fix(connection): fence every /api request behind one browser-trust check
The only browser-trust guard covered host.pickDirectory, while the consequential methods (session.prompt drives bash) accepted any Host — open to DNS rebinding, where a rebound page reads and writes the API as if same-origin and only the Host header betrays the attacker's domain. The pickDirectory-specific loopback guard becomes a prefix-wide fence: Host must be loopback or an exact host[:port] from the new trustedHosts config, an attached Origin must equal that authority, and explicit cross-site markers are refused; requests without browser markers (curl, tests, native clients) pass, because without a browser there is no confused deputy. The loopback-socket check is dropped — binding policy expresses reachability, and the fence is not an auth layer. The Agent Note records the full threat model and the alternatives.
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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Session model routing is a session-domain contract. `session.models` returns the
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Workspace and Session lists are separate reconnect baselines. `workspace.create` creates a unique name or adopts an existing directory, `workspace.delete` removes only the Workspace registration, `session.create` accepts an optional preallocated Session id, and `host/workspace-changed`, `host/workspace-removed`, plus `host/session-added` carry committed increments in either arrival order. Registration deletion preserves the directory and session logs; its Sessions remain in `session.list` and become Ungrouped. `SessionSummary.blank` and the `host/session-added` frame carry the derived zero-events bit: clients hide blank sessions and reuse them per workspace, flip blank on the first `host/session-status(running:true)`, and treat `session.list` as the reconnect authority; cold summaries are never blank because lazy persistence keeps never-appended sessions out of `list()`.
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`host.pickDirectory` opens one native directory picker and returns its selected path, or `null` when the user cancels. Its host implementation invokes platform tools without a shell: `osascript` on macOS, an STA PowerShell `FolderBrowserDialog` on Windows, and Zenity with a KDialog fallback on Linux. The picker function is injectable for tests. This user-paced method is the sole unary call exempt from the default 30-second timeout; caller and connection aborts still propagate to the native process. The browser carrier separately restricts this privileged method to loopback, same-origin requests.
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`host.pickDirectory` opens one native directory picker and returns its selected path, or `null` when the user cancels. Its host implementation invokes platform tools without a shell: `osascript` on macOS, an STA PowerShell `FolderBrowserDialog` on Windows, and Zenity with a KDialog fallback on Linux. The picker function is injectable for tests. This user-paced method is the sole unary call exempt from the default 30-second timeout; caller and connection aborts still propagate to the native process. The browser carrier's prefix-wide trust fence (dsh-client-connection) covers this method like every other `/api` request.
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`session.history` pages on message boundaries, and its tail page (no `beforeSeq`) carries two session-level extras the page window cannot supply: the in-flight partial's chunk events, and `todos` — the latest `todo/write` whole-list projection over the full log. Older pages omit `todos` because the projection is session-level, not per-page; a tail response that omits it means the whole log holds no `todo/write`, so clients read the absent field as the empty plan rather than as unchanged state.
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