feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox RFC's deferred cross-family phase. - dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event, renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter. Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session. - dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary. - dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use; approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free. - tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker, and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry. - examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating that disabled the fs stack under confined modes. RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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{
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"AGENTS.md": 1802,
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"docs/AGENTS.md": 1315,
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"docs/architecture.md": 1790,
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"docs/architecture.md": 1800,
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"docs/cordis-primer.md": 550,
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"docs/defensive-patterns.md": 550,
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"docs/testing.md": 800,
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@@ -180,6 +180,15 @@ const SERVICE_ROLES: ServiceRole[] = [
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consumers: ['bash-sandbox'],
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note: 'Consumers hand over the exact argv they are about to spawn; same-world backends wrap it under a per-call policy and report enforcement.',
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},
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{
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key: 'sandboxPolicy',
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pkg: 'sandbox',
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title: 'Sandbox policy home',
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mode: 'core',
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implementations: [],
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consumers: ['bash-sandbox', 'fs-sandbox', 'tool-bash', 'tool-fs'],
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note: 'The one home for the deployment default mode + workspace root and the per-session `sandbox/mode` override; both enforcing families read it so bash and fs cannot confine to different roots.',
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},
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{
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key: 'approval',
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pkg: 'approval',
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@@ -212,10 +221,10 @@ const SERVICE_ROLES: ServiceRole[] = [
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pkg: 'fs',
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title: 'Filesystem provider seam',
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mode: 'seam',
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implementations: ['fs-local'],
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implementations: ['fs-local', 'fs-sandbox'],
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consumers: ['tool-fs'],
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companions: ['fs-policy'],
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note: 'tool-fs executes read/write/edit through ctx.fs; fs-policy contributes observed-state checks through the fs/* event gate.',
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note: 'tool-fs executes read/write/edit through ctx.fs; fs-sandbox fences mutations by the shared sandbox mode; fs-policy contributes observed-state checks through the fs/* event gate.',
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},
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{
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key: 'compact',
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