docs(bundle): complete the Windows pwsh default contract per review

- apps/cli/reference/README: state the win32 permission/sandbox/approval
  degradation so the workspace-write promise no longer misleads Windows users
- bundle README + agent note: give the complete bash-restore recipe (disable
  pwsh-local/tool-pwsh and re-enable bash-sandbox/tool-bash), since both
  executors register the same bash service and an incomplete recipe fails
  loud at load
- windows.cordis.patch.yml: header comment notes the recipe and that the
  ui-permission row belongs to dsh-web-app (base-only profiles get a
  harmless no-match warning)
- profile-boot.ts: rewrap composeProfile JSDoc
- re-record i18n hashes for the touched bilingual pairs

packages/bundle/base/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/bundle/base/README.md
-README.md: 84e7f43aaa6cfead0ff28e30063e71062d358f0a
-README.zh.md: 30c7c259f8893ebd34da6cab362dedac067ce099
+README.md: 9e2a6305fff592eb63f927dfcc4f32437edeb1cc
+README.zh.md: 6159c23047bba4ced3345125901cc0c3ff7cd960

packages/bundle/base/README.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ English | [中文](README.zh.md)
 
 The shared dsh core as a profile bundle: [`cordis.patch.yml`](cordis.patch.yml) inserts every base plugin row — model adapters, tools, persistence, policy, settings/credentials, repository Plugins, telemetry — over the empty profile root, as the first layer of every profile's `dsh.profile.bundles` list. Later bundle layers (e.g. [`dsh-web-app`](../web-app/README.md)) and the user's profile `cordis.patch.yml` override these rows by id; a patch replaces a row's whole `config`, so mode-specific values live in mode bundles, not here. The package has no runtime API; the profile composer resolves the universal patch through the `dsh.bundle.patch` manifest field, and the launcher reads the Windows platform layer below from code on win32 hosts.
 
-Windows hosts booting a shipped profile additionally receive [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](windows.cordis.patch.yml): it disables the POSIX-only sandboxed stacks — the bash executor/tool, the permission switcher (dsh-permission requires a confining executor), the sandbox/fs-policy stack, and the approval service — and inserts the PowerShell executor and tool (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`, `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`) plus the unconfined `dsh-fs-local`. Windows has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the shipped posture is honest danger-full-access rather than a boundary only the fs tools pretend to enforce; nothing in the roster asks for approval, so the approval service is absent. The launcher applies the layer between the bundle layers and the user layers on win32 hosts; a Windows host that prefers the bash stack overrides these rows through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml`. POSIX hosts never receive it.
+Windows hosts booting a shipped profile additionally receive [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](windows.cordis.patch.yml): it disables the POSIX-only sandboxed stacks — the bash executor/tool, the permission switcher (dsh-permission requires a confining executor), the sandbox/fs-policy stack, and the approval service — and inserts the PowerShell executor and tool (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`, `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`) plus the unconfined `dsh-fs-local`. Windows has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the shipped posture is honest danger-full-access rather than a boundary only the fs tools pretend to enforce; nothing in the roster asks for approval, so the approval service is absent. The launcher applies the layer between the bundle layers and the user layers on win32 hosts; a Windows host that prefers the bash stack restores it through its profile or home `cordis.patch.yml` (disable `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh` and re-enable `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash` — both executors register the same `bash` service, so an incomplete recipe fails loud at load). POSIX hosts never receive it.
 
 The row set and its rationale are documented inline in the patch file; the [generated composition graph](../../../apps/cli/composition.md) renders it.
 

packages/bundle/base/README.zh.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 以 profile 组合包形式交付的共享 dsh 核心：[`cordis.patch.yml`](cordis.patch.yml) 在空的 profile 根之上插入全部基础插件行——模型适配器、工具、持久化、策略、settings／credentials、repository 插件、遥测——作为每个 profile 的 `dsh.profile.bundles` 列表中的第一层。后续的组合包层（例如 [`dsh-web-app`](../web-app/README.md)）和用户 profile 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 按 id 覆盖这些行；patch 会替换目标行的整个 `config`，因此模式专属的值放在各模式组合包中，而不是这里。该包没有运行时 API；profile 组合器通过 manifest（元数据清单）的 `dsh.bundle.patch` 字段解析通用 patch，启动器在 win32 主机上通过代码读取下面的 Windows 平台层。
 
-启动交付 profile 的 Windows 主机还会额外收到 [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](windows.cordis.patch.yml)：它禁用仅 POSIX 的受限栈——bash 执行器/工具、权限切换器（dsh-permission 要求有限权能力的执行器）、sandbox/fs 策略栈与 approval 服务——并插入 PowerShell 执行器与工具（`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`、`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`）以及不限权的 `dsh-fs-local`。Windows 上没有 OS 级 sandbox runner（landlock/bwrap/seatbelt 均为 POSIX 专属），因此交付姿态是诚实的 danger-full-access，而不是一个只有 fs 工具假装执行的边界；清单里没有任何动作需要审批，因此 approval 服务缺席。启动器在 win32 主机上把它应用于 bundle 层与用户层之间；偏好 bash 栈的 Windows 主机通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 覆盖这些行。POSIX 主机永远不会收到它。
+启动交付 profile 的 Windows 主机还会额外收到 [`windows.cordis.patch.yml`](windows.cordis.patch.yml)：它禁用仅 POSIX 的受限栈——bash 执行器/工具、权限切换器（dsh-permission 要求有限权能力的执行器）、sandbox/fs 策略栈与 approval 服务——并插入 PowerShell 执行器与工具（`@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local`、`@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pwsh`）以及不限权的 `dsh-fs-local`。Windows 上没有 OS 级 sandbox runner（landlock/bwrap/seatbelt 均为 POSIX 专属），因此交付姿态是诚实的 danger-full-access，而不是一个只有 fs 工具假装执行的边界；清单里没有任何动作需要审批，因此 approval 服务缺席。启动器在 win32 主机上把它应用于 bundle 层与用户层之间；偏好 bash 栈的 Windows 主机通过其 profile 或 home 的 `cordis.patch.yml` 恢复 bash 栈（禁用 `pwsh-local`/`tool-pwsh` 并重新启用 `bash-sandbox`/`tool-bash`——两个执行器注册同一个 `bash` 服务，配方不完整会在加载时 fail loud）。POSIX 主机永远不会收到它。
 
 行集合及其设计依据以行内注释写在 patch 文件里；[生成的组合图](../../../apps/cli/composition.md)负责渲染它。
 

packages/bundle/base/windows.cordis.patch.yml

@@ -13,6 +13,14 @@
 # dsh.bundle.patch — that field names the one universal layer). A Windows
 # host that prefers bash or confinement overrides these rows through its
 # profile or home cordis.patch.yml.
+# The bash-restore recipe must be complete: disable pwsh-local and tool-pwsh
+# AND re-enable bash-sandbox and tool-bash (plus permission/ui-permission only
+# if the switcher is wanted) — both executors register the same 'bash'
+# service, so re-enabling the bash rows while pwsh-local stays inserted fails
+# loud at load on a duplicate registration.
+# The ui-permission disable targets a row owned by dsh-web-app, not dsh-base:
+# a base-only profile (e.g. the `dsh plugin --profile` default template) has
+# no such row, and the no-match logs a harmless warning on every load.
 
 - id: bash-sandbox
   disabled: true