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docs(policy): align every precedence statement with the override chain

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Review fix (ds-review-bot on #623): the READMEs and JSDoc still stated the
pre-baseline formulas — resolve() outranking 'the session's last
sandbox/mode event', 'effective = explicit grant ?? fold(events) ??
deployment default', and the approval README's 'last approval/policy event'
opener — which contradict the shipped semantics for a delegated fork whose
seed tail differs from its header baseline. Every statement now names the
override chain (own post-seed switches ?? inherited header baseline): both
READMEs (both languages), resolve()'s JSDoc, the session-mode module and
event-declaration docs, the raw folds re-scoped as building blocks, and
the regenerated catalogs.
This commit is contained in:
kingwl
2026-07-27 13:45:09 +08:00
parent 68d59a5414
commit 10bb6dc4fe
11 changed files with 65 additions and 54 deletions
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packages/ui/user-approval/README.md
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Each request must belong to an open agent turn. The service appends a paired `ap
Answerers are `approval/request` waterfall listeners. Return an outcome to answer for an owned agent or call `next()` to delegate. Agent-scoped listeners receive only that agent's requests; compose one terminal answerer per deployment because sibling listener order is not a policy priority mechanism. The ACP automation bridge supplies one-shot machine decisions for sessions it owns.
`ApprovalPolicy` is `'ask'` or `'never'`. The effective value is the last `approval/policy` event, falling back to config; `setApprovalPolicy()` is the write path. `'never'` rejects before interactive dispatch and is the only policy stated in the prompt. Switches produce at most one coalesced notice, attributed positionally over the session's OWN events: to the user when an own override follows the last own `request/header`, to the delegating session when no own override exists and the delta matches the inherited header baseline, and to operator/config otherwise. `ctx.approval.overrideOf(session)` (the pure `approvalOverrideOf` export, also consumed by the permission presets) resolves the session's override chain, never the configured default: with an inherited `approvalPolicy` header baseline (a delegation child), the fold of the session's OWN switches past `SessionHeader.seedLength`, else the baseline, validated against the closed vocabulary on read; without one (a top-level session or a generic `SessionStore.fork` child), the whole-log fold, so a seed-carried `'never'` survives; the in-process subagent driver captures this at delegation and writes it into each child's creation-time header, so a `'never'` parent cannot mint prompting children, with no first-turn timing window ([rationale](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)).
`ApprovalPolicy` is `'ask'` or `'never'`. The effective value is the session's override chain (`approvalOverrideOf`, below), falling back to config; `setApprovalPolicy()` is the write path. `'never'` rejects before interactive dispatch and is the only policy stated in the prompt. Switches produce at most one coalesced notice, attributed positionally over the session's OWN events: to the user when an own override follows the last own `request/header`, to the delegating session when no own override exists and the delta matches the inherited header baseline, and to operator/config otherwise. `ctx.approval.overrideOf(session)` (the pure `approvalOverrideOf` export, also consumed by the permission presets) resolves the session's override chain, never the configured default: with an inherited `approvalPolicy` header baseline (a delegation child), the fold of the session's OWN switches past `SessionHeader.seedLength`, else the baseline, validated against the closed vocabulary on read; without one (a top-level session or a generic `SessionStore.fork` child), the whole-log fold, so a seed-carried `'never'` survives; the in-process subagent driver captures this at delegation and writes it into each child's creation-time header, so a `'never'` parent cannot mint prompting children, with no first-turn timing window ([rationale](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)).
The tools pipeline routes `ask` decisions through this seam and fails closed when it is absent; the sandboxed bash tool also uses it for escalated retries. The ACP automation bridge answers calls for its own agents through the client's machine policy. Audit events remain log-only, so the model sees only the asking consumer's result. See the [approval-seam Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md) and [sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).