to `rejected` — an unknown optionId from a non-conforming client can never grant.
-- **How do subagents' approvals route?** An agent no answerer owns delegates through the whole waterfall and fails closed — in-process subagents are deliberately unanswerable. A `'never'` parent seeds that override into each in-process child's log ([decision](2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)), so the child is told up front instead of asking into the empty waterfall. `subagent-acp`'s child-side auto-answer is separate; routing a child's asks to the parent controller is deferred (§ Deferred).
+- **How do subagents' approvals route?** They do not: delegation pins every in-process child to `'never'` ([approvals-pinned decision](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md)), so each child ask resolves `rejected` before any answerer and the child is told up front through its runtime context. `subagent-acp`'s child-side auto-answer is separate; routing a child's asks to the parent controller is deferred (§ Deferred).
 - **What does `policy: 'never'` actually change at runtime?** The service resolves every ask for that session to `rejected` before dispatching any answerer (in-service, so no registration order can bypass it); the next atomic runtime-context snapshot states the policy; each successful auto-rejection records the audit pair.
 - **What happens across a hot reload, or when an answerer unloads mid-session?** Answerers dispose with their owning fiber, so the next ask degrades to `unavailable` instead of hanging on a dead channel; remounting re-registers the answerer with no catch-up state.
 - **Where does a client get approval context?** The request carries the exact `callId` and the asker's human-readable `reason`; channel adapters may correlate richer tool-call state without duplicating arguments in the approval seam.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.zh.md

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ ACP 桥只应答其会话映射所拥有的精确 agent 对象。它携带既有
 - **谁决定一次调用是否需要 ask？** 策略生产者：返回 `permissionDecision: ask` 的钩子、任何 `tools/pre-execute` 监听器、或沙箱升级门禁。seam 和桥只负责路由和应答；二者都不注入自己对「什么值得弹出提示」的判断。
 - **用户关闭提示或轮次在 ask 进行中中止时会发生什么？** 关闭映射为 `cancelled` 并携带自己的拒绝文本。已中止的 signal 直接结算为 `cancelled` 而不派发；ask 进行中的中止丢弃迟到的应答。当两个审计追加都提交时，任一路径都记录恰好一对事件，绝不会两对。
 - **如果客户端以 harness 从未提供的选项应答呢？** 除已提供的 `allow_once` 之外的任何选项都映射为 `rejected`——来自不合规客户端的未知 optionId 永远不能授权。
-- **subagent 的审批如何路由？** 没有应答者拥有的 agent 穿过整个 waterfall 委派并失败关闭——进程内 subagent 被刻意设计为不可应答。`'never'` 父级会把该覆盖项预置到每个进程内子 agent 的日志中（[决策](2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)），因此子 agent 一开始就会得知，而不是向空的 waterfall 发出 ask。`subagent-acp` 的子侧自动应答是独立的；将子 agent 的 ask 路由到父控制器已延后（§ 延后）。
+- **subagent 的审批如何路由？** 不路由：委派会把每个进程内子 agent 钉定为 `'never'`（[审批钉定决策](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md)），因此子 agent 的每次 ask 都在任何应答者之前解析为 `rejected`，子 agent 则通过其运行时上下文一开始就会得知。`subagent-acp` 的子侧自动应答是独立的；将子 agent 的 ask 路由到父控制器已延后（§ 延后）。
 - **`policy: 'never'` 在运行时实际改变了什么？** 服务在派发任何应答者之前，将该会话的每次 ask 解析为 `rejected`（在服务内部，因此没有注册顺序能绕过它）；下一份原子化的运行时上下文快照会声明该策略；每次成功的自动拒绝都会记录审计对。
 - **热重载或应答者在会话中途卸载时会发生什么？** 应答者随其拥有的 fiber 一起 dispose，因此下一次 ask 降级为 `unavailable` 而非挂在死通道上；重新挂载会重新注册应答者，无需追赶状态。
 - **客户端从哪里获得审批上下文？** 请求携带精确的 `callId` 和发起方的人类可读 `reason`；通道适配器可自行关联更丰富的工具调用状态，而无需在审批 seam 中重复携带参数。

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md
-2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md: aeff83795eedead9c75de6bbb74c1da1945092ca
-2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.zh.md: c26e6bf8b79c86855022c384673957fe04ff761d
+2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md: 34751a4e29e48c84d37425857b8b1b56c8d866eb
+2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.zh.md: 5fa8edf04ed63da9b2e1b9a062ca2f649c8c96fb

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Agent Note: In-process subagent policy inheritance — the child starts under the parent's sandbox and approval overrides
+# Agent Note: In-process subagent policy inheritance — the child starts under the parent's sandbox override
 
 Status: implemented
 
@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ English | [中文](2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.zh.md)
 
 ## Problem
 
-Sandbox and approval overrides are per-session log folds. An in-process subagent gets a new session, so a spawn child once fell back to deployment defaults and a fork child saw only switches inside its completed-turn prefix. Delegation could therefore widen a parent that had switched to `read-only`, or turn a parent's unattended `'never'` approval stance back into prompting behavior.
+Sandbox and approval overrides are per-session log folds. An in-process subagent gets a new session, so a spawn child once fell back to deployment defaults and a fork child saw only switches inside its completed-turn prefix. Delegation could therefore widen a parent that had switched to `read-only`.
 
 ## Decision
 
-The shared in-process driver snapshots `sandboxPolicy.overrideOf(parent.session)` and `approval.overrideOf(parent.session)` before its first await. A later parent switch belongs to the parent's future; cancel-and-redelegate takes a new snapshot. Both services are optional, and only explicit session overrides are copied, never deployment defaults or one-shot grants.
+The delegation boundary snapshots `sandboxPolicy.overrideOf(parent.session)` before its first await, through the shared child-agent helpers (`captureDelegatedPolicyOverrides`/`appendDelegatedPolicyOverrides` in `dsh-subagent`), which the one-shot driver and the [continuable start](2026-08-10-continuable-subagent-policy-inheritance.md) both call. A later parent switch belongs to the parent's future; cancel-and-redelegate takes a new snapshot. The sandbox-policy service is optional, and only the explicit session override is copied, never deployment defaults or one-shot grants. The approval policy is not inherited: the same capture pins every child to `'never'` — the [approvals-pinned decision](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md) supersedes this note's original approval-override inheritance.
 
 Each captured value becomes a source-tagged `sandbox/mode` or `approval/policy` event appended during the child factory's unpublished setup. The session constructor has already fixed `Session.firstLiveSeq` at the fork-prefix length, so the inherited facts follow fork history, reach telemetry when the child is announced, and leave `SessionHeader.seedLength` at the prefix length. Existing last-event-wins folds therefore make the delegation snapshot beat stale fork history and let a later child switch beat the snapshot. A grandchild folds its parent's logged state, so the rule composes without another inheritance mechanism.
 
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Ordinary session appends validate the inherited events before publication, and p
 
 ### What a blocked child experiences
 
-A confined child gets the ordinary denial marker. No answerer currently owns an in-process child, so an escalation request fails closed and the child reports upward; a controller-owned parent may widen its own session and delegate again. An inherited `'never'` policy tells the child not to request escalation in its first system prompt.
+A confined child gets the ordinary denial marker, and an escalation request is rejected deterministically by the child's pinned `'never'` policy; the `subagent:delegation` runtime-context statement tells the child to report the limitation instead of retrying, and a controller-owned parent may widen its own session and delegate again ([approvals-pinned decision](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md)).
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ A confined child gets the ordinary denial marker. No answerer currently owns an
 - **A first-prompt listener** — rejected: it introduces listener ordering and a later timing boundary even though the creation transaction already permits log appends before publication.
 - **Copying deployment defaults** — rejected: defaults remain operator-owned and may change; an unswitched parent stamps nothing, so its child follows the current deployment.
 - **Live resolution walking `parentSession` at each call** — rejected: it breaks the "two sessions never see each other's state" isolation invariant, requires the parent session to stay loaded for the child's lifetime, and makes a mid-run parent switch retroactively change a running child. Snapshot-at-delegation is the semantic: the child keeps the policy it was handed; cancel-and-respawn picks up a tightening.
-- **Forcing `'never'` or routing asks to the root controller** — rejected as inheritance behavior. A forced value forecloses a future child answerer; parent routing needs parent-chain ownership and the spawning `callId`, and remains deferred in [the approval-seam Agent Note](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md).
+- **Forcing `'never'`** — originally rejected here as inheritance behavior because a forced value forecloses a future child answerer; that verdict is reversed by the [approvals-pinned decision](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md), which owns the current rationale. Routing asks to the root controller needs parent-chain ownership and the spawning `callId`, and remains deferred in [the approval-seam Agent Note](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md).
 
 ## Consequences
 
-- Spawn, fork, and nested in-process children retain a parent's explicit sandbox and approval overrides. The focused suite proves real filesystem denial, stale-fork precedence, delegation-time capture, the live-event boundary, default omission, and context disposal.
+- Spawn, fork, and nested in-process children retain a parent's explicit sandbox override and are pinned to `'never'` approvals. The focused suite proves real filesystem denial, stale-fork precedence, delegation-time capture, the live-event boundary, default omission, and context disposal.
 - The keyless headless snapshot is the assembled regression: only the parent is `read-only`, the deployment default is `workspace-write`, and the child's persisted event plus denied disk write both fail if capture is removed.
-- Each delegation adds at most two log-only events. `dsh-subagent-inprocess` has optional peer types for the two policy services; compositions without either service behave unchanged. Out-of-process children retain their own deployment policy, and a running child does not follow later parent switches.
+- Each delegation adds at most two log-only events. `dsh-subagent` owns the optional peer types for the two policy services — its shared helpers hold the `ctx.get` consumption; compositions without either service behave unchanged. Out-of-process children retain their own deployment policy, and a running child does not follow later parent switches.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.zh.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Agent Note: 进程内 subagent 策略继承——子 agent 在父级的沙箱与审批覆盖项下启动
+# Agent Note: 进程内 subagent 策略继承——子 agent 在父级的沙箱覆盖项下启动
 
 Status: implemented
 
@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ Status: implemented
 
 ## 问题
 
-沙箱与审批覆盖项都是按会话的日志折叠。进程内 subagent 会获得一个新会话，因此 spawn 子 agent（智能体）过去会回退到部署默认值，fork 子 agent 则只能看到其已完成轮次前缀中的切换。因此，委派可能放宽已经切换到 `read-only` 的父级，或让父级无人值守的 `'never'` 审批立场重新变成会发起提示的行为。
+沙箱与审批覆盖项都是按会话的日志折叠。进程内 subagent 会获得一个新会话，因此 spawn 子 agent（智能体）过去会回退到部署默认值，fork 子 agent 则只能看到其已完成轮次前缀中的切换。因此，委派可能放宽已经切换到 `read-only` 的父级。
 
 ## 决策
 
-共享的进程内驱动器在第一次 await 之前对 `sandboxPolicy.overrideOf(parent.session)` 和 `approval.overrideOf(parent.session)` 获取快照。父级后续的切换属于父级的未来；取消后重新委派会取得新快照。这两个服务均为可选，仅复制显式会话覆盖项，绝不复制部署默认值或一次性授权。
+委派边界在第一次 await 之前，经由共享的子 agent 辅助函数（`dsh-subagent` 中的 `captureDelegatedPolicyOverrides`／`appendDelegatedPolicyOverrides`）对 `sandboxPolicy.overrideOf(parent.session)` 获取快照；一次性驱动器与[可继续启动](2026-08-10-continuable-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)都会调用这些辅助函数。父级后续的切换属于父级的未来；取消后重新委派会取得新快照。沙箱策略服务为可选，仅复制显式会话覆盖项，绝不复制部署默认值或一次性授权。审批策略不继承：同一次捕获会把每个子 agent 钉定为 `'never'`——[审批钉定决策](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md)取代了本 note 原先的审批覆盖项继承。
 
 每个捕获值都会成为子 agent 工厂在未发布设置阶段追加的一条带来源标记的 `sandbox/mode` 或 `approval/policy` 事件。会话构造函数已将 `Session.firstLiveSeq` 固定为 fork 前缀的长度，因此继承事实会排在 fork 历史之后，在子 agent 公布时进入遥测，同时让 `SessionHeader.seedLength` 保持为此前缀的长度。因此，既有的末事件胜出折叠会让委派快照压过陈旧的 fork 历史，并让子 agent 后续的切换压过该快照。孙代 agent 会折叠其父级已记录的状态，因此无需另一套继承机制即可组合此规则。
 
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Status: implemented
 
 ### 被拦住的子 agent 会经历什么
 
-受限子 agent 会得到普通拒绝标记。目前没有应答器认领进程内子 agent，因此升级请求会以拒绝方式失败，由子 agent 向上汇报；由控制器持有的父 agent 可以放宽自己的会话后重新委派。继承的 `'never'` 策略会在第一份系统提示词中告知子 agent 不要请求升级。
+受限子 agent 会得到普通拒绝标记，升级请求则被子 agent 钉定的 `'never'` 策略确定性拒绝；`subagent:delegation` 运行时上下文声明告知子 agent 上报限制而不是重试，由控制器持有的父 agent 可以放宽自己的会话后重新委派（[审批钉定决策](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md)）。
 
 ## 考虑过的替代方案
 
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ Status: implemented
 - **首个提示词监听器**：不予采纳。尽管创建事务已经允许在发布前追加日志，它仍会引入监听器顺序与更晚的时序边界。
 - **复制部署默认值**：不予采纳。默认值仍由运维人员拥有且可能变化；未切换的父级不会记录任何值，因此其子 agent 跟随当前部署。
 - **每次调用时沿 `parentSession` 实时解析**：不予采纳。这会打破「两个会话永远看不到彼此状态」的隔离不变量，要求父会话在子 agent 的整个生命周期内保持加载，还会让父级在子 agent 运行途中做的切换追溯性地改变一个正在运行的子 agent。委派时快照才是本设计的语义：子 agent 保持它被交付时的策略；取消后重新 spawn 即可拿到收紧后的策略。
-- **强制使用 `'never'` 或把 ask 路由到根控制器**：不作为继承行为采纳。强制值会排除未来的子 agent 应答器；父级路由需要父链所有权与发起 spawn 的 `callId`，仍按[审批 seam Agent Note](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md) 所述延期。
+- **强制使用 `'never'`**：本 note 当初不作为继承行为采纳，理由是强制值会排除未来的子 agent 应答器；该结论已被[审批钉定决策](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md)推翻，现行理由归其所有。把 ask 路由到根控制器需要父链所有权与发起 spawn 的 `callId`，仍按[审批 seam Agent Note](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md) 所述延期。
 
 ## 后果
 
-- spawn、fork 和嵌套的进程内子 agent 会保留父级显式的沙箱与审批覆盖项。聚焦测试套件证明真实文件系统拒绝、陈旧 fork 优先级、委派时捕获、实时事件边界、默认值省略与上下文释放。
+- spawn、fork 和嵌套的进程内子 agent 会保留父级显式的沙箱覆盖项，并被钉定为 `'never'` 审批。聚焦测试套件证明真实文件系统拒绝、陈旧 fork 优先级、委派时捕获、实时事件边界、默认值省略与上下文释放。
 - 无密钥 headless 快照是组装后应用层面的回归测试：只有父级是 `read-only`，部署默认值是 `workspace-write`；若移除捕获，子 agent 的持久化事件与被拒的磁盘写入这两项检查都会失败。
-- 每次委派最多增加两条仅日志事件。`dsh-subagent-inprocess` 为两个策略服务提供可选 peer 类型；未组合任一服务的组合保持原有行为。进程外子 agent 仍采用自身的部署策略，正在运行的子 agent 不跟随父级后续切换。
+- 每次委派最多增加两条仅日志事件。两个策略服务的可选 peer 类型由 `dsh-subagent` 拥有——其共享辅助函数持有 `ctx.get` 消费；未组合任一服务的组合保持原有行为。进程外子 agent 仍采用自身的部署策略，正在运行的子 agent 不跟随父级后续切换。

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-continuable-subagent-policy-inheritance.i18n.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
+# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
+# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
+#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-continuable-subagent-policy-inheritance.md
+2026-08-10-continuable-subagent-policy-inheritance.md: c9b75f2840eb2f124f040d138b761ee145fc6f83
+2026-08-10-continuable-subagent-policy-inheritance.zh.md: 8bd7f68c578ed827c756a415f017eb8cb61e5721

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-continuable-subagent-policy-inheritance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Agent Note: Continuable subagent policy inheritance — the durable child log owns the delegation-time snapshot
+
+Status: implemented
+
+English | [中文](2026-08-10-continuable-subagent-policy-inheritance.zh.md)
+
+## Problem
+
+The one-shot in-process driver has seeded parent sandbox/approval overrides into its children since the [in-process policy-inheritance decision](2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md), but the continuable path never did: `SubagentContinuationManager` materialization applied only child composition and the activation setup registry. The default bundle wires both delegation tools as `backgroundMode: continuable`, so in a default deployment every background child silently fell back to deployment defaults — a parent switched to `danger-full-access` produced children stuck at `workspace-write` whose every out-of-workspace operation raised an approval prompt, and a parent's unattended `'never'` approval stance reverted to prompting ([dsh-external/issues#334](https://github.com/dsh-external/issues/issues/334)).
+
+## Decision
+
+The capture/append pair moved from the one-shot driver into the seam's shared child-agent module (`dsh-subagent/src/child-agent.ts`), the declared one home for shared child composition: `captureDelegatedPolicyOverrides(parent)` snapshots `sandboxPolicy.overrideOf(parent.session)` through optional `ctx.get` and pins the child approval policy to `'never'` ([approvals-pinned decision](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md)), and `appendDelegatedPolicyOverrides(childSession, overrides)` appends the `source: 'delegation'` events. The one-shot driver and the continuation manager both call them, so the two paths cannot drift.
+
+`startContinuable` captures before its first await (`prepareContinuable`), the same "a later parent switch belongs to the parent's future" boundary as one-shot. The snapshot travels in `MaterializeInputs.create`, so only fresh materialization appends the events during unpublished setup, after any fork seed. A cold resume passes no `create` inputs and appends nothing: the persisted child log already carries the delegation events, and replaying the log IS the state. The durable child log — not the current Activation, not the resuming parent — owns the child's effective policy, so a parent switch between residency epochs never retroactively changes a durable child.
+
+## Alternatives considered
+
+- **An activation-setup-registry contribution** (`registerContinuableSetup`) — rejected: a contribution receives only the child context, so it cannot capture the parent's overrides at the delegation boundary; the registry applies on cold resume as well as fresh creation, which would re-append or re-capture; and nothing ties a contribution's capture to the start call's synchronous prefix, so the pre-await capture guarantee would be lost.
+- **Re-capturing the parent's overrides at cold resume** — rejected: a resumed child would silently change policy with the parent's later switches, breaking the snapshot-at-delegation semantic and making effective policy depend on resume timing instead of the child's own log. A parent that wants a resumed child under new policy re-delegates.
+- **Importing the one-shot driver's inline logic from the continuation manager** — rejected: the Service Definition package cannot depend on its own provider package, and duplicating the capture/append pair in `continuation.ts` invites drift; `child-agent.ts` already holds every other shared composition step.
+- **Seeding the events into the descriptor seed turn** — rejected: the capture value is not known when the seed is assembled for every caller, and the one-shot precedent already establishes unpublished-setup appends as the ordering that places inherited facts after fork history with `firstLiveSeq` intact.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- Default-bundle background delegation (`backgroundMode: continuable`) now inherits a parent's explicit sandbox override and pins the child to `'never'` approvals; compositions without either policy service behave unchanged.
+- `dsh-subagent` gains optional peer types on `dsh-sandbox-policy` and `dsh-user-approval` (the `ctx.get` pattern the one-shot driver used); `dsh-subagent-inprocess` drops its policy-service peers and type imports entirely and delegates to the shared helpers.
+- The continuable suite (`packages/subagent/subagent/tests/continuation-inheritance.spec.ts`) pins fresh-start seeding, pre-await capture, default omission, cold-resume snapshot stability, and fork-seed precedence; the ACP snapshot scenario `subagent-continuable-inheritance` pins the child's delegation event and read-only runtime context through the assembled app and fails when the capture is removed.
+- Out-of-process providers (`acp`, `dsh-sdk`, `claude-code`, `codex`) support no continuable children (`prepareContinuable` absent), and their one-shot children keep their own deployment policy (`inheritsParentContext = false`); cross-process policy propagation remains out of scope.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-continuable-subagent-policy-inheritance.zh.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Agent Note: 可继续 subagent 策略继承——持久化子日志拥有委派时快照
+
+Status: implemented
+
+[English](2026-08-10-continuable-subagent-policy-inheritance.md) | 中文
+
+## 问题
+
+自[进程内策略继承决策](2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)以来，一次性进程内驱动器一直会把父级的沙箱／审批覆盖项注入其子级，但可继续路径从未这样做：`SubagentContinuationManager` 的物化只应用子级组合与 Activation（激活）设置注册表。默认组合包把两个委派工具都配置为 `backgroundMode: continuable`，因此在默认部署中，每个后台子 agent（智能体）都静默回退到部署默认值：切换到 `danger-full-access` 的父级产出的子 agent 卡在 `workspace-write`，每次工作区外操作都会触发审批提示；父级无人值守的 `'never'` 审批立场也退回为发起提示的行为（[dsh-external/issues#334](https://github.com/dsh-external/issues/issues/334)）。
+
+## 决策
+
+捕获／追加这对函数从一次性驱动器移入该 seam 的共享子 agent 模块（`dsh-subagent/src/child-agent.ts`），即声明的共享子级组合唯一归属之处：`captureDelegatedPolicyOverrides(parent)` 通过可选的 `ctx.get` 对 `sandboxPolicy.overrideOf(parent.session)` 建立快照，并把子级审批策略钉定为 `'never'`（[审批钉定决策](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md)），`appendDelegatedPolicyOverrides(childSession, overrides)` 则追加 `source: 'delegation'` 事件。一次性驱动器与继续执行管理器都调用它们，因此两条路径不会出现偏差。
+
+`startContinuable` 在其第一次 await（`prepareContinuable`）之前完成捕获，沿用与一次性路径相同的「父级后续切换属于父级的未来」边界。快照放在 `MaterializeInputs.create` 中传递，因此只有全新物化会在未发布的设置阶段、排在任何 fork 种子之后追加这些事件。冷恢复（cold resume）不传入 `create` 输入，也不追加任何内容：持久化的子日志已经携带委派事件，而回放该日志本身就是状态。子 agent 的生效策略由持久化子日志拥有，而不是当前 Activation，也不是发起恢复的父级，因此父级在驻留纪元（residency epoch）之间的切换绝不会追溯性地改变一个持久化子 agent。
+
+## 考虑过的替代方案
+
+- **一项 Activation 设置注册表贡献**（`registerContinuableSetup`）：不予采纳。贡献只接收子级上下文，因此无法在委派边界捕获父级的覆盖项；该注册表在冷恢复与全新创建时都会应用，会导致重复追加或重复捕获；而且没有任何机制把贡献的捕获绑定到 start 调用的同步前缀，await 前捕获的保证会因此丢失。
+- **在冷恢复时重新捕获父级覆盖项**：不予采纳。恢复的子 agent 会随父级后续切换静默改变策略，这会破坏委派时快照的语义，并让生效策略取决于恢复时机而非子级自身的日志。希望恢复的子 agent 采用新策略的父级应重新委派。
+- **让继续执行管理器导入一次性驱动器的内联逻辑**：不予采纳。Service Definition 包不能依赖自己的提供方包，而在 `continuation.ts` 中复制捕获／追加这对函数会招致偏差；`child-agent.ts` 已经承载其余每个共享组合步骤。
+- **把这些事件写入描述符种子轮次**：不予采纳。种子为每个调用方组装时，捕获值尚不可知；而且一次性路径的先例已经确立：在未发布的设置阶段追加，才是把继承事实排在 fork 历史之后、同时保持 `firstLiveSeq` 不变的顺序。
+
+## 后果
+
+- 默认组合包的后台委派（`backgroundMode: continuable`）现在会继承父级显式的沙箱覆盖项，并把子级钉定为 `'never'` 审批；未组合任一策略服务的组合保持原有行为。
+- `dsh-subagent` 新增针对 `dsh-sandbox-policy` 与 `dsh-user-approval` 的可选 peer 类型（即一次性驱动器所用的 `ctx.get` 模式）；`dsh-subagent-inprocess` 完全移除自己的策略服务 peer 与类型导入，委托给共享辅助函数。
+- 可继续测试套件（`packages/subagent/subagent/tests/continuation-inheritance.spec.ts`）锁定全新启动的种子写入、await 前捕获、默认值省略、冷恢复快照稳定性与 fork 种子优先级；ACP 快照场景 `subagent-continuable-inheritance` 经组装后的应用锁定子级的委派事件与只读运行时上下文，移除捕获时即失败。
+- 进程外提供方（`acp`、`dsh-sdk`、`claude-code`、`codex`）不支持可继续子 agent（没有 `prepareContinuable`），其一次性子 agent 保留自身的部署策略（`inheritsParentContext = false`）；跨进程策略传播仍不在范围内。

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.i18n.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
+# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
+# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
+#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md
+2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md: a21c6b966b1ad00ed63e0fe87b0ce982f0daf490
+2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.zh.md: db44ae134d34904a53691cfe78eaa5a899cf64e0

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Agent Note: Delegated subagents run with approvals pinned to `'never'`
+
+Status: implemented
+
+English | [中文](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.zh.md)
+
+## Problem
+
+A delegated child that asked for approval had no one to ask. Under an interactive parent (`'ask'`), a background child's escalation became a pending question no product surface showed — subagent sessions are omitted from the Web sidebar, the parent's `list_agents` reports plain `running`/`idle`, and the catalog rows show only activity — so a permission-blocked child was indistinguishable from a working one; headless and unanswered compositions failed the same ask closed as `'unavailable'`. The rejection audit landed only in the child's own log, and no tool parameter or Web control can adjust a running child session's sandbox mode or approval policy (Issue #1723). The mechanism-heavy fix — a durable blocked-state projection, parent notices, catalog badges, and a permission write path through the subagent ownership fence — was disproportionate directly before release.
+
+## Decision
+
+A delegated child acts only within the permission scope fixed at delegation, and approval prompts are removed from its world entirely: `captureDelegatedPolicyOverrides(parent)` (`dsh-subagent/src/child-agent.ts`) still snapshots the parent session's explicit sandbox override, but pins `approvalPolicy: 'never'` whenever the approval capability is composed — it no longer reads the parent's own approval policy. `appendDelegatedPolicyOverrides()` writes the pin as the durable `approval/policy { policy: 'never', source: 'delegation' }` event on the child's log, through the same one-shot and continuable delegation paths as the sandbox snapshot, so cold resume replays it and a fork seed's stale parent policy loses to it.
+
+Enforcement is the existing `ApprovalService` `'never'` semantics at the one operation that decides asks: every child ask — a `sandbox_permissions` escalation from bash or fs, a hook-driven permission question, any future asker — resolves `'rejected'` deterministically before any answerer is consulted, still leaving the `approval/asked`/`approval/decided` audit pair on the child log. The child's whole permission story is therefore its sandbox scope: a `danger-full-access` parent delegates children that need no approvals, a `read-only` parent delegates children with no escape hatch, and a widening decision always belongs to the parent side (widen the parent session, then delegate or follow up again).
+
+Every in-process child is told, not trapped: `applyChildComposition` registers the scoped `subagent:delegation` runtime-context statement (order 120, after the `sandbox:policy` and `approval:policy` sentences) stating that the scope was fixed at start, approval-requiring operations are rejected automatically, and a task needing wider access ends with a reported limitation instead of retries. The statement is a runtime-context contribution rather than a system-prompt section, so the deployment's system prompt stays uniform across parents and children (the snapshot suite pins that uniformity) and the fact rides the same durable snapshot as the policy sentences.
+
+This supersedes the approval half of the [in-process delegation-policy decision](2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md) and reverses its "forcing `'never'` forecloses a future child answerer" verdict: approval inheritance shipped, produced the invisible blocked states above, and a future child answerer now requires reversing this note first.
+
+## Alternatives considered
+
+- **Inheriting the parent's approval override** (the prior behavior) — rejected: only a parent already at `'never'` produced deterministic children; an interactive parent seeded children whose asks waited on a prompt no one was watching or failed closed `'unavailable'`, and the outcome depended on which surfaces happened to be attached.
+- **Blocked-state visibility and per-child permission adjustment** (the original #1723 acceptance) — deferred, not rejected: a `list_agents` blocked annotation, parent notices over the settlement-delivery seam, catalog badges, and a subagent-routed permission channel remain the richer design, but each needs its own seam work and none is required once children cannot enter a blocked-waiting state.
+- **Routing child asks to the parent controller** — still deferred in the [approval-seam Agent Note](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md): it needs parent-chain ownership and the spawning `callId`.
+- **Pinning inside `ApprovalService` by session origin** — rejected: it couples the approval package to delegation vocabulary and duplicates a decision the delegation boundary already owns; the delegation-seeded event is enforceable because no current write path can switch a child session's policy (the `/permission` command requires generic Host routing, which the subagent ownership fence denies to child sessions).
+
+## Consequences
+
+- The child's sandbox inheritance is the complete delegation permission model; the `DelegatedPolicyOverrides.approvalPolicy` field narrows to `'never' | undefined` (`undefined` only without a composed approval capability).
+- Model-visible: each child's runtime-context snapshot carries the `subagent:delegation` statement plus the standing disabled-approvals sentence; parent requests are unchanged. The executor-boundary test proves a child escalation is rejected without consulting a root answerer that would have granted it, with the audit pair logged.
+- Boundaries: in-process one-shot, continuable, and workflow-spawned children are enforced through the shared helpers; `subagent-acp` children keep that provider's explicit machine `permission` policy; `claude-code`, `codex`, and `dsh-sdk` children run in external processes under their own composition.
+- Children persisted before the pin fold to the deployment approval default on cold resume; pre-release, no migration is added.
+- Snapshot fixtures record the pin: every in-process child log gains the delegation `approval/policy` event, and `subagent-published-run-failure` now persists a one-event child log where the child previously left no durable events.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.zh.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Agent Note: 被委派的 subagent 以钉定为 `'never'` 的审批策略运行
+
+Status: implemented
+
+[English](2026-08-10-subagent-approval-pinned-never.md) | 中文
+
+## 问题
+
+被委派的子 agent 发起审批请求时无人可问。在交互式父级（`'ask'`）之下，后台子 agent 的升级请求会变成一个任何产品界面都不展示的挂起问题——subagent 会话不进入 Web 侧边栏，父级的 `list_agents` 只报告普通的 `running`／`idle`，目录树的行也只显示活动状态——因此被权限拦住的子 agent 与正常干活的子 agent 无法区分；headless 与无应答者的组合则让同一次 ask 以 `'unavailable'` 失败关闭。拒绝的审计记录只落在子 agent 自己的日志里，而且没有任何工具参数或 Web 控件能调整一个正在运行的子会话的沙箱模式或审批策略（Issue #1723）。机制繁重的修复方案——持久化的受阻状态投影、父级通知、目录树徽标，以及穿过 subagent 所有权围栏的权限写入路径——在临近发布时代价不成比例。
+
+## 决策
+
+被委派的子 agent 只在委派时固定的权限范围内行动，审批提示则从它的世界中彻底移除：`captureDelegatedPolicyOverrides(parent)`（`dsh-subagent/src/child-agent.ts`）仍对父会话的显式沙箱覆盖项建立快照，但只要审批能力已组合，就把 `approvalPolicy: 'never'` 钉定下来——不再读取父级自身的审批策略。`appendDelegatedPolicyOverrides()` 把这个钉定作为持久化的 `approval/policy { policy: 'never', source: 'delegation' }` 事件写入子 agent 的日志，与沙箱快照走完全相同的一次性与可继续委派路径，因此冷恢复会重放它，fork 种子中陈旧的父级策略也会输给它。
+
+强制执行沿用既有的 `ApprovalService` `'never'` 语义，落在裁决 ask 的唯一操作上：子 agent 的每次 ask——bash 或 fs 的 `sandbox_permissions` 升级、hook 驱动的权限询问、任何未来的请求方——都在咨询任何应答者之前确定性地解析为 `'rejected'`，同时仍在子日志上留下 `approval/asked`／`approval/decided` 审计对。子 agent 的全部权限故事因此就是它的沙箱范围：`danger-full-access` 父级委派出的子 agent 无需任何审批，`read-only` 父级委派出的子 agent 没有任何逃生通道，而放宽的决定始终属于父级一侧（先放宽父会话，再重新委派或继续 follow-up）。
+
+每个进程内子 agent 都被告知而非被困住：`applyChildComposition` 注册作用域内的 `subagent:delegation` 运行时上下文声明（order 120，位于 `sandbox:policy` 与 `approval:policy` 语句之后），声明权限范围已在启动时固定、需要审批的操作会被自动拒绝、需要更宽访问的任务应以上报限制收尾而不是重试。该声明是运行时上下文贡献而非系统提示词 section，因此部署的系统提示词在父子之间保持统一（快照测试套件钉住了这一统一性），该事实也随策略语句乘坐同一份持久化快照。
+
+本决策取代[进程内委派策略决策](2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)中的审批一半，并推翻其「强制 `'never'` 会排除未来的子 agent 应答器」的结论：审批继承已经落地，产生的正是上述不可见的受阻状态；未来若要引入子 agent 应答器，必须先推翻本 note。
+
+## 考虑过的替代方案
+
+- **继承父级的审批覆盖项**（先前的行为）：不予采纳。只有已处于 `'never'` 的父级才产生确定性的子 agent；交互式父级种出的子 agent，其 ask 要么等待一个无人在看的提示，要么以 `'unavailable'` 失败关闭，结果取决于当时恰好接入了哪些界面。
+- **受阻状态可见性与逐子级权限调整**（#1723 原有的验收）：延后而非否决。`list_agents` 的受阻标注、经由结算投递 seam 的父级通知、目录树徽标，以及 subagent 专用的权限通道仍是更完整的设计，但每一项都需要独立的 seam 工作；一旦子 agent 不可能进入等待审批的受阻状态，这些都不再是必需。
+- **把子 agent 的 ask 路由到父控制器**：仍按[审批 seam Agent Note](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md) 延后。它需要父链所有权与发起 spawn 的 `callId`。
+- **在 `ApprovalService` 内按会话来源钉定**：不予采纳。这会让审批包耦合委派词汇，并重复一个委派边界已经拥有的决定；委派种入的事件之所以可强制执行，是因为当前不存在任何能切换子会话策略的写入路径（`/permission` 命令要求通用 Host 路由，而 subagent 所有权围栏对子会话拒绝该路由）。
+
+## 后果
+
+- 子 agent 的沙箱继承就是委派权限模型的全部；`DelegatedPolicyOverrides.approvalPolicy` 字段收窄为 `'never' | undefined`（仅在未组合审批能力时为 `undefined`）。
+- 模型可见：每个子 agent 的运行时上下文快照携带 `subagent:delegation` 声明以及固定的审批已禁用语句；父级请求不变。executor 边界测试证明：即使根部有一个本会批准的应答者，子 agent 的升级仍被拒绝且不咨询该应答者，审计对照常落日志。
+- 边界：进程内一次性、可继续以及 workflow 派生的子 agent 都经由共享辅助函数强制执行；`subagent-acp` 子 agent 保留该提供方显式的机器 `permission` 策略；`claude-code`、`codex` 与 `dsh-sdk` 子 agent 运行在外部进程中，由各自的组合决定。
+- 在钉定之前持久化的子 agent 冷恢复时折叠到部署审批默认值；处于预发布阶段，不添加迁移。
+- 快照夹具记录了该钉定：每个进程内子日志都新增委派 `approval/policy` 事件，`subagent-published-run-failure` 现在会持久化一份单事件子日志，而此前该子 agent 不留任何持久化事件。