diff --git a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.i18n.yaml b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.i18n.yaml index 7a11b5e95f..3b28349045 100644 --- a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.i18n.yaml +++ b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.i18n.yaml @@ -2,5 +2,5 @@ # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority; # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with: # pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md -2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md: e93a066aca1a39fb177a7ae3c2f71f44724befd7 -2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md: e4d5254504d2f2318c6b7646f09156dfef4d7619 +2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md: 4459e121c09fe566efc9a35604df10dae223928c +2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md: 307f39d3664e5e9f837ce630fc8c8b442bc4d821 diff --git a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md index e93a066aca..4459e121c0 100644 --- a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md +++ b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.md @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ The [sandbox decision](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) leaves `PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32` emp ## Decision -Implement the rung directly on the raw ACL mechanism: duplicate the caller's token into a `WRITE_RESTRICTED` token (`CreateRestrictedToken` with `WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`) whose restricting SIDs include an orphan SID (`S-1-4-x-y`); the orphan SID's Write ACEs on the workspace and temp roots are the entire write allowlist, because `WRITE_RESTRICTED` intersects write accesses only and reads keep the caller's full ambient access. The mechanism is the one huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (`10e4dfb`) demonstrates; this port checks every API call and fails closed (the POC fail-opened on every ignored return value). The orphan SID is PER SESSION, not per spawn: the seam provisions one SID per session as a log-only `sandbox/acl-session` event on the session log (fork mints a fresh one; resume replays the same one), materializes its ACEs lazily at the session's first confined execution, and holds them for the server process's lifetime (revoked on provider dispose; idempotent re-grant skips the eager full-tree re-propagation when the exact ACE survives a restart — no garbage collection). The token's restricting list is dual-mode: list I (`read-only` = logon SID, Everyone, orphan — no Authenticated Users, so CIM is unavailable but the ambient AU-writable surface, notably the C:\-root tree-creation escape, is closed) and list J (`workspace-write` = + Authenticated Users, keeping the CIM path alive at the cost of that residual surface); the verified keep-alive invariants are logon SID + Everyone for early DLL init and CNG, and Authenticated Users for the WMI namespace security check alone. Workspace-write children see a PRIVATE per-session temp subdirectory (`\dsh-`, TMP/TEMP rewritten by the runner — bwrap `--tmpfs /tmp` semantics). It ships as [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md) (backend plus the `./runner` argv-prefix entry), the `win32` chain rung of [`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md), and [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) as the confining executor; the Windows platform layer re-enables the full permission surface (sandbox/sandbox-policy/permission/approval/fs-sandbox) over the confined pwsh stack. +Implement the rung directly on the raw ACL mechanism: duplicate the caller's token into a `WRITE_RESTRICTED` token (`CreateRestrictedToken` with `WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`) whose restricting SIDs include an orphan SID (`S-1-4-x-y`); the orphan SID's Write ACEs on the workspace and temp roots are the entire write allowlist, because `WRITE_RESTRICTED` intersects write accesses only and reads keep the caller's full ambient access. The mechanism is the one huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (`10e4dfb`) demonstrates; this port checks every API call and fails closed (the POC fail-opened on every ignored return value). The orphan SID is PER SESSION, not per spawn: the seam provisions one SID per session as a log-only `sandbox/acl-session` event on the session log (fork mints a fresh one; resume replays the same one), materializes its ACEs lazily at the session's first confined execution, and holds them for the server process's lifetime (revoked on provider dispose; idempotent re-grant skips the eager full-tree re-propagation when the exact ACE survives a restart — no garbage collection). The token's restricting list is dual-mode: list I (`read-only` = logon SID + Everyone only — no orphan and no Authenticated Users, so CIM is unavailable but the ambient AU-writable surface, notably the C:\-root tree-creation escape, is closed, and a standing grant ACE from an earlier workspace-write period stays INERT: the pass-2 check grants only what the list carries, so read-only remains strictly zero-grant across a `/permission` downgrade or a crash-resumed session, while the unrevoked ACE keeps the re-upgrade free) and list J (`workspace-write` = + Authenticated Users + orphan, keeping the CIM path alive at the cost of that residual surface); the verified keep-alive invariants are logon SID + Everyone for early DLL init and CNG, and Authenticated Users for the WMI namespace security check alone. Workspace-write children see a PRIVATE per-session temp subdirectory (`\dsh-`, TMP/TEMP rewritten by the runner — bwrap `--tmpfs /tmp` semantics). It ships as [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md) (backend plus the `./runner` argv-prefix entry), the `win32` chain rung of [`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md), and [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) as the confining executor; the Windows platform layer re-enables the full permission surface (sandbox/sandbox-policy/permission/approval/fs-sandbox) over the confined pwsh stack. ## How the restriction works (why no new identity) @@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ The [landstrip evaluation](../../rejected/feature/2026-07-26-evaluate-landstrip- ## Consequences -Bought: write-only confinement with no new OS floor (`CreateRestrictedToken` predates the mxc releases by two decades), reads/network/process visibility untouched exactly as the mode vocabulary requires, and fail-closed errors carrying the API name and the exact Win32 code. Cost: no read-side or network isolation; console isolation unavailable (hidden-console children die with `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED`; children share the host console); standing ACE mutations on the granted roots (caller-owned directories, revoked by provider dispose, self-healing across restarts via the durable per-session record); grant materialization is an EAGER full-tree propagation (`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` walks every descendant immediately — tens of seconds on large workspaces), paid once per session per server lifetime by the per-session reuse; `read-only` loses CIM (AuthUsers dropped — the WMI namespace security check fails, and `Get-ComputerInfo` silently returns incomplete results), while `workspace-write` retains the Authenticated-Users residual (a C:\-root tree-creation escape) as the price of a working CIM path; `whoami` and token-inspection cmdlets fail under the restricted token (diagnostic noise, documented). +Bought: write-only confinement with no new OS floor (`CreateRestrictedToken` predates the mxc releases by two decades), reads/network/process visibility untouched exactly as the mode vocabulary requires, and fail-closed errors carrying the API name and the exact Win32 code. Cost: no read-side or network isolation; console isolation unavailable (hidden-console children die with `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED`; children share the host console); standing ACE mutations on the granted roots (caller-owned directories, revoked by provider dispose, self-healing across restarts via the durable per-session record); grant materialization is an EAGER full-tree propagation (`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` walks every descendant immediately — tens of seconds on large workspaces), paid once per session per server lifetime by the per-session reuse; `read-only` loses CIM (AuthUsers dropped — the WMI namespace security check fails, and `Get-ComputerInfo` silently returns incomplete results), while `workspace-write` retains the Authenticated-Users residual (a C:\-root tree-creation escape) as the price of a working CIM path; `whoami` and token-inspection cmdlets fail under the restricted token (diagnostic noise, documented); and BOTH confined modes run `pwsh` in ConstrainedLanguage mode — the restricted token trips PowerShell's lockdown detection, so `Add-Type`, non-core .NET statics (`[System.IO.*]::`, `[math]::`), COM objects, and reflection fail with "only core types" errors while `-f` formatting, property access, and core cmdlets/types keep working, and the language mode cannot be lifted back to FullLanguage from inside — taught to the model in the pwsh tool description and documented in the package README's Known Limitations. ## Testing -The product-visible Windows roster flip is win32-only, so the keyless snapshot fixtures — which must replay on macOS/Linux — cannot cover it; the bundle composition specs ([`base.spec.ts`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts), [`windows-shell.spec.ts`](../../../../apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts)) plus the win32 real-runner suites (`packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/`, `packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/tests/`) are the substitute evidence, and the CI Windows lane owns the assembled signal. The per-session grant machinery is pinned cross-platform by `packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-session.spec.ts` (record fold/provision, one-shot materialization, fork/resume SID reuse, dispose revocation — Win32 surface mocked) and on win32 by `grant.spec.ts` (real-DACL materialization), the `acl.spec.ts` idempotent-grant fast-path, and the `runner.spec.ts` `--write-sid` contract (caller-owned grants, private temp subdir through TMP/TEMP, dual-mode CIM probes). +The product-visible Windows roster flip is win32-only, so the keyless snapshot fixtures — which must replay on macOS/Linux — cannot cover it; the bundle composition specs ([`base.spec.ts`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts), [`windows-shell.spec.ts`](../../../../apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts)) plus the win32 real-runner suites (`packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/`, `packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/tests/`) are the substitute evidence, and the CI Windows lane owns the assembled signal. The per-session grant machinery is pinned cross-platform by `packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-session.spec.ts` (record fold/provision, one-shot materialization, fork/resume SID reuse, dispose revocation, and the mode-switch cycle — read-only materializes nothing, the upgrade materializes once, the downgrade keeps the standing grant — with the Win32 surface mocked) and on win32 by `grant.spec.ts` (real-DACL materialization), the `acl.spec.ts` idempotent-grant fast-path, and the `runner.spec.ts` `--write-sid` contract (caller-owned grants, private temp subdir through TMP/TEMP, dual-mode CIM probes, the mode-downgrade regression — a standing grant ACE is inert under read-only and effective again on re-upgrade — and the ConstrainedLanguage pins in both modes). ## Related diff --git a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md index e4d5254504..307f39d366 100644 --- a/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md +++ b/.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-08-08-windows-acl-restricted-token-sandbox.zh.md @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Status: implemented ## Decision -直接基于原始 ACL 机制实现该档：把调用者令牌复制为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 受限令牌（`CreateRestrictedToken`，`WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`），其 restricting SIDs 中包含孤儿 SID（`S-1-4-x-y`）；工作区与临时目录上孤儿 SID 的 Write ACE 就是全部写入白名单，因为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 只对写访问做交集检查，读保持调用者的完整环境访问。该机制来自 huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc（`10e4dfb`）的演示；本移植检查每一个 API 调用并 fail-closed（POC 因忽略返回值而 fail-open）。孤儿 SID 按会话而非按 spawn：seam 每会话供给一个 SID，作为 log-only 的 `sandbox/acl-session` 事件记录在会话日志中（fork 铸出新 SID；恢复回放同一个），其 ACE 在该会话首次受限执行时惰性物化，并在服务器进程生命周期内持有（提供方 dispose（资源释放）时回收；幂等重授权在该 ACE 跨重启原样存续时跳过急切的全树重传播——不做垃圾回收）。令牌的 restricting list 为双模式：list I（`read-only` = 登录 SID、Everyone、孤儿——不含 Authenticated Users，因此 CIM 不可用，但环境 AU 可写面（尤其是 C:\-root 建树逃逸）被关闭）与 list J（`workspace-write` = + Authenticated Users，以保留该残余面为代价维持 CIM 通路存活）；经验证的保活不变式是登录 SID + Everyone 支撑早期 DLL init 与 CNG，Authenticated Users 仅支撑 WMI namespace 安全校验。Workspace-write 子进程看到的是私有的每会话临时子目录（`\dsh-`，TMP/TEMP 由 runner 重写——bwrap `--tmpfs /tmp` 语义）。它以 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md)（后端加 `./runner` argv 前缀入口）、[`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md) 的 `win32` 链档、以及作为隔离执行器的 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) 交付；Windows 平台层在受限 pwsh 栈之上重新启用完整权限面（sandbox/sandbox-policy/permission/approval/fs-sandbox）。 +直接基于原始 ACL 机制实现该档：把调用者令牌复制为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 受限令牌（`CreateRestrictedToken`，`WRITE_RESTRICTED` + `DISABLE_MAX_PRIVILEGE` + `LUA_TOKEN`），其 restricting SIDs 中包含孤儿 SID（`S-1-4-x-y`）；工作区与临时目录上孤儿 SID 的 Write ACE 就是全部写入白名单，因为 `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 只对写访问做交集检查，读保持调用者的完整环境访问。该机制来自 huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc（`10e4dfb`）的演示；本移植检查每一个 API 调用并 fail-closed（POC 因忽略返回值而 fail-open）。孤儿 SID 按会话而非按 spawn：seam 每会话供给一个 SID，作为 log-only 的 `sandbox/acl-session` 事件记录在会话日志中（fork 铸出新 SID；恢复回放同一个），其 ACE 在该会话首次受限执行时惰性物化，并在服务器进程生命周期内持有（提供方 dispose（资源释放）时回收；幂等重授权在该 ACE 跨重启原样存续时跳过急切的全树重传播——不做垃圾回收）。令牌的 restricting list 为双模式：list I（`read-only` = 仅登录 SID + Everyone——不含孤儿 SID 与 Authenticated Users，因此 CIM 不可用，但环境 AU 可写面（尤其是 C:\-root 建树逃逸）被关闭，且先前 workspace-write 时期留下的驻留授权 ACE 保持**失效**：pass-2 检查只授予列表所携带的内容，因此 read-only 在 `/permission` 降级或崩溃后恢复的会话中始终保持严格零授权，而未撤销的 ACE 让重新升级保持零成本）与 list J（`workspace-write` = + Authenticated Users + 孤儿 SID，以保留该残余面为代价维持 CIM 通路存活）；经验证的保活不变式是登录 SID + Everyone 支撑早期 DLL init 与 CNG，Authenticated Users 仅支撑 WMI namespace 安全校验。Workspace-write 子进程看到的是私有的每会话临时子目录（`\dsh-`，TMP/TEMP 由 runner 重写——bwrap `--tmpfs /tmp` 语义）。它以 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md)（后端加 `./runner` argv 前缀入口）、[`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.md) 的 `win32` 链档、以及作为隔离执行器的 [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox`](../../../../packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/README.md) 交付；Windows 平台层在受限 pwsh 栈之上重新启用完整权限面（sandbox/sandbox-policy/permission/approval/fs-sandbox）。 ## How the restriction works (why no new identity) @@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ AppContainer 令牌没有环境读访问：每个可读路径都必须预先通 ## Consequences -所得：仅写隔离、不引入新的 OS 版本下限（`CreateRestrictedToken` 比 mxc 的版本早二十年）、读/网络/进程可见性完全不受影响（与模式词汇表一致）、fail-closed 错误携带 API 名与精确 Win32 错误码。所失：无读侧或网络隔离；控制台隔离不可用（隐藏控制台子进程以 `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED` 死亡；子进程共享宿主控制台）；被授权根目录上有驻留 ACE 改动（目录须为调用者所有，由提供方 dispose 回收，借助持久化的每会话记录跨重启自愈）；授权物化是急切的全树传播（`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` 立即遍历每个后代——在大型工作区上耗时数十秒），因每会话复用，每个服务器生命周期每会话只付一次；`read-only` 失去 CIM（AuthUsers 被移除——WMI namespace 安全校验失败，`Get-ComputerInfo` 静默返回不完整结果），而 `workspace-write` 保留 Authenticated-Users 残余面（C:\-root 建树逃逸）作为 CIM 通路可用的代价；`whoami` 与令牌检查 cmdlet 在受限令牌下失败（诊断噪音，已记录）。 +所得：仅写隔离、不引入新的 OS 版本下限（`CreateRestrictedToken` 比 mxc 的版本早二十年）、读/网络/进程可见性完全不受影响（与模式词汇表一致）、fail-closed 错误携带 API 名与精确 Win32 错误码。所失：无读侧或网络隔离；控制台隔离不可用（隐藏控制台子进程以 `STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED` 死亡；子进程共享宿主控制台）；被授权根目录上有驻留 ACE 改动（目录须为调用者所有，由提供方 dispose 回收，借助持久化的每会话记录跨重启自愈）；授权物化是急切的全树传播（`SetNamedSecurityInfoW` 立即遍历每个后代——在大型工作区上耗时数十秒），因每会话复用，每个服务器生命周期每会话只付一次；`read-only` 失去 CIM（AuthUsers 被移除——WMI namespace 安全校验失败，`Get-ComputerInfo` 静默返回不完整结果），而 `workspace-write` 保留 Authenticated-Users 残余面（C:\-root 建树逃逸）作为 CIM 通路可用的代价；`whoami` 与令牌检查 cmdlet 在受限令牌下失败（诊断噪音，已记录）；且**两种**受限模式都以 ConstrainedLanguage 模式运行 `pwsh`——受限令牌触发 PowerShell 的锁定检测，因此 `Add-Type`、非核心 .NET 静态调用（`[System.IO.*]::`、`[math]::`）、COM 对象与反射都会以“only core types”错误失败，而 `-f` 格式化、属性访问与核心 cmdlet/类型继续工作，语言模式也无法从内部提升回 FullLanguage——已在 pwsh 工具描述中教给模型，并记录在包 README 的 Known Limitations 中。 ## Testing -产品可见的 Windows 阵容切换仅存在于 win32，而 keyless 快照夹具必须在 macOS/Linux 上可重放，因此无法覆盖它；替代证据是 bundle 组合 spec（[`base.spec.ts`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts)、[`windows-shell.spec.ts`](../../../../apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts)）加上 win32 真实 runner 套件（`packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/`、`packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/tests/`），组装态信号由 CI 的 Windows lane 负责。每会话授权机制在跨平台侧由 `packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-session.spec.ts` 钉住（记录 fold/供给、一次性物化、fork/恢复 SID 复用、dispose 回收——mock 掉 Win32 表面），win32 侧由 `grant.spec.ts`（真实 DACL 物化）、`acl.spec.ts` 的幂等授权快速路径与 `runner.spec.ts` 的 `--write-sid` 契约（调用者所有目录的授权、经 TMP/TEMP 的私有临时子目录、双模式 CIM 探针）钉住。 +产品可见的 Windows 阵容切换仅存在于 win32，而 keyless 快照夹具必须在 macOS/Linux 上可重放，因此无法覆盖它；替代证据是 bundle 组合 spec（[`base.spec.ts`](../../../../packages/bundle/base/tests/base.spec.ts)、[`windows-shell.spec.ts`](../../../../apps/cli/tests/windows-shell.spec.ts)）加上 win32 真实 runner 套件（`packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/`、`packages/bash/pwsh-sandbox/tests/`），组装态信号由 CI 的 Windows lane 负责。每会话授权机制在跨平台侧由 `packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-session.spec.ts` 钉住（记录 fold/供给、一次性物化、fork/恢复 SID 复用、dispose 回收，以及模式切换循环——read-only 不物化任何内容、升级只物化一次、降级保留驻留授权——mock 掉 Win32 表面），win32 侧由 `grant.spec.ts`（真实 DACL 物化）、`acl.spec.ts` 的幂等授权快速路径与 `runner.spec.ts` 的 `--write-sid` 契约（调用者所有目录的授权、经 TMP/TEMP 的私有临时子目录、双模式 CIM 探针、模式降级回归——驻留授权 ACE 在 read-only 下失效并在重新升级后再度生效——以及两种模式下对 ConstrainedLanguage 的钉定）钉住。 ## Related diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/src/index.ts b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/src/index.ts index 596665cffb..fb1a76cc9c 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/src/index.ts +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/src/index.ts @@ -378,8 +378,12 @@ export class LocalSandboxProvider extends SandboxProvider { * session's first confined execution, reused for every later call (the map * hit is the whole call). Workspace-write grants the workspace root and * the private temp subdirectory (created here); read-only materializes - * NOTHING — its token alone restricts every write. Fail-closed: a - * half-materialized grant is revoked before the error propagates. + * NOTHING — its token alone restricts every write, and a standing grant + * from an earlier workspace-write period is KEPT through a downgrade + * (never revoked): the read-only restricted token carries no orphan SID + * (list I), so the ACE is inert there, while the map hit keeps the + * re-upgrade free of re-propagation. Fail-closed: a half-materialized + * grant is revoked before the error propagates. * @param record - the session's durable record. * @param mode - the policy mode (grants exist only under workspace-write). */ diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-session.spec.ts b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-session.spec.ts index b39451d8ea..7ebb5ff2ed 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-session.spec.ts +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/tests/acl-session.spec.ts @@ -150,6 +150,68 @@ describe('windows-acl per-session grant (LocalSandboxProvider)', () => { } }) + it('mode switch: read-only materializes nothing, the upgrade materializes ONCE with the same SID, and the downgrade keeps the standing grant (no revoke, no re-grant)', async () => { + try { + const { ctx, sandbox } = await setup() + const ws = workspaceRoot() + scratch.push(ws) + const privateTemp = sessionTempDir('sess-switch') + scratch.push(privateTemp) + const session = ctx.sessions.create(SessionId('sess-switch'), { meta: { cwd: ws } }) + const readOnly: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: 'sess-switch' } + const workspaceWrite: SandboxPolicy = { mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: ws, sessionId: 'sess-switch' } + + // Read-only first: the record still rides along (--write-sid, one + // event) but NOTHING is materialized and the ambient temp root is + // passed — the map stays empty, so the later upgrade must materialize. + const confinedRo = sandbox.confine(['true'], readOnly) + expect(confinedRo.argv).toEqual([ + 'node', 'windows-acl-runner.js', + '--workspace', ws, + '--temp', tmpdir(), + '--mode', 'read-only', + '--write-sid', 'S-1-4-42-42', + '--', + 'true', + ]) + expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(0) + expect(existsSync(privateTemp)).toBe(false) + + // Upgrade: the FIRST workspace-write confine materializes the grant + // (the map was empty — read-only never wrote it) with the SAME SID + // and the private temp dir, so the upgrade path cannot dead-end. + const upgraded = sandbox.confine(['true'], workspaceWrite) + expect(upgraded.argv).toEqual([ + 'node', 'windows-acl-runner.js', + '--workspace', ws, + '--temp', privateTemp, + '--mode', 'workspace-write', + '--write-sid', 'S-1-4-42-42', + '--', + 'true', + ]) + expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(1) + expect(mockState.grants[0]).toMatchObject({ writeSid: 'S-1-4-42-42', added: [ws, privateTemp], disposed: false }) + expect(existsSync(privateTemp)).toBe(true) + + // Reuse: the second workspace-write call is the map hit. + sandbox.confine(['true'], workspaceWrite) + expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(1) + + // Downgrade: the standing grant is KEPT — never revoked, never + // re-granted. The read-only restricted token's list I carries no + // orphan SID (pinned by the windows-acl runner regression), so the + // ACE is inert under read-only while the map hit keeps the + // re-upgrade free of eager propagation. + sandbox.confine(['true'], readOnly) + expect(mockState.grants).toHaveLength(1) + expect(mockState.grants[0]!.disposed).toBe(false) + expect(session.events.filter(event => event.type === 'sandbox/acl-session')).toHaveLength(1) + } finally { + cleanup() + } + }) + it('resume: a seeded record replays with the SAME SID and no second event is appended', async () => { try { const ws = workspaceRoot() diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.i18n.yaml b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.i18n.yaml index 875a1a441d..80a35821d4 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.i18n.yaml +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.i18n.yaml @@ -2,5 +2,5 @@ # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority; # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with: # pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md -README.md: 1969515f6692eda059fd5e83449d68c6a4da5c4f -README.zh.md: 4c751ba6dc45bca8cd600b0313b342e37e9ebe54 +README.md: 2e3a16fa84541ffb2eb442c953777f37407e1b46 +README.zh.md: e58b70a120875ee57fe6e90376f7e36d9ce32ca3 diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md index 1969515f66..2e3a16fa84 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ The runner creates the restricted token, spawns the wrapped argv under it with t Modes (the token's restricting-SID list follows the mode): - `workspace-write` (list J = logon SID, Everyone, Authenticated Users, orphan): the workspace and the session's PRIVATE temp subdirectory carry the orphan-SID Write grant; every other write is denied by the token intersection. Authenticated Users stays in the list so the CIM path keeps working (`Get-CimInstance`, `Get-ComputerInfo`); the price is the residual Authenticated-Users-writable surface — notably the C:\ drive root, where standing `AU:(AD)` + `AU:(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)` ACEs admit an AU-confined tree-creation escape — see the design note. -- `read-only` (list I = logon SID, Everyone, orphan): STRICT zero grants — nothing is writable, and the token also DROPS Authenticated Users for a zero ambient-write surface (the C:\-root escape above is closed). The NUL device is a securable object and is NOT granted (unlike Linux's `/dev/null` sink): `Set-Content NUL` and native `> NUL` writes fail with access denied, while PowerShell's `> $null` redirection keeps working (it discards without opening NUL). The cost is CIM unavailability: the WMI namespace security check fails (`0x80041003`), so CIM cmdlets and `Get-ComputerInfo` (which silently returns incomplete results rather than an error) are unavailable — the model-facing surface documents that contract, not a prompt promise. +- `read-only` (list I = logon SID, Everyone — NO orphan): STRICT zero grants — nothing is writable, and the token also DROPS Authenticated Users for a zero ambient-write surface (the C:\-root escape above is closed). The orphan stays OUT of list I on purpose: a standing grant ACE from an earlier workspace-write period (a `/permission` downgrade, or a crash-resumed session) remains INERT under read-only because the write-restricted pass-2 check grants only what the restricting list carries — while the unrevoked ACE keeps the re-upgrade free of re-propagation. The NUL device is a securable object and is NOT granted (unlike Linux's `/dev/null` sink): `Set-Content NUL` and native `> NUL` writes fail with access denied, while PowerShell's `> $null` redirection keeps working (it discards without opening NUL). The cost is CIM unavailability: the WMI namespace security check fails (`0x80041003`), so CIM cmdlets and `Get-ComputerInfo` (which silently returns incomplete results rather than an error) are unavailable — the model-facing surface documents that contract, not a prompt promise. The `AclSandbox` class (`tempDir: null` disables the temp grant) remains the programmatic API for direct spawns; `AclWriteGrant` is the server-side materialization half of the per-session contract. @@ -82,3 +82,4 @@ None directly; the denial surface belongs to the tool layer. - **Resuming one session concurrently in two server processes grants two SIDs.** The durable record lives in the session log; both processes read or provision it independently, the per-path lock keeps the DACL merges consistent, and the last-written record wins for future resumes — the losing SID's ACEs are revoked by its own process's dispose. Single-writer session usage (the normal deployment) never sees this. - **Read-side confinement and network policy are out of scope** — `WRITE_RESTRICTED` intersects write accesses only; pair this backend with a read-side policy for stronger confinement. - **Wide-directory and FAT-volume warnings are deferred** — the UI-side warnings for granting unusually wide directories or FAT-class (non-ACL) volumes are not yet implemented; a FAT volume simply fails the grant loudly. +- **Both confined modes run `pwsh` in ConstrainedLanguage.** The restricted token trips PowerShell's lockdown detection, so under `read-only` AND `workspace-write` the language mode is ConstrainedLanguage: `Add-Type` (C# compile, P/Invoke), non-core .NET static calls (`[System.IO.*]::`, `[math]::`, `[Environment]::`), COM objects, and reflection fail with `Cannot create type` / `Cannot invoke method` ("only core types") errors, and `$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode = 'FullLanguage'` is refused. Core cmdlets, core types (`[string]`, `[datetime]`, `[regex]`, `[guid]`), `-f` formatting, and property access keep working. The `pwsh` tool description teaches this contract to the model; `danger-full-access` calls run unconfined at FullLanguage. diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.zh.md b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.zh.md index 4c751ba6dc..e58b70a120 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.zh.md +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.zh.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ runner 创建受限令牌，在令牌下启动被包裹的 argv，stdio 直接 模式（令牌的 restricting SID 列表随模式而定）： - `workspace-write`（列表 J = 登录 SID、Everyone、Authenticated Users、孤儿 SID）：工作区与会话的**私有**临时子目录携带孤儿 SID 的 Write 授权；其余写全部被令牌交集拒绝。Authenticated Users 保留在列表中，CIM 路径才能继续工作（`Get-CimInstance`、`Get-ComputerInfo`）；代价是残留的 Authenticated Users 可写面——尤其是 C:\ 盘根，那里驻留的 `AU:(AD)` + `AU:(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)` ACE 允许 AU 受限的子进程通过创建目录树逃逸——见设计笔记。 -- `read-only`（列表 I = 登录 SID、Everyone、孤儿 SID）：**严格零授权**——没有任何可写位置，令牌还**去掉** Authenticated Users，让环境写入面归零（上述 C:\ 根逃逸被关闭）。NUL 设备是带安全描述符的对象，同样不被授权（区别于 Linux 的 `/dev/null` sink）：`Set-Content NUL` 与原生 `> NUL` 写会以 access denied 失败，而 PowerShell 的 `> $null` 重定向不受影响（它直接丢弃、不打开 NUL）。代价是 CIM 不可用：WMI 命名空间安全检查失败（`0x80041003`），因此 CIM cmdlet 与 `Get-ComputerInfo`（静默返回不完整结果而非报错）不可用——模型可见面文档化的是这一契约，而非提示词承诺。 +- `read-only`（列表 I = 登录 SID、Everyone——不含孤儿 SID）：**严格零授权**——没有任何可写位置，令牌还**去掉** Authenticated Users，让环境写入面归零（上述 C:\ 根逃逸被关闭）。孤儿 SID 有意留在列表 I **之外**：先前 workspace-write 时期留下的驻留授权 ACE（`/permission` 降级，或崩溃后恢复的会话）在 read-only 下保持**失效**，因为 write-restricted 的 pass-2 检查只授予 restricting 列表所携带的内容——而未撤销的 ACE 让重新升级免于重新传播。NUL 设备是带安全描述符的对象，同样不被授权（区别于 Linux 的 `/dev/null` sink）：`Set-Content NUL` 与原生 `> NUL` 写会以 access denied 失败，而 PowerShell 的 `> $null` 重定向不受影响（它直接丢弃、不打开 NUL）。代价是 CIM 不可用：WMI 命名空间安全检查失败（`0x80041003`），因此 CIM cmdlet 与 `Get-ComputerInfo`（静默返回不完整结果而非报错）不可用——模型可见面文档化的是这一契约，而非提示词承诺。 `AclSandbox` 类（`tempDir: null` 关闭临时目录授权）仍是直接 spawn 场景的程序化 API；`AclWriteGrant` 是按会话契约中服务器侧的物化半边。 @@ -82,3 +82,4 @@ g++ -std=c++20 -municode -O2 -o abi-probe.exe verify/abi-probe.cpp -ladvapi32 && - **在两个服务器进程中并发恢复同一会话会产生两个 SID。** 持久化记录存放在会话日志中；两个进程各自读取或创建记录，按路径的锁保持 DACL 合并一致，最后写入的记录胜出并用于后续恢复——落败 SID 的 ACE 由其所属进程的 dispose 撤销。单写者的会话用法（常规部署形态）不会遇到这种情况。 - **读侧隔离与网络策略超出范围** —— `WRITE_RESTRICTED` 只对写访问做交集检查；更强的隔离需叠加读侧策略。 - **宽目录与 FAT 卷警告留待后续** —— 针对异常宽的目录或 FAT 类（无 ACL）卷授权的 UI 侧警告尚未实现；FAT 卷只会让授权立即报错。 +- **两种受限模式都以 ConstrainedLanguage 运行 `pwsh`。** 受限令牌触发 PowerShell 的锁定检测，因此在 `read-only` 与 `workspace-write` 下语言模式都是 ConstrainedLanguage：`Add-Type`（C# 编译、P/Invoke）、非核心 .NET 静态调用（`[System.IO.*]::`、`[math]::`、`[Environment]::`）、COM 对象与反射都会以 `Cannot create type` / `Cannot invoke method`（“only core types”）错误失败，且 `$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode = 'FullLanguage'` 会被拒绝。核心 cmdlet、核心类型（`[string]`、`[datetime]`、`[regex]`、`[guid]`）、`-f` 格式化与属性访问继续工作。`pwsh` 工具描述把这一契约教给模型；`danger-full-access` 调用不受隔离、以 FullLanguage 运行。 diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/src/token.ts b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/src/token.ts index 009592bb28..2b114a6567 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/src/token.ts +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/src/token.ts @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ export interface RestrictingSidSet { * Create the write-restricted token with the mode-selected restricting list * (dual lists verified on Win11 26200, see the POC-worktree restrict-variant * harness): - * - list I (read-only): [logon SID, EVERYONE, orphan] + * - list I (read-only): [logon SID, EVERYONE] * - list J (workspace-write): [logon SID, EVERYONE, Authenticated Users, orphan] * * The logon SID and EVERYONE are shared: they keep the early startup chain @@ -121,15 +121,22 @@ export interface RestrictingSidSet { * (0x80041003 otherwise) — read-only drops it for a zero ambient-write * surface (it closes the host's C:\-root tree-creation escape, where * `AU:(AD)` + `AU:(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)` ACEs stand) at the cost of CIM - * unavailability; documented in README. INTERACTIVE/LOCAL are absent from - * BOTH lists — the host's Public tree grants write to INTERACTIVE, so - * removing it closes that escape. S-1-2-1 (console logon) is intentionally - * absent: see win32-abi.ts for the verified failure modes. FAILS CLOSED: any - * failure throws — never spawn unrestricted. + * unavailability; documented in README. List I also carries NO orphan: a + * standing grant ACE from an earlier workspace-write period (a + * `/permission` mode downgrade, or a crash-resumed session) must stay INERT + * under read-only — the WRITE_RESTRICTED pass-2 check grants only what the + * restricting list carries, so omitting the orphan keeps read-only strictly + * zero-grant even with stale ACEs standing, while the unrevoked ACE keeps + * the re-upgrade free (the seam's grant map hits it — no re-propagation). + * INTERACTIVE/LOCAL are absent from BOTH lists — the host's Public tree + * grants write to INTERACTIVE, so removing it closes that escape. S-1-2-1 + * (console logon) is intentionally absent: see win32-abi.ts for the + * verified failure modes. FAILS CLOSED: any failure throws — never spawn + * unrestricted. * @param api - the binding table. * @param currentToken - the process token to restrict. * @param logonSid - the copied logon session SID. - * @param writeSid - the orphan SID forming the write allowlist. + * @param writeSid - the orphan SID forming the write allowlist (list J only). * @param known - the well-known SIDs entering the restricting list. * @param mode - selects the restricting list (I for read-only, J for workspace-write). * @returns the restricted token handle. @@ -143,7 +150,7 @@ export function createRestrictedToken( mode: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write', ): NativePtr { const restrictingSids = buildRestrictingSids(mode === 'read-only' - ? [logonSid, known.world, writeSid] + ? [logonSid, known.world] : [logonSid, known.world, known.authUser, writeSid]) const tokenSlot = allocPtrSlot() const created = api.createRestrictedToken( diff --git a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/runner.spec.ts b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/runner.spec.ts index 8ddd10c474..18af8a8ffd 100644 --- a/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/runner.spec.ts +++ b/packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/tests/runner.spec.ts @@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ describe.skipIf(!isWin32 || !pwshAvailable())('windows-acl runner', () => { it('workspace-write: the confined child writes granted directories only', () => { const probe = [ "$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';", + // The restricted token puts pwsh into ConstrainedLanguage in BOTH modes + // (documented Known Limitation) — pinned here so a token change that + // silently restores FullLanguage is caught. + '\'LANGMODE: \' + $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode;', `try{Set-Content -Path '${writableDir}\\child-wrote.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'TARGET-WRITE: OK'}catch{'TARGET-WRITE: DENIED'};`, `try{Set-Content -Path '${isolatedTemp}\\child-wrote.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'TEMP-WRITE: OK'}catch{'TEMP-WRITE: DENIED'};`, `try{Set-Content -Path '${escapeFile}' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'ESCAPE-WRITE: OK (ESCAPE!)'}catch{'ESCAPE-WRITE: DENIED'};`, @@ -70,6 +74,7 @@ describe.skipIf(!isWin32 || !pwshAvailable())('windows-acl runner', () => { '--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', probe, ]) expect(result.status, `stderr: ${result.stderr}`).toBe(0) + expect(result.stdout).toContain('LANGMODE: ConstrainedLanguage') expect(result.stdout).toContain('TARGET-WRITE: OK') expect(result.stdout).toContain('TEMP-WRITE: OK') expect(result.stdout).toContain('ESCAPE-WRITE: DENIED') @@ -100,6 +105,7 @@ describe.skipIf(!isWin32 || !pwshAvailable())('windows-acl runner', () => { '--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', probe, ]) expect(result.status, `stderr: ${result.stderr}`).toBe(0) + expect(result.stdout).toContain('LANGMODE: ConstrainedLanguage') expect(result.stdout).toContain('TARGET-WRITE: DENIED') expect(result.stdout).toContain('TEMP-WRITE: DENIED') expect(result.stdout).toContain('NUL-WRITE: DENIED') @@ -168,6 +174,46 @@ describe.skipIf(!isWin32 || !pwshAvailable())('windows-acl runner', () => { } }, 30_000) + it('mode-downgrade leak regression: a STANDING workspace grant is inert under read-only and effective again on re-upgrade', () => { + // The reported defect: a session that materialized its grant in + // workspace-write keeps the ACE standing for the server lifetime. After + // switching to read-only, the restricted token's list I must carry NO + // orphan SID — the standing ACE stays but the pass-2 check cannot use + // it, so the workspace write is denied (previously it LEAKED). The + // switch back reuses the SAME standing ACE: the re-upgrade write lands + // without any re-grant. + const writeSid = 'S-1-4-9001-7' + const grant = AclWriteGrant.create(writeSid) + grant.add(writableDir) + try { + const downgradeProbe = [ + "$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';", + `try{Set-Content -Path '${writableDir}\\downgraded.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'DOWNGRADE-WRITE: OK (LEAK!)'}catch{'DOWNGRADE-WRITE: DENIED'}`, + ].join('') + const downgraded = runRunner([ + '--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'read-only', '--write-sid', writeSid, + '--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', downgradeProbe, + ]) + expect(downgraded.status, `stderr: ${downgraded.stderr}`).toBe(0) + expect(downgraded.stdout).toContain('DOWNGRADE-WRITE: DENIED') + expect(existsSync(join(writableDir, 'downgraded.txt'))).toBe(false) + + const reupgradeProbe = [ + "$ErrorActionPreference='SilentlyContinue';", + `try{Set-Content -Path '${writableDir}\\reupgraded.txt' -Value ok -ErrorAction Stop;'REUPGRADE-WRITE: OK'}catch{'REUPGRADE-WRITE: DENIED'}`, + ].join('') + const reupgraded = runRunner([ + '--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'workspace-write', '--write-sid', writeSid, + '--', 'pwsh', '/NoLogo', '/NonInteractive', '/NoProfile', '/Command', reupgradeProbe, + ]) + expect(reupgraded.status, `stderr: ${reupgraded.stderr}`).toBe(0) + expect(reupgraded.stdout).toContain('REUPGRADE-WRITE: OK') + expect(existsSync(join(writableDir, 'reupgraded.txt'))).toBe(true) + } finally { + grant.dispose() + } + }, 30_000) + it('runner-side failure: signature on stderr and exit 127, the command never runs', () => { const result = runRunner(['--workspace', writableDir, '--temp', isolatedTemp, '--mode', 'workspace-write']) expect(result.status).toBe(127)