feat(sandbox): cross-family file sandbox — one policy home, sandboxed fs provider, fs escalation parity

Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.

- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
  deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
  renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
  Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
  write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
  the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
  through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
  re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
  ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
  approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
  approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
  confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
  and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
  that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.

RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
This commit is contained in:
kingwl
2026-07-14 20:05:57 +08:00
parent c3137b5474
commit 2dc62497ce
100 changed files with 2238 additions and 385 deletions

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@@ -99,12 +99,12 @@ describe('acp bridge — session config options', () => {
// Idle: nothing in the log yet — turn-enclosure forbids a bare append.
const session = h.ctx.agents.list()[0]?.session
expect(session?.events.some(e => e.type === 'permission/preset' || e.type === 'bash/sandbox-mode' || e.type === 'approval/policy')).toBe(false)
expect(session?.events.some(e => e.type === 'permission/preset' || e.type === 'sandbox/mode' || e.type === 'approval/policy')).toBe(false)
await h.client.prompt({ sessionId, prompt: [{ type: 'text', text: 'anchor' }] })
const events = session?.events ?? []
expect(events.filter(e => e.type === 'permission/preset').map(e => e.data)).toEqual([{ preset: 'danger-full-access' }])
expect(events.filter(e => e.type === 'bash/sandbox-mode').map(e => e.data)).toEqual([{ mode: 'danger-full-access' }])
expect(events.filter(e => e.type === 'sandbox/mode').map(e => e.data)).toEqual([{ mode: 'danger-full-access' }])
expect(events.filter(e => e.type === 'approval/policy').map(e => e.data)).toEqual([{ policy: 'never' }])
const turnStart = events.findIndex(e => e.type === 'turn/start')
const anchored = events.findIndex(e => e.type === 'permission/preset')
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ describe('acp bridge — session config options', () => {
expect(back.configOptions).toEqual([permissionOption('workspace-write')])
await h.client.prompt({ sessionId, prompt: [{ type: 'text', text: 'anchor' }] })
const events = h.ctx.agents.list()[0]?.session.events ?? []
expect(events.some(e => e.type === 'permission/preset' || e.type === 'bash/sandbox-mode' || e.type === 'approval/policy')).toBe(false)
expect(events.some(e => e.type === 'permission/preset' || e.type === 'sandbox/mode' || e.type === 'approval/policy')).toBe(false)
})
it('a no-op switch (the value already shown) records nothing and keeps a live pending', async () => {
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ describe('acp bridge — session config options', () => {
const anchored = events.findIndex(e => e.type === 'permission/preset')
expect(turnStart).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0)
expect(anchored).toBeGreaterThan(turnStart)
expect(events.some(e => e.type === 'bash/sandbox-mode')).toBe(true)
expect(events.some(e => e.type === 'sandbox/mode')).toBe(true)
expect(events.some(e => e.type === 'approval/policy')).toBe(true)
await h.client.cancel({ sessionId })
await hung
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ describe('acp bridge — session config options', () => {
const agent = h.ctx.agents.list()[0]
if (agent === undefined) throw new Error('expected an agent')
agent.session.append('turn/start', { turn: 1, trigger: { kind: 'message', source: { kind: 'user' } } })
agent.session.append('bash/sandbox-mode', { mode: 'read-only' })
agent.session.append('sandbox/mode', { mode: 'read-only' })
agent.session.append('turn/end', { turn: 1, reason: { kind: 'completed' } })
// The echo of the derived current is a no-op, not an unknown-value error…
const echo = await h.client.setSessionConfigOption({ sessionId, configId: 'permission', value: 'custom' })

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
"peerDependencies": {
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash": "^0.0.1",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox": "^0.0.1",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy": "^0.0.1",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-session": "^0.0.1",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval": "^0.0.1",
"cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.6"
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
"devDependencies": {
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash": "workspace:^",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox": "workspace:^",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy": "workspace:^",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-session": "workspace:^",
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval": "workspace:^",
"cordis": "^4.0.0-rc.6"

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/**
* User-facing PERMISSION PRESETS: one product-level knob over the two
* mechanism knobs. A preset names a bundle — its sandbox mode
* (`bash/sandbox-mode`) and its approval policy (`approval/policy`) — so a
* (`sandbox/mode`) and its approval policy (`approval/policy`) — so a
* user picks `workspace-write` or `danger-full-access` while the mechanism
* tiers stay orthogonal capabilities. Switching a preset WRITES THROUGH: one `permission/preset` event
* records the chosen bundle (the audit fact reverse-mapping cannot recover —
@@ -19,7 +19,10 @@ import { Context, Service } from 'cordis'
import z from 'schemastery'
import type { Session, SessionEvent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
import type { SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
import { SANDBOX_MODES, effectiveSandboxMode, setSandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
import { SANDBOX_MODES, effectiveSandboxMode, setSandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy'
// Side-effect type import: declaration-merges `ctx.bash` (the capability fact
// `sandboxMode` this service reads), without a value dependency on the seam.
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
import type { ApprovalPolicy } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval'
import { APPROVAL_POLICIES, effectiveApprovalPolicy, setApprovalPolicy } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval'
@@ -33,7 +36,7 @@ declare module '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session' {
interface SessionEventMap {
/**
* The session's permission preset was switched — log-only (the
* `bash/sandbox-mode` precedent): durable and replayable, never in the
* `sandbox/mode` precedent): durable and replayable, never in the
* model transcript. The LAST such event is the session's preset
* ({@link effectivePermissionPreset}); the knob events the switch wrote
* through follow it in the same turn, and they — not this record of the
@@ -48,7 +51,7 @@ declare module '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session' {
* runs under while the preset is active — plus its presentation.
*/
export interface PresetSpec {
/** The `bash/sandbox-mode` value the preset writes through. */
/** The `sandbox/mode` value the preset writes through. */
sandbox: SandboxMode
/** The `approval/policy` value the preset writes through. */
approval: ApprovalPolicy

View File

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ describe('PermissionService', () => {
it('a knob state matching no table entry derives custom — a state, not an error', async () => {
const ctx = await mounted()
const session = freshSession('sess-custom')
session.append('bash/sandbox-mode', { mode: 'read-only' })
session.append('sandbox/mode', { mode: 'read-only' })
expect(ctx.permission.current(session.events)).toBe(CUSTOM_PRESET)
// Switching FROM custom is an ordinary write-through; custom itself is
// never a target.
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ describe('PermissionService', () => {
expect(ctx.permission.current(session.events)).toBe('agentish')
// A knob drifts: the fold's bundle no longer matches → reverse map wins.
session.append('approval/policy', { policy: 'never' })
session.append('bash/sandbox-mode', { mode: 'danger-full-access' })
session.append('sandbox/mode', { mode: 'danger-full-access' })
expect(ctx.permission.current(session.events)).toBe('danger-full-access')
})
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ describe('PermissionService', () => {
ctx.permission.set(session, 'danger-full-access')
expect(session.events.map(e => [e.type, e.data])).toEqual([
['permission/preset', { preset: 'danger-full-access' }],
['bash/sandbox-mode', { mode: 'danger-full-access' }],
['sandbox/mode', { mode: 'danger-full-access' }],
['approval/policy', { policy: 'never' }],
])
})
@@ -109,12 +109,12 @@ describe('PermissionService', () => {
// A knob drifts out from under the preset (a direct setter call, a test
// scenario): the session derives custom, and re-asserting the preset is
// a real switch again — choice re-recorded, only the drifted knob moves.
session.append('bash/sandbox-mode', { mode: 'read-only' })
session.append('sandbox/mode', { mode: 'read-only' })
ctx.permission.set(session, 'danger-full-access')
const tail = session.events.slice(4)
expect(tail.map(e => [e.type, e.data])).toEqual([
['permission/preset', { preset: 'danger-full-access' }],
['bash/sandbox-mode', { mode: 'danger-full-access' }],
['sandbox/mode', { mode: 'danger-full-access' }],
])
})

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
{
"path": "../../sandbox/sandbox"
},
{
"path": "../../sandbox/sandbox-policy"
},
{
"path": "../../bash/bash"
},