Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into worktree/persist-web-theme-settings

# Conflicts:
#	.agents/notes/implemented/testing/2026-07-24-web-gui-browser-e2e-lane.i18n.yaml
#	packages/client/ui-conversation/README.i18n.yaml
#	packages/host/apiproxy/README.i18n.yaml
This commit is contained in:
Yichen Jiang
2026-08-07 16:45:23 +08:00
310 changed files with 9523 additions and 983 deletions

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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-07-29-sticky-composer-conversation-scroll.md
2026-07-29-sticky-composer-conversation-scroll.md: d3fed7a9d0b1f39f9551fbd85e0f83515b1a2690
2026-07-29-sticky-composer-conversation-scroll.zh.md: 2beee34d3bb68832d14b7607b43aa11e1425d53d
2026-07-29-sticky-composer-conversation-scroll.md: 8657080078e475d6e90f17a6c0f8cb5b2fb1555d
2026-07-29-sticky-composer-conversation-scroll.zh.md: a588903adf51c6fcdd01f851d4f5e6570f695242

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@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ The active conversation column split scrolling: the chat (and trajectory) view o
Session stats live on `'conversation.composer.dock'` (above `'conversation.input.dock'`). The InputBar textarea, when inside the host, chains `wheel` with `{ passive: false }`: while the capped textarea can still scroll in that direction it keeps the native gesture; only at its own edge does it `preventDefault` and apply `deltaY` to the host.
Chat history prepend follows reader intent through stable rendered node/call identities rather than whole-scrollport height deltas. `ChatView` records the first visible `data-chat-anchor-key` and its top relative to the scrollport when paging starts, reselects the currently visible stable anchor after every reader scroll while the request is in flight, and compensates by that row's post-prepend rectangle delta. Reaching the bottom or appending the reader's own message cancels the paging anchor, so a late page cannot pull the view away from the newest content. Bottom follow is stored state rather than raw scroll geometry. A passive wheel listener takes its pre-input baseline from the last main-thread-delivered or programmatically written `scrollTop`, because Chromium may advance compositor geometry before delivering the event; the current non-negative floor excludes a concurrent layout clamp from reader movement. A scroll without matching wheel movement re-pins while following and only refreshes the semantic position while reading. ChatView's single `ResizeObserver` follows streaming, tool disclosure, and draft resize only while bottom ownership remains pinned, without a second per-chunk scroll write.
Chat history prepend follows reader intent through stable rendered node/call identities rather than whole-scrollport height deltas. `ChatView` records the first visible `data-chat-anchor-key` and its top relative to the scrollport when paging starts, reselects the currently visible stable anchor after every reader scroll while the request is in flight, and compensates by that row's post-prepend rectangle delta. Reaching the bottom or appending the reader's own message cancels the paging anchor, so a late page cannot pull the view away from the newest content. Bottom follow is stored state rather than raw scroll geometry; how reader input is recognized — device-agnostic deviation from the observed-top ledger of the last delivered or written `scrollTop` — is owned by the [reader-scroll-attribution note](2026-08-06-reader-scroll-attribution-observed-top-ledger.md). ChatView's single `ResizeObserver` follows streaming, tool disclosure, and draft resize only while bottom ownership remains pinned, without a second per-chunk scroll write.
## Alternatives considered
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ Chat history prepend follows reader intent through stable rendered node/call ide
**Keep StatsLine inside ChatView below the message column.** Rejected: outside the sticky composer it would scroll away while the input stayed pinned.
**Model every browser scroll input source.** Rejected for this narrow fix: the reproduced desktop path uses wheel/trackpad input. Pointer/touch scrolling, native-scrollbar dragging, keyboard scrolling, focus navigation, and nested overflow ownership remain outside the provenance model instead of adding a general input state machine.
**Model every browser scroll input source.** Rejected for this narrow fix: the reproduced desktop path uses wheel/trackpad input. Pointer/touch scrolling, native-scrollbar dragging, keyboard scrolling, focus navigation, and nested overflow ownership were left outside the provenance model instead of adding a general input state machine. The [reader-scroll-attribution note](2026-08-06-reader-scroll-attribution-observed-top-ledger.md) later closed this deferral by generalizing attribution through the observed-top ledger, still without an input state machine.
## Consequences
Wheel over the footer scrolls the transcript; the visible layout is a fixed header, scrolling transcript, and sticky bottom composer. Stats appear on every active view tab. Nested view scrollers under the host are suppressed so sticky Turn headers in Trajectory stick to the column host. Concurrent history, streaming, tool expansion, and composer reflow preserve wheel/trackpad scroll decisions, including Chromium's compositor-first delivery and stream-finalization clamp/regrow. Other browser scroll inputs do not change follow ownership under this narrow provenance rule. No session → blank Hero and Hero → active both keep the same textarea DOM node and InputHub draft.
Wheel over the footer scrolls the transcript; the visible layout is a fixed header, scrolling transcript, and sticky bottom composer. Stats appear on every active view tab. Nested view scrollers under the host are suppressed so sticky Turn headers in Trajectory stick to the column host. Concurrent history, streaming, tool expansion, and composer reflow preserve reader scroll decisions, including Chromium's compositor-first delivery and stream-finalization shrink clamp. Follow ownership extends to every reader input under the [reader-scroll-attribution note](2026-08-06-reader-scroll-attribution-observed-top-ledger.md). No session → blank Hero and Hero → active both keep the same textarea DOM node and InputHub draft.

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@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Status: implemented
会话统计挂在 `'conversation.composer.dock'`(位于 `'conversation.input.dock'` 之上)。InputBar 的 textarea 在宿主内以 `{ passive: false }` 链式处理 `wheel`:在限高 textarea 仍能沿该方向滚动时保留原生手势;仅在自身边缘才 `preventDefault` 并将 `deltaY` 施加到宿主。
Chat 历史前插通过稳定的已渲染 node/call 身份跟随读者意图,而不是使用整个滚动容器的高度差。分页开始时,`ChatView` 记录第一个可见的 `data-chat-anchor-key` 及其相对滚动容器的顶部位置;请求在途期间,每次读者滚动都会重新选择当前可见的稳定锚点;页面到达后则按该行矩形的前后差值补偿。到达底部或追加读者自己的消息会取消分页锚点,因此迟到的页面不能把视图从最新内容拉走。贴底跟随采用存储状态,而不是原始滚动几何状态。passive wheel 监听器以最近一次由主线程交付或由程序写入的 `scrollTop` 作为输入前基线,因为 Chromium 可能先推进合成器几何状态,之后才交付事件;当前使用的非负下限不会将并发的布局钳制计入读者移动。没有对应滚轮/触控板输入位移的滚动,在跟随状态下会重新贴底,在阅读状态下则只刷新语义位置。`ChatView` 的单个 `ResizeObserver` 只会在贴底所有权仍保持时跟随流式输出、工具展开与草稿尺寸变化,且每个 chunk 不会触发第二次滚动写入。
Chat 历史前插通过稳定的已渲染 node/call 身份跟随读者意图,而不是使用整个滚动容器的高度差。分页开始时,`ChatView` 记录第一个可见的 `data-chat-anchor-key` 及其相对滚动容器的顶部位置;请求在途期间,每次读者滚动都会重新选择当前可见的稳定锚点;页面到达后则按该行矩形的前后差值补偿。到达底部或追加读者自己的消息会取消分页锚点,因此迟到的页面不能把视图从最新内容拉走。贴底跟随采用存储状态,而不是原始滚动几何状态;读者输入如何被识别——即以与设备无关的方式偏离由最近一次交付或写入的 `scrollTop` 构成的 observed-top ledger——由[读者滚动归因笔记](2026-08-06-reader-scroll-attribution-observed-top-ledger.md)负责。`ChatView` 的单个 `ResizeObserver` 只会在贴底所有权仍保持时跟随流式输出、工具展开与草稿尺寸变化,且每个 chunk 不会触发第二次滚动写入。
## Alternatives considered
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ Chat 历史前插通过稳定的已渲染 node/call 身份跟随读者意图
**把 StatsLine 留在 ChatView 消息列下方。** 否决:落在 sticky 编辑器之外会随内容滚走,而输入区仍钉在底部。
**为每一种浏览器滚动输入来源建模。** 此次窄范围修复不采用:已复现的桌面端路径使用滚轮/触控板输入。指针/触控滚动、拖动原生滚动条、键盘滚动、焦点导航与嵌套 overflow 所有权仍不纳入输入来源模型,也不为此新增通用输入状态机。
**为每一种浏览器滚动输入来源建模。** 此次窄范围修复不采用:已复现的桌面端路径使用滚轮/触控板输入。指针/触控滚动、拖动原生滚动条、键盘滚动、焦点导航与嵌套 overflow 所有权当时被留在输入来源模型之外,也未为此新增通用输入状态机。[读者滚动归因笔记](2026-08-06-reader-scroll-attribution-observed-top-ledger.md)后来通过 observed-top ledger 泛化了归因,补上了这一延后事项,且仍未引入输入状态机。
## Consequences
在页脚上滚轮会滚动 transcript;可见布局是固定标题栏、可滚动 transcript 与 sticky 底部编辑器。统计出现在每一个活跃视图标签上。宿主下的嵌套视图 scroller 被抑制,因而 Trajectory 的 sticky Turn 标题贴在列宿主上。并发历史加载、流式输出、工具展开与编辑器重排会保留滚轮/触控板的滚动决定,包括 Chromium 先推进合成器几何状态再交付事件,以及流收尾阶段滚动位置受钳制后滚动容器重新增长的情况。在这条窄范围的输入来源规则下,其他浏览器滚动输入不会改变贴底跟随所有权。无 session → blank Hero 与 Hero → active 都保持同一 textarea DOM 节点以及 InputHub 草稿。
在页脚上滚轮会滚动 transcript;可见布局是固定标题栏、可滚动 transcript 与 sticky 底部编辑器。统计出现在每一个活跃视图标签上。宿主下的嵌套视图 scroller 被抑制,因而 Trajectory 的 sticky Turn 标题贴在列宿主上。并发历史加载、流式输出、工具展开与编辑器重排会保留读者的滚动决定,包括 Chromium 先推进合成器几何状态再交付事件,以及流收尾阶段的收缩钳制。贴底跟随所有权依据[读者滚动归因笔记](2026-08-06-reader-scroll-attribution-observed-top-ledger.md)扩展到每一种读者输入。无 session → blank Hero 与 Hero → active 都保持同一 textarea DOM 节点以及 InputHub 草稿。

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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-08-02-message-fork-actions-require-completed-turn-tail.md
2026-08-02-message-fork-actions-require-completed-turn-tail.md: f2e7fd67b65a6ce4a86ba3f4405f78842be8f234
2026-08-02-message-fork-actions-require-completed-turn-tail.zh.md: 2c3feeaa3ef01dbde67faa73257520918996f9c8
2026-08-02-message-fork-actions-require-completed-turn-tail.md: abdcbc79948c67619bb70a8a87741046f65b8838
2026-08-02-message-fork-actions-require-completed-turn-tail.zh.md: a93b572c6db3c76ce3869747fd9a7660bf3ea395

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`ConversationSnapshot.turnEnds` retains the completed turn boundaries present in the raw event window. The conversation view walks transcript nodes through each boundary and enables branch only when the boundary's last node is a user message, a durable steering message, or a content-bearing assistant message. Open turns have no eligible message, and a later tool result, reasoning-only interruption, turn error, or other transcript node leaves branch unavailable on earlier messages. The unavailable control stays visible, focusable, and hoverable; `aria-disabled`, a tooltip, and `aria-describedby` explain the completed-tail requirement without sending a Host request. Copy and clock remain available under their existing message chrome, and the Host's completed-turn fork semantics remain unchanged.
The message-bubble half of this eligibility is superseded by the [user-bubble branch removal](../simplification/2026-08-06-user-bubbles-drop-the-branch-action.md): user and steering bubbles no longer render the control at all, so only content-assistant tails may fork; the assistant-side gate and its visible-but-unavailable presentation stand.
This narrows the message eligibility established by the earlier [Web session fork action decision](../feature/2026-07-27-web-session-fork-actions.md). Session-row forking still selects the latest completed turn, and eligible message actions still pass their event seq through the shared client runtime operation.
## Alternatives considered

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`ConversationSnapshot.turnEnds` 保留原始事件窗口中的已完成轮次边界。会话视图按各边界遍历 transcript(文本记录)节点,仅当边界的最后一个节点是用户消息、持久 steering(中途引导)消息或含内容的 assistant 消息时才启用分支操作。开放轮次没有符合条件的消息;如果后面还有工具结果、只有推理内容的中断、轮次错误或其他 transcript 节点,较早消息上的分支操作会保持不可用。不可用的控件仍然可见、可聚焦、可悬停;`aria-disabled`、tooltip 与 `aria-describedby` 会说明已完成尾部这一要求,且不会发送 Host 请求。复制和时钟仍可在既有消息 chrome 下使用,Host 按已完成轮次 fork 的语义保持不变。
本资格判定中消息气泡的那一半已被 [user 气泡分支移除决策](../simplification/2026-08-06-user-bubbles-drop-the-branch-action.md)取代:user 与 steering 气泡不再渲染该控件,因此只有内容 assistant 尾部可以 fork;assistant 侧门禁及其可见但不可用的呈现保持有效。
本决策收紧了较早的 [Web 会话 fork 操作决策](../feature/2026-07-27-web-session-fork-actions.md)所定义的消息资格。Session 行 fork 仍选择最新的已完成轮次;符合条件的消息操作仍通过共享 client 运行时操作传递其事件 seq。
## 考虑过的替代方案

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# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-08-05-turn-tail-actions-require-a-completed-turn.md
2026-08-05-turn-tail-actions-require-a-completed-turn.md: 689d50bb86c830d6e428239f112568f00d74c9b8
2026-08-05-turn-tail-actions-require-a-completed-turn.zh.md: 2cc426bbb82acb8f57d491b0f068e89771699357

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# Agent Note: Turn-tail IconActions require a completed turn
Status: implemented
English | [中文](2026-08-05-turn-tail-actions-require-a-completed-turn.zh.md)
## Problem
Assistant IconActions were derived from the finalized transcript alone: the last content-text assistant of each turn owned the row. That quantity is stable only after the turn closes. While a turn is still producing steps, the narration a model writes before a tool call *is* the last content assistant so far, so it took the row for as long as the tool ran and then lost it to the next step's text. Readers saw copy, branch, and a clock appear under an intermediate sentence, shift the flow by one 28px row, and disappear. The row was also incoherent in that state: its branch control was already disabled through `turnEnds`, and its `Ran for` label was already withheld through `turnTimings`, so only copy worked.
The [message chrome decision](../feature/2026-07-29-web-message-icon-actions-and-clock.md) always claimed mid-turn narration stays chrome-free; the derivation never carried a completion signal to make that true.
## Decision
`assistantActionsSeqs` takes `ConversationSnapshot.turnEnds` and grants the row only within a turn that has a `turn/end` in the window. Ownership inside a completed turn is unchanged: its last content-text assistant. A turn still producing steps grants nothing, so its narration never mounts the row, and the seat appears once, under the settled answer, when the turn closes.
This is the same completion fact the branch control and the run-time label already use, so the three parts of one row now agree. Turn completion is read from the durable `turn/end` event rather than inferred from `running`, the streaming partial, or in-flight tool calls, matching the [completed-turn-tail decision](2026-08-02-message-fork-actions-require-completed-turn-tail.md). Every reason kind closes a turn, so an aborted turn's frozen tail keeps its footer, and a crash-orphaned turn receives its `turn/end` from log repair on load.
`hasContentText` moves to `chat-flow.ts` and `AssistantMarkdown` imports it, so the ownership gate and the mount gate cannot drift apart.
## Alternatives considered
**Withhold by naming the open turn from `running` plus the streaming partial or the first in-flight tool call.** This shipped briefly in the original change and was then dropped. It infers completion instead of reading it, needs a special case so a turn accepted before its first step does not strip the previous answer's seat, and is the inference the completed-turn-tail decision rejected for the branch control. `turnEnds` answers the same question per turn with no inference and no special case.
**Leave the row mounted mid-turn and disable its controls.** Rejected: mid-turn narration is not a degraded answer, it is not the answer. Copy would still write an intermediate sentence, and the row would still move to the real tail at turn end.
**Keep the row under every finalized content node permanently.** Rejected again here for the reason the original decision gave: repeating copy, branch, and a clock under every step clutters the flow. It also does not solve the reported problem, since the branch control is only meaningful on the tail.
## Consequences
A running turn carries no message footer below the user bubble that triggered it, while every earlier completed turn keeps its own; the seat appears once when `turn/end` lands, which adds one 28px row under the settled answer at that moment. A turn whose `turn/end` is outside the loaded window grants nothing, which cannot arise from paging because a turn's end follows its own nodes. `apps/web/tests/turn-tail-actions.e2e.ts` pins both states through the assembled application: a `hang` sidecar on the second model call parks a turn whose first step narrated before calling bash, and the two goldens hold the parked flow and the flow after stopping. Package tests cover the derivation directly and the running-turn render.

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# Agent Note: 轮次尾部 IconActions 要求轮次已完成
Status: implemented
[English](2026-08-05-turn-tail-actions-require-a-completed-turn.md) | 中文
## 问题
assistant IconActions 此前只从已定稿的 transcript(文本记录)推导:每个轮次中最后一条含内容文本的 assistant 拥有该行。这个量只有在轮次关闭后才稳定。轮次仍在产出步骤时,模型在工具调用前写下的叙述就是当时该轮次的最后一条内容 assistant,于是它在工具执行期间取得该行,等下一步的文本落定又把它交出去。读者会看到复制、分支和时钟出现在一句中间叙述下方,把流程推开一行 28px,然后消失。该行在这个状态下本身也是残缺的:分支控件已经通过 `turnEnds` 判定为禁用,`Ran for` 标签已经通过 `turnTimings` 判定为不显示,只有复制可用。
[消息 chrome 决策](../feature/2026-07-29-web-message-icon-actions-and-clock.md)一直声称轮次中间的叙述不带 chrome,但推导过程从未拿到能让这句话成立的完成信号。
## 决策
`assistantActionsSeqs` 接收 `ConversationSnapshot.turnEnds`,只在事件窗口中存在该轮次 `turn/end` 时才授予该行。已完成轮次内部的归属不变,仍是其最后一条含内容文本的 assistant。仍在产出步骤的轮次不授予任何座位,因此其叙述不会挂载该行;轮次关闭时,座位在已定稿答案下方一次性出现。
这与分支控件和运行时长标签使用的完成事实相同,因此同一行的三个部分现在口径一致。轮次是否完成读自持久的 `turn/end` 事件,而不是从 `running`、流式 partial 或在途工具调用推断,与[已完成轮次尾部决策](2026-08-02-message-fork-actions-require-completed-turn-tail.md)一致。任何 reason 类别都会关闭轮次,因此已中止轮次冻结的尾部保留其操作栏,而崩溃遗留的开放轮次会在加载时由日志修复补上 `turn/end`。
`hasContentText` 移入 `chat-flow.ts`,由 `AssistantMarkdown` 导入,使归属门控与挂载门控无法各自漂移。
## 考虑过的替代方案
**用 `running` 加流式 partial 或第一个在途工具调用指认开放轮次,据此扣留。** 这一做法曾在最初的变更中短暂存在,随后被删除。它推断完成状态而不是读取完成状态,还需要一个特例,避免轮次已被接受但尚未产出第一步时把上一条回答的座位取走;这正是已完成轮次尾部决策为分支控件否决过的推断。`turnEnds` 按轮次回答同一个问题,不需要推断,也不需要特例。
**轮次进行中保留该行,只把控件置为不可用。** 不予采纳:轮次中间的叙述不是一个降级的答案,它根本不是答案。复制仍然会写入一句中间文本,该行在轮次结束时仍然要移动到真正的尾部。
**让每个已定稿的内容节点长期保留该行。** 在此重新否决,理由与最初的决策相同:在每一步下重复复制、分支和时钟会打乱流程。它也解决不了本次报告的问题,因为分支控件只有落在尾部才有意义。
## 后果
运行中的轮次在触发它的用户气泡之下不再有任何消息操作栏,而此前每个已完成轮次仍保留各自的座位;座位在 `turn/end` 到达时一次性出现,此刻已定稿答案下方会多出一行 28px。`turn/end` 落在加载窗口之外的轮次不授予座位,而翻页不会造成这种情况,因为一个轮次的结束事件排在它自己的节点之后。`apps/web/tests/turn-tail-actions.e2e.ts` 通过组装后的应用钉住两种状态:`hang` sidecar 作用在第二次模型调用上,把一个首步先叙述再调用 bash 的轮次挂住,两份 golden 分别记录挂起中的流程和停止之后的流程。包级测试直接覆盖该推导以及运行中轮次的渲染结果。

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# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-08-06-api-key-format-validation.md
2026-08-06-api-key-format-validation.md: d1f6d31d362b76392514704be780f553b45d36ad
2026-08-06-api-key-format-validation.zh.md: 75b3fa247bdf449964a874e909e6e3bc9e0694fa

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# Agent Note: Validate API key format before it reaches an HTTP header
Status: implemented
English | [中文](2026-08-06-api-key-format-validation.zh.md)
## Problem
An API key holding characters no HTTP header value can carry was accepted by every configuration surface and failed only when a request was built, far from the field that caused it.
Pasting a key containing an emoji, CJK text, or a full-width punctuation mark into the web Models page reported a successful save. The first turn then failed with `Cannot convert argument to a ByteString because the character at index 7 has a value of 55357 which is greater than 255` — the index and code point are UTF-16 internals with no action attached, and they disclose the code point of one character of the key. `llm-deepseek` produced this because `fetch` builds the `Bearer` header inside the `try` in [adapter.ts](../../../../packages/llm/llm-deepseek/src/adapter.ts), whose `catch` labels every failure `TRANSPORT`; that label is in `DEFAULT_RETRYABLE_CODES`, so a permanent, deterministic fault was also retried three times.
`llm-pi-ai` was worse on the same input. Its discovery probe builds the same header with a bare `fetch` in [discovery.ts](../../../../packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/src/discovery.ts) and wrapped every failure as `could not reach <url>`, so a local key fault was reported as an unreachable network. The probe is reachable from the unsaved draft: `ProviderEditor` puts the typed `keyDraft` into its probe request, so the model-listing button sent an illegal key before anything was stored.
Whitespace passed every check. `ProviderEditor` tested `keyDraft.length` and `resolveAdapterOptions` tested `config.apiKey.length`, so a key of three spaces stored and then authenticated as `Bearer` plus blanks. `llm-pi-ai` rejected an empty literal `apiKey` in `resolveProfiles`, but applied no check whatsoever to a credential- or environment-sourced key — the path the Models page writes, and therefore the path users actually take.
Sources: deepseek-harness#1594 and #1595; dsh-external#247, #249, #266, and #210.
## Decision
One rule defines a legal key: **after trimming, non-empty, and every character within `[\x21-\x7E]`** — printable ASCII, space excluded.
This single predicate covers every input the sources list: empty, leading and trailing whitespace, interior whitespace, C0 control characters, emoji, CJK text, and full-width punctuation. It is also exactly the constraint that produced the ByteString failure, so the two issues close on one definition rather than on two coincidentally related fixes.
A second, narrower rule catches a pasted environment line: input matching `^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*=[^=]` or wrapped in matching quotes is refused. Restricting the prefix to upper-case keeps real keys clear of it — `sk-` forms break the identifier match at the hyphen — and requiring a non-`=` character after the separator keeps base64 padding clear of it too. It reports the same format failure as an illegal character rather than its own message: the reader's next move is identical either way, so a separate line would name a cause without changing what to do.
### Invariants belong at every layer; heuristics belong where the human is
The charset rule is an invariant. A non-ASCII character *cannot* travel in a header value for any provider, so enforcing it in the browser, in each resolver, and on every credential read is consistent by construction rather than by agreement.
The shape rule is a guess about how people paste, so it runs **only in the browser**. `llm-pi-ai` fronts OpenAI, Anthropic, and arbitrary hand-declared gateways whose key formats this repository does not own; a gateway issuing a key shaped like `TENANT1=abc` would, if the rule ran in the resolver, be locked out with no escape — the settings page would refuse it and a hand-written `.env` would be rejected on read. Confining the heuristic to the surface where the paste happens keeps the environment as the way through.
### Absence is a configuration state, not a missing key
"No API key" means three different things here, and only one of them is an error. The rule applies to a value that was *provided*; deciding whether one was provided at all stays with each caller.
**Omitted.** A profile naming neither `apiKey` nor `apiKeyEnv` is authenticated by something other than a harness-held key. `routeAuth` in [provider.ts](../../../../packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/src/provider.ts) keeps the installed catalog provider's own auth precisely so provider-native ambient discovery survives, and `openai-codex` — shipped in that catalog — authenticates through OAuth and refuses an explicit key outright. `namesCredential` carries this distinction. In `llm-deepseek`, an absent `apiKey` likewise falls through to `apiKeyEnv`. Omission is never validated.
**A blank field in the web UI.** The key input opens empty even for a provider whose key is already stored — the `keyStored` copy reads "Configured — enter a new value to replace" — so blank means *keep what is stored*. `ProviderEditor` skips `credentials.set` entirely when the draft is empty, and that stays a no-op: a blank field never blocks submit, or editing a base URL would demand re-entering the key.
**Provided, but empty or whitespace-only.** What this means depends on what absence selects for that surface, and the two adapters differ for a reason. In `llm-pi-ai` it is an error, because absence there switches authentication mode — to the installed provider's ambient discovery or OAuth — so a blank key leaves genuine ambiguity about which was meant; its wording names the legitimate alternative rather than just refusing (*has an empty apiKey; omit it to use ambient authentication*). In `llm-deepseek` absence merely selects a different *source* for the same key, `apiKeyEnv`, so a blank literal resolves through that fallback exactly as an omitted one does. In the browser it is always a failure, on both cards: the field is where a person just typed, and silently discarding what they typed is never the right answer.
`normalizeApiKey` therefore takes `string`, never `string | undefined`.
### Where the rule lives
`normalizeApiKey` is a module of the `dsh-llm` seam, beside [attribution.ts](../../../../packages/llm/llm/src/attribution.ts), which already owns shared header concerns. Both adapters depend on the seam and both need the rule, so it has two current consumers rather than a speculative one. It returns the trimmed value or a reason (`empty`, `illegalCharacters`).
Both adapters also need the identical "refuse a stored credential" diagnosis, differing only by package prefix. `LlmError` is declared in the seam's `index.ts`, so `assertUsableApiKey(raw, pkg, ref)` lives there beside it and neither adapter carries a local copy. The predicate module stays dependency-free: importing `LlmError` into `api-key.ts` would cycle with `index.ts`'s re-export of it.
The client cannot import any of this: client packages reference only client packages, so `packages/client/ui-models` mirrors the predicate in its own `apiKey.ts` and owns the localized messages, exactly as `validateDeepSeekModels` mirrors the host's `catalogModel` schema. Each side names the other in a comment.
### What each surface does
| Surface | Behavior |
|---|---|
| `dsh-llm` | Owns `normalizeApiKey`, `assertUsableApiKey`, and `INVALID_CREDENTIAL_CODE`, which is deliberately outside `DEFAULT_RETRYABLE_CODES`. |
| `llm-deepseek` `resolveAdapterOptions` | Refuses a literal `apiKey` no header can carry, beside the other beyond-schema bounds; uses the trimmed value. An absent or blank one falls through to `apiKeyEnv`. |
| `llm-deepseek` `resolveApiKey` | Normalizes what the credentials seam or environment returns, rejecting with `INVALID_CREDENTIAL` naming the Models page and never echoing the key. |
| `llm-pi-ai` `resolveProfiles` | Applies the shared rule, keeping its "omit it to use ambient authentication" wording, and writes the trimmed value into the resolved profile. |
| `llm-pi-ai` `resolveApiKey` | Normalizes the credential and environment paths. A profile naming no credential still returns `undefined`, so ambient and OAuth routes are unaffected. |
| `llm-pi-ai` `discoverModels` | Normalizes before building the header, so an illegal key is a credential fault rather than an unreachable endpoint. A probe carrying no key stays unauthenticated. |
| `ui-models` | Mirrors the charset rule, adds the shape heuristic, trims `keyDraft` before probe and `credentials.set`, and fixes the `stringAt` emptiness test. A blank field remains a no-op that submits; a field holding only whitespace is a field-level failure. Submit **and the endpoint interrogation** are both gated, so a refused key never spends a round trip to be told what the field already says, and the failure renders on the field, matching the existing `modelFailure` pattern. |
`ProviderEditor` serves both the DeepSeek and pi-ai layouts, so one client change covers both providers. `CustomProviderCard` carries the same judgement for a hand-declared route.
`credentials-local` is deliberately untouched. It stores credentials generally, and printable-ASCII is a constraint of HTTP headers rather than of credential storage; its existing refusal of values no dotenv style can represent stands as it was.
## Alternatives considered
**A `.pattern()` on the `apiKey` schema field.** Vendored schemastery supports it, and the pattern would serialize to the browser with the rest of the namespace schema — one rule, delivered rather than mirrored. It lost because a pattern cannot trim first: `cordis.yml` would then reject a padded key while `.env` tolerated one, and the resolver would disagree with the schema about the same string. Validating in `resolveAdapterOptions` keeps every surface trim-then-validate, and that function is already where this package re-judges bounds the schema cannot express.
**A validation module shared by client and host.** Rejected by the source-plane layout: client packages reference only client packages plus `vendor/cordis` and `support/invariants`, and widening that to reach a host package would collide the two `Context` merges the split exists to keep apart. Mirroring a one-line predicate with a test on each side is the established shape here.
**A per-adapter thrower in each of `llm-deepseek` and `llm-pi-ai`.** The first plan gave each adapter its own, differing only by the package prefix in the message, with a duplication-gate exemption to excuse the pair. Rejected before implementation: `LlmError` is declared in the seam, so the seam can own the diagnosis outright, and an exemption there would have hidden exactly the duplication it was covering for.
**Sniffing the `TypeError` in the adapter's `catch`.** This would classify the ByteString failure after the fact, leaving the header construction itself unguarded. It depends on the wording of a Node error message, so it degrades silently across runtime versions, and it cannot help `llm-pi-ai`, whose request header is built inside the pi-ai SDK. Refusing the key before handing it over works for both adapters and for the discovery probe.
**Enforcing in `credentials-local.set`.** It would catch every writer at once, including a hand-edited file. It lost because that provider stores credentials of every kind, and a rule derived from HTTP header encoding does not belong to it.
**Running the shape heuristic in the resolvers too.** Symmetric, and it would stop a pasted environment line written directly into `.env`. Rejected for the lockout described above: a false positive in a resolver leaves the user no working path, while a false positive in the browser leaves the environment open.
**Probing the provider at save time to prove the key works.** It would close the complaint the sources actually open with — a save that reports success and fails at the first turn. Rejected as out of scope and, on the code as it stood, unbuildable: `discoverModels` short-circuits to the installed catalog before any network call for exactly the providers pi-ai ships catalogs for, so it verified nothing about the key, and the DeepSeek card has no probe at all. A verifier's value is distinguishing "key rejected" from "cannot reach", which is the distinction this change makes reliable; building it first would have produced a verifier unable to tell its own outcomes apart. Comparable products also do not verify on save, so a blocking network call there would be an unexpected behavior rather than a missing one.
## Consequences
A malformed key is refused at the field that holds it, and a malformed stored key fails as `INVALID_CREDENTIAL` with a message naming where to fix it and no fragment of the key. Because that code sits outside `DEFAULT_RETRYABLE_CODES`, a deterministic credential fault is no longer retried three times as a transport blip. `llm-pi-ai` discovery reports an illegal probe key as a credential fault instead of an unreachable endpoint.
The shape heuristic can refuse a real key. The first draft matched any upper-case identifier followed by `=`, which review showed was broader than intended: an all-upper-case base64 key ending in padding (`ABCD==`) matched an assignment it does not resemble. Requiring a non-`=` character after the separator excludes padding, since base64 only ever pads at the end. What remains — an upper-case name, one `=`, then a value — is a shape no known provider issues, and the rule runs only in the browser, so a user who still hits it can set the credential through the environment. The residual cost is a confusing refusal for a key nobody has yet reported.
Restricting to printable ASCII is stricter than the transport requires: a header value may carry `\x80`–`\xFF`. Admitting latin-1 would let `é` through to return an opaque 401 instead of a local, explained refusal, so the stricter rule is deliberate. A provider that issues latin-1 keys would need this rule widened.
The charset predicate exists twice, once per source plane. The layout forbids sharing it; each side carries its own test and names its twin.
Keys already stored by an earlier build are read through `resolveApiKey`, so an illegal stored value fails at resolution rather than at request time. The diagnosis improves, but the failure moves earlier for anyone currently holding one.
The costliest way to get this wrong would have been to treat absence as invalidity: a rule applied to `undefined` breaks every route authenticating through ambient discovery or OAuth, and a blank field that blocked submit makes editing any other setting demand re-entering the key. Both are pinned by tests rather than left to care.
## Testing
`packages/llm/llm/tests/api-key.spec.ts` drives `normalizeApiKey` and `assertUsableApiKey` over the whole input table — empty, whitespace-only, padded, interior-space, C0 control, emoji, CJK, full-width, latin-1, and the printable-ASCII boundary — and pins that a refusal carries `INVALID_CREDENTIAL` and no part of the key.
`packages/llm/llm-deepseek/tests/` covers the literal-config path in `adapter.spec.ts` and the stored-credential path end to end in `dynamic-config.spec.ts`, through the real credentials seam rather than a stub. `packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/tests/` covers `resolveProfiles` — including that the trimmed value reaches the resolved profile, which the `...rest` spread would otherwise discard — and the discovery probe, including that a probe with no key sends no `authorization` header.
`packages/client/ui-models/tests/` pins `apiKeyFailure` over the same table plus the paste-shape cases, and drives both cards: a blank field submits without writing a credential, a whitespace-only field fails on the field, an illegal or wrapped key blocks submit and the interrogation alike, a padded key is trimmed before `credentials.set` and before an interrogation, and a hand-declared route can be created with no key at all.
The user-visible terminal state is pinned where it is actually assembled: `examples/headless-agent/tests/headless.snapshot.ts` runs the one-shot app against a stored key no header can carry, over the same keyless composition its missing-credential sibling uses, and records that the turn ends on `INVALID_CREDENTIAL` with an actionable message carrying neither the key nor the word `ByteString`. A package test could not have shown that, and the web e2e covers only the browser half.

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# Agent Note: 在 API Key 进入 HTTP header 之前校验其格式
Status: implemented
[English](2026-08-06-api-key-format-validation.md) | 中文
## Problem
一个含有 HTTP header value 无法承载的字符的 API Key,曾被每一层配置界面接受,直到构造请求时才失败——离引发它的那个字段已经很远。
把含 emoji、中文或全角标点的 Key 粘进 Web 模型设置页,保存会报成功。第一轮对话随即失败于 `Cannot convert argument to a ByteString because the character at index 7 has a value of 55357 which is greater than 255`——其中的下标与码点是 UTF-16 内部细节,不附带任何可执行动作,却泄露了 Key 中某一个字符的码点。`llm-deepseek` 之所以产出这句,是因为 `fetch` 在 [adapter.ts](../../../../packages/llm/llm-deepseek/src/adapter.ts) 的 `try` 内部构造 `Bearer` header,而那个 `catch` 把一切失败都标为 `TRANSPORT`;该标签又在 `DEFAULT_RETRYABLE_CODES` 之中,于是一个永久且确定的故障还会被重试三次。
同样的输入在 `llm-pi-ai` 上更糟。它的探测路径在 [discovery.ts](../../../../packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/src/discovery.ts) 里用裸 `fetch` 构造同一个 header,并把一切失败包装成 `could not reach <url>`,于是一个本地的 Key 故障被报成网络不可达。这条探测在保存之前就够得着:`ProviderEditor` 把用户输入的 `keyDraft` 直接放进探测请求,所以「获取模型列表」按钮会在任何东西落盘之前就把非法 Key 发出去。
空白字符能通过每一道检查。`ProviderEditor` 判的是 `keyDraft.length`,`resolveAdapterOptions` 判的是 `config.apiKey.length`,于是三个空格构成的 Key 会被存下,随后以 `Bearer` 加若干空格去认证。`llm-pi-ai` 在 `resolveProfiles` 中拒绝空的字面量 `apiKey`,却对来自凭据或环境的 Key 完全不做检查——而那正是模型设置页写入的路径,也就是用户真正走的路径。
来源:deepseek-harness#1594 与 #1595;dsh-external#247、#249、#266、#210。
## Decision
一条规则定义什么是合法 Key:**trim 之后非空,且每个字符都落在 `[\x21-\x7E]`**——可打印 ASCII,不含空格。
这一个断言覆盖了来源列出的全部输入:空值、首尾空白、中间空白、C0 控制字符、emoji、中文、全角标点。它同时正是造成 ByteString 失败的那条约束,所以两个 issue 收敛于同一个定义,而不是两个恰好相关的修复。
第二条更窄的规则用于识别整行粘贴的环境变量:匹配 `^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*=[^=]` 或首尾成对引号的输入会被拒绝。把前缀限定为全大写可以让真实 Key 与之绝缘——`sk-` 这类形态会在连字符处中断标识符匹配——而要求分隔符之后必须是非 `=` 字符,则让 base64 的 padding 也与之绝缘。它报出的是与非法字符相同的那条格式失败,而不是自己的一句:读到它的人下一步动作完全一样,因此单列一句只会点出一个原因,却不改变该怎么做。
### 不变量属于每一层,启发式属于人所在的那一层
字符集规则是不变量。非 ASCII 字符对任何 provider 都**不可能**在 header value 中传输,因此在浏览器、在各个 resolver、在每一次凭据读取上执行它,是结构上的一致而非约定上的一致。
形状规则是对人如何粘贴的猜测,因此**只在浏览器中运行**。`llm-pi-ai` 前面挂着 OpenAI、Anthropic 以及任意手工声明的网关,本仓库并不掌握它们的 Key 格式;若这条规则运行在 resolver 中,一个签发形如 `TENANT1=abc` 的网关会让用户被彻底锁死、无路可走——设置页拒绝它,手写的 `.env` 在读取时同样被拒。把启发式限制在粘贴动作发生的那一层,环境变量便始终是那条出路。
### 「没有 Key」是一种配置状态,不是缺失
在这里,「没有 API Key」意味着三件完全不同的事,其中只有一件是错误。规则作用于**已提供**的值;至于究竟有没有提供,由各个调用方自行判断。
**未指定。** 既不写 `apiKey` 也不写 `apiKeyEnv` 的 profile,是由 harness 所持有的 Key 之外的东西来鉴权的。[provider.ts](../../../../packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/src/provider.ts) 中的 `routeAuth` 保留内置 catalog provider 自身的鉴权,正是为了让 provider 原生的 ambient 发现得以存活;而该 catalog 附带的 `openai-codex` 通过 OAuth 鉴权,并会直接拒绝一个显式的 Key。`namesCredential` 承载着这一区分。在 `llm-deepseek` 中,缺省的 `apiKey` 同样会回落到 `apiKeyEnv`。未指定的情形永不参与校验。
**Web UI 中留空的输入框。** 即便某个 provider 的 Key 已经存好,该输入框也是空着打开的——`keyStored` 的文案写的是「已配置——输入新值以替换」——所以留空意味着*保持已存储的值*。`ProviderEditor` 在草稿为空时完全跳过 `credentials.set`,这一点保持不变:留空绝不拦截提交,否则改一个 base URL 都得重新输一遍 Key。
**已提供,但为空或纯空白。** 它意味着什么,取决于「缺失」在该界面上选中了什么,而两个适配器的差异是有依据的。在 `llm-pi-ai` 中它是错误,因为那里的缺失切换的是**鉴权方式**——转向内置 provider 的 ambient 发现或 OAuth——因此一个空 Key 究竟想选哪一种是真有歧义;它的措辞指明了合法替代路径而非单纯拒绝(*has an empty apiKey; omit it to use ambient authentication*)。在 `llm-deepseek` 中,缺失只是为同一把 Key 选择了另一个**来源** `apiKeyEnv`,因此空白字面量会像缺省一样经该回落解析。在浏览器中它始终是失败,两张卡片皆然:字段是人刚刚敲过字的地方,静默丢弃他敲进去的内容永远不是正确答案。
因此 `normalizeApiKey` 接受 `string`,而绝非 `string | undefined`。
### 规则住在哪里
`normalizeApiKey` 是 `dsh-llm` seam 的一个模块,与已经承担共享 header 事务的 [attribution.ts](../../../../packages/llm/llm/src/attribution.ts) 并列。两个适配器都依赖该 seam 且都需要这条规则,因此它拥有两个当前消费者而非一个预设消费者。它返回 trim 后的值,或一个原因(`empty`、`illegalCharacters`)。
两个适配器同样都需要那句完全相同的「拒绝一个已存储凭据」的诊断,差别仅在包名前缀。`LlmError` 声明在 seam 的 `index.ts` 中,因此 `assertUsableApiKey(raw, pkg, ref)` 就住在它旁边,两个适配器都不再各留一份。断言模块本身保持零依赖:把 `LlmError` 引入 `api-key.ts` 会与 `index.ts` 对它的再导出成环。
客户端无法引入其中任何一个:client 包只 reference client 包,因此 `packages/client/ui-models` 在自己的 `apiKey.ts` 中镜像这个断言并持有本地化文案,正如 `validateDeepSeekModels` 镜像 host 侧的 `catalogModel` schema。两侧在注释中互相指名。
### 各个界面各做什么
| 界面 | 行为 |
|---|---|
| `dsh-llm` | 拥有 `normalizeApiKey`、`assertUsableApiKey` 与 `INVALID_CREDENTIAL_CODE`,后者刻意不进 `DEFAULT_RETRYABLE_CODES`。 |
| `llm-deepseek` `resolveAdapterOptions` | 拒绝标头无法承载的字面量 `apiKey`,与其他超出 schema 的边界检查并排;使用 trim 后的值。缺省或空白的 `apiKey` 回落到 `apiKeyEnv`。 |
| `llm-deepseek` `resolveApiKey` | 归一化凭据 seam 或环境返回的值,以 `INVALID_CREDENTIAL` 拒绝,消息指明模型设置页,绝不回显 Key。 |
| `llm-pi-ai` `resolveProfiles` | 施加这条共享规则,保留其「omit it to use ambient authentication」的措辞,并把 trim 后的值写进解析后的 profile。 |
| `llm-pi-ai` `resolveApiKey` | 归一化凭据与环境路径。不指定任何凭据的 profile 仍返回 `undefined`,ambient 与 OAuth 路由不受影响。 |
| `llm-pi-ai` `discoverModels` | 在构造 header 之前归一化,使非法 Key 成为凭据故障而非端点不可达。不带 Key 的探测保持未鉴权。 |
| `ui-models` | 镜像字符集规则,加入形状启发式,在探测与 `credentials.set` 之前 trim `keyDraft`,并修正 `stringAt` 的空值判断。留空的输入框仍是可以提交的空操作;只含空白的输入框则是字段级失败。提交**与端点探测**同时受拦截,因此被拒绝的密钥不会白花一次往返去换取字段上已经写明的答案;失败呈现在字段上,与既有的 `modelFailure` 模式一致。 |
`ProviderEditor` 同时服务 DeepSeek 与 pi-ai 两种布局,因此一处客户端改动覆盖两个 provider。`CustomProviderCard` 为手工声明的路由承载同一套判定。
`credentials-local` 刻意不动。它存储各类凭据,而可打印 ASCII 是 HTTP header 的约束而非凭据存储的约束;它既有的、拒绝任何 dotenv 样式都无法表示的值的行为保持原样。
## Alternatives considered
**在 `apiKey` schema 字段上加 `.pattern()`。** vendor 中的 schemastery 支持它,且该 pattern 会随命名空间 schema 一同序列化到浏览器——一条规则,投递而非镜像。它落败于 pattern 无法先行 trim:那样 `cordis.yml` 会拒绝带首尾空白的 Key 而 `.env` 却容忍,resolver 与 schema 会对同一个字符串给出分歧。在 `resolveAdapterOptions` 中校验可以让每一层都是 trim-then-validate,而该函数本就是本包重新裁定 schema 无法表达的边界之处。
**由 client 与 host 共享一个校验模块。** 被 source plane 布局否决:client 包只 reference client 包外加 `vendor/cordis` 与 `support/invariants`,把它放宽到够得着 host 包会撞上这一分割本就要隔开的两份 `Context` 合并。在两侧各镜像一行断言并各配一份测试,是此处的既定形态。
**在 `llm-deepseek` 与 `llm-pi-ai` 中各留一个抛错 helper。** 最初的计划正是各留一份,差别仅在消息中的包名前缀,并配一个重复检测豁免来放行这一对。在实现之前即被否决:`LlmError` 声明在 seam 中,因此 seam 完全可以自己拥有这句诊断,而那里的一个豁免恰恰会掩盖它本要遮掩的重复。
**在适配器的 `catch` 中嗅探 `TypeError`。** 这只是事后归类 ByteString 失败,header 构造本身仍无防护。它依赖 Node 错误消息的措辞,因而会随运行时版本静默失效;它也帮不到 `llm-pi-ai`——后者的请求 header 构造在 pi-ai SDK 内部。在交出 Key 之前就拒绝,则对两个适配器与探测路径同时有效。
**在 `credentials-local.set` 中执行。** 它能一次性拦住所有写入方,包括手工编辑的文件。它落败于该 provider 存储各种类型的凭据,而一条源自 HTTP header 编码的规则并不属于它。
**让形状启发式也在 resolver 中运行。** 更对称,且能拦住直接写进 `.env` 的整行环境变量。因上文所述的锁死风险而否决:resolver 中的一次误判会让用户无路可走,浏览器中的一次误判则仍留有环境变量这条路。
**在保存时探测 provider 以证明 Key 可用。** 它能关掉来源真正开篇抱怨的那件事——保存报成功、第一轮才失败。因超出范围而否决,且在当时的代码上无法建成:对 pi-ai 恰好自带 catalog 的那些 provider,`discoverModels` 会在任何网络调用之前短路到内置 catalog,因而对 Key 什么都验证不了;而 DeepSeek 卡片根本没有探测。验证器的价值在于分清「Key 被拒」与「无法连通」,而这正是本次改动让其变得可靠的区分;先建验证器只会得到一个分不清自身结果的验证器。同类产品也不在保存时验证,因此保存时的阻断式网络调用会是一个意外行为,而非一处缺失。
## Consequences
格式错误的 Key 在持有它的那个字段上就被拒绝;格式错误的已存储 Key 以 `INVALID_CREDENTIAL` 失败,消息指明修复位置且不含 Key 的任何片段。由于该 code 位于 `DEFAULT_RETRYABLE_CODES` 之外,一个确定性的凭据故障不再被当作瞬时传输抖动重试三次。`llm-pi-ai` 的探测把非法 Key 报为凭据故障,而非端点不可达。
形状启发式可能拒绝一个真实的 Key。最初的写法匹配任意「全大写标识符接 `=`」,评审指出其覆盖面比预期更宽:一个以 padding 结尾的全大写 base64 Key(`ABCD==`)会命中它并不像的赋值形态。要求分隔符之后必须是非 `=` 字符即可排除 padding——base64 的 padding 只出现在末尾。剩下的形态(大写名称、一个 `=`、然后是值)是已知 provider 不会签发的,且该规则只在浏览器中运行,因此仍撞上它的用户可通过环境变量设置该凭据。残留代价是对一个尚无人报告过的 Key 给出一次令人困惑的拒绝。
限定为可打印 ASCII 比传输本身的要求更严:header value 是可以承载 `\x80`–`\xFF` 的。放行 latin-1 会让 `é` 通过并换回一个语焉不详的 401,而不是一次本地的、有解释的拒绝,因此从严是刻意的。若某个 provider 签发 latin-1 的 Key,这条规则需要放宽。
字符集断言存在两份,每个 source plane 一份。布局禁止共享它;两侧各自带测试并在注释中指名其孪生体。
早先版本已存下的 Key 会经 `resolveApiKey` 读取,因此一个非法的既存值将从解析时开始失败,而非到请求时才失败。诊断变好了,但对当前正持有这类值的人而言,失败点提前了。
把这件事做错的最大代价,会是把「未指定」当成「非法」:一条施加到 `undefined` 上的规则会打断每一条依赖 ambient 发现或 OAuth 鉴权的路由,而一个会拦截提交的空输入框,则会让改动任何其他设置都必须重新输入 Key。这两点都由测试钉住,而不是仅仰赖谨慎。
## Testing
`packages/llm/llm/tests/api-key.spec.ts` 以整张输入表驱动 `normalizeApiKey` 与 `assertUsableApiKey`——空值、纯空白、带首尾空白、含中间空格、C0 控制字符、emoji、中文、全角、latin-1,以及可打印 ASCII 的边界字符——并钉住一次拒绝携带 `INVALID_CREDENTIAL` 且不含 Key 的任何部分。
`packages/llm/llm-deepseek/tests/` 在 `adapter.spec.ts` 中覆盖字面量配置路径,在 `dynamic-config.spec.ts` 中经真实凭据 seam(而非 stub)端到端覆盖已存储凭据路径。`packages/llm/llm-pi-ai/tests/` 覆盖 `resolveProfiles`——包括 trim 后的值确实到达解析后的 profile,否则会被 `...rest` 展开丢弃——以及探测路径,包括不带 Key 的探测不会发出 `authorization` 标头。
`packages/client/ui-models/tests/` 以同一张表加上形状用例钉住 `apiKeyFailure`,并驱动两张卡片:留空的输入框可提交且不写入凭据、只含空白的输入框在字段上失败、非法或被包裹的 Key 同时拦截提交与探测、带首尾空白的 Key 在 `credentials.set` 与探测之前被 trim,以及手工声明的路由可以完全不带 Key 创建。
用户可见的终态则钉在它真正被组装的位置:`examples/headless-agent/tests/headless.snapshot.ts` 让 one-shot 应用在一个 HTTP 标头无法承载的已存密钥下运行,复用其 missing-credential 兄弟场景的同一套无密钥 composition,并记录该轮以 `INVALID_CREDENTIAL` 结束、消息可操作且既不含密钥也不含 `ByteString` 字样。包级测试无法证明这一点,而 web e2e 只覆盖了浏览器那一半。

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# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-08-06-provider-credential-lifecycle.md
2026-08-06-provider-credential-lifecycle.md: ce45207e7ac7224f44e34945e36ba85db0971f09
2026-08-06-provider-credential-lifecycle.zh.md: c476417517b8ed72036344a13720a8ba378775e6

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# Agent Note: Recoverable provider credential lifecycle
Status: implemented
English | [中文](2026-08-06-provider-credential-lifecycle.zh.md)
## Problem
The Models editor spans independent settings and credential RPC domains. It previously committed provider settings before storing the API key but kept the revision and original subtree from when the card opened. If the credential write failed, retry replayed the already-committed settings mutation with a stale revision and produced a conflict, leaving the user unable to complete the second stage from the same card. A blank pi-ai key also wrote the derived `apiKeyEnv` without a credential, which prevented pi-ai from using provider-native discovery. At deletion, the inverse leak remained: the profile disappeared but its page-stored key stayed in `.env` and silently became active when the provider was added again. Generic row actions and confirmation copy did not identify which provider would be changed.
## Decision
Provider save remains a two-stage settings-then-credentials operation over the existing wire domains, but the card treats the successful settings response as a commit checkpoint. It replaces its comparison subtree and expected revision with the returned redacted descriptor before attempting `credentials.set`; if that second stage fails, the draft key and card stay visible, and retry produces no settings ops and repeats only the credential write. Genuine concurrent changes before the first settings commit still fail with `settings-conflict`. Typed keys are trimmed at the UI and direct DeepSeek resolver boundaries, and pi-ai records a derived reference only when the normalized key is non-empty; saving a blank key materializes an empty, reference-free profile for provider-native discovery.
Deletion removes a credential only when the joined row identifies the exact `<ROUTE>_API_KEY` reference derived by this page and reports it configured and writable. It unsets that credential before the user-layer profile so a settings-stage failure leaves the row and its frozen target visible for retry; both unsets are idempotent. Custom references, environment credentials, missing credentials, and targets the join cannot identify are retained. The row's accessible Edit/Delete names and the destructive dialog title, description, and final action all use the same stable `Display Name (route-id)` identity, collapsing to the route id when both strings match. The dialog states whether the stored key will be removed and owns operation failures instead of replacing the whole page with a load-error banner. Rows expose API-key state only from the value-free join: a confirmed literal or referenced credential is a green solid dot, a confirmed missing named reference is a red solid dot, and reference-free provider-native authentication or unavailable credential enrichment has no dot. Each dot has accessible copy and a tooltip, while successful Apply uses the same provider identity in a local status message and never echoes secret material.
## Alternatives considered
**Add a cross-domain transaction RPC.** Settings and credentials have separate owning services and durable stores; introducing a new host transaction would broaden the public wire and still require compensation for provider-specific persistence failures. The UI checkpoint makes the current ordered stages recoverable without adding a fourth configuration contract.
**Delete every credential reference named by a removed profile.** A custom reference can be shared, externally managed, or intentionally survive profile churn. Exact equality with this page's derived target plus configured+writable state is the narrow evidence available to the page; anything weaker risks deleting a credential it does not own.
**Remove settings first and compensate by recreating the profile.** The browser holds only a redacted subtree and cannot faithfully reconstruct stored literal secrets or concurrent edits. Credential-first deletion leaves the authoritative profile visible on partial failure and makes retry safe without synthesizing configuration.
## Consequences
The Models page can recover from either second-stage failure without reload, secret disclosure, or a false concurrency conflict, and blank-key pi-ai profiles preserve Bedrock, Vertex, and other provider-native authentication. Confirmed status is visible without turning route liveness, native authentication, or a failed credential lookup into a false error, and a successful replacement remains observable even when the row stays green. Deleting a page-managed provider no longer leaves a reusable local key, while ambiguous credentials deliberately remain for manual management. Save and delete are still not atomic across durable stores: a process crash can stop between stages, but their order and idempotence leave an observable, retryable state. Component tests pin partial-success retries, empty-key native auth, normalized literals, status visibility, target identity, cleanup ownership, and credential/settings rejection ordering; the keyless browser scenario pins bilingual accessible copy and verifies that confirmed deletion removes both `settings.yaml` profile and `.env` credential. This decision refines the Models apply semantics recorded in the [web configuration plane note](../architecture/2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md).

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# Agent Note: 可恢复的提供方凭据生命周期
Status: implemented
[English](2026-08-06-provider-credential-lifecycle.md) | 中文
## 问题
Models 编辑器横跨互相独立的 settings 与凭据 RPC 领域。之前它先提交提供方 settings,再存储 API 密钥,却一直保留卡片打开时的 revision 和原始子树。如果凭据写入失败,重试会用陈旧 revision 重放已提交的 settings 变更,并产生冲突,导致用户无法从同一张卡片完成第二个阶段。空的 pi-ai 密钥还会写入派生的 `apiKeyEnv`,却不写入凭据,从而阻止 pi-ai 使用提供方原生凭据发现。删除时则存在相反的残留问题:profile 消失了,页面存储的密钥却保留在 `.env` 中,并在重新添加提供方时静默地恢复作用。笼统的行操作与确认文案也没有标明要更改哪个提供方。
## 决策
提供方保存仍在现有 wire 领域上按先 settings、后凭据的两阶段顺序执行,但卡片会把成功的 settings 响应视为提交检查点。它会在尝试 `credentials.set` 之前,用返回的脱敏 descriptor 替换比较基准子树与预期 revision;如果第二阶段失败,草稿密钥与卡片会继续显示,重试不会产生 settings op,只会再次写入凭据。首次 settings 提交之前发生的真实并发变更仍会以 `settings-conflict` 失败。UI 与 DeepSeek 直连 resolver 边界均会去除所输密钥的首尾空白,且只有标准化密钥非空时,pi-ai 才会记录派生引用;留空密钥会具化一个空的、不带引用的 profile,以便使用提供方原生凭据发现。
只有当联接所得的行识别出该页面派生的精确 `<ROUTE>_API_KEY` 引用,并将其报告为已配置且可写时,删除操作才会清除该凭据。它会先取消设置该凭据,再取消设置用户层 profile;如果 settings 阶段失败,该行及其已冻结的目标仍可见,便于重试。两项 unset 都具备幂等性。自定义引用、环境凭据、缺失的凭据,以及联接无法识别目标的凭据均会保留。行的无障碍 Edit/Delete 名称以及破坏性对话框的标题、说明和最终操作都使用同一个稳定的 `Display Name (route-id)` 标识;当两个字符串相同时,标识会简化为路由 id。对话框会说明是否一并删除已存密钥,并在自身内显示操作失败,而不是用加载错误横幅替换整个页面。行只根据不含值的联接结果展示 API 密钥状态:确认已配置的字面密钥或引用凭据显示为绿色实心点,确认缺失的具名引用显示为红色实心点,无引用的提供方原生认证或无法取得凭据补充信息时则不显示状态点。每个状态点都有无障碍文案和工具提示;「应用」成功后的本地状态消息会使用同一个提供方标识,且绝不回显任何机密内容。
## 曾考虑的替代方案
**添加跨领域事务 RPC。**settings 与凭据分属不同的主管服务与持久存储;引入新的 Host 事务会扩大公开 wire 面,而且仍需要补偿提供方特定的持久化失败。UI 检查点让当前的有序阶段变得可恢复,无需添加第四项配置契约。
**删除被移除 profile 所指定的每一个凭据引用。**自定义引用可能被共享、由外部管理,或有意在 profile 反复增删时存留。与该页面派生目标精确相等,再加上已配置且可写的状态,是页面所能获得的最小范围证据;比这更弱的判定都有可能删除不属于它的凭据。
**先删除 settings,再重建 profile 以作补偿。**浏览器只持有脱敏后的子树,无法忠实重建已存的字面机密或并发编辑。先删除凭据可以让权威 profile 在部分失败时仍然可见,并且无需合成配置就能安全重试。
## 后果
Models 页可以从任一第二阶段失败中恢复,无需重新加载,也不会泄露机密或产生虚假的并发冲突;空密钥的 pi-ai profile 会保留 Bedrock、Vertex 与其他提供方原生认证。已确认的状态清晰可见,同时不会把路由存活状态、原生认证或凭据查询失败误报为错误;即使该行继续显示绿色,密钥替换成功也仍然可观察。删除由页面管理的提供方不再遗留可重用的本地密钥,而存在歧义的凭据会有意保留,交由手动管理。保存与删除在跨持久存储时仍非原子操作:进程可能在两个阶段之间崩溃,但它们的顺序与幂等性会留下可观察、可重试的状态。组件测试固定了部分成功后的重试、空密钥原生认证、标准化字面值、状态可见性、目标标识、清理所有权,以及凭据/settings 拒绝顺序;无密钥的浏览器场景固定了双语无障碍文案,并验证确认删除会同时清除 `settings.yaml` profile 与 `.env` 凭据。此决策细化了 [web 配置平面 note](../architecture/2026-07-30-web-config-plane.md) 中记录的 Models 应用语义。

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# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/bug-fix/2026-08-06-reader-scroll-attribution-observed-top-ledger.md
2026-08-06-reader-scroll-attribution-observed-top-ledger.md: 2dcd0178e4216d4d3e2edcd3bfcc05b63606c333
2026-08-06-reader-scroll-attribution-observed-top-ledger.zh.md: ffb03fdb68c9cb040e311077dd698b310a033fdd

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# Agent Note: Reader scroll attribution through the observed-top ledger
Status: implemented
English | [中文](2026-08-06-reader-scroll-attribution-observed-top-ledger.zh.md)
## Problem
ChatView's bottom-follow recognized only wheel/trackpad gestures as reader input: while pinned to the floor, a scroll event without matching wheel movement was treated as programmatic and snapped back. Touch panning, native-scrollbar dragging, and keyboard paging therefore could not leave the bottom of a streaming transcript — on a phone the tail was effectively locked. That wheel-only provenance was a deliberate deferral in the [sticky-composer note](2026-07-29-sticky-composer-conversation-scroll.md), which rejected a general input state machine "for this narrow fix" and left every other scroll source outside the model.
## Decision
Reader input is no longer identified by device. ChatView keeps an observed-top ledger (`observedTopRef`): the last `scrollTop` either delivered on the main thread or written by the component, recorded synchronously at every programmatic write site — bottom follow, open restore, prepend anchoring, resize follow, and scroll delivery itself. When a scroll event arrives, a position that deviates from `min(ledger, floor)` by more than half a pixel is reader input; a position on the ledger (a delayed programmatic delivery) or exactly on the shrunken floor (a browser clamp after content shrank) preserves the current ownership state. Ownership then changes only through reader input under the existing threshold rule: within `FOLLOW_THRESHOLD` of the floor re-pins, beyond it releases follow and shows Back to bottom. The wheel listener and its epoch bookkeeping are deleted; the component listens to `scroll` alone, so wheel, touch, scrollbar, keyboard, and any future input source are covered by one rule.
## Contract change: coalesced shrink-plus-regrow clamps
A shrink clamp whose layout regrows within the same rendering update before the clamp's scroll event is delivered is geometrically indistinguishable from reader input, so it now reads as the reader and releases follow (Back to bottom recovers). Realistic React-commit-driven shrink and regrow is still absorbed: the layout-effect follow re-pins and re-records the ledger per commit, and a shrink-only clamp lands exactly on `min(ledger, floor)`. Only a non-React reflow that shrinks and regrows inside one update mis-attributes. The previous wheel model kept following in that raced case; the unit contract was rewritten to the absorbed-shrink-only guarantee in the same change.
## Testing
Unit specs in `packages/client/ui-conversation/tests/chat-view.spec.tsx` pin the ledger contract directly: a `readerScroll` helper delivers a position the component never wrote, programmatic deliveries land on the ledger, and the stream-finalization shrink clamp keeps following. Two scenarios in `apps/web/tests/chat-scroll-contract.e2e.ts` extend the [browser e2e lane](../testing/2026-07-24-web-gui-browser-e2e-lane.md): keyboard paging over a settled transcript and a touch-style momentum fling against paced streaming, both red under the wheel-only implementation and green under the ledger.
The lane's Chromium cannot synthesize any non-wheel device scrolling, which bounds what the e2e can drive for real: `Input.synthesizeScrollGesture` with a touch source and hand-rolled `Input.dispatchTouchEvent` sequences deliver DOM events but never move a scroller (headless and headed-under-Xvfb alike); the `default` gesture source synthesizes wheel events; and compositor scrollbars ignore synthetic mouse input entirely, with a gutter visible only when `--hide-scrollbars` is removed. Keyboard is the one working non-wheel primitive, so it carries the real-input-pipeline proof, and the fling scenario replays touch's signature — per-frame decaying displacements the component never authored — through the scrollport directly.
## Alternatives considered
**Keep the wheel-only model.** Rejected: it is the defect. Touch, scrollbar, and keyboard readers cannot take ownership away from a streaming tail, and each newly supported device would need its own carve-out.
**Enumerate input devices.** Adding `touchstart`/`pointerdown`/`keydown` listeners beside the wheel epoch was the obvious extension. Rejected: native-scrollbar dragging exposes no input event to latch before its scrolls arrive, device lists rot as browsers add sources, and every listener would need its own compositor-delivery grace window — the input state machine the sticky-composer note already declined to build.
**Absorb the coalesced shrink-plus-regrow clamp with heuristics.** Floor-mismatch grace windows or deferred rAF re-checks could keep the raced clamp from reading as the reader. Rejected: streaming rewrites the floor at chunk pace (24 ms) against ~16 ms frames, so any grace window either swallows genuine touch input during streaming — reopening the bug this change fixes — or is too short to cover the race it targets. The mis-attribution is accepted and recoverable instead.
**Drive real touch and scrollbar devices in e2e.** Rejected by the environment, not by preference: every synthesis path (CDP touch gestures, touch event sequences, synthetic mouse on classic scrollbars, headed under Xvfb) was probed and cannot scroll; the details live in Testing above.
## Consequences
Every reader input owns bottom-follow uniformly, with less code: the wheel listener, its epoch counter, and the pre-input baseline bookkeeping are gone, and attribution rides state the component already maintained. The sticky-composer note's layout, wheel chaining, and prepend-anchoring decisions are untouched and remain authoritative; its narrow provenance rule is superseded by this note. The cost is the contract change above — a coalesced non-React shrink-plus-regrow clamp now pauses follow until the reader returns to the floor or presses Back to bottom — traded for touch, scrollbar, and keyboard correctness during streaming. The e2e lane gains non-wheel coverage only within what its browser can synthesize; if gesture synthesis starts working in a future Chromium, the fling emulation can be replaced by real touch strokes without changing the asserted contract.

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# Agent Note: 经由 observed-top ledger 的读者滚动归因
Status: implemented
[English](2026-08-06-reader-scroll-attribution-observed-top-ledger.md) | 中文
## 问题
ChatView 的贴底跟随此前只把滚轮/触控板手势识别为读者输入:钉在底部(floor)期间,一个没有对应滚轮位移的滚动事件会被视为程序化滚动并被拉回底部。因此触控平移、拖动原生滚动条与键盘翻页都无法离开流式 transcript(文本记录)的底部,在手机上尾部实际上被锁死。这种仅认滚轮的输入来源判定是 [sticky-composer 笔记](2026-07-29-sticky-composer-conversation-scroll.md)中有意的暂缓:该笔记拒绝为「此次窄范围修复」建立通用输入状态机,把其余所有滚动来源都留在模型之外。
## 决策
读者输入不再依据设备来识别。ChatView 维护一份 observed-top ledger(`observedTopRef`):即最近一次由主线程交付、或由组件自身写入的 `scrollTop`,并在每一个程序化写入点(贴底跟随、打开时恢复、前置锚定、尺寸变化跟随以及滚动交付本身)同步记录。滚动事件到达时,偏离 `min(ledger, floor)` 超过半像素的位置即为读者输入;落在 ledger 上的位置(迟到的程序化交付),或恰好落在收缩后底部上的位置(内容收缩后的浏览器钳制),则维持当前的所有权状态。此后所有权只经由读者输入、按既有阈值规则变化:位置距底部在 `FOLLOW_THRESHOLD` 以内则重新贴底,超出则释放跟随并显示「回到底部」。滚轮监听器及其 epoch 簿记已删除;组件只监听 `scroll`,因此滚轮、触控、滚动条、键盘以及未来任何输入来源都由同一条规则覆盖。
## 契约变更:收缩与重新增长被合并的钳制
如果一次收缩钳制的布局在同一次渲染更新内、赶在该钳制的滚动事件交付之前重新增长,那么这个事件在几何上与读者输入无法区分,因此它现在会被判读为读者并释放跟随(可经「回到底部」恢复)。现实中由 React 提交(commit)驱动的收缩与重新增长仍会被吸收:layout effect 中的跟随会在每次提交后重新贴底并重新记录 ledger,而仅收缩的钳制会恰好落在 `min(ledger, floor)` 上。只有在同一次更新内先收缩再重新增长的非 React 重排会被误归因。旧的滚轮模型在这种竞态情形下会保持跟随;单元测试契约已在同一变更中改写为只吸收纯收缩的保证。
## 测试
`packages/client/ui-conversation/tests/chat-view.spec.tsx` 中的单元测试直接钉住 ledger 契约:`readerScroll` 辅助函数交付一个组件从未写入过的位置,程序化交付落在 ledger 上,流收尾阶段的收缩钳制保持跟随。`apps/web/tests/chat-scroll-contract.e2e.ts` 中的两个场景扩展了[浏览器 e2e 车道](../testing/2026-07-24-web-gui-browser-e2e-lane.md):在已停稳的 transcript 上做键盘翻页,以及对着按节奏推进的流式输出做一次触控式惯性快滑(momentum fling);两者在仅认滚轮的实现下均为红、在 ledger 下均为绿。
该车道的 Chromium 无法合成任何非滚轮的设备滚动,这限定了 e2e 能真实驱动的范围:触控来源的 `Input.synthesizeScrollGesture` 与手工构造的 `Input.dispatchTouchEvent` 序列都能交付 DOM 事件,却从不移动滚动容器(无头模式与 Xvfb 下的有头模式皆然);`default` 手势来源合成的是滚轮事件;合成器滚动条则完全无视合成的鼠标输入,且只有移除 `--hide-scrollbars` 后才能看到滚动条槽。键盘是唯一可用的非滚轮原语,因此由它承担真实输入流水线的证明;快滑场景则把触控的特征(组件从未写入过的逐帧衰减位移)直接回放进滚动容器。
## 曾考虑的替代方案
**保留仅认滚轮的模型。** 否决:它本身就是缺陷所在。触控、滚动条与键盘读者无法从流式尾部夺走所有权,而每种新支持的设备都需要单独开一个特例。
**逐一枚举输入设备。** 在滚轮 epoch 旁边加挂 `touchstart`/`pointerdown`/`keydown` 监听器是最显而易见的扩展。否决:拖动原生滚动条在其滚动事件到达之前不暴露任何可供锁存的输入事件;设备清单会随浏览器新增输入来源而逐渐腐化;而且每个监听器都需要自己的合成器交付宽限窗口——这正是 sticky-composer 笔记当初就拒绝构建的那个输入状态机。
**用启发式吸收收缩与重新增长被合并的钳制。** 针对底部失配的宽限窗口,或推迟到 rAF 的复查,本可让这种竞态下的钳制不被判读为读者。否决:流式输出以分片节奏(24 ms)改写底部,而帧间隔约 16 ms,因此任何宽限窗口要么会在流式输出期间吞掉真实的触控输入(重新打开本次变更所修复的缺陷),要么短到盖不住它想针对的竞态。转而接受这一误归因,它是可恢复的。
**在 e2e 中驱动真实的触控与滚动条设备。** 否决来自环境,而非偏好取舍:每条合成路径(CDP 触控手势、触控事件序列、经典滚动条上的合成鼠标、Xvfb 下的有头模式)都逐一试过,均无法滚动;细节见上文「测试」一节。
## 后果
每种读者输入现在都以同一方式拥有贴底跟随,而代码更少:滚轮监听器、它的 epoch 计数器以及输入前基线簿记均已移除,归因搭载在组件本就维护的状态之上。sticky-composer 笔记中的布局、滚轮链式处理与前置锚定决策原样保留,仍为权威;其窄范围的输入来源规则由本笔记取代。代价就是上文的契约变更:一次收缩与重新增长被合并的非 React 钳制现在会暂停跟随,直到读者回到底部或按下「回到底部」;以此换来流式输出期间触控、滚动条与键盘的正确性。e2e 车道获得的非滚轮覆盖仅限其浏览器能够合成的范围;若手势合成在未来某个 Chromium 版本中开始可用,可以在不改变所断言契约的前提下,把快滑模拟替换为真实的触控划动。