docs: purge chain-of-thought leakage from prose

Delete design-session citations (decision/audit/plan ordinals, stack
positions), change narration, review choreography, and reviewer-addressed
justification from comments, JSDoc, docs, READMEs, Agent Notes, tests, and
generator templates; restate every affected fact as current-state contract
prose. Fix generated docs at their sources and regenerate the catalogs and
cordis-surface regions; re-paste type-equiv blocks; update every bilingual
counterpart and re-record the pairs. Record the citation rule in the
committed-artifact-citations Agent Note.

packages/subagent/subagent-acp/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/subagent/subagent-acp/README.md
-README.md: 4fdd3a09e128d4dc7ec7395d9578803c64a33bc6
-README.zh.md: 7cb1e3d18602ef839e4af316962fc2d10bc67640
+README.md: 33711eb93c38d93472b3b625a86721c1365ac8d9
+README.zh.md: e57010f395e4ebae9b2e909bf63b7ffa1a90afe2

packages/subagent/subagent-acp/README.md

@@ -97,4 +97,4 @@ Append-only; newly visible content follows the reusable request prefix and does
 - **Local workspaces only** — the resolved cwd is a local path handed to a child on the same machine; workspace mapping for a remote ACP agent would need its own backend capability and is not designed here.
 - **No optional start-time capabilities** — this provider cannot apply the local harness's `outputSchema`, depth cap, tool filter, or persona inside the remote process, so it advertises none and the service rejects requests that require them.
 - **Only committed `agent_message_chunk` text is collected** — the automation server keeps reasoning, tool activity, plans, and other trace data in the child session log rather than emitting them on ACP.
-- **Permission prompts are auto-answered** (`permission: allow | reject`) — no human is surfaced a child's `session/request_permission` in this cut.
+- **Permission prompts are auto-answered** (`permission: allow | reject`) — no human is surfaced a child's `session/request_permission`.

packages/subagent/subagent-acp/README.zh.md

@@ -97,4 +97,4 @@ ACP 不声明任何启动时能力，因为当前进程无法强制执行远程
 - **仅支持本地工作区**：解析后的 cwd 是交给同一台机器上子进程的本地路径；远程 ACP agent 的工作区映射需要独立的后端能力，本包尚未设计。
 - **不支持可选启动时能力**：该提供方无法在远程进程内应用本地 harness 的 `outputSchema`、深度上限、工具过滤器或 persona，因此不会声明这些能力；服务会拒绝需要它们的请求。
 - **只收集已提交的 `agent_message_chunk` 文本**：自动化服务器把推理（reasoning）、工具活动、计划和其他 trace 数据保留在子 agent 会话日志中，不通过 ACP 发出。
-- **权限提示自动回答**（`permission: allow | reject`）：当前版本不会把子 agent 的 `session/request_permission` 呈现给人。
+- **权限提示自动回答**（`permission: allow | reject`）：不会把子 agent 的 `session/request_permission` 呈现给人。

packages/subagent/subagent-acp/src/index.ts

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ export interface Config {
   /**
    * How to auto-answer the child's `session/request_permission` prompts:
    * `reject` (default — decline every prompt) or `allow` (approve via the first
-   * allow-shaped option). The first cut surfaces no prompt to a human.
+   * allow-shaped option). No prompt is surfaced to a human.
    */
   permission: PermissionPolicy
   /**

packages/subagent/subagent-acp/src/run.ts

@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ export async function startAcpRun(request: SubagentStartRequest, spec: AcpRunSpe
         output.push(acpContentText(update.content))
       }
       // Other updates (thoughts, tool calls, plans) are consumed but not
-      // surfaced in this cut — the subagent returns only its final answer.
+      // surfaced — the subagent returns only its final answer.
       return Promise.resolve()
     },
     requestPermission(params: RequestPermissionRequest): Promise<RequestPermissionResponse> {