fix(docs): address Codex review round 2 — repoint every remaining moved-policy citation
The definitive sweep (audit every AGENTS.md mention in packages/, docs/, examples/, scripts/) found thirteen more citations of relocated policy and two citations of rules that never existed as quoted: - with-key policy comments (web deepseek/perplexity e2e headers) -> docs/testing.md; real-impl-over-mock comments (acp harness, load, stream-update specs) -> docs/testing.md; defensive-pattern quotes (acp index.ts x3, stream-update) -> docs/defensive-patterns.md. - md-tier repoints: real-api-e2e RFC, tool-schema-catalog RFC, postmortem 0001 guardrail row, adding-a-package cookbook, drop-bash-output-spill-files RFC, acp-subagent-backend RFC phrasing. - Two false attributions dropped in favor of self-contained reasoning: tool-todo's 'don't validate scenarios that can't happen' and the bash-stdin-env RFC's 'Don't add features beyond what the task requires' (neither rule ever existed under those names). - Citations of the two 'not golden truth' doctrines stay: those bullets survive verbatim in the root conventions. Note: packages/support/ui-stdio readline TTY spec flakes under full coverage on a heavily loaded box (passes standalone and passed the same tree's coverage run minutes earlier); untouched by this stack.
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Tianyi Cui
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Three deliberate choices:
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## Scope: configurable scrub pattern is NOT included
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An earlier sketch of this work also proposed making `SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN` configurable. Validating against the code, that is **speculative and already subsumed**: `run.ts` documents a configurable whitelist as future work, and the new explicit `env` field — merged after the scrub — already gives a caller full control, including over credential-shaped vars. There is no current caller that needs to *broaden* the ambient scrub (the hazard runs the other way). Adding a config knob now would be a feature with no consumer, against [AGENTS.md](../../../../AGENTS.md) § "Don't add features beyond what the task requires". If a real workflow ever needs to forward a specific ambient credential, the explicit `env` field is the supported path; a configurable scrub can be reconsidered then.
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An earlier sketch of this work also proposed making `SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN` configurable. Validating against the code, that is **speculative and already subsumed**: `run.ts` documents a configurable whitelist as future work, and the new explicit `env` field — merged after the scrub — already gives a caller full control, including over credential-shaped vars. There is no current caller that needs to *broaden* the ambient scrub (the hazard runs the other way). Adding a config knob now would be a speculative surface with no consumer. If a real workflow ever needs to forward a specific ambient credential, the explicit `env` field is the supported path; a configurable scrub can be reconsidered then.
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## Consequences
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@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ The child is a separate process, so it inherits an environment. Credential-shape
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## Testing
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Designed at every tier the backend touches, per the AGENTS.md "design test infrastructure up front" rule:
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Designed at every tier the backend touches, per the root AGENTS.md rule that a new capability shape names its coverage at every tier at plan time:
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- **Keyless unit/integration** (`subagent-acp.spec.ts`): spawns a scripted mock ACP server subprocess (`tests/mock-acp-server.ts`) and drives it through the real backend over real ACP stdio. Covers: the prompt round-trip + output accumulation; every StopReason mapping; cancellation via `run.cancel()` and via the request signal; the already-aborted-before-start case; the cancel-races-ahead-of-newSession case; a torn-pipe-after-cancel (child crashes on cancel) settling `aborted`; permission auto-answer under both policies (including the allow-policy-no-allow-option fallback); a non-message update consumed but not accumulated; a nonexistent-command spawn failure settling `error`; HMR provider cleanup; and the namespace export shape. 100% per-file coverage.
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- **With-key e2e** (`subagent-acp.e2e.ts`): the harness drives ITSELF — the backend spawns the real `acp-agent` example process and a real model in that child answers a prompt (PONG) and does real file work (writes `proof.txt`, verified on disk). Self-skips without `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY`. This is the "talk to our own process" smoke and the out-of-process analogue of the in-process spawn e2e.
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@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The cordis catalog is a pure TypeScript-AST pass because every event/service nam
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- `tool-subagent`'s tool name is `config.toolName ?? 'subagent'` — chosen at load, not a literal.
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- An MCP plugin can register **raw JSON Schema** directly via `ctx.tools.register()` without `defineTool` at all, so enumerating `defineTool(` call sites structurally under-counts.
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The only faithful source of truth is the schema the registry actually holds after the plugin loads. Booting is the [unit-test discipline](../../../../AGENTS.md) "verify the world, not a synthetic stand-in" applied to a doc generator: read the shipped artifact, not a re-derivation of it.
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The only faithful source of truth is the schema the registry actually holds after the plugin loads. Booting is the [testing-policy discipline](../../../testing.md) "verify the world, not the self-report" applied to a doc generator: read the shipped artifact, not a re-derivation of it.
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### Restoring "nothing silently omitted"
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ci.yml's value is that it is keyless, forkable, and always-green: any contributo
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### Cost is not the constraint; reliability is
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The usual reason to ration real-API CI — token cost — does not apply here: we are DeepSeek and internal inference is effectively free. So the design optimizes for *coverage and signal*, not for minimizing calls. The suite runs in full (all six `*.e2e.ts` files), on multiple triggers, on every trusted PR. This is the CI embodiment of the AGENTS.md "lean on with-key e2e tests" policy.
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The usual reason to ration real-API CI — token cost — does not apply here: we are DeepSeek and internal inference is effectively free. So the design optimizes for *coverage and signal*, not for minimizing calls. The suite runs in full (all six `*.e2e.ts` files), on multiple triggers, on every trusted PR. This is the CI embodiment of the [docs/testing.md](../../../testing.md) with-key policy.
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### Triggers: trusted events only
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ This proposal can land independently of [a generic long-running tool runtime](..
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- `OutputCollector` keeps bounded buffers only and deletes the temp-file machinery.
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- `renderResult()` reports truncation without a filesystem path.
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- Tests cover tail truncation and no longer assert full-output file contents.
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- Security guidance in [root AGENTS.md](../../../../AGENTS.md) stops treating private spill files as a model-visible interface.
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- Security guidance in [docs/defensive-patterns.md](../../../defensive-patterns.md) stops treating private spill files as a model-visible interface.
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## What we give up
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