fix(tool-cordis): replace the pass-through ctx proxy with a whitelist façade

Review finding (#220): the guarded proxy only special-cased ctx.tools, so
mount code could reach an UNGUARDED context through ctx.root, ctx.extend(), or
a service instance's .ctx, then ctx.root.tools.register({…}) to bypass the
marker check and host-realm normalization — a raw vm-realm result would later
error a real agent turn at the session-log plainness check.

The sandbox ctx is now a whitelist façade, not a pass-through proxy: it exposes
only what a mount needs — tools.register (marker-guarded), on/once, provide, the
timer helpers, and injected services resolved through a guarded get — and denies
every framework-plumbing member (root, parent, fiber, reflect, registry, extend,
isolate, intercept, plugin, set, mixin, …) with a teaching error. Injected
services are wrapped so a method returning a Context is rejected on the way back
(the .ctx escape), closing the one indirect leak. There is no context-valued
member left to reach; cross-mount provide/inject is untouched (the plugin's own
inject and the fiber's pending/active gating are unchanged). ctx.plugin (child
plugins) and ctx.set are denied by design; ctx.effect is deferred (FIXME).

Adds tests/sandbox-context.spec.ts covering the escape class (root/extend/fiber/
plugin/set/… denied, the classic root.tools.register bypass, the .ctx escape,
read-only writes) plus the async-service and symbol/in-operator paths for 100%
coverage. RFC/README/tool-catalog/config-catalog updated; api-catalog.ts
regenerated (also picks up the codeRuntime service that entered on the master
merge and was left stale).
This commit is contained in:
imccyu
2026-07-09 01:37:40 +08:00
parent aed752a75d
commit 1b1ba96d4f
9 changed files with 348 additions and 45 deletions

View File

@@ -386,13 +386,13 @@ describe('cordis_mount', () => {
console.error('errored')
const round = atob(btoa('hi'))
const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(round)
return { name: 'codec-' + new TextDecoder().decode(bytes), apply(ctx) { console.log('applied', typeof ctx.fiber) } }
return { name: 'codec-' + new TextDecoder().decode(bytes), apply(ctx) { console.log('applied', typeof ctx.on) } }
`,
})
expect(result.isError).toBe(false)
expect(text(result)).toContain('plugin "codec-hi"')
expect(log).toHaveBeenCalledWith('[cordis:dyn-1]', 'warned')
expect(log).toHaveBeenCalledWith('[cordis:dyn-1]', 'applied', 'object')
expect(log).toHaveBeenCalledWith('[cordis:dyn-1]', 'applied', 'function')
expect(error).toHaveBeenCalledWith('[cordis:dyn-1]', 'errored')
})

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import { call, setup, text } from './helpers.ts'
/**
* The sandbox context façade is a whitelist, not a pass-through proxy: mount
* code reaches only the registration/eventing verbs, the timer helpers, a
* guarded `tools`, and its injected services. Every framework-plumbing member
* that could hand back an UNGUARDED context — through which a plugin could
* `ctx.<escape>.tools.register({…})` to bypass the marker check and host-realm
* normalization — is denied. These are the regression guards for that escape
* class (the review finding on the original pass-through proxy).
*/
/** Mount a plugin whose `apply` touches one framework member, and report the error text. */
async function mountTouching(ctx: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof setup>>, expr: string): Promise<string> {
const result = await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: `return { name: 'probe', inject: ['tools'], apply(ctx) { ${expr} } }`,
})
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
return text(result)
}
describe('sandbox context façade — escape surface is closed', () => {
it.each([
['ctx.root', 'const c = ctx.root'],
['ctx.parent', 'const c = ctx.parent'],
['ctx.scope', 'const c = ctx.scope'],
['ctx.fiber', 'const f = ctx.fiber'],
['ctx.reflect', 'const r = ctx.reflect'],
['ctx.registry', 'const r = ctx.registry'],
['ctx.events', 'const e = ctx.events'],
['ctx.extend()', 'ctx.extend({})'],
['ctx.isolate()', 'ctx.isolate("x")'],
['ctx.intercept()', 'ctx.intercept("x", {})'],
['ctx.plugin()', 'ctx.plugin({ apply() {} })'],
['ctx.set()', 'ctx.set("tools", 1)'],
['ctx.mixin()', 'ctx.mixin("x", [])'],
])('denies %s with a teaching error', async (_label, expr) => {
const ctx = await setup()
const message = await mountTouching(ctx, expr)
expect(message).toContain('sandbox ctx does not expose')
expect(message).toContain('withheld by design')
})
it('the classic ctx.root.tools.register bypass registers nothing and fails loud', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: `
return {
name: 'root-bypass',
inject: ['tools'],
apply(ctx) {
ctx.root.tools.register({
name: 'smuggled',
description: 'raw, unguarded',
parameters: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
async execute() { return [] },
})
},
}
`,
})
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(result)).toContain('sandbox ctx does not expose "root"')
// The whole point: the bypass never reaches the registry.
expect(ctx.tools.get('smuggled')).toBeUndefined()
})
it('rejects assignment to the façade rather than silently dropping it', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: 'return { name: \'writer\', apply(ctx) { ctx.stash = 1 } }',
})
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(result)).toContain('sandbox ctx is read-only')
})
it('denies a service whose method returns a Context (the .ctx escape), registering nothing', async () => {
// A cordis Service instance carries `.ctx` (a real Context), so
// `ctx.systemPrompt.ctx.root.tools.register(…)` would be a fresh unguarded
// handle. The service wrapper's return-value guard rejects any Context on
// the way back to sandbox code, so the escape never lands. (`systemPrompt`
// is in the setup harness, so the plugin activates and its apply runs.)
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: `
return {
name: 'svc-ctx-escape',
inject: ['systemPrompt', 'tools'],
apply(ctx) {
ctx.systemPrompt.ctx.root.tools.register({
name: 'smuggled_via_service',
description: 'raw, unguarded',
parameters: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
async execute() { return [] },
})
},
}
`,
})
expect(result.isError).toBe(true)
expect(text(result)).toContain('returned a cordis Context, which the sandbox does not expose')
expect(ctx.tools.get('smuggled_via_service')).toBeUndefined()
})
it('guards an async injected-service method: a host-realm Promise resolves through the guard', async () => {
// The return guard's Promise arm only fires for a HOST-realm Promise
// (a vm-realm one is not `instanceof` the host `Promise`). Provide a
// host-realm service from the test, then inject + await it from a mount:
// the resolved value is non-Context data and passes through.
const ctx = await setup()
ctx.plugin({
name: 'host-async-svc',
apply(c) { c.provide('hostAsync', { grab: async () => 'host-fetched' }) },
})
await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: `
return {
name: 'async-consumer',
inject: ['hostAsync', 'tools'],
apply(ctx) {
harness.registerTool(ctx, harness.defineTool({
name: 'do_fetch',
description: 'awaits the host async service',
parameters: {},
async execute() {
const value = await ctx.hostAsync.grab()
return [{ type: 'text', text: value }]
},
}))
},
}
`,
})
const result = await call(ctx, 'do_fetch', {})
expect(result.isError).toBe(false)
expect(text(result)).toBe('host-fetched')
})
it('reads a symbol property as undefined and answers the `in` operator without throwing', async () => {
const ctx = await setup()
const result = await call(ctx, 'cordis_mount', {
code: `
return {
name: 'introspector',
inject: ['tools'],
apply(ctx) {
const sym = ctx[Symbol.iterator]
console.log('probe', sym === undefined, 'tools' in ctx, 'on' in ctx, 'root' in ctx)
},
}
`,
})
expect(result.isError).toBe(false)
})
})