fix(docs): address Codex review round 2 — repoint every remaining moved-policy citation
The definitive sweep (audit every AGENTS.md mention in packages/, docs/, examples/, scripts/) found thirteen more citations of relocated policy and two citations of rules that never existed as quoted: - with-key policy comments (web deepseek/perplexity e2e headers) -> docs/testing.md; real-impl-over-mock comments (acp harness, load, stream-update specs) -> docs/testing.md; defensive-pattern quotes (acp index.ts x3, stream-update) -> docs/defensive-patterns.md. - md-tier repoints: real-api-e2e RFC, tool-schema-catalog RFC, postmortem 0001 guardrail row, adding-a-package cookbook, drop-bash-output-spill-files RFC, acp-subagent-backend RFC phrasing. - Two false attributions dropped in favor of self-contained reasoning: tool-todo's 'don't validate scenarios that can't happen' and the bash-stdin-env RFC's 'Don't add features beyond what the task requires' (neither rule ever existed under those names). - Citations of the two 'not golden truth' doctrines stay: those bullets survive verbatim in the root conventions. Note: packages/support/ui-stdio readline TTY spec flakes under full coverage on a heavily loaded box (passes standalone and passed the same tree's coverage run minutes earlier); untouched by this stack.
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@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Three deliberate choices:
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## Scope: configurable scrub pattern is NOT included
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An earlier sketch of this work also proposed making `SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN` configurable. Validating against the code, that is **speculative and already subsumed**: `run.ts` documents a configurable whitelist as future work, and the new explicit `env` field — merged after the scrub — already gives a caller full control, including over credential-shaped vars. There is no current caller that needs to *broaden* the ambient scrub (the hazard runs the other way). Adding a config knob now would be a feature with no consumer, against [AGENTS.md](../../../../AGENTS.md) § "Don't add features beyond what the task requires". If a real workflow ever needs to forward a specific ambient credential, the explicit `env` field is the supported path; a configurable scrub can be reconsidered then.
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An earlier sketch of this work also proposed making `SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN` configurable. Validating against the code, that is **speculative and already subsumed**: `run.ts` documents a configurable whitelist as future work, and the new explicit `env` field — merged after the scrub — already gives a caller full control, including over credential-shaped vars. There is no current caller that needs to *broaden* the ambient scrub (the hazard runs the other way). Adding a config knob now would be a speculative surface with no consumer. If a real workflow ever needs to forward a specific ambient credential, the explicit `env` field is the supported path; a configurable scrub can be reconsidered then.
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## Consequences
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