feat(bash): add stdin + extra env to the executor seam as a trusted-plugin surface

The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the Claude Code / Codex way:
JSON payload on stdin, context in CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR / CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT env.
Reusing the ctx.bash seam for that needs two new inputs — but stdin and arbitrary
env are exactly what dsh-bash-local's credential scrub exists to keep away from
model-driven commands. So this adds them as a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface:

- BashExecRequest + BashExecSpec gain optional `stdin` and `env`. They are plain
  optionals on the resolved spec (not required-but-nullable like `owner`): a
  missing one means "none", the safe default, not a security footgun.
- dsh-bash-local threads them through resolve/run/start. `env` merges AFTER the
  credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry wins even on a
  credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's OWN ambient creds from
  model-driven commands, not a trusted plugin. stdin is always a pipe, closed
  immediately (with bytes when supplied, empty otherwise — EOF as before); an
  EPIPE from a child that exits without reading is swallowed.
- The model-facing dsh-tool-bash NEVER forwards model input into stdin/env (its
  request is command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal/owner only). A regression guard
  drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the request carries
  neither field — proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them.

Configurable scrub (in an earlier sketch) is dropped as speculative: the explicit
`env` field already gives a trusted caller full control, and no caller needs to
broaden the ambient scrub. Documented in a new architecture RFC, the bash.md
type-equiv blocks, and the three bash READMEs.

docs/core-data-structures/bash.md

@@ -17,6 +17,23 @@ interface BashExecRequest {
   timeoutMs?: number | undefined
   /** Abort signal — implementations kill the command when it fires. */
   signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
+  /**
+   * Bytes to write to the command's stdin, then close it. Absent leaves stdin
+   * closed/empty (the default for model-driven tool calls). A TRUSTED-PLUGIN
+   * surface: the model-facing bash tool does NOT thread model-supplied input
+   * here — it is set by in-process plugins (e.g. the hooks bridges, which write
+   * a hook command's JSON payload to its stdin).
+   */
+  stdin?: string | undefined
+  /**
+   * Extra environment entries for the command, merged AFTER the
+   * implementation's credential scrub (so an explicit entry here is honored even
+   * when its name matches the scrub pattern — the caller takes responsibility).
+   * Like {@link stdin}, a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface: the model-facing bash tool
+   * never forwards model-supplied env; in-process plugins (the hooks bridges)
+   * set hook env vars (`CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`, `CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT`, …) here.
+   */
+  env?: Record<string, string> | undefined
   /**
    * Opaque OWNER token for a background task — the consumer's isolation key
    * (the tool layer passes the owning agent's `session.header.id`). The
@@ -36,6 +53,23 @@ interface BashExecSpec {
   timeoutMs: number
   /** Abort signal — implementations kill the command when it fires. */
   signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
+  /**
+   * Bytes to write to the command's stdin (then close it), carried through
+   * verbatim from {@link BashExecRequest.stdin}. OPTIONAL on the resolved spec
+   * (unlike `owner`): it has no config default, so a missing one means "no
+   * stdin" — the safe, ordinary case — not a silent footgun, so it stays a
+   * plain optional rather than required-but-nullable. A TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface
+   * (see the request field).
+   */
+  stdin?: string | undefined
+  /**
+   * Extra environment entries, carried through verbatim from
+   * {@link BashExecRequest.env} and merged by the implementation AFTER its
+   * credential scrub (an explicit entry wins even when its name matches the
+   * scrub pattern). OPTIONAL on the spec for the same reason as `stdin` — no
+   * config default, absent means "no extra env". A TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface.
+   */
+  env?: Record<string, string> | undefined
   /**
    * Opaque owner token, REQUIRED-but-nullable (mirrors `workdir`/`timeoutMs`
    * being required on the resolved spec): {@link BashExecutor.resolve} carries
@@ -50,6 +84,8 @@ interface BashExecSpec {
 
 The `owner` token is the isolation key: the executor stores it but never interprets it (access policy is the consumer's job), so a background task started by one agent isn't readable cross-session. A required-but-nullable field makes a forgotten owner a visible `undefined` rather than a silently-unowned task.
 
+`stdin` and `env` are a **trusted-plugin surface**: an in-process plugin (the hooks bridges, native plugins) sets them to feed a hook command its JSON payload on stdin and its `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`/`CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT` env. The model-facing `dsh-tool-bash` tool deliberately NEVER forwards model input into either field — its request is built from `command`/`workdir`/`timeoutMs`/`signal`/`owner` only — so a model cannot smuggle an env var or stdin payload past the credential scrub (a guard test asserts this). `env` is merged AFTER the scrub so a trusted caller can set even a credential-shaped var; the scrub's job is to stop the harness's OWN ambient credentials leaking into model-driven commands, not to constrain a trusted plugin.
+
 Both ids the seam handles are [branded](core.md) (zero-cost `string` brands, the same machinery as `SessionId`/`AgentId`): `BashTaskId` (a tracked background task, generated `bash-N` by the local executor) and `OwnerToken` (the opaque isolation key). `OwnerToken` is deliberately a DISTINCT brand from `SessionId`, not an alias: the bash seam is a capability seam that must not know what an owner token *means*, so it never imports `dsh-session`'s vocabulary — the `dsh-tool-bash` consumer is the single boundary that casts the owning agent's `SessionId` into an `OwnerToken`. Branding both stops a raw `string` (or a `BashTaskId` where an `OwnerToken` is expected, or vice versa) from slipping through the type checker on the model-facing `task_id` path.
 
 ## Foreground runs: `BashRunResult`

docs/rfc/README.md

@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ Do NOT write one for a mechanical or local choice (a variable name, a one-file r
 | [Branded IDs everywhere they belong](implemented/architecture/2026-06-20-branded-ids.md) | 2026-06-20 |
 | [Extract example apps into packages](implemented/architecture/2026-06-20-extract-example-app-packages.md) | 2026-06-20 |
 | [Event-domain semantics — session is the fact log, agent is the live surface](implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-event-domain-semantics.md) | 2026-06-30 |
+| [stdin + extra env on the bash seam — a trusted-plugin surface](implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md) | 2026-06-30 |
 
 ### Process
 

docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# RFC: stdin + extra env on the bash seam — a trusted-plugin surface
+
+Status: implemented (accepted 2026-06-30)
+
+<!-- XXX: legacy ADR/RFC body format, not yet normalized to a unified RFC template. -->
+
+## Context
+
+The hooks subsystem (stack PR-A…PR-F) runs external hook commands the way Claude Code and Codex do: a hook is a shell command that receives its event payload as **JSON on stdin** and reads context from a handful of **environment variables** (`CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`, `CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT`, `PLUGIN_ROOT`, …). The harness already has a perfectly good command runner behind the `ctx.bash` capability seam ([dsh-bash](../../../../packages/bash/bash) → [dsh-bash-local](../../../../packages/bash/bash-local)), with process-group kills, output truncation/spill, and a credential scrub. Reusing it for hook execution means the bridges do not re-implement subprocess plumbing — but the seam had no way to write stdin or set extra env.
+
+The friction is that those two inputs are **dangerous in exactly the way the seam was built to prevent**. [dsh-bash-local](../../../../packages/bash/bash-local)'s `childEnv()` deliberately scrubs `*KEY*`/`*SECRET*`/`*TOKEN*` from the child environment so the harness's own `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` cannot leak into model-driven command output (see [AGENTS.md](../../../../AGENTS.md) § Defensive patterns, "Never hand untrusted/model output the ambient environment or predictable paths"). An arbitrary-env / arbitrary-stdin capability is the opposite of that guarantee. So the question this RFC answers is not "can we add stdin/env" — it is "who is allowed to use them, and how is that boundary enforced".
+
+## Decision
+
+Add `stdin?: string` and `env?: Record<string, string>` to **both** `BashExecRequest` (the model-/plugin-facing request) and `BashExecSpec` (the resolved spec `run`/`start` act on), and thread them through `dsh-bash-local`: `resolve()` carries them verbatim, `run()`/`start()` pass them to `runBash`, which writes the bytes to the child's stdin and merges the extra env.
+
+Three deliberate choices:
+
+1. **`stdin`/`env` are a TRUSTED-PLUGIN surface, enforced at the consumer, not the seam.** The seam itself imposes no access policy (consistent with how `owner` works — the executor stores but never interprets it). The enforcement lives in the model-facing consumer [dsh-tool-bash](../../../../packages/bash/tool-bash): its `bash` tool builds its `BashExecRequest` from `command`/`workdir`/`timeoutMs`/`signal`/`owner` **only**, and never reads model arguments into `stdin`/`env`. A model that smuggles `env`/`stdin` keys into the tool-call arguments gets them ignored. A regression guard (`tool-bash` "trusted-plugin boundary" tests) drives the real tool with adversarial args and asserts the recorded request carries neither field — and is proven to go red if the consumer ever forwards them. Only in-process plugins (the hooks bridges, native plugins) that construct a `BashExecRequest` directly can set them.
+
+2. **`env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so a trusted caller's explicit entry always wins** — even a credential-shaped name. This is correct precisely because the scrub's job is narrow: stop the harness's *ambient* `process.env` credentials from leaking into *model-driven* commands. A trusted plugin that explicitly sets a var has taken responsibility for it; the scrub is not a constraint on trusted callers. `childEnv(extra?)` layers `scrub(process.env)` → `ENV_OVERRIDES` (the model-friendly `TERM=dumb` etc.) → `extra`, last-wins.
+
+3. **`stdin`/`env` are required-absent-OK (plain optional) on the resolved spec, NOT required-but-nullable like `owner`.** `owner` is required-but-nullable because a *silently* missing owner yields an unowned, cross-session-readable task — a security footgun that a visible `undefined` guards against. `stdin`/`env` have no such hazard: a missing one means "no stdin / no extra env", which is the safe, ordinary case (every model-driven call). So they stay plain optionals, matching `signal`.
+
+`dsh-bash-local` now ALWAYS spawns stdin as a `'pipe'` and closes it immediately — with the supplied bytes when a trusted plugin set `stdin`, empty otherwise. A closed empty pipe gives a reading child EOF exactly as the previous `'ignore'` (`/dev/null`) did, so the no-stdin path is behavior-equivalent; keeping the `stdio` tuple a literal `['pipe','pipe','pipe']` also preserves the typed `spawn` overload that guarantees non-null `stdout`/`stderr`. A child that exits without reading makes the stdin write fail EPIPE; that error is swallowed (the command's outcome rides on its exit code/output, not the write) so it never crashes the host or rejects `done`.
+
+## Scope: configurable scrub pattern is NOT included
+
+An earlier sketch of this work also proposed making `SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN` configurable. Validating against the code, that is **speculative and already subsumed**: `run.ts` documents a configurable whitelist as future work, and the new explicit `env` field — merged after the scrub — already gives a trusted plugin full control, including over credential-shaped vars. There is no current caller that needs to *broaden* the ambient scrub (the hazard runs the other way). Adding a config knob now would be a feature with no consumer, against [AGENTS.md](../../../../AGENTS.md) § "Don't add features beyond what the task requires". If a real workflow ever needs to forward a specific ambient credential, the explicit `env` field is the supported path; a configurable scrub can be reconsidered then.
+
+## Consequences
+
+The hooks bridges (PR-F) build a `BashExecRequest` with the hook's JSON payload as `stdin` and its `CLAUDE_*`/`PLUGIN_ROOT` vars as `env`, and run it through the same `ctx.bash` everything else uses — no bespoke subprocess code, and the full process-group-kill / truncation / spill machinery for free. The model-facing attack surface is unchanged: the consumer's request-building is the single boundary, guarded by a test that fails if it regresses. The vocabulary addition is documented in [docs/core-data-structures/bash.md](../../../core-data-structures/bash.md) (the `type-equiv` request/spec blocks) and the three bash-package READMEs; the trusted-plugin rule mirrors the existing scrub/predictable-path discipline in [AGENTS.md](../../../../AGENTS.md) § Defensive patterns.