refactor: simplify session log representation

docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-18-compaction-capability-seam.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Status: implemented
 
 A long-running agent conversation grows without bound. As the event log accumulates turns, the derived message history eventually approaches the model's context window — the model then truncates mid-response (`max-tokens`) or degrades. **Compaction** is the mitigation: replace a run of older history with a concise summary, keeping recent context intact.
 
-The [session surface](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-18-session-surface.md) was built as the foundation for exactly this — a linked list over the event log with a `surfaceOp: { op: 'replace', start, end }` operation purpose-built to shadow a range of nodes and insert a replacement, with `sourceEventSeqs` recording provenance so the decision replays deterministically. What remained was the plugin that *decides what to compact and produces the summary*.
+The [session surface](../../implemented/architecture/2026-06-18-session-surface.md) was built as the foundation for exactly this — an ordered projection over the event log with a `surfaceOp: { op: 'replace', start, end }` operation purpose-built to shadow a range of entries and insert a replacement, with `sourceEventSeqs` recording provenance so the decision replays deterministically. What remained was the plugin that *decides what to compact and produces the summary*.
 
 Two forces shape the design. First, compaction is **swappable**: token counting can be a char/4 heuristic or a real tokenizer, and summarization can be a model call, a template, or a remote service — these vary independently of *when* and *which range* to compact. Second, `SurfaceEventType` is closed to five event types (`user/message`, `assistant/message`, `tool/result`, `context/message`, `steering/message`); only those may carry `surfaceOp`. A bespoke `compaction/*` event therefore **cannot** itself appear on the surface — the compiler rejects `surfaceOp` on it and the invariants plugin rejects it at runtime.
 
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ This **amends** the original RFC's claim of "NO changes to `dsh-agent-loop`; com
 
 Auto-compaction fires before **every** step, not once per turn. This is **load-bearing for runaway-turn survival**: a tool-heavy ReAct turn appends an `assistant/message` + a `tool/result` per step, so the surface grows *within* a turn. A single turn can grow past the window on its own (a "runaway turn") — and the only moment to rescue it before the next model call overflows is the next step's `pre-step` checkpoint. Gating compaction to a turn's first step (or, worse, retaining the whole in-flight turn verbatim) re-opens exactly the hole compaction exists to close: the harness would die when compaction is most needed.
 
-So retention does **not** protect the in-flight turn, and turn boundaries play no role in it. `compactIfNeeded` walks the surface nodes tail→head, summing per-node token estimates, and retains the smallest tail-run of **whole units** whose total reaches `retainTokens`; everything older is compacted (head-anchored — see below). A *unit* is either a whole closed step (its `assistant/message` plus its `tool/result`s) or a single no-step node (a pre-step `user/message`, inter-step `steering/message`, or injection `context/message`). The walk rounds toward retaining *more*: when the raw token cutoff lands mid-step, it extends the retained side head-ward until the cut before the retained node is **tool-pairing balanced**. The single structural guard is therefore **tool-pairing balance** — a region's edges are balanced cuts on the *surface* (no unanswered `tool-call` crosses either edge), so a compacted region never splits a step's tool-calls from their `tool/result`s (which would produce a transcript every provider rejects). The check is decided over the surface linked list, **not** the log's `step/*` markers: a compaction lands a replacement node at a high log seq whose surface position is the head, so a log-position scan mis-reads its neighbours — `dsh-session` exports `isToolPairingBalanced(nodes, events, beforeSeq)` for the surface-anchored check. `compactRegion` enforces it strictly, throwing on a boundary that would split a step.
+So retention does **not** protect the in-flight turn, and turn boundaries play no role in it. `compactIfNeeded` walks the surface entries tail→head, summing per-entry token estimates, and retains the smallest tail-run of **whole units** whose total reaches `retainTokens`; everything older is compacted (head-anchored — see below). A *unit* is either a whole closed step (its `assistant/message` plus its `tool/result`s) or a single no-step entry (a pre-step `user/message`, inter-step `steering/message`, or injection `context/message`). The walk rounds toward retaining *more*: when the raw token cutoff lands mid-step, it extends the retained side head-ward until the cut before the retained entry is **tool-pairing balanced**. The single structural guard is therefore **tool-pairing balance** — a region's edges are balanced cuts on the *surface* (no unanswered `tool-call` crosses either edge), so a compacted region never splits a step's tool-calls from their `tool/result`s (which would produce a transcript every provider rejects). The check is decided over surface order, **not** the log's `step/*` markers: a compaction lands a replacement at a high log seq whose surface position is the head, so a log-position scan misreads its neighbours — `dsh-session` exports `isToolPairingBalanced(nodes, events, beforeSeq)` for the surface-anchored check. `compactRegion` enforces it strictly, throwing on a boundary that would split a step.
 
 A runaway turn thus compacts exactly like any other history: its early *closed* steps get summarized while its recent steps stay verbatim. When the only compactable content left is an un-splittable open tail step (its tool-calls have no results yet), compaction declines (`null`) and retries once that step closes.
 

docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-29-todo-write-tool.md

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ The list is appended as a `todo/write` event carrying the full `{ todos }` snaps
 
 ### NOT a surface event
 
-`todo/write` is deliberately excluded from `SurfaceEventType`. The surface is the projection that produces the LLM message history (`deriveMessages()`); a todo write produces no conversation message. So it carries no `surfaceOp`, never joins the surface linked list, and never reaches `deriveMessages()` — it is durable, replayable *UI* state that travels alongside the conversation without being part of it. (The dev-mode invariants still require it to sit inside an open turn, which it always does: it is appended mid-step during a tool call.)
+`todo/write` is deliberately excluded from `SurfaceEventType`. The surface is the projection that produces the LLM message history (`deriveMessages()`); a todo write produces no conversation message. So it carries no `surfaceOp`, never joins the ordered surface, and never reaches `deriveMessages()` — it is durable, replayable *UI* state that travels alongside the conversation without being part of it. (The dev-mode invariants still require it to sit inside an open turn, which it always does: it is appended mid-step during a tool call.)
 
 ### Priority synthesized only at the ACP boundary
 

docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-explicit-tool-order.md

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Config plumbing follows the `persona` precedent, and `toolOrder` sits beside it:
 - Every registry-built assembly starts with a deterministic tool order on every host; absent an expert listener that deliberately changes it, every `request/header` event and model request inherits that order. The CI-vs-local registration-order flip is structurally gone, and the default is lexicographic.
 - The initial `PromptAssembly.tools` is canonical, so waterfall listeners start from the model-facing order; provider registration order is observable nowhere before that cooperative seam.
 - The snapshot suite's single pinned request-header fixture (`text-turn`) carries the new canonical tool order; every other ACP snapshot keeps the header bulk scrubbed as `{{system}}`/`{{tools}}`, per the pinned-header design.
-- A pure tool reordering between steps is representable only as a `request/header` `'fallback'` snapshot (the name-keyed `ToolsDelta` cannot express it); with a stable canonical order such reorders no longer occur in practice, so the fallback path stays a safety valve.
+- A pure tool reordering between steps is logged like any other header change: a full `request/header` snapshot with reason `'change'`. Stable canonical order prevents registration timing from creating such changes in the ordinary path.
 - The `toolOrder` key rides the app → `agent-core` → `SystemPrompt` forwarding chain, so deployments set it next to `persona` in the app config; `dsh-llm` and the agent loop are untouched.
 - A misspelled or unloaded tool name in `toolOrder` fails the turn at prompt assembly, not the boot: the loop assembles inside the turn (after `turn/start`, before `step/start`), so the rejection reaches the turn's outer catch — the turn closes balanced with an `error` reason carrying the message, `agent/error` mirrors it, no step opens, no `request/header` is logged, no request reaches the adapter, and the agent returns to idle. Every turn fails identically until the config is fixed; the process itself stays up (matching the repo rule that explicit config references must not be silently ignored — the enforcement point is the assembly because no earlier universal moment exists).
 - A tool provider that returns the reserved rest-entry name has the same prompt-assembly failure shape as an unknown listed name. This keeps the sentinel from becoming an ambiguous real tool and preserves the "never drops a tool" ordering contract.

docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ interface SessionEventMap {
 
 Each owner exports the same three-piece kit: the event declaration, a pure fold (`effectiveSandboxMode(events)` / `effectiveApprovalPolicy(events)` — a `findLast`, typed to the domain's closed union), and THE write path (`setSandboxMode(session, mode)` / `setApprovalPolicy(session, policy)` — a switch IS its event; nothing mutates state out of band). No shared owner service, no generic facts map, no registry: a third knob copies the ~40-line pattern into its own package. Execution follows the fold on both sides — the bash tool's per-call stamp reads it as the middle rung of the § Escalation precedence chain, and the approval seam's `'never'` gate is [the approval RFC](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md)'s side of the same pattern.
 
-**Visibility is deliberately asymmetric between the knobs.** The SANDBOX mode is stated nowhere and its switches are not narrated: a standing "you are read-only" declaration teaches the model to refuse preemptively (observed live: sessions where the model would not even attempt a write it could have escalated), while the denial marker already names the mode the command ran under at exactly the moment the boundary matters — behavior, not belief, carries the state, and a switch simply changes what the next command does. The APPROVAL policy keeps both layers, because its failure mode is the opposite: an auto-rejected ask under `'never'` returns "the user rejected …" wording no behavior can disambiguate, so the prompt states `'never'` (and ONLY `'never'` — an `'ask'` promise is unknowable without asking, and absence under a logged header is how the narrator reads `'ask'` back), and an `agent/pre-step` narrator injects at most one coalesced notice per policy switch: idle flip-flops collapse to one notice at the next turn's first step, a net-zero round trip to none, and a mid-turn change is narrated no later than the next step. Its "last told" is in-memory with a log-derived fallback (the folded header's system text parsed against the closed candidate sentence; LAST occurrence wins, so a persona quoting it cannot shadow the real section), so restarts lose nothing; attribution is positional (a knob event after the log's last `request/header*` reads `changed by the user`, a drift with no such event reads `changed by the operator/config`).
+**Visibility is deliberately asymmetric between the knobs.** The SANDBOX mode is stated nowhere and its switches are not narrated: a standing "you are read-only" declaration teaches the model to refuse preemptively (observed live: sessions where the model would not even attempt a write it could have escalated), while the denial marker already names the mode the command ran under at exactly the moment the boundary matters — behavior, not belief, carries the state, and a switch simply changes what the next command does. The APPROVAL policy keeps both layers, because its failure mode is the opposite: an auto-rejected ask under `'never'` returns "the user rejected …" wording no behavior can disambiguate, so the prompt states `'never'` (and ONLY `'never'` — an `'ask'` promise is unknowable without asking, and absence under a logged header is how the narrator reads `'ask'` back), and an `agent/pre-step` narrator injects at most one coalesced notice per policy switch: idle flip-flops collapse to one notice at the next turn's first step, a net-zero round trip to none, and a mid-turn change is narrated no later than the next step. Its "last told" is in-memory with a log-derived fallback (the folded header's system text parsed against the closed candidate sentence; LAST occurrence wins, so a persona quoting it cannot shadow the real section), so restarts lose nothing; attribution is positional (a knob event after the log's last `request/header` reads `changed by the user`, a drift with no such event reads `changed by the operator/config`).
 
 **The editor surface** is protocol-native [Session Config Options](https://agentclientprotocol.com/protocol/session-config-options) — the spec's replacement for session modes (slated for removal in ACP v2), already SDK-typed. The bridge advertises one independent `select` per composable knob — `sandbox-mode` (category `mode`) iff the mounted executor confines, `approval-policy` iff the approval seam is composed — with `currentValue` folded from each session's own log, in `session/new` and `session/load` responses. `session/set_config_option` validates against the same closed lists, routes to the domain setter, and returns the complete refreshed state (the spec contract).
 
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ FIXME: Revisit this tool-local boundary. The follow-up design needs to determine
 - Unit tier (no real runner anywhere): profile dialects, per-platform chain selection (sole candidate unprobed, no chain fails closed, multi-candidate probe order), verdict caching, the fail-closed end, probe-report parsing, and the launcher/`sandbox-exec` CLI contracts via fake runner scripts in `dsh-sandbox-local`; wrapping, policy hand-off, fact stamping, and runner-failure-outranks-denial classification (foreground throw, background `runnerFailed` fact) against a fake provider in `dsh-bash-sandbox`; the error's structured identity in `dsh-sandbox`. The escalation matrix spans the three bash packages: verbatim carry-through in `dsh-bash-local`, stamp/branch/per-task-facts in `dsh-bash-sandbox`, and the capability gate, `justification` pairing, fail-closed texts (pinned verbatim), and grant stamping in `dsh-tool-bash`. The switching surface pins the folds, the stamping precedence, the `'never'` gate, per-session section rendering, the full narrator matrix (cold start, coalescing, net-zero, resume drift with operator wording, positional attribution, persona-shadow hardening), and the bridge's advertisement gating, validation rejections, idle-vs-mid-turn anchoring (dev invariants mounted), and `session/load` reporting over a real two-process JSONL round trip.
 - Keyless real-runner e2e, split along the seam and per rung: CI's `sandbox-e2e` matrix runs bwrap and Landlock on Linux (the Landlock leg once per architecture, each confining through the registry-installed launcher) and Seatbelt on macOS against real kernels, failing on a silent all-skip. World-proofs live in `dsh-sandbox-local` (denied writes absent on disk, workspace writes landing, temp-area grants pinned, kernel denial text matching the advertised dialect) and `dsh-bash-sandbox` (the through-`ctx.bash` consumer proofs, including denied-then-overridden-write-lands). This package's own publish path is rehearsed without publishing (`packed-install.e2e.ts`): `pnpm pack`, tarballs installed into a throwaway consumer with the launcher family resolving from the registry, plain `node` confining through the INSTALLED launcher — asserted executable apart, so a mode-stripped binary can never masquerade as a non-enforcing kernel. The switching surface has its own keyless e2e (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent`): the real `cordis.yml` tree advertises both options, honors switches end to end, and rejects out-of-vocabulary values.
 - With-key e2e (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/escalation.e2e.ts`): real model + real runner + the REAL bridge answerer, world-verified — denied under `read-only`, escalates with justification, the scripted editor grants and the retried write lands on disk, while a rejected escalation leaves no write. Self-skips without `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` or a usable runner (e2e.yml installs bubblewrap so it actually executes in CI).
-- Snapshot tier (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/acp.snapshot.ts`): the keyless config-option wire; the recorded mode-switching arc as the suite's pinned header — necessarily, since mid-session switches emit the `request/header-delta`s the uniformity guard licenses only in the pin — committing both switches, the prompt-section delta and one "changed by the user" notice per knob, and a confined write landing under the switched mode; and both recorded escalation branches over scripted `permissionAnswers` (grant runs confined under `workspace-write`; rejection executes nothing and pins the fail-closed text). Replay re-executes every fixture's bash calls under the host's real runner (ci.yml's snapshot lane installs bubblewrap). Deliberately absent: a fixture carrying a real DENIAL — denial stderr is the backend's dialect and would pin a fixture to its recording platform; the escalation prompts assert the prior denial instead, and the denial→marker path stays on the tiers above.
+- Snapshot tier (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/acp.snapshot.ts`): the keyless config-option wire; the recorded mode-switching arc as the suite's pinned header — necessarily, since its mid-session switch emits the changed `request/header` the uniformity guard licenses only in the pin — committing both switches, the full changed prompt and one "changed by the user" notice per knob, and a confined write landing under the switched mode; and both recorded escalation branches over scripted `permissionAnswers` (grant runs confined under `workspace-write`; rejection executes nothing and pins the fail-closed text). Replay re-executes every fixture's bash calls under the host's real runner (ci.yml's snapshot lane installs bubblewrap). Deliberately absent: a fixture carrying a real DENIAL — denial stderr is the backend's dialect and would pin a fixture to its recording platform; the escalation prompts assert the prior denial instead, and the denial→marker path stays on the tiers above.
 
 ## Deferred phases
 
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ Each phase gets its full design when picked up, validated against the code at th
 - **A generic `env/state` facts map with an owner service** — rejected: approval and sandbox compose independently, so neither's state may drag in a third package; single-key folds are one `findLast` each, dissolving the owner service; no invariant spans the knobs, so atomic multi-key patches bought nothing.
 - **Narrate via `agent/user-message` + a bus event** — rejected: it presupposes a turn-entry seam that does not exist (the real seam is `agent/prompt-submit`), and pre-step's position serves both the coalesced turn-entry notice and the mid-turn immediacy bound with one listener.
 - **A standing prompt statement of the sandbox mode (+ a switch narrator)** — shipped first, then removed on live evidence: with `Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.` in every request, the model refused to ATTEMPT denied-then-escalatable work (five of twelve turns in the first manual session ended with zero tool calls), turning the sandbox into a soft lockout. The denial marker names the mode at the moment it matters and the escalation fields carry the recovery; the approval knob keeps its statement because an auto-rejection is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human "no".
-- **Track "last told" with its own bookkeeping events** — rejected: the `request/header*` fold already records the exact prompt the model saw; parsing the closed candidate sentences back replaces a second bookkeeping stream — events are needed only where they ARE the store.
+- **Track "last told" with its own bookkeeping events** — rejected: the latest `request/header` already records the exact prompt the model saw; parsing the closed candidate sentences back replaces a second bookkeeping stream — events are needed only where they ARE the store.
 - **ACP session modes instead of config options** — rejected: one mode list cannot carry two orthogonal knobs; config options are the spec's designed surface and modes are slated for removal in ACP v2.
 
 ## Consequences

docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-07-session-prefix.md

@@ -22,21 +22,20 @@ Because composition runs before the boundary snapshot, a composing listener's se
 
 ## Testing
 
-**Unit** — [interception.spec.ts](../../../../packages/core/agent-loop/tests/interception.spec.ts) pins compose-once across turns and steps (one composition, zero `request/header-delta`s), canonical prepend ordering, empty-prefix omission from the header, the frozen seed (in-place push throws), held-reference mutation immunity, and composition-precedes-pre-step with the seam receiving the composed value; [cancel.spec.ts](../../../../packages/core/agent-loop/tests/cancel.spec.ts) pins cancel/dispose landing inside the composition window and the discard-and-recompose stale-cache guard; dsh-session codec tests cover the `messagePrefix` fold/diff/apply arms (empty ≡ absent); dsh-invariants tests pin the `messagePrefix + derivation` equation; dsh-compact-basic tests pin that the pressure estimate counts the handed prefix. **Snapshot** — the acp-snapshot normalizer scrubs header prefixes to count-preserving `{{messagePrefix}}` tokens (unit-covered in dsh-acp-snapshot); header content itself is pinned per [the pinned-header scenario RFC](../testing/2026-07-06-pin-request-header-content-in-one-scenario.md), and the example tree loads no prefix contributor, so live goldens stay prefix-free. **e2e** — none prefix-specific: the seam is provider-independent and deterministic; the with-key cache measurement in [request-cache.e2e.ts](../../../../packages/core/agent-loop/tests/request-cache.e2e.ts) already proves the cacheable-prefix economics the design rests on.
+**Unit** — [interception.spec.ts](../../../../packages/core/agent-loop/tests/interception.spec.ts) pins compose-once across turns and steps (one composition and no changed headers), canonical prepend ordering, empty-prefix omission from the header, the frozen seed (in-place push throws), held-reference mutation immunity, and composition-precedes-pre-step with the seam receiving the composed value; [cancel.spec.ts](../../../../packages/core/agent-loop/tests/cancel.spec.ts) pins cancel/dispose landing inside the composition window and the discard-and-recompose stale-cache guard; dsh-session header tests cover canonical prefix snapshots and latest-snapshot folding; dsh-invariants tests pin the `messagePrefix + derivation` equation; dsh-compact-basic tests pin that the pressure estimate counts the handed prefix. **Snapshot** — the acp-snapshot normalizer scrubs header prefixes to count-preserving `{{messagePrefix}}` tokens (unit-covered in dsh-acp-snapshot); header content itself is pinned per [the pinned-header scenario RFC](../testing/2026-07-06-pin-request-header-content-in-one-scenario.md), and the example tree loads no prefix contributor, so live goldens stay prefix-free. **e2e** — none prefix-specific: the seam is provider-independent and deterministic; the with-key cache measurement in [request-cache.e2e.ts](../../../../packages/core/agent-loop/tests/request-cache.e2e.ts) already proves the cacheable-prefix economics the design rests on.
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
-- **Per-request `before`/`after` slots recomputed every step** (the shape first proposed: a waterfall firing on every request, contributing frozen `before` messages ahead of the history and fresh `after` messages behind it) — rejected. A per-step `before` recompose invites silent drift — nothing anchors it to the log short of logging a header delta per step — and an `after` slot sits behind the growing history, so its tokens re-pay on every request and everything after it is uncacheable. Measured against the alternatives, every current update pattern is served cheaper by a durable append (paid once, cache-read thereafter), and the only content with no home was the session-stable opener — which wants freezing, not recomputation.
-- **A system-prompt section** (`system-prompt/assemble`) — rejected for this content: the assembly renders to the single `system` string, so message-shaped openers do not fit, and the system prompt is deliberately re-assembled per step (with header deltas when it changes) while the opener wants instance-frozen semantics.
+- **Per-request `before`/`after` slots recomputed every step** (the shape first proposed: a waterfall firing on every request, contributing frozen `before` messages ahead of the history and fresh `after` messages behind it) — rejected. A per-step `before` recompose invites drift that must be logged as a full changed header, and an `after` slot sits behind the growing history, so its tokens re-pay on every request and everything after it is uncacheable. Measured against the alternatives, every current update pattern is served cheaper by a durable append (paid once, cache-read thereafter), and the only content with no home was the session-stable opener — which wants freezing, not recomputation.
+- **A system-prompt section** (`system-prompt/assemble`) — rejected for this content: the assembly renders to the single `system` string, so message-shaped openers do not fit, and the system prompt is deliberately re-assembled per step (with a full changed header when it changes) while the opener wants instance-frozen semantics.
 - **A durable history opener** (`inject()` at session start) — rejected: permanent history is the failure mode in the problem statement — replayed everywhere, compactable, stale across resumes.
-- **Compose per turn instead of per instance** — rejected: a turn-boundary recompose either desyncs silently from the log or forces a header delta per change, and it busts the provider cache exactly as often as it fires; the legitimate refresh point is the instance boundary, where the `'resume'` snapshot already records drift attributably.
+- **Compose per turn instead of per instance** — rejected: a turn-boundary recompose either desyncs silently from the log or forces a full changed header, and it busts the provider cache exactly as often as it fires; the legitimate refresh point is the instance boundary, where the `'resume'` snapshot already records drift attributably.
 - **Compose lazily at the first request and let compaction read the folded header** (the shape as first merged) — superseded in review: the fold matches the live prefix only from the instance's second request on, so on a resumed/forked instance's first step the pressure gate read the PREVIOUS instance's prefix and could under-gate. Composing before the first pre-step and handing the live value through the seam makes the estimate exact at every step.
-- **A dedicated session event carrying the prefix** — rejected: the header events are the request's non-history record by design; a second event would be a second home for the same fact and another codec to keep total.
+- **A dedicated session event carrying the prefix** — rejected: request headers are the request's non-history record by design; a second event would be a second home for the same fact.
 
 ## Consequences
 
 - `agent/pre-step` and `CompactService.compactIfNeeded` carry a `sessionPrefix` parameter: every pre-step listener and compaction backend sees the real per-instance value (all in-repo implementations updated in the same change, per the pre-release stance).
 - A contributor whose content changes mid-session is not re-read until the next instance — by design. A deployment needing mid-session catalog updates routes the change notice through the append-only history channels and pays one durable `context/message`.
 - The dropped `after` slot leaves no request-only channel near the request tail; nothing in the repo needs one, and adding it back would re-open the every-step re-pay cost the design exists to avoid.
-- The `request/header-delta` `messagePrefix` arm (whole-array replacement, empty array encoding transition to absence) exists for codec totality; the loop never exercises it, because the cached prefix cannot change within an instance.
 - An empty composition is canonical absence: no-contributor deployments log no extra header bytes and their requests are the bare derivation.

docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-08-self-referential-cordis-toolset.md

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Freshness is gated like every generated artifact: `pnpm run verify-cordis-api` (
 
 The plugin exposes one config field, validated by schemastery and documented in [the config catalog](../../../config-catalog.md): `vmTimeoutMs` (default 5000), the millisecond bound on the synchronous portion of mount-code evaluation. Tool names, the `cordis-dynamic` group name, and the `dyn-` id prefix are structural vocabulary and stay fixed. All three tools render as `generic` cards per [the tool cookbook](../../../cookbook/adding-a-tool.md) (`cordis_inspect` a `read`, `cordis_mount` an `execute` carrying the code as `rawInput`, `cordis_unmount` a `delete`), with no `presentResult` overrides.
 
-Model-visible ⟺ logged holds with no new session event type: a mount or unmount is visible only through its own `tool/call` / `tool/result` pair, which the loop logs, and the changed tool set a mount induces is logged by the request-header delta the loop already emits when schemas change between steps. There is deliberately no `cordis/mount` provenance event — it would duplicate what the tool-call pair records. Dynamic mounts are process-lifetime, not session state: resuming a persisted session rehydrates the conversation but does not re-mount plugins.
+Model-visible ⟺ logged holds with no new session event type: a mount or unmount is visible only through its own `tool/call` / `tool/result` pair, which the loop logs, and the changed tool set a mount induces is logged by the full changed request header the loop emits when schemas change between steps. There is deliberately no `cordis/mount` provenance event — it would duplicate what the tool-call pair records. Dynamic mounts are process-lifetime, not session state: resuming a persisted session rehydrates the conversation but does not re-mount plugins.
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ The correctness investment therefore goes where it pays for every capability at
 
 **A hand-maintained service/event reference in the tool.** The first cut of the inspect tool carried a hand-written table of service method signatures. It was replaced by the generated `api-catalog.ts` because a hand table drifts from the JSDoc the moment a signature changes and nothing gates the drift, whereas the generated artifact is freshness-checked against the same AST the docs use.
 
-**A new `cordis/mount` session event.** A durable provenance event recording each mount (source, name) has clear precedent (`hook/invoked`, `compact/start`). It was declined for v1: mount and unmount are already visible as `tool/call` / `tool/result` pairs and the tool-set change is already logged as a request-header delta, so a dedicated event would only duplicate the record. It remains addable if an audit use case needs mount provenance separable from the tool call.
+**A new `cordis/mount` session event.** A durable provenance event recording each mount (source, name) has clear precedent (`hook/invoked`, `compact/start`). It was declined for v1: mount and unmount are already visible as `tool/call` / `tool/result` pairs and the tool-set change is already logged as a full changed request header, so a dedicated event would only duplicate the record. It remains addable if an audit use case needs mount provenance separable from the tool call.
 
 **A hardened / capability-restricted sandbox.** Trapping Node built-ins and handing mount code a whitelist façade rather than the raw context might suggest an intent to sandbox for safety. It is explicitly not that: the traps and the façade narrow the *surface* mount code sees — steering it onto cordis services and away from leak-prone Node built-ins and framework internals — for correctness and to close the unguarded-context escape, but the capabilities the façade exposes (`ctx.bash`, `ctx.fs`, `ctx.web`) reach the real runtime, so it is not a security boundary. A real one (separate process, permission prompts) was out of scope for a dev/opt-in toolset and would fight the entire point — handing the model the live runtime.