Merge worktree-hooks-b-bash-seam into worktree-hooks-c-interception

Bring the interception-seams branch onto current master (via A→B). The
substantive reconciliation is master's compaction `agent/pre-step` serial seam
meeting C's interception seams:

- types.ts: keep BOTH master's `agent/pre-step` AND C's new interception events
  (`agent/prompt-submit`, `agent/session-start`, `agent/turn-continuation`→
  `ContinuationDecision`); drop the turn-mirror declarations (removed on A).
- loop.ts: the merged per-turn order is `turn/start` → per queued msg
  `agent/prompt-submit` (rewrite/inject/block) → (fully-blocked ⇒ zero-step
  `rejected`) → per step: drain steering → assemble system prompt →
  `agent/pre-step` (compaction, OUTSIDE the step) → `step/start` → single
  `deriveMessages()` → model → tools/pre-execute·dispatch·post-execute. No
  turn-mirror emits; `closeTurn()` is the A-simplified single-call form.
- Docs (architecture, core.md, agent/agent-loop READMEs, catalog) reconciled to
  show C's interception seams alongside `agent/pre-step`, no turn/step mirrors.
- rfc/README: dropped the stale `proposed/` compaction row (master moved that RFC
  to implemented/); kept C's new `pre-tool-input-rewrite` proposed row.
- interception.spec.ts: migrated its two `agent/turn-end` reason collectors to
  the `turn/end` session event, and ADDED a cross-test proving a
  `prompt-submit` rewrite + additionalContext is VISIBLE to an `agent/pre-step`
  listener on the same turn — pinning the merged seam ordering (compaction sees
  the post-prompt-submit surface, not stale history).

packages/bash/bash-local/README.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Design surveyed against the bash tools of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, and pi;
 - **Spawn per call, no shell state** — every call is a fresh non-login `bash -c` (deterministic; no rc files). All four surveyed tools spawn per call. `XXX(stateful-shell)` in `src/run.ts` records the two proven stateful designs (Claude Code's cwd-only persistence; Codex's PTY exec sessions) for when real workflows demand them.
 - **Process-group kills with escalation** — children are spawned `detached` (own process group); kills send SIGTERM to the group, then SIGKILL after a 3s grace (OpenCode's escalation; pipelines and subshells die with the parent). ESRCH is tolerated; daemons that re-parent away from the group can still survive — same caveat as the surveyed tools.
 - **Tail-keep truncation + spill files** — output beyond `maxOutputBytes` keeps the in-memory TAIL (errors/results cluster at the end — pi/OpenCode rationale) while the FULL stream is appended to a temp file whose path is reported when available. If the final spill close reports a delayed writeback failure, the executor still returns the tail but withholds the path rather than advertising a possibly incomplete file.
-- **Model-friendly env + credential scrub** — `process.env` minus credential-shaped vars (`*KEY*`/`*SECRET*`/`*TOKEN*`), then `NO_COLOR=1 TERM=dumb PAGER=cat GIT_PAGER=cat` (Codex's hardcoded set) so pagers and ANSI color don't garble results. A spec's **trusted-plugin** `env` is merged LAST (after the scrub), so an in-process plugin's explicit entry wins even on a credential-shaped name — the scrub guards the harness's *ambient* credentials from *model-driven* commands, not a trusted caller. The spec's `stdin` (also trusted-plugin) is written to the child and closed; with none supplied, stdin is an immediately-closed empty pipe (EOF, as before). See [the trusted-plugin RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md).
+- **Model-friendly env + credential scrub** — `process.env` minus credential-shaped vars (`*KEY*`/`*SECRET*`/`*TOKEN*`), then `NO_COLOR=1 TERM=dumb PAGER=cat GIT_PAGER=cat` (Codex's hardcoded set) so pagers and ANSI color don't garble results. This scrub is the security control that keeps the harness's *ambient* credentials out of a spawned command. A spec's `env` is merged LAST (after the scrub), so a caller's explicit entry — a value it already holds — wins even on a credential-shaped name. The spec's `stdin` is written to the child and closed; with none supplied, stdin is an immediately-closed empty pipe (EOF, as before). Both `env`/`stdin` are set by in-process plugins (the hooks bridges); the model-facing tool doesn't expose them. See [the bash-stdin-env RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md).
 - **Background tasks** — `start()` returns immediately, no timeout applies (Claude Code detaches timeouts when backgrounding), `readOutput()` is incremental with whole-stream byte offsets, and disposal kills everything. The spec's opaque `owner` token is stored on the tracked task and returned by `ownerOf(id)` — the executor never interprets it (the consumer's access policy does), and because it lives with the task here it survives a `tool-bash` HMR reload.
 
 ## Sandboxing