feat(web): open a produced file from the conversation
Serve one file at a time out of a Session's workspace under /f on the web transport, and point the conversation's existing file-open affordance at it. Clicking a write/edit/read row's path now opens that file in a browser tab — including from a LAN client, where the Host's system opener is fenced to loopback and answered nothing. - /f/<sessionId>/<segments> in client-connection, behind the same browser-trust fence as /api; realpath confinement, streamed reads, GET/HEAD only, nosniff + no-store. - Script-capable documents carry CSP sandbox: model-authored markup must not be same-origin with /api, where events.mux is a readable GET stream. - ApiProxy.workspaceRootOf answers where a Session's files live without resuming an agent; the client program cannot reach the core services. - The /f URL shape lives in dsh-host-apiproxy/api so both ends share one encoding (client bundles may not value-import another plugin).
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ZiyaZhang
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# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-31-web-workspace-file-links.md
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2026-07-31-web-workspace-file-links.md: b7fd5ca240db3ca885e89f4cf6dcc135e7c88de8
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2026-07-31-web-workspace-file-links.zh.md: 74949afe0260d2d9018691740573ff24a1bce820
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# Agent Note: opening a produced file from the web UI
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Status: implemented
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English | [中文](2026-07-31-web-workspace-file-links.zh.md)
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> Scope: the `/f` workspace-file route on the web transport, the `IWorkspaces.fileUrl` derivation behind it, and the conversation's file-open affordance switching to it. Not in scope: an artifact registry, versioning, live reload, or any model-facing declaration.
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## Problem
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A web session that produced a file had no way to look at it. The agent wrote `deepseek-homepage.html`, said so, and the user's only recourse was to copy an absolute path like `/private/tmp/dsh-client-hotplug.ygPvsm/workspaces/plugin-hotplug/deepseek-homepage.html` into a terminal.
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The parts were nearly all present, pointed at the wrong target. `ToolRow` already renders a mutation or read row's path as a real button, `ui-conversation` already routes its click through `openFile`, and `workspaces.openPath` already carries it to the Host's system opener. But that opener runs on the Host machine, and `host.openPath` is loopback-pinned by the `/api` trust fence, so the affordance answered nothing for a browser reached over the LAN and was invisible even locally (the path styled as plain text, underlined only on hover). Meanwhile `MarkdownText` strips every non-`http(s)` URL, so a path the model wrote into its closing message could never become a link at all, and `ToolCallView.locations` — the follow-along vocabulary the file tools already populate — had no consumer in the client.
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## Decision
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**One prefix route on the transport that already exists, not a new capability.** `client-connection` owns both browser-facing prefixes: `/api` for RPC and `/f/<sessionId>/<segments…>` for workspace-file reads. It was already the package holding `httpServer`, the `trustedHosts` config, and the browser-trust fence; a separate package would have duplicated the fence and the config, and forced `AppCLIEntry` to patch two rows for one `--trusted-host` flag. The webserver's own contract — every feature surface is a route some other plugin registers — makes the route the whole mechanism. Segments ride the path rather than a query parameter so a served document's relative references resolve to its siblings.
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**The request names a Session; the gateway names the authority.** `ApiProxy.workspaceRootOf` answers where a Session's files live — a live agent's `session.header.cwd` first, then the persistence store, never a resume — as a second, non-envelope face of the `cwd` the session summaries already carry. The route reads that instead of `ctx.agents` directly, because `client-connection` is registered in the client program and importing the core service packages merges their host-side `sessions: SessionStore` declaration over the browser runtime's own `sessions: SessionsService` — the collision `tsconfig.host.json`/`tsconfig.client.json` exist to prevent. Both the cwd and the resolved target go through `realpath` before the prefix comparison, so a workspace-internal symlink pointing outward is refused by its target; traversal spellings are refused at parse time, before any filesystem call. Reads stream through `pipeline`, so a client that goes away destroys the descriptor and no request ever buffers a file.
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**The URL shape lives in `dsh-host-apiproxy/api`, with the other browser-importable contract surfaces.** Both ends must agree on one encoding, but a client bundle may not value-import another plugin's package: the purity gate in `packages/client/tsdown.client.ts` allows only platform modules and the `INLINE_SAFE` wire layers, of which apiproxy is one. Putting `api/files.ts` there is what lets the browser half build a URL and the serving half parse it from a single source, and it needed no new package edge — both sides already depend on apiproxy.
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**Model-authored documents are served into an opaque origin.** `.html`/`.htm`/`.xhtml`/`.svg` carry `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox allow-scripts allow-popups allow-modals allow-forms`. Serving generated markup same-origin with `/api` would put `/api/events.mux` — a readable `GET` stream — one `window.open` away from a page the model wrote. The sandbox costs the preview its `localStorage`, cookies, and same-origin `fetch`; `host.openPath` stays as the full-capability way to open the same file on the Host machine, so the trade is resolved by keeping both affordances rather than by weakening either.
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**The client decides by derivation, not by probing.** `IWorkspaces.fileUrl(sessionId, cwd, path)` expresses a tool-reported path as segments below the session cwd and returns the origin-relative URL, or `undefined` when the path leaves the workspace. `undefined` is exactly the signal to fall back to `openPath`, so a file outside the workspace behaves as it did before and no capability negotiation is needed.
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## Alternatives considered
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- **The artifact capability family (RFC #268 / PR #272)** — a seam with ids, versions, snapshot storage, its own HTTP server, SSE live reload, and a browser auto-opener. Its review found seven critical issues, and every one of them came from that machinery: an unlistened opener spawn crashing the harness, the opener inheriting `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY`, in-flight publishes outliving disposal, `readFile` preceding the size cap, a snapshot TOCTOU, and retention leaking with undisposed agents. `dsh web` already runs an HTTP server and the user is already in a browser, so none of that machinery buys anything here. The RFC and its tests stay as the input for the day a real cross-session or versioned-artifact need appears; this route is that seam's natural mount point when it does.
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- **A dedicated `dsh-client-workspace-files` package** — the honest seam shape if file serving were an independent capability. It is not: it needs the same fence and the same `trustedHosts` value as `/api`, and splitting would have duplicated both against the repository's own "don't split preemptively" rule.
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- **Keeping the URL-shape module in `client-connection` and importing it from the runtime** — the first cut, and the build refused it: a cross-plugin value import into a client bundle either inlines a duplicate runtime instance or names a specifier the frozen module table cannot answer. The gate is the reason the shared module sits in the wire layer rather than in the package that happens to own the route.
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- **`/f/<absolute path>`, so `openPath` could stay the single call site** — drops the sessionId from the URL, but then the served authority becomes the union of every workspace the host knows. The tight authority costs exactly one call-site edit, because `openFile` already has both the sessionId and the cwd in scope.
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- **`connect-src 'none'` instead of `sandbox`, to keep `localStorage` working** — blocks `fetch`/`EventSource` but not `window.open('/api/events.mux')`, which is readable same-origin. The two GET SSE endpoints are what make the sandbox necessary rather than optional.
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- **Linkifying paths in the assistant's closing message** — the shape a user asks for ("put the link at the end"), but it makes rendering depend on the model spelling a path recognizably. The tool calls already carry `locations` as structured fact; consuming that is the reliable source and is left as the follow-up this route unblocks.
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## Consequences
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Every existing file affordance changed target at once: write, edit, read, and the generic single-file card all reach `openFile`, so one call-site edit made produced files openable in the browser, LAN clients included. Three tests asserting the old `openPath` destination were rewritten to the new one; the outside-workspace fallback keeps the old assertion. The route is covered against a real HTTP server and a real temporary workspace, because confinement, content typing, and the sandbox header are wire facts, and the assembled web lane (`apps/web/tests/workspace-file-open.e2e.ts`, keyless over a cold-seeded session) proves the product path: clicking a read row's path opens `/f/<sessionId>/a.txt` in a second tab serving that workspace file, while a traversal spelling answers 404. `localStorage` is unavailable inside a preview, which is visible on generated pages that persist a theme toggle — the Host opener remains for those. Still deferred: the end-of-turn deliverable row derived from `locations`, and any linkification inside assistant Markdown.
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# Agent Note：从 web UI 打开产出的文件
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Status: implemented
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[English](2026-07-31-web-workspace-file-links.md) | 中文
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> 范围：web 传输层上的 `/f` 工作区文件路由、其背后的 `IWorkspaces.fileUrl` 推导，以及会话中打开文件的交互改指向它。不在范围内：产物注册表、版本、实时重载，或任何面向模型的声明。
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## 问题
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一个产出了文件的 web 会话，没有办法看到那个文件。agent 写出了 `deepseek-homepage.html` 并如实告知，而用户唯一的办法是把 `/private/tmp/dsh-client-hotplug.ygPvsm/workspaces/plugin-hotplug/deepseek-homepage.html` 这样的绝对路径复制进终端。
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零件几乎都在，只是指错了目标。`ToolRow` 早已把改写行或读取行的路径渲染成一个真正的按钮，`ui-conversation` 早已把它的点击经由 `openFile` 转发，`workspaces.openPath` 也早已把它送到 Host 的系统打开器。但那个打开器运行在 Host 机器上，而 `host.openPath` 被 `/api` 信任 fence 钉在回环，所以这个交互对经 LAN 访问的浏览器什么都答不了，即便在本机也是隐形的（路径的样式就是普通文本，只有 hover 时才有下划线）。与此同时 `MarkdownText` 会剥掉每一个非 `http(s)` 的 URL，因此模型写进收尾消息里的路径根本不可能成为链接；而 `ToolCallView.locations`——文件工具早已填好的跟随文件词汇——在客户端没有任何消费方。
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## 决定
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**在已有的传输层上加一条前缀路由，而不是加一项能力。** `client-connection` 持有两条面向浏览器的前缀：`/api` 承载 RPC，`/f/<sessionId>/<segments…>` 承载工作区文件读取。它本来就是持有 `httpServer`、`trustedHosts` 配置和浏览器信任 fence 的那个包；单开一个包会把 fence 和配置各复制一份，并逼着 `AppCLIEntry` 为一个 `--trusted-host` 标志去 patch 两行。webserver 自己的契约——每个特性面都是别的插件注册的一条路由——让这条路由本身就是全部机制。段落走路径而非查询参数，是为了让所服务文档的相对引用能解析到它的同级文件。
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**请求指名 Session，由网关指名权限边界。** `ApiProxy.workspaceRootOf` 回答某个 Session 的文件位于何处——先看活跃 agent 的 `session.header.cwd`，再看持久化存储，绝不恢复会话——它是会话摘要早已携带的那个 `cwd` 的第二副面孔，只是不带信封。路由读取它而不是直接够 `ctx.agents`，因为 `client-connection` 注册在 client 程序里，而引入核心服务包会把它们 host 侧的 `sessions: SessionStore` 声明盖到浏览器运行时自己的 `sessions: SessionsService` 之上——这正是 `tsconfig.host.json`／`tsconfig.client.json` 分立所要防的那种冲突。cwd 与解析出的目标在前缀比较前都要过 `realpath`，因此工作区内指向工作区外的符号链接会因其目标而被拒绝；穿越写法在解析期就被拒，早于任何文件系统调用。读取经 `pipeline` 流出，因此客户端离开即销毁描述符，任何请求都不会把文件缓冲起来。
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**URL 形状落在 `dsh-host-apiproxy/api`，与其余浏览器可导入的契约面同处一地。** 两端必须就同一套编码达成一致，但客户端 bundle 不允许值导入另一个插件的包：`packages/client/tsdown.client.ts` 里的纯度 gate 只放行平台模块与 `INLINE_SAFE` 协议层，而 apiproxy 正是其中之一。把 `api/files.ts` 放在那里，才使构造 URL 的浏览器半侧与解析它的服务半侧共用单一来源，而且没有新增任何包依赖边——两侧本来就依赖 apiproxy。
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**模型撰写的文档被送进不透明源。** `.html`／`.htm`／`.xhtml`／`.svg` 会带上 `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox allow-scripts allow-popups allow-modals allow-forms`。若把生成的标记与 `/api` 同源提供，`/api/events.mux`——一条可读的 `GET` 流——离模型写的页面就只有一次 `window.open` 之遥。sandbox 让预览失去 `localStorage`、cookie 与同源 `fetch`；`host.openPath` 作为在 Host 机器上以完整能力打开同一文件的方式保留下来，因此这个取舍是靠同时保留两个交互解决的，而不是靠削弱其中之一。
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**客户端靠推导决定，而不是靠探测。** `IWorkspaces.fileUrl(sessionId, cwd, path)` 把工具报告的路径表达为 session cwd 之下的段落并返回相对于源的 URL，路径离开工作区时返回 `undefined`。`undefined` 恰好就是回退到 `openPath` 的信号，因此工作区外的文件行为与以往一致，也不需要任何能力协商。
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## 考虑过的替代方案
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- **产物能力族（RFC #268 / PR #272）**——一条带 id、版本、快照存储、自有 HTTP 服务器、SSE 实时重载与浏览器自动打开器的 seam。它的评审给出了七个 critical，而每一个都来自那套机械结构：未监听的打开器 spawn 会让 harness 崩溃、打开器继承 `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY`、进行中的 publish 活过 dispose、`readFile` 先于大小上限、快照的 TOCTOU，以及未 dispose 的 agent 导致保留期泄漏。`dsh web` 本来就跑着一个 HTTP 服务器，用户本来就在浏览器里，那套机械结构在这里买不到任何东西。RFC 与其测试保留下来，作为真正出现跨会话或版本化产物需求那天的输入；届时这条路由就是那条 seam 的天然挂载点。
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- **单开一个 `dsh-client-workspace-files` 包**——如果文件服务是一项独立能力，这才是诚实的 seam 形状。它不是：它需要与 `/api` 相同的 fence 和相同的 `trustedHosts` 值，拆分会把两者都复制一份，违背仓库自己的“不要预先拆分”。
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- **把 URL 形状模块留在 `client-connection` 里、由 runtime 去导入**——最初就是这么写的，构建直接拒绝：向客户端 bundle 做跨插件值导入，要么内联出一份重复的运行时实例，要么落到冻结模块表答不出的说明符上。这道 gate 正是共享模块落在协议层、而非落在恰好持有该路由的那个包里的原因。
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- **`/f/<绝对路径>`，好让 `openPath` 保持为唯一调用点**——这会把 sessionId 从 URL 里去掉，但所服务的权限边界随之变成 host 已知的全部工作区之并集。紧的权限边界只花掉一处调用点的改动，因为 `openFile` 本来就同时持有 sessionId 与 cwd。
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- **用 `connect-src 'none'` 代替 `sandbox`，以保住 `localStorage`**——它挡得住 `fetch`／`EventSource`，挡不住 `window.open('/api/events.mux')`，而后者是同源可读的。正是那两个 GET SSE 端点让 sandbox 成为必需而非可选。
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- **把路径在助手的收尾消息里链接化**——这是用户开口要的形状（“在结尾附上链接”），但它让渲染取决于模型是否把路径拼写得可识别。工具调用已经把 `locations` 作为结构化事实携带；消费它才是可靠来源，作为这条路由解锁的后续留下。
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## 影响
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现有的每一处文件交互都同时换了目标：write、edit、read 与通用单文件卡片都汇到 `openFile`，因此一处调用点的改动就让产出的文件在浏览器里可打开，LAN 客户端也在内。三个断言旧 `openPath` 去向的测试被改写为新的去向；工作区外的回退保留了旧断言。这条路由对着真实 HTTP 服务器与真实临时工作区做覆盖，因为收敛、内容定型与 sandbox 头都是协议事实；而组装后的 web 通道（`apps/web/tests/workspace-file-open.e2e.ts`，在冷播种会话上无密钥运行）证明了产品路径：点击读取行的路径会在第二个标签页打开 `/f/<sessionId>/a.txt` 并提供那个工作区文件，而穿越写法应答 404。预览中无法使用 `localStorage`，这在会持久化主题切换的生成页面上是看得见的——那些场景仍有 Host 打开器。仍然暂缓：由 `locations` 推导的回合末交付物行，以及助手 Markdown 内部的任何链接化。
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