Coder/deepseek-harness
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

feat(credentials): move the store to .credentials.yaml and layer $DSH_HOME/.env

Browse Source 
$DSH_HOME/.env carried two incompatible jobs. As credentials-local's writable
secret store it could not be hoisted into process.env — hoisting makes every
stored key read as a read-only launch override and blocks rotation from the
TUI and the web page. But its name and dotenv format promise an environment
file, so a DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL sitting beside a working DEEPSEEK_API_KEY in the
same file was silently ignored: only the credential provider read the
document, and it addresses credential references alone.

Split the two jobs into two files.

.credentials.yaml is the provider-managed store: a strict YAML mapping of
CredentialRef to non-empty string, no version field, no wrapper level. Because
it holds credentials and nothing else, a non-mapping root, a non-identifier
key, a non-string value, an empty string, a duplicate key, and malformed YAML
are all rejections rather than skipped entries — loud at boot and at a write,
warn-and-keep-last-good on a live reload. The dotenv physical-line editor
gives way to a patch of the parsed document, so comments and untouched entries
keep their formatting and any string value round-trips, multi-line included.
Writer lock, read-modify-write, atomic 0600 write under a 0700 directory,
watcher, self-write suppression, and quiescent disposal are unchanged.

$DSH_HOME/.env becomes the user's ordinary environment layer. app-boot's new
loadLayeredEnv loads the invoking directory's .env then the Harness home's,
giving user < project < inherited; the home resolves from the inherited
environment first, so a project .env cannot redirect it.

Credential precedence is unchanged: the live environment still wins read-only
over the file, and shadowed writes still reject. Whether a provider-managed
store should instead win over the environment is a separate decision.

No migration: a key already in $DSH_HOME/.env keeps resolving through the new
environment layer, as a read-only env source that shadows the stored one.
This commit is contained in:
Yichen Jiang
2026-08-04 14:50:38 +08:00
parent 88c035c98e
commit 03b534de16
41 changed files with 566 additions and 423 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

21
packages/credentials/credentials-local/README.md
View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ File-backed [credentials](../credentials/README.md) provider: two layers, one ho
| Layer | Source id | Writable | Wins |
|---|---|---|---|
| Live process environment | `env` | no | always |
| `$DSH_HOME/.env` document | `file` | yes (`set`/`unset`) | otherwise |
| `$DSH_HOME/.credentials.yaml` document | `file` | yes (`set`/`unset`) | otherwise |
The environment wins because a launch-time override (`DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=… dsh`, CI secrets, a dev shell sourcing the repo `.env`) is operator intent for this run — and because it cannot be edited from inside, it must be *visibly* read-only: `describe()` reports `source: 'env', writable: false`, and `set`/`unset` reject instead of writing a change the reader would never see. Resolution reads `process.env` live and never writes it back.
@@ -15,24 +15,33 @@ The environment wins because a launch-time override (`DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=… dsh`,
| Field | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `path` | `<harness home>/.env` | Credentials document location. |
| `path` | `<harness home>/.credentials.yaml` | Credentials document location. |
| `dshHome` | `$DSH_HOME` or `~/.dsh` | Harness home used when `path` is omitted. |
| `watch` | `true` | Hot-publish external edits. |
| `debounceMs` | `100` | Watcher write-settle window. |
## The document
dotenv format, parsed with `dotenv` and edited by a physical-line editor that preserves every byte it does not own: `set` rewrites the first assignment of its key in place with that line's own ending (dropping later duplicates, which dotenv's last-wins reading would otherwise let override the edit), `unset` removes only the owning line, and comments, unrelated lines, CRLF endings, and the continuation lines of another key's quoted multi-line value all survive verbatim. Every write first re-reads the document under the cross-process writer lock of [`dsh-atomic-write`](../../util/atomic-write/README.md) and publishes anything it had not observed, then commits atomically with mode `0600` under an owner-only (`0700`) directory — so a concurrent writer or an external edit inside the watcher's debounce window is folded in rather than overwritten.
A YAML mapping of credential reference to value, and nothing else:
Values are rendered in the narrowest style dotenv reads back verbatim — bare, then single-quoted (fully literal), then double-quoted (only without backslashes, which double-quote reading expands). A value no style can represent, and any entry that already spans multiple physical lines, fails loud instead of being corrupted silently. An empty stored value is absent, per the seam rule.
```yaml
DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: sk-…
OPENAI_API_KEY: sk-…
```
The document holds credentials only, so every deviation is a rejection rather than a skipped entry — a silently ignored key would read as "the secret I stored has no effect". A non-mapping root, a key that is not a POSIX identifier, a non-string value, an empty string, a duplicate key, and malformed YAML all fail: loud at boot, and warn-and-keep-the-last-good-snapshot on a live reload. There is no `version` field and no wrapper level; the format is the mapping.
Writes patch the parsed document rather than rebuilding it, so comments and the formatting of every untouched entry survive. A comment directly above an entry is that entry's annotation and is removed with it. Every write first re-reads the document under the cross-process writer lock of [`dsh-atomic-write`](../../util/atomic-write/README.md) and publishes anything it had not observed, then commits atomically with mode `0600` under an owner-only (`0700`) directory — so a concurrent writer or an external edit inside the watcher's debounce window is folded in rather than overwritten. An on-disk document that no longer parses fails the write instead of overwriting content the provider could not understand.
Any string value round-trips, multi-line values included, so no entry is unwritable for want of a quoting style. An empty stored value is absent, per the seam rule — which is why an empty string in the document is rejected outright: `unset` removes a key, it does not blank it.
## Hot reload
External edits publish `credentials/updated` per changed reference after the snapshot is replaced **wholesale** — an entry deleted on disk never lingers in memory. The provider's own writes are recognized by content and publish exactly their one commit event. An unreadable document at runtime keeps the last good snapshot and warns; an absent file is an empty store; an unreadable file at boot fails loud. Keys that are not POSIX identifiers are preserved file content the seam cannot address.
External edits publish `credentials/updated` per changed reference after the snapshot is replaced **wholesale** — an entry deleted on disk never lingers in memory. The provider's own writes are recognized by content and publish exactly their one commit event. An unreadable or invalid document at runtime keeps the last good snapshot and warns; an absent file is an empty store; an unreadable or invalid file at boot fails loud.
## Security boundary
The document is `0600` under a `0700` directory, which stops other OS users — **not** the model. Tool processes (bash, the filesystem tools) run as the same user, and the shipped `workspace-write` file policy confines mutations rather than reads, so they can read this file exactly like any other file the user owns; no sandbox mode singles it out. What the harness does hold to is narrower: it never hands the model a resolved path to the document, and never loads it into the process environment (see [app-boot's Personal config](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#personal-config)), so reaching the value takes a deliberate read of a path the agent was not given.
The document is `0600` under a `0700` directory, which stops other OS users — **not** the model. Tool processes (bash, the filesystem tools) run as the same user, and the shipped `workspace-write` file policy confines mutations rather than reads, so they can read this file exactly like any other file the user owns; no sandbox mode singles it out. What the harness does hold to is narrower: it never hands the model a resolved path to the document, and never loads it into the process environment — unlike `$DSH_HOME/.env`, which is the user's ordinary environment layer (see [app-boot's Personal config](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#personal-config)) — so reaching the value takes a deliberate read of a path the agent was not given.
That is discretion, not a boundary. A deployment that must keep provider keys away from its own agent cannot get there with file permissions; an OS-keychain provider — a store the model's processes cannot read at all — is the deferred answer and belongs beside this provider as a sibling package.